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This study explores the relationship between the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) and the international legal system, with 
empirical focus on the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) regime as 
codified in the 1982 Third United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea. The main pattern explained is China’s practice of 
international law in its maritime disputes, moving beyond a 
question of “compliance” with the relevant rules to address how 
China shapes the underlying legal norms, and vice versa. The 
analysis demonstrates that the EEZ regime transforms Chinese 
interests in maritime space, enabling the systematic use of 
legal means of excluding others from disputed space along 
China’s maritime periphery. Backed up by growing capacity (i.e., 
“rising power”) to enforce its claims, China’s purposive 
interpretation and flexible application of the norms of the EEZ 
regime manifest as “creeping” claims to jurisdiction and rights 
beyond those contemplated in UNCLOS III. These nominally 
jurisdictional claims enable the PRC’s push toward closure, a 
broader strategic aim to control vital maritime space that 
includes political, military and economic components. Using a 
framework adapted from the transnational legal process theory of 
international law, the study proceeds to analyze Chinese 
practice in terms of four linked processes: interaction, 
interpretation, internalization, and implementation. Tracing 
these processes from China’s early encounters with Western 
international law, through its participation in the conference 
to draft the law of the sea convention, and into subsequent 
efforts to incorporate EEZ rules into PRC law and policy, the 
empirical analysis reveals that China’s engagement in 
transnational legal processes does not result in its obedience 
to liberal rules and norms. Rather, China’s practice in the EEZ 
transforms the scope and content of those underlying norms, 
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The EEZ and Maritime Disputes 
 
This study explores the relationship between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and 
the law of the sea, with empirical focus on the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) regime as 
codified in the 1982 Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 
III).1 The main pattern to be explained is China’s practice of international law in its 
maritime disputes, moving beyond a question of “compliance” with the relevant rules to 
address instead how China shapes the underlying legal norms, and vice versa. The 
analysis demonstrates that the EEZ regime transforms Chinese interests in maritime 
space, enabling systematic use of the EEZ regime as a means of excluding others from 
disputed space along China’s maritime periphery. Backed up by growing capacity (i.e., 
“rising power”) to enforce its claims, China’s purposive interpretation and flexible 
application of the norms of the EEZ regime manifest as “creeping” claims to jurisdiction 
and rights beyond those contemplated in UNCLOS III. These nominally jurisdictional 
claims enable the PRC’s push toward closure, a broader strategic aim to control vital 
maritime space that includes political, military and economic components. 
Why study China and the law of the sea? The basic motivation is to understand the 
crucial legal element of China’s conduct in its maritime disputes. These long-standing 
conflicts with its neighbors concern sovereignty, rights and jurisdiction on and around the 
																																																								
1 Referred to as UNCLOS III, UNCLOS or the Convention. 
2 China has nine maritime disputes, one with each maritime neighbor: Japan, North Korea, South Korea, 
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hundreds of tiny islands, rocks and reefs dotting the South and East China Seas (SCS and 
ECS).2 The disputes are now, by any reasonable estimate, more significant and more 
destabilizing than at any time in the past and are unlikely to be resolved in the foreseeable 
future. One dispute was the subject of a recent arbitral award that China has shrilly 
rejected (the Philippines-China UNCLOS Annex VII arbitration),3 and other like suits are 
threatened by Japan and Vietnam. The disputes lie at the center of escalating American 
and Chinese competition over access to and use of space under dispute (Dutton 2014). 
They generate diplomatic and practical problems over crisis management, dispute 
resolution, law enforcement, navigation, and resource exploitation. The contested 
maritime domain of East Asia will be an area of major importance for global order for a 
long time to come, and the law of the sea looms large in any rendering of this problem. 
China’s relationship to the law of the sea is also an influential case for theory, indicating 
the potential for international law to produce dysfunction in international politics. All 
parties agree on the validity of the law of the sea, yet do not agree about the underlying 
norms of the EEZ, with powerful states practicing according to their lights rather than in 
line with their legal obligations. This observation challenges the standard, competing 
explanations that law will have no influence on strong states, or that it will produce a 
binding contract where all states recognize mutual benefits, or that it will lead once-
																																																								
2 China has nine maritime disputes, one with each maritime neighbor: Japan, North Korea, South Korea, 
Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei and Vietnam. The disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands 
in the ECS are entirely controlled and administered by Japan. In the SCS, China controls the disputed 
Paracels group (having seized them in a naval skirmish with Vietnam in 1974), but holds only 7 of the 63 
occupied features in the Spratly group (Vietnam has 38, Malaysia 8, the Philippines 9, Taiwan 1). Samuels 
1982, Lo 1989, Garver 1992 and Austin 1998 provide good summaries of some of the main facets of these 
disputes from the perspective of Chinese foreign policy. Fu 1995 offers a more partisan Chinese 
perspective on the disputes. 
3 Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China, Case 
2013-19 (2013) 
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uncooperative states to value and obey legal rules. Instead, I argue that international law 
can also enable state practices that reshape its underlying norms, creating political 
opportunities for states far beyond obedience or disobedience. International law is a 
political arena that may transform the states participating in international legal processes, 
giving rise to new interests in new games constituted by new legal norms. The hopeful 
expectation that the progressive legalization of international politics will produce ever-
wider adherence to liberal norms must be reexamined in light of growing Chinese 
influence on those norms, which is nowhere more evident than in its maritime disputes. 
This study illustrates that dysfunction by examining China’s practice in the EEZ. The 
research demonstrates how the indeterminate norms of that newly-created regime filter 
through China’s domestic political and legal institutions and prompt the state to grow into 
this new space at the expense of other states. Creeping PRC jurisdictional claims, 
matched to growing maritime capacity, have allowed the PRC to pursue closure of the 
vast, disputed maritime zones defined and constituted by the law of the sea. This process 
has exacerbated existing maritime disputes and undermined the function of the UNCLOS 
treaty, whose norms are challenged and altered by Chinese practice.  
I turn to a theory of transnational legal process to explain this phenomenon, an approach 
that integrates international law and international relations analysis. The standard theory 
presents a useful framework for analyzing the various historical stages of China’s 
relationship to the EEZ regime, and issues testable hypotheses of how that relationship 
should evolve – namely, towards obedience. The theory is heavily normative in character, 
prescribing energetic use of legal procedures and advocacy to ensure that states do more 
than simply comply with international law, but rather obey it because its liberal norms are 
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internalized within their legal systems.4 The contrast between this expectation and 
observations of China’s practice is productive, and stimulates theoretical questions about 
what alternatives to obedience may result from transnational legal processes and why. 
The study therefore draws on international relations to complement the lawyer’s 
prescriptive view of international law, explaining how China’s engagement in 
transnational legal processes produces transformative effects – just not the ones intended 
by liberal-minded analysts. Rather than promoting convergence around liberal norms, the 
law of the sea constitutes yet another arena of international political contestation. With 
obvious recent decline in American popular support for underwriting these and other 
fundamental aspects of the liberal world order, we should consider the increasing 
potential for profound and illiberal Chinese influence on the progressive development of 
international law.  
Main subjects of inquiry: EEZs and maritime disputes  
These transformative effects are especially prominent in the EEZ, which comprises 
nearly 40% of the water space on the planet. It confers sovereign rights to resources – but 
not sovereignty – to coastal states out to 200 nautical miles (nm) from their coastlines. In 
the EEZ, states exercise specific jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce those rights, which 
																																																								
4 I employ the term “liberal” throughout this study to refer to the presumption of individual autonomy; state 
authority exists only where expressly granted. There are many different connotations of the term in 
contemporary discourse, but all share the notion that individuals (or firms) enjoy substantive freedom to 
engage in any activity that is not expressly proscribed by law. In international law, the relevant individual 
may be considered as the state itself. The liberal canon of interpretation is best expressed in the opinion 
from landmark case of the SS Lotus: “…all that can be required of a State is that it should not overstep the 
limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction” (Permanent Court of International Justice 1927: 
para. 42). A political authority’s right to infringe or otherwise limit an individual liberty or right must have 
a positive basis in law; otherwise, that liberty or right is presumed to be enjoyed by the individual. By 
contrast, an illiberal view would default to the presumption that the state has authority unless there is a 
specific positive rule granting a right to an individual. 
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are (at least in the black letters of the law) exclusively economic. This new zone is at 
once a radical expansion of the scope of physical space under state authority, and a 
radical dilution of the degree of authority states may legitimately exercise within their 
boundaries. China’s claims to legal authority within that space – and beyond it – exceed 
limits prescribed in the Convention. With growing capabilities to assert that authority, 
China is undertaking practical steps to assert its claims to rights and jurisdiction, drawing 
it into conflict with other users of the vital maritime space of the East Asian littoral.  
These conflicts are most acute in China’s maritime disputes with each of its maritime 
neighbors – Japan, North and South Korea, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, 
Vietnam, and Taiwan. Disputed sovereignty over various islands is the heart of the 
disputes, 5 but their political relevance lies primarily in the maritime zones – the EEZ in 
particular – to which the sovereign can lay claim for economic use. China’s creeping 
jurisdictional claims indicate that it prizes these zones for political and strategic reasons 
as well. While China has yet to formally declare its EEZ boundaries, in practice it 
enforces claims to vast EEZs and engages in steady (and increasingly coercive) efforts to 
exert practical control over contested island territory and surrounding maritime space. 
China’s remarkable contemporary project to build artificial island territory out of sand, 
coral and cement in these “grey zones” of unresolved state authority is only the latest and 
most concrete manifestation of a long-standing PRC campaign to assert creeping 
jurisdiction.  																																																								
5 Many of the disputed “islands” are in fact rocks, reefs, atolls, and all variety of submerged or partially 
submerged mid-ocean feature. There is controversy as to whether many of them can lawfully be claimed as 
sovereign territory. Nevertheless, sovereign title to these “insular features” is the origin of the disputes. 
Rights and jurisdiction are allocated in zones radiating outward from land, accruing to the sovereign who 
owns the territory. They are thus a first-order consequence of sovereignty disputes, and given the trivial 
size and function of virtually every disputed feature, constitute the principal material stakes in the disputes. 
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The PRC has staked expansive claims that gesture to UNCLOS norms but depart from 
them in crucial ways. In arrogating to itself new state authority over ocean space, China 
broadens the scope and augments the content of UNCLOS norms as they are converted 
into domestic law and policy. This process transforms the Chinese state apparatus for 
dealing with the maritime domain, and simultaneously transforms the regional and, 
perhaps over time, global norms of the EEZ. China is not the only state to seek more 
authority at sea than the law prescribes, but it does so with greater scale and purpose. 
China’s rising power enables more effective control over ever broader swathes of ocean 
space. This power is manifest in terms of capacity to use – and deny foreign use of – 
maritime space with an increasingly capable navy, coast guard, merchant marine, and 
fishing fleet, as well as significantly enhanced capital and technical capacity to exploit 
oil, gas, minerals, and conduct scientific research. It is recognizable as creeping 
jurisdiction, an insidious legal process accompanying China’s broader strategic push to 
achieve closure along its vulnerable maritime frontier. 
This Chapter introduces the study in Section I by first acquainting the reader with the 
broad historical contours of global ocean politics that led to the formation of the EEZ 
regime. Section II establishes that new regime’s bearing on maritime disputes, then 
Section III considers how scholars of international relations have addressed the subject of 
China’s relationship to international law. The chapter concludes with a brief preview of 
the study and the primary sources used for research. This discussion paves the way for 
the following chapter’s development of a theoretical and methodological framework for 
studying China’s relationship to the law of the sea. 
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I. Blue Territory: The Landlubber State Takes To The Sea 
Some state or another claims sovereignty over every inch of dry land on the planet. 
Notwithstanding the dismal regularity of bloody conflict over which state owns which 
geographic space, states by and large recognize and respect other states’ sovereign 
authority over territory. Indeed, territorial sovereignty is the most fundamental rule of the 
game in international relations, necessary for the existence of the modern state. From the 
advent of the Westphalian state system – which signifies the sovereign’s control of 
territory exclusive of other authority – until the middle of the twentieth century, the 
boundaries of the state terminated at the water’s edge.  
More precisely, a state’s territorial sovereignty extended a bit beyond the water’s edge. 
States traditionally laid claim to a narrow band of “territorial sea” adjacent to their 
coastlines. Normally, this zone was about three nautical miles (nm) in breadth — a 
standard called the “cannon-shot rule,” because that distance was once reckoned the 
effective range of shore-based cannon6 — and endowed the state with something 
approaching full sovereign authority.7 Beyond that short range at which the sovereign 
could exercise a substantial degree of physical control, however, there was no recognized 
sovereign authority, only a vast commons. The oceans were truly inter-national: a 
connective medium, a conduit for trade and communication, a common pool of public 
resources, and a space of contested control and intermittent naval warfare between states 
and privateers.  																																																								
6 The lack of uniformity of the 3nm territorial sea is well-documented by those trying to identify the 
moment when a customary rule ripened, but for our purposes the variations in the breadth of zones claimed 
in this early period (4nm, 6nm) are trivial – the point is there was a narrow territorial sea and no legitimate 
basis for state authority beyond it.  
7 States developed a variety of customs permitting the traffic of vessels to and from commercial ports and 
transit through narrow straits. 
Introduction: The EEZ and Maritime Disputes 
	 8 
Beyond the range of coastal artillery, the oceans could not be an object of territorial 
ownership. This unregulated or open state of oceanic affairs reflected, on the one hand, 
the basic practical challenges facing any state with designs on meaningful ownership of 
ocean space. That is, the vast size of the oceans, the technological limitations of vessels 
and aircraft, insufficient means of collecting intelligence and conducting surveillance, 
and various other technical constraints meant that states simply lacked capacity to 
achieve effective military and commercial control over ocean space far from shore.  
On the other hand, this openness was purposefully maintained by a succession of 
maritime-oriented nations with strong navies. Tasked with protection and expansion of 
far-flung overseas colonial possessions, shipping routes, and commercial interests, these 
maritime powers mounted concerted efforts to sustain a mare liberum, the famous 
“freedom of the seas” doctrine (Grotius 1609; Potter 1924; Lapidoth 1975; O’Connell 
1982; Pirtle 2000).8 That combination of insufficient human capacity to effectively 
enclose ocean space, paired with sufficient state power and purpose to stabilize openness 
as a rule, kept the formal and practical boundaries of the territorial state very close to land 
for most of the modern era. Widespread beliefs that the seas’ resources were limitless and 
impossible to own or occupy facilitated this relative lack of acquisitiveness on the part of 
states (Butler 1990), which otherwise engaged in seizing every other part of the earth’s 
																																																								
8 Paul Kennedy, citing famous American naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan, notes that “[c]ommand of 
the sea has never implied a total possession of oceanic waters: this is both physically impossible and 
strategically unnecessary. For the sea is not, like the land, of much use to man in itself. He cannot live on it, 
farm it, develop it, buy it or sell it. It is, instead, a medium through which he travels from one land position 
to another: or, in [Alfred Thayer] Mahan’s classic description, it resembles ‘a wide common, over which 
men may pass in all directions, but on which some well-worn paths show that controlling reasons have led 
them to choose certain lines of travel rather than others.’ If it is possible for a nation generally to preserve 
its traffic along these ‘well-worn paths’ and to deny this privilege to the enemy, then it would possess 
command of the sea: its trade would flourish, its links overseas would be maintained, and its troops would 
pass freely to desired destinations.” (Kennedy 1981: 2) 
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surface and exploiting its resources. The only authority claimed and exercised by states 
developed slowly, and related to the legal status of seagoing vessels themselves and, 
later, the individual people aboard them.9  
Nearly without exception, this norm of free seas prevailed through all of the turmoil of 
the last four centuries of international politics, all of the dizzying advances in 
shipbuilding, artillery, and naval technology, and all of the births, deaths, revolutions and 
transformations of the coastal states nominally in possession of these “territorial” waters 
(Jessup 1927, Riesenfeld 1942, O’Connell 1982). A strong customary reluctance to 
territorialize the seas persisted long after the development of sufficient state capacity to 
use and regulate ocean space beyond the narrow coastal band of the territorial sea. 
Beginning after World War II, however, state authority over ocean space expanded “with 
a speed and geographic scope that would be the envy of the most ambitious conquerors in 
human history” (Oxman 2006: 832).  
The historical dominance of the mare liberum doctrine and its attendant liberal, laissez-
faire norms of international navigation suffered a series of major setbacks in the post-war 
movement towards mare clausum, or a “closed sea” regime.10 Though this movement 
was initiated by developed states with capacity to exploit far-flung resources of the 
																																																								
9 This highly limited, non-territorial form of jurisdiction developed slowly and unevenly in state practice, 
treaties and, eventually, in jurisprudence. The clearest recognition of this circumstance – no state authority 
over ocean space, only over the vessels and individuals aboard them – came in the judgment in the 
Permanent Court of International Justice ruling in S.S. Lotus (1927), which confirmed that the “freedom of 
the high seas is derived from the absence of territorial sovereignty throughout the oceans and the lack of 
coastal state competence to exercise any kind of jurisdiction over foreign vessels on the open ocean.” 
(Kraska 2011: 134, citing Permanent Court of International Justice 1927, at 25.) 
10 John Selden was the most influential publicist of this thesis, arguing that the British crown de facto 
exercised sovereign control over vast ocean spaces. See Selden 1635. 
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world’s oceans,11 the developing world soon embraced it and moved to establish explicit, 
legal norms and rules recognizing exclusive state authority over ever-wider tracts of 
ocean space. This “contraction and dismemberment of the freedom of the high seas”12 
proceeded through gradual expansion of the scope and deepening of the content of state 
authority, principally through claims to rights for fishing and resource exploitation in 
progressively broader zones, and through establishment of new patterns of control by 
enforcing those rights when other states objected or interfered (Oxman 2006).13  
A host of material factors gave momentum to this “global enclosure movement,” among 
them: (1) emerging technological capacity and wherewithal to exploit resources – not just 
fish, but oil, gas and minerals – in waters and seabed farther from shore, (2) growing 
populations driving greater demands for protein and seabed mineral (especially 
hydrocarbon) resources, (3) greater awareness of the need to respond to growing 
environmental damage from reckless maritime practices, (4) urgent demands to prevent 
the collapse of global fisheries stocks, and (5) newly recognized viability of international 
organizations as venues for designing and enforcing agreements – especially the United 
Nations. This latter, historically unique factor ensured that the principal instruments of 
closure were institutionalized rules and principles, negotiated in international legal 
settings, typically in the form of multilateral treaties. 
																																																								
11 The United States was a pioneer in extending the rights of states beyond their territorial seas in the post-
war years. Most notable are the Truman Proclamations in 1945, which unilaterally asserted sovereign rights 
over the fish and mineral resources of the continental shelf and its superjacent waters. 
12 Riesenfeld 1983: 12. 
13 Iceland’s expansion of its fishing rights was the proximate cause for the series of “Cod Wars” of the 
1950s and 1970s that are generally recognized as a pioneering development in the formation of the EEZ 
regime. Tommy Koh, the president of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, ascribes the 
development of the regime almost entirely to demands for fishing rights and related jurisdiction (Koh 1983) 
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The law of the sea is the primary body of legal rules and principles governing the world’s 
oceans, a longstanding customary regime that has been progressively developed and, 
from the mid-twentieth century onward, codified through a series of international 
conferences. With the signing of UNCLOS III in 1982, the international community 
recognized coastal state authority over nearly 40% of the waters that had been 
unrestricted “high seas” for centuries. Though this development depended in the first 
place upon major advances in technological capacity to use ocean space and resources, it 
became political reality only through a highly institutionalized process that undercut the 
traditional dominance of strong maritime states over the law of the sea. The ocean 
enclosure movement consolidated its territorial effects through legal processes that 
enabled small, historically marginalized states to pool their interests and bargain 
effectively for a regime that checked the unlimited authority of the strongest maritime 
powers (Nye 1975; Keohane and Nye 1977; Keohane 1984; Krasner 1985).  
Among other important legal effects, the protracted international negotiations over 
extended maritime jurisdiction produced an entirely new regime for waters beyond the 
territorial sea: the exclusive economic zone, or EEZ, extending 200nm from coastal 
baselines.14 This unprecedented maritime expansion of the geographic boundaries of the 
state, coupled with radical dilution of the state’s legal authority within those boundaries, 
created a new arena for international conflict and cooperation.  
II. The EEZ Complicates Maritime Disputes 
																																																								
14 See Article 56, “The Exclusive Economic Zone,” UNCLOS III (Appendix A) 
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Maritime jurisdictional questions relating to the EEZ have come to the fore of 
international politics in China’s many maritime disputes, each of which surfaces 
pronounced differences between China and other states on the extent of its authority in 
the new zones established by the long process of ocean enclosure. Five features of this 
new regime and its bearing on China’s disputes warrant elaboration at the outset, as they 
color the ensuing analysis and will afford the reader an important sense of the basic legal 
and geographic characteristics of the EEZs of Asia.  
(1) The EEZ does not grant the coastal state sovereignty, in the sense of plenary 
jurisdiction,15 but rather prescribes only certain sovereign rights to resources and 
jurisdiction over specified activities (see UNCLOS III, Part V, reproduced in Appendix 
A). Consistent with the name of the zone, those rights and jurisdiction are intended to be 
both exclusive to the coastal state, and limited solely to economic use. 
(2) This limited authority reflects a tenuous balance of rights and interests for “coastal” 
states and “flag” or “user” states operating in the coastal state’s jurisdictional zones. It 
represents a compromise solution between the developing states who advocate for ocean 
enclosure – i.e., extension of the essentially sovereign territorial sea – and the maritime 
powers seeking to sustain the existing, liberal order of high seas freedoms, thereby 
checking the breadth and depth of coastal state authority.16  
																																																								
15 Except where otherwise noted, I use jurisdiction in the following sense: “[a state’s] authority to make, 
apply and enforce rules within a certain geographic area” (Byers 1999: 54). Legal sovereignty is effectively 
plenary jurisdiction – total authority over anything going on within a given territorial space. 
16 Many jurists lament this compromise and the blurred boundary it creates between sovereign and non-
sovereign maritime space. For a severe criticism of the EEZ regime created in Part V of UNCLOS III, see 
Judge Oda’s dissenting opinion in Continental Shelf [“Continental Shelf case”] (Tunisia v. Liyan Araba 
Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. (Judgment of Feb. 24), 4, 157-71. 
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(3) Even remote off-shore islands fitting certain criteria17 may be entitled to an EEZ, 
though the zones themselves cannot be used to lay claim to sovereign title over territory 
within them. The law of the sea has no bearing on sovereignty itself, instead proceeding 
from the principle that la terre domine la mer (the land dominates the sea). All maritime 
claims to rights and jurisdiction must originate in sovereignty over land territory. 
(4) The radical expansion of state jurisdiction over maritime space created a circumstance 
in which states with no prior maritime boundary disputes now have them. This problem 
of maritime delimitation is especially pertinent in the world’s many closed and semi-
enclosed seas, where opposite and adjacent coasts often lie within 400nm of one another 
and necessarily create overlapping 200nm EEZs. In consequence, less than half of 
potential maritime boundaries are even partially delimited to date.18 These boundaries 
remain unsettled due in large part to the recent emergence of the boundary disputes 
resulting from the extended jurisdiction embodied in the EEZ. Even though the disputed 
space is vast and beyond the capacity of most states to effectively administer and control, 
states bargain hard for their EEZ entitlements. 
(5) China is surrounded by semi-enclosed seas, the South and East China Seas, and thus 
unavoidably faces overlapping 200nm EEZ claims. These are front and center in its nine 
maritime disputes (one with each of its maritime neighbors). To date, China has not 
successfully negotiated the delimitation of a single EEZ boundary, nor even declared its 																																																								
17 UNCLOS, Article 121 deals with the regime of islands and lays out certain ambiguous criteria for which 
“insular features” are entitled to which maritime zones. Only fully-fledged “islands” are entitled to an EEZ.  
18 “The prodigious extension in the breadth of coastal State claims to maritime jurisdiction has resulted in a 
similarly significant increase in the number of overlapping maritime claims and a consequent proliferation 
in the number of potential maritime boundaries. This, in turn, helps to explain the profoundly incomplete 
nature of the maritime political map of the world in contrast to its terrestrial counterpart” (Schofield et al. 
2014: 2). 
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own EEZ boundaries. Although maritime boundary disputes are by no means rare, China 
is unique in the sheer number and political intensity of its disputes, and in its resistance to 
accepting a conventionally-defined version of the EEZ.  
The Contest for Extra Territoriality  
In creating this “specific legal regime of the exclusive economic zone,” the delegates to 
the UNCLOS III conference could not resolve a great many existing controversies about 
extended maritime rights and jurisdiction, and compounded these with many new 
controversies. The mixed EEZ regime to which they ultimately agreed afforded the state 
some “extra territoriality” in the form of property rights and specific jurisdiction over 
areas that, at least since Grotius, were considered exempt from any ownership.19 By the 
mid-twentieth century, state practices were already diverse in terms of which rights and 
jurisdiction they claimed and exercised, complicating already formidable challenges to 
finding a common regime that could accommodate all claims. Moreover, the negotiators 
did not effectively ward off foreseeable conflicts with respect to ambiguities and 
inconsistencies in this new regime – specifically, how a coastal state’s economic rights 
interact with the navigational rights of user states.  
UNCLOS III effected a compromise solution to a complex problem (Riesenfeld 1983, 
Friedheim 1993). In consequence, the legal and practical effects of the EEZ regime are 
not at all static because its norms are contested and still evolving in state practice. 
However indeterminate the regime remains, international courts began recognizing the 																																																								
19 There is a foundational debate as to whether the appropriate term for the world’s oceans beyond 
territorial seas is res communis, property of all (Grotius 1609) or res nullius, property of none but 
susceptible to acquisition (Selden 1635). In either formulation, the vast space in the EEZ was not under any 
commonly accepted state authority until UNCLOS III.   
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EEZ as a binding part of customary international law as early as the Continental Shelf 
(Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling in 1982;20 
formally, the EEZ went into effect along with UNCLOS III in 1994 (when the requisite 
number of states ratified the treaty).  
The baked-in political-legal controversy over what the rules actually mean in practice is 
playing out in consequential ways in the twenty-first century.21 The strategic and 
economic stakes of this contest are high. Determination of which state will exercise what 
type of authority over this large new maritime zone entails, at a minimum, some major 
distributive consequences. Allocating resources and control is thus predictably the subject 
of major interstate competition. The EEZ is the locus of political contestation arising 
from demand for offshore oil and gas, seabed minerals, near- and distant-water fishing 
grounds (and accompanying requirements for environmental and fisheries protection). 
Further, piracy, smuggling, arms- and human-trafficking, natural disasters, and a host of 
other nontraditional maritime security threats also drive states to seek more 
comprehensive jurisdiction over ocean space. Finally, every strategic and commercial 
“sea line of communication” (SLOC) runs through at least one EEZ, making the content 
of coastal state jurisdiction in the EEZ a vital and material concern for a wide spectrum of 
transnational stakeholders. The development of the law of the sea thus proceeds 
alongside a rising tide of naval and coast guard competition to control maritime space in 
																																																								
20 “The concept of the EEZ…may be regarded as a part of modern international law,” Continental Shelf, 
ICJ (1982), p. 18, par. 74. 
21 For a thorough international discussion on how to deal with the balance between free navigation and 
overflight and coastal state rights in EEZs, see the contentious document published by EEZ Group 21 2005, 
“Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the Exclusive Economic Zone. See also Aceves 1996; Pirtle 
2000; Van Dyke 2005. 
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the EEZs of the world in order to secure scarce resources and mitigate maritime security 
threats.  
Given the material rewards of owning more resources and controlling more space, it is 
not surprising that many states have sought to “territorialize” maritime space by assigning 
themselves broader and deeper rights to valuable ocean real estate and resources. This 
tide of “creeping jurisdiction” may be eroding the will and capacity of strong maritime 
states to enforce openness as the global norm. In the EEZ, this means building up the 
specific economic jurisdiction provided for in UNCLOS III to augment a state’s authority 
to regulate all manner of conduct in coastal zones in the name of security, development, 
conservation, and so on.  
The PRC is at the vanguard of this movement to consolidate state authority over the EEZ 
(Dutton 2014), and is engaged in more – and more consequential – maritime disputes 
than any other state. They center on sovereignty questions, but the advent of the EEZ and 
its massive entitlements to jurisdiction and rights raises the stakes, compounds their legal 
complexity, and even creates new disputes over rights and delimitation. Disputing states 
dispute the meaning of the regime. The Chinese view of the EEZ tends towards greater 
closure – effected through steadily creeping jurisdiction for the coastal state. The PRC 
claims broader functional and geographic scope to prescribe and enforce its domestic 
law, and correspondingly, deny formerly-enjoyed rights and freedoms to user states (in 
particular, for states claiming to be the coastal state in disputed zones). 
III. Assessments of China’s practice of international law 
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Having established the basic historical contours of the EEZ and demonstrating how this 
nominally legal regime maps onto China’s contentious maritime disputes, we now turn to 
the extant body of work on those disputes. These studies tend to address either the 
political or legal dimensions of disputes without considering a broader historical context 
in which these nominally separate subjects are intertwined. By treating China’s approach 
to international law – specifically its growing capacity to shape the law and use it to 
Chinese advantage – instead of how international law affects a mostly passive China, this 
analysis departs from conventional wisdom about how growing participation in 
international institutions influences the character of China’s “rise” to global prominence. 
A generation of scholars emphasized how China’s integration into a variety of 
international institutions based on treaties and other legal norms nurtured more 
cooperative elements of China’s post-Mao reform and opening. Generally, they 
applauded the PRC’s growing integration into the international legal system as an 
important reason for its relatively low-key, non-revisionist foreign policy (Jacobson and 
Oksenberg 1990; Pearson 1999; Johnston 2003, 2008; Kent 2002, 2007). The greater 
China’s entanglement with legal institutions governing trade, human rights, arms control, 
and so on, the greater its acceptance of their cooperative norms. Most recognized the 
potential for China to play a disruptive role (Feinerman 1995), but argued against its 
likelihood given clear Chinese interests in a “peaceful rise” within the existing order. 
China’s long-anticipated move from “norm-taker” to “norm-maker” is evidently afoot, 
and seems to include a role as a “norm-shaker” (Kim 1999) in the case of the law of the 
sea. 
Introduction: The EEZ and Maritime Disputes 
	 18 
China is a founding member and vocal party to UNCLOS III, yet its formal acceptance of 
the regime belies significant practical rejection of certain core law of the sea principles 
and norms in its maritime disputes. These practices are often described as a pattern of 
“assertiveness” (Fravel and Swaine 2011; Johnston 2013), marked by Chinese claims to 
territory, jurisdiction, and sovereign rights claimed and, in many cases, exercised by 
neighboring states. Chinese conduct in these disputes departs markedly from the 
“peaceful rise” reassurance strategy thought to guide Chinese statecraft since the 
beginning of the reform period (Goldstein 2005). Especially given China’s successful 
management of nearly all of its contested land boundaries (Fravel 2008), its failure to 
fully settle22 even one of its maritime boundaries is remarkable and worrisome.  
With the intensification of disputes in recent years, students of Chinese foreign policy 
and Asian international relations are struggling to reconcile China’s conduct in its 
maritime disputes with the once predominant view of the many virtues of China’s 
participation in international institutions. The theoretically-grounded notion that China 
would be bound or otherwise constrained by its international legal obligations due in part 
to pressures of socialization23 is giving way to accumulating empirical evidence that such 
socialization is more complex and not always accompanied by the anticipated salutary 
effects. At a minimum, it is a two-way street: China is not just a socializee. Its practice 
may influence the norms as much as China is influenced by them.  
																																																								
22 The partial delimitation of a small section of its maritime boundary with Vietnam in 2000 is a qualified 
exception. See Kardon 2015. 
23 Checkel describes the generic view of socialization as a “process of inducting actors into the norms and 
rules of a given community. Its outcome is sustained compliance based on the internalization of these new 
norms. In adopting community rules, socialization implies that an agent switches from following a logic of 
consequences to a logic of appropriateness; this adoption is sustained over time and is quite independent 
form a particular structure of material incentives and sanctions” (Checkel 2005: 804). 
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The tendency of Western scholars to characterize China’s relationship to the outside 
world in terms of “impact-response” (Cohen 1984)24 is markedly less persuasive in this 
era of China’s revival as a great power with sufficient autonomy to generate “impact” on 
its own. International law is one arena in which this impact is to be expected. 
Experienced scholar-practitioners are increasingly open to the theoretical and practical 
validity of the thesis that “a rising China, especially an authoritarian one, will want to 
rewrite the rules of the current international order, not accommodate itself to those 
rules.”25 Nowhere is this competition over “the rules” more acute and consequential than 
in the littorals of East Asia, yet no systematic work has addressed China’s attitude toward 
and practice of the law of the sea. This study seeks to do precisely that, and in so doing, 
to explore the processes by which China is influencing a major strand in the normative 
fabric of international politics.  
Several China scholars have employed this kind of functionally-specific analysis to good 
effect. An early study of China’s participation in the United Nations by Kim (1978) 
“illustrate[d] China’s selective, pragmatic, and opportunistic posture on legal issues.”26 
Drawing preliminary judgments based on the PRC’s first few years representing China in 
the UN, Kim recognized a “contradictory mixture of qualified acceptance of traditional 
international law, on the one hand, and a revisionist challenge to destroy the old legal 
order and to establish a new one, on the other.”27 A decade later, another Kim study of 
China in multilateral treaties diagnosed a shift from “a value-oriented to a functional, 																																																								
24 Paul Cohen (1984) criticized the limitations and ethnocentrism of this style of analysis, characteristic of 
the “Fairbank” school in Chinese historiography, which explained major developments in modern China’s 
society and politics as largely a result of its encounter with the West. For an especially clear statement of 
this thesis, see Teng and Fairbank 1979.  
25 Christensen 2015: 54 
26 Kim 1978: 335 
27 Ibid.: 347 
Introduction: The EEZ and Maritime Disputes 
	 20 
interest-oriented direction” in Chinese practice (Kim 1987). Many later scholars 
provisionally accepted this thesis of a pragmatic Chinese approach to international law, 
noting (or hoping) that the “revisionist” strain in China’s attitude toward international law 
might be tempered by increasing familiarity with international legal institutions.  
Jacobsen and Oksenberg (1990), for example, focused on China’s participation in the 
Bretton Woods economic institutions, highlighting the emergence of “non-coerced 
cooperation” (159) driven by changes to China’s domestic political institutions 
engendered by the norms and procedures of those economic regimes.  
More recent analysis makes good use of accumulating evidence of Chinese practices 
regarding important international legal norms. Carlson (2005) addressed the nuances of 
China’s post-Mao approach to issues of sovereignty by isolating various “boundary-
reinforcing” as well as “boundary-transgressing” facets of Chinese practice. His study 
rectified the prevailing view that China is uniformly “hypersovereigntist,” demonstrating 
that China’s interaction with that central norm of international politics has not produced 
either/or outcomes. Instead, a distinctive Chinese discourse and political process led to 
(theoretically) unexpected and non-uniform changes in foreign policy. In this vein, 
Johnston (2008) produced a rigorous, theoretically-grounded account of the 
“microprocesses” of China’s grudging compliance and gradual acceptance of various 
arms control institutions. Yet, even as he condemns the “teleology of socialization”28 
toward inevitable cooperation and harmony, Johnston analyzes only positive cases in 
which China changed its conduct (and sometimes its underlying beliefs) in line with 
prevailing, cooperative (typically liberal) norms of the institutions it had joined.   																																																								
28 Johnston 2008: xxiv 
Rising Power, Creeping Jurisdiction: China’s Law of the Sea 
	 21 
Non-cooperative outcomes are seldom analyzed with the same devotion as the feel-good 
stories about cooperation. That potential is not ignored, just made conditional and left 
aside as theoretically uninteresting – perhaps because it strengthens a somewhat cynical 
thesis about the limits (or irrelevance) of international law (Goldsmith and Posner 2006). 
Instead, China scholars tend to emphasize the pro-social, non-disruptive aspects of 
China’s integration. Johnston concludes that “China has joined most international 
institutions that regulate interstate behavior; inside the institutions, [China] generally has 
not tried to undermine the functioning or purposes of the institutions; and increasingly, 
Chinese foreign policy accepts that for the foreseeable future it will have to accommodate 
US hegemony, or when it must be challenged, it will do so mainly inside international 
institutions.”29 Yet since 2008, by nearly any account (including Johnston’s own)30 China 
is mounting a fairly direct challenge to the “functioning” and “purposes” of the law of the 
sea, and in ways that transcend mere legalistic maneuvering within parameters defined by 
a treaty organization.  
China’s maritime disputes should therefore inform our broader assessment of the 
consequences, good and bad, of PRC integration into international (legal) institutions. 
Rather than join a chorus of cynical voices who appraise this development as irrefutable 
evidence of an inexorable “contest for supremacy” (Friedberg 2011) or an indicator of the 
																																																								
29 Johnston 2008: 207-208 
30 Johnston finds much of the hand-wringing about China’s “assertiveness” to be poorly founded in logic 
and fact, except when it comes to their aggressive exercise of maritime jurisdiction: “[t]he only clear 
example of new assertiveness in Chinese foreign policy in the last few years has been in maritime spaces 
along China's periphery” (Johnston 2013: 41). He goes on to describe this assertiveness: “PRC presence 
activities have generally increased in the last few years (e.g., more frequent patrols by various maritime-
related administrative agencies, more risk-acceptant action to defend Chinese fishing activities, the 
encouragement of tourism, and more vigorous diplomatic pushback against other state’s claims). Judging 
from the responses of other countries in the region, these activities clearly contributed to an escalation of 
tension in the East Asian maritime space” (Ibid., 46). 
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inevitable Chinese bid for regional hegemony (Mearsheimer 2001), this study seeks to 
first understand the underlying regime and then analyze the particular ways in which 
China has or has not sought to revise “the rules” in non-cooperative fashion.   
The missing (maritime) legal element in studies of maritime disputes  
To date, analysis of China’s conduct in maritime disputes is incomplete because it has not 
been grounded functionally in the law of the sea. This is true even of the most persuasive 
and theoretically-informed IR work on China’s maritime disputes, Taylor Fravel’s Strong 
Borders Secure Nations (2008). He developed an original theory that explains how and 
why China has managed to settle nearly all of its many sovereignty disputes, those over 
islands among them. He debunked the widely held view that China was more prone to 
escalation in such disputes than are other states,31 and described a robust pattern of 
cooperation – especially with weaker neighbors, and especially on land borders.32 
Fravel’s book is the so-called “category-killer” on China’s territorial disputes, but does 
not succeed in killing off the maritime dispute category.  
This is so because the study does not distinguish the theoretical bases for disputes over 
land boundaries from disputes over islands and their associated maritime zones. Yet these 
“offshore island disputes” buck the otherwise robust empirical pattern explained in his 
theory. Indeed, island disputes are addressed almost parenthetically, despite the fact that 
																																																								
31 Early studies of Chinese territorial disputes had concluded that China was more prone to escalation and, 
indeed, had a political-military preference for limited use of force for non-tactical, even ideological 
purposes (Whiting 1996; Christensen 1996; Johnston 1998). 
32 Fravel notes that China has had more territorial disputes than any other state since the end of WWII but 
“has been more likely to compromise over disputed territory and less likely to use force than many policy 
analysts assert, international relations theories might predict, or China scholars expect" (Fravel 2008: 3). 
Fravel describes this pattern as a “mostly status-quo approach toward consolidating control of the territory 
believed to be part of a modern Chinese state” (Fravel 2008: 313).  
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they represent six of only twenty-three total border disputes. Islands also account for two 
of the six instances of escalation that Fravel codes, and only one of the seventeen 
episodes of compromise.33 While the numbers are small, they demonstrate 
disproportionate escalation and notable lack of cooperation in the maritime domain.  
Whereas China’s observed conduct in terrestrial disputes is a good fit for his theory that 
escalation serves to check deteriorating claim strength34 and that compromise is pursued 
to mitigate internal security threats,35 Fravel needs an auxiliary, under-theorized category 
for the maritime disputes: “delay.”36 Delay is the dominant pattern in the maritime 
disputes because it is relatively cheap for states to maintain maritime disputes, where 
only nominal publicity for the claim suffices to sustain a state’s position in the dispute. 
This assumption of “cheapness” may have applied in an earlier era, but should be 
reconsidered in light of the considerable diplomatic and operational friction in these 
disputes since 2009, their correspondingly high resource demands, and growing 
prominence as a major liability in China’s regional and global diplomacy. The 
opportunity cost argument he deploys is logically compelling, but no longer tenable 
based on empirical observation. China is spending a great deal of money and enduring 																																																								
33 These instances of escalation in the maritime domain (naval skirmishes with Vietnam over the Paracels 
in 1974 and the Spratlys in 1988) were also unlike the terrestrial escalations: neither of those disputes was 
terminated or otherwise resolved by the action, so they still remain on the docket of active disputes. 
Moreover, that one (of seventeen) instances of compromise that took place in the maritime domain (the 
cession of White Dragon Tail Island [白龙尾岛] in 1957) is also not a good match for his other coded 
compromises: the island was ceded, but the waters surrounding it were not “compromise” in the area in 
question (the Gulf of Tonkin) was not achieved until 2004. This compromise doesn’t “count” for Fravel 
because it concerns a maritime boundary and jurisdictional competences rather than the sovereign title to 
territory.  
34 Fravel’s theory of escalation is more complex, but basically views decisions to escalate as a function of 
the relationship between state’s claim strength, the value of the territory, and its ability to project power 
into the disputed area.  
35 Also to manage external security threats, though the internal explanation was more prevalent. This 
contradicted the commonly held belief that China would escalate its border conflicts to distract from 
internal instability or insecurity. 
36 Fravel 2008: 268-270 
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substantial diplomatic costs to consolidate claims, in a pattern of behavior that strains any 
commonsense understanding of a “delay” strategy. Especially in light of the frequent 
paramilitary “escalation” in disputed zones and China’s long-standing but still-born 
policy of “compromise” (in the form of joint-development),  his theory bears 
reexamination and revision.37  
One crucial reason these maritime disputes are difficult to shoehorn into a mainly 
terrestrial theory is that they implicate not just territorial sovereignty but also maritime 
jurisdiction – a category Fravel explicitly places outside the scope of his theory.38 This 
perhaps understandable sin of omission makes clear why the theory cannot account for 
maritime disputes as successfully as it does terrestrial ones. The land at stake is trivial, at 
least in material terms. Nearly all of the islands are tiny, uninhabited and mostly devoid 
of economic value. The maritime zones around them are where the resources lie (or 
swim), and also where the disputes themselves play out in the form of military activities, 
navigation, law enforcement, fishing, scientific research, etc. In the maritime domain, it is 
the jurisdictional zones that territorial sovereignty over islands can generate that comprise 
the scarce resources at stake in the disputes. The actors involved are generally not 
military, the stakes are not territory, and the empirical pattern diverges dramatically from 
that observed so robustly on terra firma. 
Fravel shores up some of these issues in later work specific to each dispute, 
differentiating the domains by arguing that “maritime sovereignty…is weaker than 																																																								
37 “主权在我，搁置争议，共同开发” [Sovereignty is ours, shelve the disputes and pursue joint 
development] is the policy prescription China’s paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, issued in 1978 with 
respect to disputes with Japan. It became the principal rhetorical plank of China’s diplomatic rhetoric 
regarding its maritime disputes, at least up to 2014.  
38 Fravel 2008: 10 
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territorial sovereignty.”39 He claims that the existence of complex jurisdictional issues 
that can be separated from the core question of territorial sovereignty generates policy 
options and facilitates “active dispute management” that seems to “limit the potential for 
escalation.”40 This complexity enables China to pursue a “delaying strategy that seeks to 
consolidate China’s claims and deter other states from strengthening their own claims.”41 
This purported strategy assigns a substantial role for PRC civilian maritime law 
enforcement agencies, rather than the PLA Navy, which can maintain and prosecute 
China’s claims in a politically cheaper, more limited fashion. These are welcome 
amendments, a “jurisdictional turn” in work on China’s maritime disputes that this study 
pursues further, diving deeper into the patterns of practice that are explicable only in 
terms of the specific legal claims they target. 
This jurisdictional turn points to the EEZ as the key zone in question because of its sheer 
size, recent vintage, and the indeterminacy surrounding the specific rights and 
jurisdiction it affords the coastal state. Consider that the surface area of the entire 
Senkaku/Diaoyu island group that generates so much strife between China and Japan is a 
mere seven square kilometers; its sole mammalian inhabitants are goats, and no resources 
have been exploited on the “islands” since a Japanese bonito flake factory on the biggest 
island went out of business in 1940.42 The Spratly group, though composed of some 140 
insular features, has no more than 2.5 km2 of above-tide surface area (prior to the 2013-
2015 PRC island-building campaign) and hosts only garrisoned troops and maritime law 
enforcement personnel as inhabitants. Compare that miniscule size and negligible 																																																								
39 Fravel 2010: 146 
40 Ibid.: 145 
41 Fravel 2011: 313 
42 Kaneko 2010: 3 
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function to over 430,000 km2 of EEZ that each island could, in principle, generate.43  
These important yet technical jurisdictional issues are largely distinct from the 
sovereignty issues, the primary subject of nationalist outrage over lost territory (Downs 
and Saunders 1999; Ross 2009; Ciorciari and Weiss 2012; Wallace and Weiss 2015). It is 
now axiomatic that domestic nationalism encourages PRC leaders (who themselves spur 
that very nationalism) to “bargain hard” for all of the stakes in maritime disputes, perhaps 
far out of proportion to their economic and strategic value. The specific legal 
interpretations and practices undertaken by the state to prosecute its claims, however, are 
known only to a very small, specialized community (e.g., law of the sea experts, coastal 
province bureaucrats, fishing and offshore energy interests). This study proceeds from the 
assumption that this specialized community is empowered to act due to the salience of 
these issues in domestic politics (and develops this logic further in Chapter 4), respecting 
that the origins and dynamics of nationalism in China lie far beyond the scope of this 
inquiry. At hand is the narrower question of how the law of the sea influences China’s 
conduct in its maritime disputes, and reciprocally, how China’s practices influence the 
law of the sea.  
IV. Overview of the Study and Sources 
This introductory chapter established the importance of the subject and the demand for 
specialized analysis on the legal dimensions of China’s maritime disputes. Each 
subsequent chapter relies principally on Chinese and Western academic writing in law 
and policy journals on law of the sea issues. Each also draws extensively on author 																																																								
43 This figure represents the scope of jurisdiction if the radius of the zone is calculated from a single point. 
Given that any island capable of rating an EEZ would have a non-trivial size, the actual zone would be 
somewhat larger.  
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interviews and conversations with Chinese academics, military and civilian officials, and 
government think-tank experts conducted during fieldwork in China in 2012 and in 2014-
15; during the latter period, many of these conversations came during conferences and 
workshops as a visiting scholar at the PRC National Institute for South China Sea 
Studies, a think tank in Hainan (the province nominally administering all of China’s 
disputed South China Sea Claims) that was actively engaged in developing PRC maritime 
law and policy (and advocating existing policy).44 In parallel, as a rapporteur for two 
separate and ongoing UNCLOS track II dialogues from 2012 to present, the author 
engaged with leading Chinese scholars and officials addressing legal and security aspects 
of PRC maritime disputes. Due to the sensitivity of the subject for Chinese scholars and 
practitioners, there are no references to specific names of people involved in interviews 
and discussions.  
Chapter 1 lays out a theoretical approach that challenges the expectation that growing 
engagement in international law is likely to produce Chinese “obedience” to liberal 
norms. The theory of transnational legal process, modified to the case at hand, tees up 
empirical chapters that individually treat the theorized processes by which Chinese actors 
are influenced, and exert influence upon, the EEZ regime. Chapter 2 examines the 
UNCLOS III negotiations, detailing the PRC’s positions and situating them in broader 
geopolitical and historical context. Drawing on the minutes of the conference, Chinese 
legislative records, and Chinese scholarly commentary, this analysis surfaces a distinctive 
Chinese interpretation of the purpose and function of international law. That 
interpretation is the subject of Chapter 3, which surveys China’s traditional and 																																																								
44 Appendix D discusses fieldwork techniques and salient features of conducting research in the PRC.  
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contemporary attitude toward law, the law of the sea in particular. Through examination 
of influential pedagogical texts used to teach international law (and the history of 
international law) in China, a basically instrumental and fundamentally illiberal approach 
shines through. Chapter 4 then examines the PRC’s domestic legal institutions, analyzing 
key statutes and regulations to demonstrate the indeterminate process by which 
international treaty norms enter the Chinese state. Having established the primacy of 
political actors in making determinations about if and how international legal norms 
become domestic law, Chapter 5 then moves to examine the specific process by which 
the PRC has practiced in EEZ. The empirical analysis centers on the black letters of PRC 
national legislation, administrative regulations, and departmental rules, which in their 
indeterminacy permit massive political discretion to official actors to expand the content, 
scope and function of the state in line with China’s putative “maritime rights and 
interests.” A concluding chapter then summarizes the theoretical and empirical 
contributions of the study and suggests possible extensions into other legal domains 
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Chapter 1 
 
Four i’s: A Practical Theory for China and the Law of the Sea 
 
 
Rules and norms codified in international law figure prominently in China’s maritime disputes. 
Such disputes are hardly conceivable in the absence of the parties’ adversarial positions on 
sovereign title, jurisdictional entitlements, property rights over resources – in short, their 
respective claims on to legal rights legal obligations. Yet even if the law of the sea “matters” in 
some technical sense, its practical function in these disputes (if any) is not so obvious. Does it 
directly cause some observable pattern of behavior? Does it meaningfully constrain actions that 
might otherwise be taken? Does it prompt actions that might not otherwise be necessary? Does it 
encourage cooperation or sow seeds of conflict? Can Chinese practice in the EEZ tell us 
anything about how international law functions? This chapter explores theoretical approaches to 
those questions and proposes a model of transnational legal process that captures the key 
dynamics of China’s engagement with the law of the sea, an influential case that can yield 
broader insight into international law’s transformative potential in international politics. 
Legal practice can be observed in a state’s black-letter laws and regulations as well as the 
administrative and law enforcement activities it undertakes in the EEZ to exercise its 
jurisdiction.1 In turning to the jurisdictional elements of the disputes, this study aims to fine-tune 
our sense of the legal relevance of the observed conduct in disputes, the precise geography of 
activity, the resources in play, and the actual content of the claims. By reference to dynamics 
                                                
1 In standard public international law texts, these are two of the three principle forms of state jurisdiction: 
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specific to the EEZ, we can actually describe the physical space in which much of the drama 
plays out, “see” the major distributional issues at stake, and identify some of the concrete 
practices the PRC adopts to prosecute its claims. Those latter practices are best described as 
concerted PRC efforts to prescribe and enforce domestic laws in disputed zones. The PRC does 
so with a growing body of legislation and regulation on the law of the sea, a massively 
augmented maritime-related bureaucracy charged with administering China’s claimed rights, and 
a fleet of nominally civilian coast guard “white hulls”2 enforcing those rights in grey zones of 
undetermined jurisdiction. It is these practices that produce much of the observed friction and 
controversy in these maritime disputes and are best treated, analytically, as China’s practice of 
maritime law in its claimed EEZs.  
Theorizing Maritime Law and Politics 
The disciplines of international relations (IR) and international law (IL) furnish useful conceptual 
tools to define and structure the inquiry, but there is no handy “off-the-shelf” theory for 
examining this kind of phenomenon. Perhaps because the theoretical apparatus for dealing with 
such disputes in IR is designed with territorial issues in mind, behavior in a non-sovereign zone 
is hard to categorize.3 The presumption that some historical boundary exists informs this work, 
and makes the legal “creation” of new territorial space (as in the case of the EEZ) impossible to 
                                                
2 Civilian vessels with white hulls enforce domestic maritime law; naval vessels, by contrast, have grey hulls and 
typically have no law enforcement responsibility. Chinese interlocutors express a general belief that actions by 
paramilitary law enforcement vessels are less escalatory than comparable actions undertaken by naval vessels 
(author interviews with maritime security specialists in Hainan and Beijing, April 2014-March 2015). See also Hong 
2014. 
3 A fairly comprehensive, recent review of literature on territorial disputes is found in Vasquez 2009: 135-164. The 
presence of permanent populations, settled economic activity, and fixed military capabilities that characterize 
disputed land are basic assumptions informing this body of research, but are hardly applicable in the maritime 
domain. Furthermore, the Militarized Interstate Dispute data so frequently used by researchers to make generalizable 
claims about territorial disputes fails to distinguish between terrestrial and maritime domains, and has no coding rule 
to deal with conflict in “grey zones” like disputed EEZs. See also Hensel in Vasquez 2000 and Lemke 2002 for 
discussions about geographic proximity as a parameter in militarized dispute behavior that also fails to account for 
distant maritime boundaries. 
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evaluate (Simmons 2005, Carter and Goemans 2011). Legal differences regarding specific 
jurisdiction and sovereign rights necessarily fall out, as do observation and consideration of their 
possible practical effects on the onset, dynamics, and resolution of the disputes.  
Concepts and research tools need to be tailored to the EEZ, which is not easily pigeonholed as an 
exclusively economic regime, nor profitably detached from the broader customary and 
conventional regime of the law of the sea4 in which it is nested. Its rules and norms are not 
comprehensible or legally coherent without reference to the vast body of public international 
law, customary and conventional, from which it arises. In parallel, even if important dynamics of 
maritime disputes are understandable only by reference to the wider legal order, explanation of 
China’s particular legal practices demands consideration of the historical and political context 
from which the arise. A systematic, hybrid approach is warranted, marrying insights from 
international law and international relations, and tempered by close attention to their 
applicability to China’s unique geopolitical circumstances and distinctive legal institutions. 
This will not be the first effort to cast the law of the sea in the context of international politics. In 
a marked departure from the IR field’s near-singular focus on the high politics of security, 
scholars in the 1970s addressed the “complex interdependence” (Keohane and Nye 1977) of 
states in transnational economic and security networks, and enmeshed in norm-creating 
multilateral institutions. Some devoted attention to the UNCLOS III treaty, which highlighted 
                                                
4 This is not synonymous with UNCLOS III, nor even its combination with UNCLOS I and II – rather, the generic 
term “law of the sea” refers to the entire “public order of the oceans” (Burke and McDougal 1962), composed 
primarily of customary international law and associated international practice, as well as the UNCLOS treaties and 
related international organizations (like the International Maritime Organization, or the International Seabed 
Authority). The EEZ regime functions interdependently with other parts of the law of the sea, and refers frequently 
to other aspects of the law of the sea as limiting and enabling elements of the various rights and obligations it 
creates.  
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many of the complex trade-offs characteristic of an interdependent system.5 This work fit into an 
emerging “regime theory” enterprise (Krasner 1983), which addressed this complexity with the 
concept of regimes: sets of principles, rules, norms, and decision-making procedures in a given 
issue area of international politics. Even as regime theorists scrupulously avoided “the ‘L’ 
word”6 – namely law, which was tacitly the variable (whether independent or intervening) under 
scrutiny – they shed light on how it helped foster cooperative behavior among competitive states.  
This agenda soon fractured into competing theoretical and methodological fiefdoms,7 but 
signaled a dawning convergence between international law and international relations fields that 
has been carried on in vibrant interdisciplinary work.8 
Work in this vein focuses on trade, human rights, arms control, environmental protection, and a 
host of other critical subjects in international politics. Despite the impressive participation of the 
international community in UNCLOS III (168 parties) and its significant bearing on global trade, 
environment, and security, the law of the sea has almost entirely eluded study as an 
interdisciplinary subject. Work on the EEZ regime has been almost exclusively written for 
professional legal audiences.9 This may be because the EEZ is a specialized body of law marked 
by exquisite hair-splitting on arcane subjects. It is also likely a result of the ocean’s poor fit with 
our standard, sovereignty-oriented model of world politics. For contemporary IR, the EEZ in 
                                                
5 Nye, for example, highlights the “non-traditional” roles of multinational firms, international organizations like the 
UN, transnational scientific bodies, and relates them to traditional actors like state governments and navies (Nye 
1975: 37-41). 
6 Chayes and Chayes 1995: 303 fn 3 
7 See Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 2000 and Rittberger 1995 for fuller discussion of this disciplinary issue. 
8 Summaries of the burgeoning work in this interdisciplinary vein can be found in Abbott 1989; Ratner and 
Slaughter 1999; Abbott, et al. 2000; Hafner-Burton, Victor, and Lupu 2012; Dunoff and Pollack 2013. 
9 A number of law journals are almost entirely devoted to law of the sea issues, including Marine Policy, Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law, Ocean Development and International Law, and a series of volumes comprised mostly of 
proceedings from Law of the Sea Conferences as well as commentary by leading LOS scholars, published by Brill, 
Martinus Nijhoff, and other specialized publishing houses. The EEZ is also extensively covered in many textbooks 
and monographs pitched to professional legal audiences, among them O’Connell 1982, Kwiatkowska 1989, 
Churchill and Lowe 1999, Rothwell and Stephens 2010, Tanaka 2012, Rothwell et al (eds.) 2015  
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particular is neither fish nor fowl: it is “more like something that might have existed under 
feudalism, where different activities within the same territory were subject to different rules, than 
under sovereignty in which the expectation is that all activities within a given territory will be 
controlled by one single authority.”10 It is not clear whether the EEZ is a zone of domestic or 
international politics, nor whether it should indeed be treated as an exclusively economic zone, 
given the major security implications of the regulated space. At a more granular level, the basic 
indeterminacy and contestation embedded within many EEZ rules makes it impossible to 
diligently apply the narrow but potentially powerful, deductive tools favored in rationalist social-
scientific analyses.  
In light of this analytical challenge, this chapter develops a theoretical approach to the case by 
bringing to bear insights from international relations in an adaptation of the “transnational legal 
process” theory employed by Harold Koh and other practicing international lawyers. The major 
contribution is to extend that standard legal analysis into an “implementation” phase, which 
better accounts for a disjuncture between putatively liberal norms and decidedly illiberal 
practices. Section I sketches certain basic propositions about the role of international law in 
international politics and argues that they offer incomplete but useful explanations. Section II 
draws on these diverse explanatory insights to harness the considerable descriptive power of a 
legal process-based model of how international law functions, but challenges its liberal bias. 
Section III proposes modifications to the theory of transnational legal process composed of 4 i’s 
– interaction, interpretation, internalization, and implementation – and highlights the important 
role of indeterminacy in all of these processes. Section IV describes the method by which this 
modified theory can be applied and comments on case selection.  
                                                
10 Krasner 2011: xiii 
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I. What Does International Law Do? The View from Power, Contract, and Norms 
How does the law of the sea influence China’s conduct in its maritime disputes? China 
specialists are torn on the one hand between an expectation that participation in multilateral 
treaty organizations like UNCLOS promotes PRC acceptance of cooperative norms, and on the 
other that China is bucking the norms of the treaty to pursue an assertive maritime strategy. This 
latter view complements the broader worry in IR that a rising China is a revisionist China that 
will subvert or replace those institutions; the former reinforces a faith in the socializing power of 
international institutions and the norms they purvey. This tension reflects a basic disagreement in 
international relations theory about what, if anything, international law actually does. This study 
does not seek to adjudicate between competing theoretical claims on this foundational issue. 
Rather, it aims to apply theory to guide an empirical inquiry into a practical problem. To this 
end, the subsequent brief discussion of the basic propositions of international relations on 
international law11 demonstrates that no general orientation is a good fit for the basic empirical 
contours of the case at hand. By teasing out second-order implications, however, we can then 
mine the theories for specific insights that guide development of an appropriate theoretical 
framework for analyzing China and the law of the sea.  
One cluster of theories gives analytical pride of place to power, and asks how laws reflect and 
perpetuate the material and ideological interests of the states from which they emerge (Carr 
1946; Morgenthau 1948; Gilpin 1981; Krasner 1999; Goldsmith and Posner 2006). Another 
major school emphasizes the function of legal institutions and asks about the conditions under 
which self-interested states will create, join, and enforce treaties and agreements (Abbott et al. 
                                                
11 I also cite international law scholars who consciously apply these IR insights into their work. Dunoff and Pollack 
2013 offer a comprehensive survey of the growing collaboration between the fields. 
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2000; Hathaway 2005; Simmons 2009, Goodman and Jinks 2013) – that is, why they contract 
into cooperative regimes. Norms, meanwhile, are the locus of diverse inquiries into how law 
operates in world politics, emphasizing the social qualities of legal institutions and processes and 
the important role of identity informing choices (Kratochwil 1989; Ruggie 1998; Reus-Smit 
2004).  Other norm-oriented efforts focus on the transnational links among non-state actors, 
charting the emergence, development and demise of legal norms and associated rules (Finnemore 
1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Price 2004) that belie an instrumentally rationally account of state 
interests. Through these three “lenses” for viewing the politics of international law, we see three 
modal answers (and accompanying explanations) for international law’s influence on the state. 
Power: No influence. The strictest power-centric approaches, when deigning to consider the role 
of international law at all, dictate a one-way, dead-end street: strong states make and use 
international law to suit their interests. Those laws do not meaningfully constrain them – still less 
so if the law bears on core state interests in security.12 The advent of international laws may well 
be correlated with systematic behavioral changes consistent with those laws, especially among 
weak states, but we ought not explain such changes as functions of the law, per se. From a strict 
power standpoint, international law is epiphenomenal.13 The more “basic causal factors” 
(Krasner 1982a) are the interests, defined in terms of power (Morgenthau 1948), of the strong 
state or states that make and enforce legal rules. International laws will change as the relative 
power of states to dictate and enforce them changes. This logic reasonably explains rule-
                                                
12 The basic axiom is that states in an anarchic system must engage in “self-help” to ensure their survival (Waltz 
1979). National security (or survival) interests trump any other consideration, and determine behavior: “where 
international norms (and international law backed by norms) run contrary to state security interests, security interests 
will prevail and norms-based international law will not constrain behavior” (Steinberg 2013: 152).  
13 Goldsmith and Posner (1999, 2006) borrow extensively from IR to develop this logic in a comprehensive theory 
of “the limits of international law”: “[n]ations do not act in accordance with a norm that they feel obliged to follow; 
the act because it is in their interest to do so. The norm does not cause the nations’ behavior; it reflects their 
behavior” (Goldsmith and Posner 1999: 1132). 
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conformity by weak states (who obey in order to avoid punishment) as well as by strong states 
(who establish and generally adhere to rules that satisfy their existing interests).14   
The fact that UNCLOS III, and especially its EEZ regime, was opposed by the most powerful 
states from its inception is sufficient grounds to throw out a strict power explanation in which 
rules simply reflect the interests of strong states. The strongest states in the system, United States 
and the Soviet Union, uncharacteristically found common cause in resisting this new regime, 
hoping to maintain more open access to littoral waters for strategic and economic purposes (Nye 
1975; Hollick 1981; Friedheim 1993). So too did Japan, the UK, and other European states with 
substantial maritime capabilities. The UNCLOS III treaty process was a response to Third World 
demands for equity in the world’s ocean resources. This rule-setting came at the expense of the 
strong states, which preferred a liberal, unregulated regime to the non-market allocations 
successfully promoted by the developing world (Krasner 1985). If we proceed with the notion 
that those rules are simply a reflection of the interests of the powerful, we do considerable 
violence to the clear history of the regime, and neglect consideration of the interests it actually 
codifies.  
Nonetheless, there is an important element of a power-centric approach worth salvaging and 
considering in this case. What happens when the link between power and law is attenuated or 
even severed? International law that does not conform to the interests of powerful states (or 
reflects only those of some powerful states but not others) will not reliably generate clear and 
stable norms for weaker states to obey. If international law is out of step with the distribution of 
power that structures the system of international politics, the rules it prescribes may be 
                                                
14 International law thus functions as an adjunct to more fundamental power dynamics, with strong states able “to 
use international law instead for the promotion of their national interests” (Morgenthau 1948: 299). 
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dysfunctional.15 That is, without the coercive threat of power underlying the rules, without the 
full-throated support of strong states, the law does not necessarily cease to exist – rather, it 
becomes a venue of political contestation, subject to change, decay or replacement.  
Contract: Constraining influence.16 The core argument from contract expects international law to 
meaningfully influence states if compliance with the law has a higher utility than non-
compliance.17 The robustness of that influence – that is, the likelihood of compliance – will 
depend on how much utility is at stake (however defined and operationalized). By virtue of 
contracting (or consenting), states commit to undertake prescribed actions that reduce uncertainty 
and transaction costs for all contracting parties, leading to positive feedback for the constraining 
effects of international laws.18 Following this logic, even powerful states may be effectively 
“constrained by the international legal system.”19 Contracting states do not exert any individual 
influence on international law as they do in the power approach, where powerful states willfully 
create international law to promote their own interests. Instead, international law-as-contract 
emerges as a functional solution to a collective action problem, a Pareto-improving product of 
                                                
15 “Respect for law and treaties will be maintained only in so far as the law recognizes the effective political 
machinery through which it can itself be modified and superseded” (Carr 1946: 176). Carr’s argument is that rigid 
sets of rules that are not capable of reinterpretation or amendment as the power that supports them waxes and wanes 
will generate political discord. The basic coherence between the distribution of material power and the “rules and 
rights” of the system is a linchpin of Gilpin’s theory of international governance (Gilpin 1981: 34-37). International 
lawyers sensitive to power politics make a similar point (e.g., Vagts and Vagts 1979: 555). 
16 The basic idea is that contracts constrain rather than enable, serving as a parameter that can change the way a state 
orders its preferences – but not change its underlying interests or identity. This operation works through “persistent 
and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape 
expectations” (Keohane 1989: 3). 
17 Abbott et al. (2000) develop an analytical framework for understanding contract in the instrumentally rational, 
unitary, egoistic state. See Guzman (2008) for an illustration of a positive, rational choice international law 
understanding of how such constraints might operate.  
18 Keohane 1984 and his disciples develop many variations on this basic argument. Some of these approaches are 
more mixed, combining a logic of consequences and a logic of appropriateness but still focusing on how consent and 
contract can constrain states. For example, Ikenberry argues that “where rules and principles that spell out the terms 
on which disputes are to be settled are also agreed upon, this also strengthens expectations about future state 
behavior. In other words, institutional agreements can create ‘process rationality’; an institutional framework is 
created that specifies the appropriate and expected way in which states will conduct their relations” (Ikenberry 2001: 
65). 
19 Simmons 2009: 12 
Chapter 1 – Four i’s: A Practical Theory for China and the Law of the Sea 
	 38 
the aggregated interests of the contracting states (Koremonos et al. 2001). A multilateral treaty is 
a product of the political-legal “market” rather than a result of the influence of any individual 
state.20 If the price is right – that is, if the bargain struck offers net utility – states contract in. 
On its face, the argument from contract is satisfying in respect of the EEZ regime, in that it 
accounts for a seemingly cooperative, relatively efficient outcome that accounts for the varied 
interests of a large number of states. The EEZ establishes some degree of order for an otherwise 
disorderly situation in which states advanced incompatible claims to extended jurisdiction and 
clashed over resource rights.21 That some parties have not fully complied is not problematic in 
itself if there was some convergence on an agreed norm that permitted a more efficient exercise 
of jurisdiction to the states that value it most (Posner and Sykes 2010). However, the implication 
that China ratified the treaty because it was superior to alternatives (in delivering some kind of 
utility or welfare) strains even the loosest contract framework. As addressed in the subsequent 
chapter, the configuration of China’s geography and the scale of its fishing fleet together ensure 
that China faces an absolute loss in terms of available fishing grounds. All Chinese EEZ 
entitlements are truncated by its geography, meaning it gained a smaller zone of exclusive 
jurisdiction than others; more importantly, its distant water fishing fleet, the largest in the world, 
was now no longer allowed to operate in the EEZs of other states, radically diminishing the 
resources directly available to China. Further, the EEZ’s generation of extended jurisdiction from 
islands vastly complicated and expanded the known problem of sovereignty disputes in the South 
and East China Seas. Perhaps most damaging to this approach, the contracted solution was 
indeterminate: it did not clearly distribute rights and duties to coastal and user states in EEZs, 
                                                
20 Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001 offer an especially clear illustration of this line of reasoning. This 
microeconomic logic leaves us with a kind of “stork theory” of international law – when states love each other very 
much and want to maximize their utility, a functional solution will be delivered to them [by a stork]. 
21 The “Cod Wars” are the most recognizable of these conflicts. See Jonsson 1982.  
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and left unanswered critical questions about the conditions under which states were entitled to 
EEZs (the “island” regime of Article 121 in particular). By assuming common knowledge of the 
specific constraints a contract imposes, this mode of reasoning fails to account for the substantial 
interpretive and practical leeway some international legal agreements afford.22 The contract is, at 
best, incomplete. 
Even if this theoretical edifice is not entirely satisfying, tinkering a bit with some of the parts of 
the contract analogy yields four helpful insights. (1) Some contracts do not offer any net utility, 
but states comply nonetheless because the alternatives are even worse. This may be because of 
coercion, or simply because the costs of an alternative contract or course of action are even 
higher (Gruber 2000). (2) States may selectively comply with only some functional parts of a 
contract (i.e., a treaty) because some provisions are more advantageous (or less disadvantageous) 
than others.23 (3) Geographically varied non-compliance may occur due to uneven distributions 
of enforcement power. (4) Incomplete contracting leading to “dueling compliances” is another 
possibility, whereby incompleteness, incoherence, indeterminacy or ambiguity in the language of 
the contract creates the institutional possibility and organizes incentives for contracting parties to 
behave in non-cooperative ways.24 The conventional wisdom that, in China, “signing the contract 
is only the beginning of a negotiation”25 has particular resonance here, as the contracting process 
                                                
22 Some scholars point to the prevalence of “soft law” as evidence that such indeterminacy can in fact promote 
adherence to contracts, a kind of “rational adaptation to uncertainty” about present and future states of the world 
(Abbott and Snidal 2000: 444). If indeed the indeterminate rules of the EEZ seemed to promote cooperation in a 
practical sense, this would be a profitable line of inquiry. It is further undercut by the fact that the UNCLOS III 
treaty is very clearly “hard law” imposing definite obligations and adjudication procedures. 
23 There are many possibilities for how this would work: Some non-compliance can escape detection or avoid 
punishment sufficient to disincentivize the action. Sometimes this selective compliance is a function of different 
sub-state actors with different assessments of the utility of various provisions. 
24 See, for example, Jonsson and Tallberg 1998: 928–940, who explore how ‘contracts’ evolve through strategic 
behavior even after agreements are finalized. 
25 The author heard versions of this statement from dozens of interlocutors during fieldwork in China in 2012, and 
2014-2015. Several law professors also cited the same unverifiable claim that only 30% of contracts signed in China 
are faithfully executed. 
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may be protracted over a long period over which parties test and manipulate the de facto 
meaning of a given agreement as it is implemented in practice. 
Norms: Transformative influence. Norms that constitute the international legal system can 
transform the identities and interests of states (or rather, the organizations and people composing 
them).26 By virtue of participating in a political order in which international law is a common 
institution (Bull 1977), certain “reasons for action”27 are created that would not otherwise exist 
(Kratochwil 1989). The existence of a norm can make certain actions conceivable (like 
administering an EEZ) and create new categories of action (like passing laws on the EEZ) that 
would not otherwise have been appropriate or meaningful.28 International law may then 
influence not only the consequences states face for certain behaviors, but also influence states’ 
beliefs about what is an appropriate way to act in their self-interest.29 That judgment of 
appropriate behavior is largely a function of a state’s identity – a self-image, held by individuals 
representing a state, that the state has such-and-such interests and values and such-and-such 
modes of conducting itself in international affairs. In short, identities prefigure interests;30 both 
may change as a function of the social environment in which the actors operate (Klotz 1995). 
This influence operates through intersubjective knowledge among relevant actors of appropriate 
                                                
26 The idea of a transformative role for norms overlaps significantly with the idea of a “constitutive” role, and the 
two may be used interchangeably for purposes of general discussion (Searle 1969, 1995; Katzenstein 1996).  
27 See also Ruggie 1998.  
28 Elster 1989, Kratochwil 1989, Chayes and Chayes 1993, Katzenstein 1996, and Ruggie 1998, among others, 
develop this logic. Norms may operate as “reasons for action” as distinguished from “causes for action” (Ruggie 
1998: 869). One way to understand this distinction is to assume that “social norms provide an important kind of 
motivation for action that is irreducible to rationality or indeed to any other form of optimizing mechanism” (Elster 
1989: 15). 
29 The basic difference between a norm- and an interest-oriented style of reasoning is the claim that states act on the 
basis of a “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1998: 949-954). This is especially so when these norms are a 
product of new circumstances and thus create new incentives – that is, constitute new rules of the game. Such 
“constitutive rules do not merely regulate, they create or define new forms of behaviour…Regulative rules regulate a 
pre-existing activity, an activity whose existence is logically independent of the rules. Constitutive rules constitute 
(and also regulate) an activity the existence of which is logically independent of the rules” (Searle 1969: 33-34). 
30 The generic claim is that norms “constitute social identities and give national interests their content and meaning” 
(Adler 2013: 126). 
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norms, which may be diffused in varied social-institutional environments through networks of 
expert or scientific communities, diplomatic corps, and other non-state actors.  
Because the argument from norms does not entail any general prediction about what 
international law “does,” it does not necessarily mischaracterize China’s relationship to the law 
of the sea. However, the thrust of the norms research agenda has been towards demonstrating the 
salutary effects of international law, focusing on the diffusion of norms concerning free trade, 
human rights, the environment, laws of war, and arms control to the exclusion of stories about 
the failure of norms to properly take root, or the diffusion of “bad” or amoral norms.31 A sort of 
selection bias is evident in this scholarship, in which the favored subjects of research tend to be 
liberal norms valued for ethical reasons.32 Even cursory familiarity with the story of China and 
the law of the sea is sufficient to recognize that no such cooperative tendency is afoot. Even if 
we assume, as contractualists do, the underlying determinacy and coherence of the norms, there 
is strong evidence in this case at least that China’s practices diverge substantially from those of 
other states. Indeed, states do not always “learn” the same things from the same social 
environments, and may in fact distance or dissociate themselves from the norms purveyed in 
international legal regimes.33 Socialization is not always a homogenizing process. Norms may be 
                                                
31 A notable exception is Evangelista and Shue (eds) 2014, which explores aerial bombardment without pressing a 
narrative of norms always changing in a more progressive, humane, or desirable direction.   
32 The field is not quite this uniform, and many authors carve out exceptions for non-liberal states. For example, 
Beth Simmons notes the existence of “strategic ratifiers” – states that exploit membership in human rights regimes 
for reputational effects, but fail to honor their obligations (Simmons 2009: 58-59). Nonetheless, these “false 
positives” are relegated to peripheral roles in analysis that develops the causal pathways through which norms 
properly take root. At any rate, the norms associated with the EEZ have no meaningful ethical content (with the 
exception of environmental protection, perhaps), and are thus less easily evaluated on substantive grounds (is 200nm 
better than 100nm?) than they are on procedural grounds (do the regime’s norms become a part of general state 
practice?). 
33 “The meaning of norms can…be ‘de-linked’ or ‘decoupled’ from their original purposes; even as they maintain 
legitimacy through the connection to an internationally accepted institution, people’s interpretations will vary 
depending on political, social and cultural context” (Leheny 2006: 12-13). Other authors explore the logic of 
“decoupling” with considerable rigor, noting that “spurious forms of compliance” (Goodman and Jinks 2013: 30) 
are more prevalent than conventional models typically allow. They argue that there is significant theoretical space 
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interpreted and practiced in various ways, a possibility that the standard approach from norms 
does not so much foreclose as underemphasize.  
The following four second-order norm-based alternatives for how a state might be influenced by 
international law have bearing on our case: (1) Retrograde motion toward rejection of all or part 
of international legal obligation: a state’s engagement with international law may lead it not to 
learn that “all law is good” but rather to the belief that “some law is good and some is bad.” A 
state’s representatives may conclude that (at least partial) non-participation in the system, 
however materially costly, is in the national interest because international law is illegitimate. (2) 
Opportunistic use of international law as an instrument of policy: the normative “lesson” may not 
be interpreted or internalized in pro-social ways, leading the state to use the law contrary or 
orthogonal to the “intent and purpose” of the original norms. (3) Law as justification for new 
practices: interpretations of the law, especially new law, may create new reasons for action. A 
state may acquire new legal rights, or revise its understanding of existing rights, and will then act 
accordingly to secure those rights. The processes by which those rights are recognized and acted 
upon will depend on the state’s domestic legal organization to incorporate international norms 
and rules, and will be shaped by more general attitudes toward international law, informed by the 
state’s identity as a state who accepts, rejects, values, or devalues international law. Such 
practices may not be uniform from state to state, varying according to sub-state variables like the 
type and character of the state’s legal and political institutions. Finally, (4) norms are not static: 
there is substantial scope for actor agency in changing existing norms or creating new norms.34 
                                                                                                                                                       
and empirical evidence for major disjunctures, or decoupling, between formal treaty commitments and practice 
(Goodman and Jinks 2013: 135-165). 
34 Kratochwil explains this reciprocal action: “Actors are not only programmed by rules and norms, but they 
reproduce and change by their practice the normative structures by which they are able to act, share meanings, 
communicate intentions, criticize claims, and justify choices. Thus, one of the most important sources of change, 
Rising Power, Creeping Jurisdiction: China’s Law of the Sea 
	 43 
The role for individual or state agency in the law-making process is especially relevant when 
considering the advent of an entirely new regime, like the EEZ, and the participation of a novice 
actor, like the PRC.   
Power, Contract, and Norms: Insufficient but Necessary Parts of an Explanation 
How do power, contract and norms come into play in the specific domain of China’s relationship 
to the EEZ regime? Do we see a prevalent pattern of international law failing to constrain strong 
actors (with law epiphenomenal to power), of it meaningfully constraining them in particular 
settings (through contract), or transforming the political arena and the participants themselves, 
thereby creating new reasons for action (through norms)? Must we choose between them? If law 
is operating according to each in greater or lesser degree, as seems likely, the payoff lies in 
determining when, where, and how that operation takes place in the case under inquiry. Basic 
familiarity with the EEZ regime and China’s maritime disputes immediately demonstrates the 
limits of any fully orthodox approach from power, contract or norms. Each suffers from some 
major defects in explaining even the basic outlines of the story of China and the EEZ. Yet the 
second-order implications that can be derived from each theoretical approach are instructive, and 
should be woven into the analysis. Each at least tacitly admits of the possibility for 
transformative change – both to the states and actors interacting with international law, and the 
rules and norms constituting international legal institutions.  
The argument from power functions very differently when the interests of powerful states are not 
the basis of “the rules.” The expectation that those rules, untethered from power, should not have 
direct influence on those states is probably a sound one, but it does not rule out the possibility 
                                                                                                                                                       
neglected in the present regime literature, is the practice of the actors themselves and its concomitant process of 
interstitial law-making in the international arena” (Kratochwil 1989: 61). 
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that the law may enable weaker states who would otherwise be constrained by it in a functional 
international legal system underwritten by the power and interests of strong states. “No 
constraint” is not the same as “no influence,” though the two are often conflated. The strict 
contract argument, meanwhile, is perhaps most helpful in identifying what the EEZ regime is 
not: a determinate, efficient solution to a problem. It obscures the wide variety of ways the rules 
might be interpreted. In the absence of a mechanism – in the form of a powerful state or states, or 
agreed procedure, or the overwhelming superiority (or efficiency) of one particular solution – 
that could force convergence on any one particular interpretation of the norms of the regime, we 
are obliged to inquire into other processes in play. Attention to norms likewise seems necessary, 
but insufficient without broadening the aperture to include the diversity of norms and the range 
of outcomes from their diffusion. Studies of norms need not be limited to “cooperative” 
empirical phenomena. Transformation of state interests by norms – and of norms, by state 
practices – can lead to more disagreement, depending on the actors and the norms in question.   
Considering these various explanations in concert, it is evident that the influence of law is likely 
far more complex and practically meaningful than can be represented by reference solely to 
“constraint” or “no constraint.” Practice can and should be described in richer terms than 
compliance and non-compliance (Kingsbury 1997).  Full appreciation for the constitutive role of 
norms operating in complex social environments allows a more nuanced, if less parsimonious, 
account of regimes like the EEZ to emerge as the historically unique products of patterned state 
practice.35 To realize these insights, we turn to international law scholarship of recent decades, 
which offers some powerful insights into the process of international law-making through 
international legal practice. 
                                                
35 For thorough exposition of this idea, see Reus Smit 2004: 18-20. 
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II.  Ocean Politics Through a Legal Lens 
Certain strands of international legal theory provide the basis of a broad analytical construct that 
can accommodate those various theoretical propositions from IR and apply them productively to 
examine China’s relationship with the EEZ. Most applicable are social science-informed 
approaches that transcend the international lawyer’s abiding professional concern with 
compliance – what practices “count” as compliant and how they should be encouraged – to deal 
with the broader questions of how international law relates to international political order. This 
section first observes the liberal presumptions baked into international law scholarship, then 
moves to critique a particularly influential articulation of an implicitly liberal theory (Harold 
Hongjuh Koh’s theory of transnational legal process). This critique yields a novel way to fold 
power, contract, and norms into the study, while retaining lawyerly attention to the specific 
substantive and procedural qualities of the norms under inquiry. 
International Law’s Liberal Bias 
Disentangling the normative aim to promote compliance from the analytical aim to explain the 
actual qualities of state practices is a challenging task for legal scholars trained in Western 
jurisprudence. With the important exception of radical approaches in critical legal studies 
(Kennedy 1988; Koskenniemi 1989; Purvis 1991), the legal discipline and profession at least 
implicitly value a profoundly liberal concept of the rule of law as the default mode of domestic 
and international politics. By introducing some of the more complex and explicitly political 
possibilities envisaged in IR, we can head off this bias and develop a working theory that admits 
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a possibility that the “progressive development” of the law of the sea36 may well make its 
“progress” along an alternative track. 
In the legal field, the “majority opinion,” as it were, seems to be that international law is on 
balance a modernizing force for backward countries, a vector for universalistic liberal values 
(with largely Western origins and championed by western publicists) that will promote greater 
domestic and global harmony. One of the most influential spokespeople for this view, Anne-
Marie Slaughter writes with a coauthor that “[i]nternational legal rules and institutions can 
enhance the capacity and effectiveness of domestic institutions. If properly designed and 
structured they can help backstop domestic political and legal groups trying to comply with 
international legal obligations.”37 This “liberal internationalist model”38 of international law does 
not argue that all states inevitably fold into the liberal order, but it does make a strong normative 
claim about the superiority of the “zone of law” (in which international law takes effect in 
domestic legal systems) over the “zone of politics” in which legal obligations have no special 
salience, and are honored only where expedient.39 Western international lawyers argue that 
drawing illiberal states like China into the “zone of law” is among the basic purposes of legal 
regimes like the law of the sea.40 
International relations scholars advance a variety of arguments for why liberal norms should be 
considered the default in international politics (Keohane 1984, Doyle 1986, Fukuyama 1992, 
                                                
36 “Progressive development” is among the overarching aims of UNCLOS III, announced in its Preamble and firmly 
ensconced as an important goal of professionals working on the law of the sea.  
37 Slaughter and Burke-White 2006: 333 
38 Burley 1992: 1909 
39 “Within the liberal zone of law, the price of a general rule of recognition and enforcement of foreign law is the 
submission of the specific law in question to some form of minimal review for consistency with fundamental public 
policy and congruence with the balance of competing national interests. In the zone of politics between liberal and 
nonliberal states, by contrast, political considerations are expected to dominate the dispute resolution process” 
(Burley 1992: 1911). 
40 Comments by Harold Koh, Columbia Law School (1 November 2012).  
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Ikenberry 2000). In large part, they prevail in the contemporary international system due to the 
gradual establishment of Western-dominated global institutions for trade, investment, security, 
human rights, and so on. These institutions bind the leading states in the system and offer “voice 
opportunities” to weaker states that invest them in the system and make it superior to “exit” to an 
insecure and unprosperous world (Ikenberry 1998/1999, 2000). Theoretically, this ascendant 
liberalism is subject to change with changing distributions of power, but the robustness of these 
institutions and their efficiency relative to plausible alternatives make such changes less 
likely (Keohane 1984). Without announcing any normative preference for liberalism, this school 
contends that, descriptively, American (and Western) power is perpetuated in the form of 
binding institutions that enshrine liberal norms, even after that power is no longer sufficient to 
enforce those norms. International law is the most tangible manifestation of this institutionalized 
post-World War II arrangement, establishing a process of international political decision-making 
with wide legitimacy, and that is superior to all conceivable alternatives.41 
The rise of China42 poses a particular challenge to this fairly dominant approach to contemporary 
international relations. Its proponents are now mounting a concerted rear-guard action to shore 
up the resilience of this system, in part by relying on fever-finer distinctions about the liberal 
character of the supposedly prevailing world order. In the face of a distribution of power that 
does not give America untrammeled freedom of action and capacity to unilaterally set and 
enforce “the rules,” leading scholars like Ikenberry pronounce the robustness of the basic liberal 
                                                
41 Ikenberry has been one of the clearest and most influential proponents of this claim that the opportunity costs of 
unseating the “liberal world order” are prohibitively high. He has argued for twenty years, even in light of the rise of 
China and other developing states, that “alternatives to an open and rule-based order have yet to crystallize” 
(Ikenberry 2011a: 58). More recently, he has conceded the profound challenge to this system presented by China 
and Russia, but maintains that the system will remain intact because it brings together such a broad coalition of 
states acting in concert on the basis of their self interest: "…even if China and Russia do attempt to contest the basic 
terms of the current global order, the adventure will be daunting and self-defeating" (Ikenberry 2014: 89). 
42 China’s rise, as well as that the “BRICS” states, supports the widely shared view that America’s unipolar moment 
is vanishing, or has vanished. 
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compact embedded in the system: “…to the extent that their demands on the system are 
primarily about the distribution of authority and rights, and not about the underlying principles of 
liberal order as such, it will be more likely that new bargains and agreements can be reached that 
preserve the basic framework of the existing system.”43 Now, even as certain privileges and 
advantages erode, the formerly dominant Western states should remain confident that the 
fundamentally liberal character of global order remains intact because there is not (yet) a 
coherent substitute for it.44 
This conceit of liberal ascendancy is not limited to self-professed liberals. Indeed, regardless of 
theoretical stripes, there is a tacit presumption that liberal norms predominate and will continue 
to do so. The empirical record of the last decades seems to support the liberal thesis, even for 
those not inclined to accept it on theoretical grounds. Many international lawyers visit the church 
of Morgenthau to chant their profound skepticism about international law’s independent power 
(Goldsmith and Posner 2006). Yet in so doing, these scholars effectively predict liberal 
outcomes. This is not because of the superior efficiency or utility of those norms, but rather due 
to their powerful proponents: if power determines law, powerful liberal states will create liberal 
laws. The United States, Europe, Japan, and their various allies and like-minded partners have 
long enjoyed a favorable balance in the international distribution of power and consequently 
determine the relevant “rules and rights” of the system.45 The global market economy and 
accompanying legal institutions that have emerged in the post-war era reflect their interests: they 
promote liberal norms.  
                                                
43 Ikenberry 2011b: 282 
44 “[A]s this hegemonic organization of the liberal international order starts to change, the hierarchical aspects are 
fading while the liberal aspects persist. So even as China and other rising states try to contest US leadership – and 
there is indeed a struggle over the rights, privileges, and responsibilities of the leading states within the system – the 
deeper international order remains intact” (Ikenberry 2011a: 61). 
45 Gilpin 1981: 30 
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Meanwhile, despite no necessary analytical bias towards liberalism, empirical arguments based 
on norms are inexorably drawn to study the diffusion of liberal norms. After all, they are the 
predominant stock of norms in the contemporary system, and the ones most highly prized and 
promoted by powerful states, multinational firms, and even high-minded “norms entrepreneurs.” 
The norms associated with the law of the sea were once profoundly liberal, so this bias is quite 
appropriate for an earlier era in which mare liberum was the uncontested, perhaps even 
peremptory norm of the maritime domain.46   
However, this bias should now be inverted: the stock of norms embodied in UNCLOS III marks 
a profound departure from that liberal doctrine of freedom of the seas. In assigning coastal state 
control to vast expanses of maritime space that were once unregulated high seas, the new regime 
established norms that inevitably infringe upon formerly-enjoyed liberal freedoms.47 The EEZ, in 
particular, grants jurisdiction and rights to the coastal state on the basis of geography – not on the 
basis of the liberal principle that the market will determine access and use on a first-come-first-
serve basis (Krasner 1985).48 These new norms are decidedly not akin to those of the human 
rights and free trade, which tend to reduce the state’s exclusive control over many domains of 
activity; instead, they are “control” norms that open the door to considerable state discretion for 
those polities inclined to pick up this new instrument and use it for political purposes. 
Recognition of the qualities of these new norms undermines some of the substantive claims of 
                                                
46 Lapidoth 1975: 259. Peremptory, or jus cogens norms are those from which no derogation is possible, and will 
override other norms where there is conflict between them. 
47 Analyzing the various functional areas now regulated by coastal states in EEZs – fisheries, commercial and tanker 
traffic, military activities, and maritime security – a prominent law of the sea scholar concludes that it “is clear that 
it is no longer accurate to say that the freedom of navigation exists in the exclusive economic zone….The balance 
between navigation and other national interests continues to develop, and navigational freedoms appear to be 
disappearing during this evolutionary process” (Van Dyke 2005: 121). 
48 Krasner develops this argument at length in his case study of the law of the sea in the suggestively-titled 
Structural Conflict: Third World Against Global Liberalism, charging that new norms of “authoritative allocation” 
under such regimes undercuts the liberal operation of a “market-oriented regime” in which “allocation is a function 
of the resources and preferences [i.e., power and interests] of individual actors” (Krasner 1985: 297). 
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liberal-minded theorists, but opens the door to understand how the same processes that promote 
liberal norms might also lead to the “progressive development” of a more closed law of the sea. 
Such a decay or dysfunction of liberal norms in international law and politics is neither 
anomalous nor unexpected. The fragility of post-war institutions upholding the purportedly 
liberal world order has been a periodic obsession of the IR discipline at least since the 1970s. 
Even in the triumphal moments of post-Soviet collapse, the impermanence of that triumph was 
always implicit. Reminders of liberal norms’ vulnerability to structural changes, evolving 
ideologies, and exogenous shocks are ever more urgent in the coming era of Trump, Brexit, and 
the powerful backlash against the very globalization that nurtured and distributed liberalism 
wherever markets took it. If the purpose backing Western power is no longer committed to 
upholding this order, there is growing potential for China and others to drive transformative 
change. 
The Promise and Peril of Transnational Legal Process 
Process-oriented IL scholarship offers an ideal vehicle for exploring this increasingly real 
eventuality of non-liberal developments in international law. Proponents of this move aim to 
transcend the false binary between the “zone of law” and the “zone of politics” by adopting a 
more self-consciously social mode of inquiry that recognizes the interrelationship of those 
arenas.49  Particularly notable in this vein is the “New Haven School” of policy-oriented 
jurisprudence, which treats international law as a “process of authoritative and controlling 
decision” (Lasswell and McDougal 1992). It is explicitly social-scientific in its aim to consider 
international law as a product of social activity, and to analyze it systematically by drawing on 
                                                
49 For a review of this literature, see Koh 1997: 2618-2624 
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observations beyond the traditional “positive” sources of international law. This heavily 
normative (and famously unwieldy)50 framework aims to help legal scholars make 
determinations about what the law should be for the sake of human dignity (Lasswell and 
McDougal 1992; Reisman 1993). In so doing, it backs into the same liberal presumptions that 
seem so peculiarly inapt for the case at hand. Even if “human dignity” appears unobjectionable 
and universalistic at first blush, in the breach it merely provides a normative excuse for 
international legal decisions and policies favored by the liberal west.51  
Still, the New Haven school’s deliberate focus on process and close attention to concrete 
practices rather than abstract rules is a valuable corrective, and worth exploring as a vehicle for 
analyzing the contemporary international politics of the EEZ without some of the normative 
baggage. Stripped of its Cold War baggage and revitalized by a heavy dose of contemporary IR 
and sociology, the New Haven school has enjoyed a modern renaissance in the form of 
“transnational legal process” theory (TLP). This theory’s principle advocate and practitioner, 
Harold Hongjuh Koh,52 honors the school’s origins in New Haven and American legal realism 
by eschewing legal formalism for a more social, policy-oriented approach that embraces the 
multiplicity of actors, forums, and norms that constitute the contemporary international legal 
                                                
50 Fitzmaurice 1971: 360-367 
51 Critical legal scholars argue that New Haven school practitioners derive these values from human rights treaty 
instruments as proxies for “community” or “universal” norms, and therefore end up promoting [U.S.] policy rather 
than offering a normative guide for practice (Koskenniemi 1989: 204-207). The tension between economic rights to 
development at a state level and individual rights is an especially clear area where this framework becomes 
contentious. 
52 Currently professor at the Yale Law School, Koh was the U.S. State Department Legal Adviser from 2009-2013 
and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor from 1998-2001.  
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order. The central problematique for this school is the question of obedience, or as Thomas 
Franck memorably has it: “why do powerful states follow powerless rules?”53 
TLP resembles sociologically-oriented IR in recognizing that law becomes meaningful only in 
the “interplay between [legal] rules and social processes”54 that operate outside, inside and in 
between states. It borrows IR’s attention to the transnational arena, and is similarly motivated by 
the historically- and empirically-informed judgment that “the jurisdiction and agendas of states 
are increasingly worked out within a transnational context.”55 There is no presumption of states 
as unitary actors, representing the sole agents of public international law. Unlike deliberately 
apolitical conventional theories of law, TLP does not impose analytical strictures that demand 
formal, “legalistic” reasoning according only to positive law, existing and operating independent 
of politics. Instead, the TLP approach conceives the two as mutually constitutive, 
accommodating a norm-conscious IR lens that sees the “politics within law, the idea that law can 
be constitutive of politics, that politics may take a distinctive form when conducted within the 
realm of legal reasoning and practice.”56 Contestation and practice of international law is a 
significant part of international politics; meanwhile, international politics are shaped in myriad, 
often profound, ways by the particular constellations of rules and norms produced by the 
international legal system and their implementation by states and sub-state agents. In this 
rendering, politics and international law have a reciprocal relationship; they cannot be addressed 
in isolation without considerable distortion. 
                                                
53 Franck 1990: 3. See Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Summer 2007) for a symposium on the 
subject of the “New” New Haven School of international law. 
54 Koh 1997: 2618 
55 Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996: 48 
56 Reus-Smit 2004: 14 
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Koh focuses on legal encounters among actors including states, organizations and individuals, a 
recursive pattern of activity which “feeds back to modify domestic law, reshape domestic 
bureaucracies, and change the attitudes of domestic decisionmakers” such that they are more 
likely to obey the law “out of perceived self-interest.”57 The theory posits that such obedience 
comes about through linked processes of interaction, interpretation, and internalization.58 The 
transnational legal process theory “predicts that nations will come into compliance with 
international norms if transnational legal processes are aggressively triggered by other 
transnational actors in a way that forces interaction in forums capable of generating norms, 
followed by norm internalization. This process of interaction and internalization in turn leads a 
national government to engage in new modes of interest-recognition and identity-formation in a 
way that eventually leads the nation-state back into compliance.”59  
For our purposes, the main promise of the theory lies in its dynamic model of how law functions 
in between and inside states. It recognizes not merely horizontal relationships among unitary, 
sovereign states, but also the vertical relationships among diverse actors within states, and their 
multifaceted intercourse with one another. This transnational frame enables a richer and more 
satisfying analysis of law’s influence on China’s interests and identity (and vice versa), 
recognizing the role of diplomats representing China in its interactions, the political and 
scholarly elites who interpret the law of the sea, the legislators and bureaucrats drafting and 
enacting PRC maritime law, and the various sub-state agencies carrying out China’s practices in 
                                                
57 Koh 1997: 2655, 2622 
58 Koh’s thesis is developed over the course of several articles, including Koh 1991: 2347, 2398-2402; Koh 1994a: 
2391, 2405-09; Koh 1994b: 999; Koh 1996: 194-206; Koh 1997: 2645-2659; Koh 1998: 627-679. Others, notably 
Shaffer 2012, have developed TLP as a practical tool for anticipating the effectiveness of international legal rules 
and norms. 
59 Koh 1996: 206 
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the EEZ.  With some adaptation, this transnational legal process model offers an ideal fit for the 
problem at hand.  
III. Beyond Obedience: Adapting Transnational Legal Process to China and the EEZ  
To adapt TLP for the purpose of framing a study of how China and the EEZ regime influence 
one another, four aspects of the model must be reconsidered: (1) the teleology of “obedience” to 
law must be discarded; (2) the process of internalization and obedience are not directly linked, so 
an intervening process of implementation should be conceptualized to account for divergent 
practices and outcomes; (3) the model must also be tailored to address the distinctive properties 
of non-liberal legal and political institutions, like the PRC’s; and (4) the indeterminacy of key 
norms must figure into our expectations of how laws will be internalized into a state’s domestic 
legal institutions and implemented in practice.  
(1) Teleology of obedience. Koh’s theory wears its hopeful teleology on its sleeve. He argues that 
“[b]y domesticating international rules, transnational legal process can spur internal acceptance 
even of previously taboo political principles. The process usually occurs in four phases: 
interaction, interpretation, internalization and obedience.”60 The last of these phases is not 
descriptive but prescriptive, and summarily neglects a host of other possible. This “best of all 
possible worlds” template insists that every story eventually comes to a cheerful, Panglossian 
end by virtue of a transnational legal process that will transmit exactly the norms intended. The 
basic idea is that people just need to participate in the transnational legal process for long enough 
                                                
60 Koh 1998: 644, italics added 
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and eventually they will learn to love (liberal) norms – and not just because they are incentivized 
to comply for the sake of material or psychic rewards, but because they genuinely want to.61  
The reasons for discarding this teleology of obedience are not just analytical. The triumph of law 
over politics presumed in Koh’s model is actually not so much a theoretical prediction as a 
normative “plan of strategic action for prodding nations to obey [the law].”62 Speaking on 
China’s maritime conduct in particular, Koh advocates drawing PRC conduct “out of the zone of 
politics and into the zone of law.”63 This is not an objectionable aim when the norms and rules in 
question enact prohibitions on torture or slavery, for which momentous historical and normative 
changes are quite evident and welcome (if incomplete). The moral force of the EEZ regime, by 
contrast, is negligible, and need not be promoted for normative reasons. For the most part, it is a 
regime that coordinates and assigns state jurisdiction for the sake of efficiency (Posner and Sykes 
2010), not justice, and should not be considered to have a very significant ethical dimension.  
This tendency to moralize the rules reflects a common political preference among foreign 
experts, especially when it comes to “socializing” China to be a “responsible stakeholder.”64 
Whatever its ethical merits, it is not one suited the empirical study of political contestation over 
rules of law. This study will therefore intentionally transgress and elide the boundaries between 
these “zones.” I prefer to make no assumptions about where politics begins and ends, nor do I 
                                                
61 Koh argues that “moral, normative, and legal reasons are in fact conjoined in the concept of obedience. A 
transnational actor's moral obligation to obey an international norm becomes an internally binding domestic legal 
obligation when that norm has been interpreted and internalized into its domestic legal system.” (Koh 1997: 2659). 
Johnston 2008 uses the concept of “social influence,” and Goodman and Jinks 2013 use “socialization” to explain 
this phenomenon, identifying shifts in actors’ perceived costs and benefits created by social rewards or censure 
(“back-patting” or “opprobrium” in Johnston 2008). When the social process appears to redefine the actor’s utility 
function (rather than just shifting it up or down with incentives that do not modify underlying interests), these and 
other sociologically-oriented models focus on phenomena of persuasion and learning. 
62 Koh 1997: 2655 
63 Harold Koh remarks at Columbia Law School (November 1, 2011).  
64 This is the felicitous phrase of former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, who was among the key 
proponents of the notion that China’s participation in international legal institutions is, on balance, a desirable 
American foreign policy objective. 
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assume that obedience with the rules (however defined) is a necessary – or even necessarily a 
desirable outcome. Further, we need not assume that states “obey” the EEZ in a manner 
consistent with the purposes of those who developed the regime.  
Instead of presupposing the congruity between the original norm and its eventual practice, TLP 
can be revised to admit for the possibility of international law being distorted, abridged, or 
omitted as it is internalized into a state’s domestic laws, sometimes decoupled from the function 
and purpose of the original norm as the state implements the rule in practice. “Obedience” to a 
rule is only one of several possible outcomes of the transnational legal process.  
(2) Beyond internalization. Such alternatives can be more fully explored by replacing the 
“obedience” phase with a descriptive implementation process after internalization. In doing so, 
we eliminate the teleological faith in converging practices and recognize the many directions that 
participation in transnational legal processes may lead. Koh’s theory, like that of many practicing 
international lawyers, ends with the state adopting compliant laws that will then become policy 
through stable, institutionalized processes. These processes produce a recognizable script for 
regulatory, executive, and judicial organs to put obedient policy in to practice. His ultimate 
concern is with internalized obedience to those rules, but his conception of internalization is too 
narrowly scoped to appreciate polities in which law on the books is peripheral to observed 
decision-making and practice. Ending with internalization may be highly practical when human 
rights norms and rules are the object of study (and advocacy): the whole point is for the state to 
change the rights it bestows on its own citizens, which they can then enforce against the state 
through courts and other institutionalized oversight processes. But in a state without a robust rule 
of law, like China, the transnational legal process lives on as the norm circulates throughout the 
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state. We will not understand its influence without taking a further step to explore its 
implementation in systematic terms.65 
After all, Koh is not just proposing ad hoc obedience, but rather, the progressive transformation 
“from one-time grudging compliance with an external norm to habitual internalized 
obedience.”66 The implied multiple rounds of interaction in global law-making forums involve 
states that, having internalized the norms and rules in question, will eventually externalize them 
in a transnational setting. For them to be externalized, the norms must find their way into the 
practices of the various agents of the state who implement the new rules instilled by interaction, 
interpretation, and internalization of international law.  
This stage is necessary for any explanation of how there were even norms to be internalized in 
the first place: states must have put them into practice in the international arena for there to be 
any cause for cooperation in the form of treaty-making. In including implementation, we address 
the actual practices that must ensue for obedience – or any other outcome – to take root. This 
move also opens the door for analysis of how a state’s practices can influence the original norm 
or rule. We ought not seek to explain why all roads lead to “obedience” when that is not the only 
endgame, and in any event, becomes meaningful only to the extent it is put into practice. We 
need to incorporate the implementation process to account for these practices. 
(3) Adapted to China’s party-state political system. A further modification concerns the types of 
                                                
65 Koh does nod to the iterated nature of the transnational legal processes under inquiry, but does not extend his 
analysis to consider alternative pathways of “progress”: “[f]rom this process of interaction, new rules of law emerge, 
which are interpreted, internalized, and enforced, thus beginning the process all over again….[TLP] focuses not 
simply upon how international interaction among transnational actors shapes law, but also on how law shapes and 
guides future interactions: in short, how law influences why nations obey” (Koh 1996: 184). This appreciation of 
continuity in process, however, does not extend to his analysis, which tends to see internalization as equivalent to 
obedience. It is the underspecification of the internalization process, then, that this intervention seeks to treat. 
66 Koh 1997: 2655 
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agents, institutions and norms involved in transnational legal processes, especially interpretation 
and internalization. The particular qualities of China’s domestic legal and political institutions 
need to be reckoned with for TLP to adequately deal with the case of China and the EEZ. 
Specifically, the model must account for the absence of independent transnational actors and 
groups typically cited as influencing state-level decisionmaking; even more important from a 
process standpoint, the model must be amended to address the lack of institutionalized, legal 
mechanisms for voicing independent preferences, even from actors within the state itself.  
Koh’s theory depends heavily on a vigorous role for diverse actors empowered by domestic legal 
institutions. There is an assumption that some type of independent power resides in courts, 
lawyers inside and outside government, legislators, regulatory agencies, and civil society actors 
(e.g., transnational norm entrepreneurs, non-governmental organizations, media, activists). Their 
participation in the transnational legal process does most of the heavy lifting in the theory. 
However, these diverse stakeholders are unlikely to be significant factors in transnational legal 
processes in illiberal states without rule of law. Perhaps even more so than other illiberal and 
authoritarian states, China has virtually no legal and judicial checks on exercise of centralized 
political power by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The PRC legislature, while producing 
ever-greater quantities of black letter law, tends only to rubber-stamp CCP decisions, and 
exercises no formal or informal check on executive prerogatives. The CCP dominates the 
government, controlling appointments to all of the key government positions and dictating the 
state’s policy goals through political officers embedded at every level of governance.  
Further, China’s laws are not easily or directly influenced by its weak, muted and disorganized 
civil society. To the extent such non-state groups exist, they are unable to directly or 
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meaningfully exercise voice in the political-legal processes of the contemporary PRC. All 
decision-making about treaty ratification and implementation takes place among CCP elites and 
is then presented to bureaucrats as a script for administration, never entering the public arena as a 
subject for wider debate. So in China, where political elites dominate the lawmaking and policy 
process to the near-total exclusion of civil society and courts, we must tailor our view of what 
types of transnational legal processes are even plausible. Any international norms reflected in 
PRC law depend heavily on the particular configuration of power within the Chinese party-state. 
Koh anticipated this generic dissent about the way norms function within illiberal states, and 
argues that the effectiveness of TLP (i.e., its tendency to produce obedience) depends more on 
the qualities of the “particular rule for which internalization is sought,” not the legal and political 
system in question.67 Conveniently, he cites “rules regarding the law of the sea” among those 
that are “routinely internalized.”68 He further argues that the “nature and permeability of the 
domestic legal system as a whole”69 (i.e., the degree to which it is liberal) is not as important as 
the degree of internalization of a particular set of norms. In the Chinese case, as perhaps in other 
non-liberal legal orders, there is in fact a remarkably high degree of internalization. The lack of 
checks, balances, oversight, public input, and many other “inefficient” features characteristic of 
rule-of-law systems are absent, allowing the party-state elite to act swiftly and decisively to 
promulgate laws that correspond to treaty obligations. The issue worth considering, then, is not 
the degree of internalization, then, but rather the type. Determinations of which norms will 
survive the internalization process, and in which form, and for which purposes are the exclusive 
                                                
67 Koh 1998: 623. He later explains that “...the key determinant of whether nations obey particular rules is not so 
much the nature and permeability of the domestic legal system as a whole, but rather the degree to which particular 
rules are or are not internalized into the domestic legal structure” (Koh 1998: 675). 
68 Ibid., 623 
69 Ibid., 675 
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domain of political, rather than legal, judicial, or legislative, elite.  
Koh also recognizes that internalization may indeed be more readily achieved in non-liberal 
states by virtue of strong executive powers, unhindered by judicial and legislative meddling. He 
views this as a potentially positive feature, citing the possibility that the executive may then 
effectively force agencies “to adopt default rules that avoid routine noncompliance with the 
international rule” which ultimately “should have a liberalizing impact, even upon states that 
have proven relatively impervious to external influence.”70 He even uses the case of China and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as a plausibility probe for this argument:  
Once Chinese executive officials have agreed to accept those norms, however 
grudgingly, the transnational process forces described earlier will begin to put pressure 
upon China – with the assistance of both governmental and nongovernmental actors – in 
various international fora to comply with various norms associated with that treaty. 
China's domestic institutions will have an incentive to adopt default rules that avoid 
routine noncompliance with the international rule. As international sanctions begin to 
attach to those norms, a process of vertical internalization will predictably commence, 
however slowly. Thus, over time, acceptance of the international rule should have a 
liberalizing impact, even upon states that have proven relatively impervious to external 
influence.71  
 
He sustains this argument only by wishing away the party-state’s centralized authority, and 
assuming that a concern for efficiency and discomfort with non-compliance will win out. Such 
assumptions may be valid as a starting point for reasoning about transnational legal processes in 
the United States, which may well be a good working model for processes in other liberal states. 
Tellingly, he uses the United States’ grudging acceptance of the 12nm territorial sea rule codified 
in UNCLOS III as another plausibility probe. In this story, the emergence of a customary norm at 
odds with U.S. practice and the principled advocacy of sub-state actors (in the military, coast 
guard, fishing and oil industry interests, and legal advisers in the executive branch) eventually 
                                                
70 Ibid., 676 
71 Ibid. 
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led to an executive order to adopt the 12nm rule.72 This thorough application of a liberal mode of 
reasoning – whereby the aggregated interests of actors in society constitute the preferences of the 
state (Moravksic 1997) – is indeed plausible and empirically observable in the U.S. system, but 
begs the question of whether it is only plausible and empirically observable in such a system. 
 
There is no doubt that the distribution of preferences among domestic actors inform decisions 
undertaken in the highest reaches of the CCP. Still, the PRC’s centralized, closed-door process is 
not akin to the decentralized public policy process in a liberal state like the United States. At a 
minimum, Chinese leaders are willing and ready to silence non-conforming voices once policies 
have been deliberated and chosen.73 Still, Koh’s approach is instructive. The actors depicted in 
the plausibility probe of the U.S. do in fact resemble those who have been most visible and 
influential in the Chinese engagement with the EEZ regime: central Party-state elites, the navy, 
and maritime law enforcement agencies. Despite differences in regime-type, the essentially 
functional, non-normative nature of the EEZ regime74 makes it amenable to an approach which 
can see the push and pull of diverse actors who advocate particular laws and policies on the basis 
of “where they sit” (Allison 1971). We must be more modest, however, about the plausible scope 
of their influence. China’s legal system functions as one of several channels for administering 
policy (Lampton and Lieberthal 1992; Lubman 1999; Gallagher and Woo 2011) rather than the 
overarching framework in which political processes play out. There are no legal checks 
constraining the executive’s freedom of action.75 So, while Koh’s theory gives us a wide lens to 
                                                
72 Koh 1998: 636-641 
73 The field of Chinese politics struggles continuously to make sense of policy outputs in a system marked by 
massive lack of transparency and centralized authority. The “fragmented authoritarianism” model developed by 
Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988 is one such effort, and various modifications of the thesis (that below the highly 
efficacious but limited central level, there is significant fragmentation) remains influential among contemporary 
China specialists (e.g., Downs 2004; Mertha 2009). 
74 In that it principally assigns rights and duties in uninhabited ocean space. 
75 This relationship between legal institutions and the political process in the PRC is explored at length in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 1 – Four i’s: A Practical Theory for China and the Law of the Sea 
	 62 
capture all relevant actors, his account is overly optimistic about the governance and regulatory 
capacity of authoritarian states with weak rule of law, and thus only partially applicable. 
The upshot for the model is a need to truncate and streamline the generic internalization process. 
Koh lays out three complementary mechanisms of internalization: social, judicial, and political.76 
We can restrict analysis only to the latter mechanism. Strict repression of domestic organizations 
not sanctioned by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), rigorous filtering of information from 
abroad, and virtually non-existent civil society effectively rule out the primary function of the 
first (whereby non-state actors lobby the state to commit to and comply with international law). 
Social groups independent of the party-state (to the extent they exist) are never free to organize 
or express contrary political opinions. Certainly public opinion tends to mobilize around policy 
positions adopted at the center, but this is a second-order phenomenon. Social internalization is a 
function of political internalization, and has no independent role to play in explaining how EEZ 
norms come to bear in China. 
As for the second, judicial internalization mechanism, China’s judiciary is almost entirely 
disempowered, especially on matters of political salience (Lubman 1999; Diamant, Lubman, and 
O’Brien 2005). No court has the authority to strike down a government agency’s policy, nor 
practical means to question any state actor’s interpretation of a national law or regulation. 
Lawyers, meanwhile, within and without government are a marginalized profession and play 
peripheral roles, even in government agencies charged with regulating or implementing law.77 
                                                
76 Social internalization relies on an informed public that can mobilize in interest groups to lobby the state; judicial 
internalization relies on court actions and judicial interpretations for its effectiveness; political internalization hinges 
on political elites’ adoption of the norm into policy. See Koh 1997: 2656-2657; Koh 1998: 623. 
77 For example, Jiang Ping 1997 refers to an “absence of dignity among the Chinese people for lawyers’ 
communities….The image of the lawyer is declining.” Minzner (2013) reviews the history of legal education and 
notes the prevailing view of law as peripheral and lawyers as low-status workers. 
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The international lawyers within government are perhaps the weakest players in the Chinese 
foreign policy apparatus. Even if diplomats in the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs are well-
socialized in international legal environments and increasingly identify as part of an epistemic 
community that values prevailing legal norms (Johnston 2008), they have virtually no access to 
foreign policy decision-making (Jakobson 2014). In short, there are few if any judicial or legal 
checks on the political autonomy of the CCP. Theorizing an independent role for judges and 
international lawyers is misleading in this case (and in many others). 
Only the third process, that of “political internalization” by elites, is a plausible pathway through 
which international norms might enter Chinese domestic institutions. Party-state leaders exercise 
centralized legislative, executive, and judicial authority to choose which treaties to enter and 
determine whether and how their norms are incorporated into law and policy. Political judgment 
that the international legal norms in question are important and worth implementing in some 
fashion creates necessary and sufficient conditions for those norms to have influence on the legal 
institutions of the state, and to disseminate more widely to other social actors. This 
overwhelming discretion for political elites in the PRC strongly recommends tailoring the 
internalization process to suit the particular political and legal institutions of the Chinese state.78 
Although Koh anticipates that his “theory of norm-internalization…explains how internalization 
can promote the domestic transformation of polities from illiberal to liberal,”79 the CCP’s 
steadfast resistance to “peaceful evolution” and wariness of liberalizing political reform make 
this a highly dubious proposition in the case of China.80 He is nonetheless committed to an 
                                                
78 Chapter 4 devotes extended discussion to this claim. 
79 Koh 1998: 677 
80 Shambaugh 2008: 41-160 spells out the CCP’s sustained internal discussion in the wake of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union about erecting bulwarks against liberalization that could threaten the primacy of the party. 
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important axiom about the transformational potential of international legal norms, borrowed 
from IR. Koh claims that habitual practice can “constitute the identity of the state as a law-
abiding state, and hence, as a ‘liberal’ state.”81 The identity-constitutive aspect of his reasoning 
should be preserved; the liberal triumphalism should not.82 That insight is best realized in this 
case by focusing only on the political leg of the internalization triad. 
(4) Indeterminacy is a property of both the EEZ and Chinese legal rules and processes. A final 
and generic critique of TLP is its tacit faith in the basic determinacy of legal norms. The theory 
presumes that the transnational legal process will ultimately produce a reasonable, shared, and 
authoritative decision on a norm’s content and scope. Koh theorizes the process of interpretation 
as a panacea to any lack of clarity or coherence in the norms under consideration. Although there 
may be much hemming and hawing in the process of reaching an agreement about a treaty or 
rule, ultimately the process “forces an interpretation or enunciation of the global norm applicable 
to the situation.”83 There are ample reasons to doubt that any single, agreed “global norm 
applicable to the situation” has crystallized in the case under inquiry – nor indeed, should we 
expect one to emerge in many politically contentious arenas of international law. In the EEZ, as 
in so many domains nominally governed by international law, many of the relevant norms are 
indeterminate – that is, they admit of multiple equally reasonable interpretations.84  
                                                
81 Koh 1997: 2603, citing Klotz 1995: 478. Italics in original. 
82 The presumption that such identity transformations tend towards liberalism is sometimes questioned. Norm-
oriented scholars sometimes recognize that the model of transformational change is not just one of “‘diffusion’ of 
liberal institutions and practices, but one through which the preferences and identities of actors engaged in 
transnational society are sometimes mutually transformed through their interactions with each other…Modern 
networks are not conveyor belts of liberal ideals but vehicles for communicative and political exchange, with the 
potential for mutual transformation of participants” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 214). 
83 Koh 1997: 2646 
84 “A law is indeterminate when a question of law, or of how the law applies to facts, has no single right answer” 
(Endicott 2000: 9). It can also be defined as a situation in which “a competent adjudicator can square a decision in 
favor of either side in any given lawsuit with the existing body of legal rules” (Solum 1987: 462). See also Kress 
1989; Bix 1993. 
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Indeterminacy rears its complicating head in myriad ways for students of international law and 
international relations. Even for lawyers working in a strictly positivist mode, there is always a 
“large and important field left open for the exercise of discretion by Courts and other officials in 
rendering initially vague [i.e., indeterminate] standards determinate, in resolving the 
uncertainties of statutes, or in developing and qualifying rules only broadly communicated by the 
authoritative standards.”85 In municipal systems, there is an elaborate judicial and regulatory 
apparatus that resolves such indeterminacy; in international law, typically no such mechanism 
exists. Only the state has discretion to make a final determination about the scope and nature of 
its own obligations. For some legal scholars, such “auto-interpretation” is not so problematic 
because properly drafted laws and properly trained lawyers and judges will constrain more 
reckless or opportunistic efforts to distort legal obligations.86 The scope of indeterminacy is 
relatively narrow and “discretion is ‘relative’ because its limits are assumed to be set by law.”87 
Those critical of the coherence and efficacy of this epistemic community, however, argue that 
such exercises of discretion “cannot be detached from the conditions of political contestation in 
which they are made.”88 Reasonable analysts may differ about whether the entire legal edifice is 
indeterminate,89 or only select rules.90 Whatever that judgment, in the absence of supranational 
                                                
85 Hart 1960: 132 
86 Some legal scholars argue that “self-serving auto-interpretation” is constrained by “precision of individual 
commitments, coherence between individual commitments and broader legal principles, and accepted modes of legal 
discourse and argument all help limit such opportunistic behavior. Granting interpretive authority to courts or other 
legal institutions further constrains auto-interpretation” (Abbott and Snidal 2001: 427). Again, this may be a 
reasonable claim for American and European legal systems, but strains all credibility in the Chinese context. 
87 Hart 1960: 128 
88 Koskenniemi 2004: 198 
89 One of the most stirring critical assaults on international law argues that determinacy in international legal norms 
is the mark of hegemony: “Consensus is, after all, the end-point of a hegemonic process in which some agent or 
institution has succeeded in making its position seem the universal or ‘neutral position’” (Koskenniemi 1989: 597). 
90 For a potent critique of the “critical dogma,” see Solum 1987, who finds irremediable weakness in the “strong” 
version of the indeterminacy thesis (that the entire system is indeterminate); he notes the factual validity of weaker 
versions of the indeterminacy thesis, but finds their implications less radical than usually suspected. 
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authority it is clear enough that the legal outcome in cases of indeterminacy cannot be 
determined solely by impartial recourse to legal rules.91  
Social science deals with indeterminacy without the expectation that there is a professional 
process likely to resolve it. For rationalist IR, indeterminacy takes the form of multiple 
equilibria: equally likely strategic choices or outcomes in a given interaction. These are 
circumstances where the payoff will not uniquely determine behavior.92 Game-theoretic 
approaches reframe these circumstances as coordination problems, where actors are indifferent 
among equilibria but common knowledge can provide a focal point for efficient choices.93 
Social-scientifically-minded lawyers are also persuaded by this logic, arguing that simple acts of 
communication are cheap and efficient ways to smooth away any jagged edges left by 
indeterminate norms.94 Proponents of “soft law” believe that such indeterminacy can in fact be a 
feature, not a bug, of international institutions where “hard” commitments would make wide 
participation costly, cumbersome and unlikely to persist (Abbott and Snidal 2000).  
 
Challenges to these depoliticized games point to the determinate role of power in forcing the 
adoption of one norm over another, with some kind of coercion underlying the choice of 
different distributional outcomes in a given bargaining situation (Krasner 1991). Where there are 
                                                
91 There may indeed be an “invisible college of international lawyers” that can resolve indeterminacy of treaty rules 
in a professional, consistent, unbiased way, but there is little evidence that this college permeates non-western states 
in any effective way. For this critical argument, see especially Koskenniemi 1989: 35-40. He further questions the 
weak indeterminacy thesis, which argues that there are “certain ‘core meanings’ on which professional lawyers 
agree and peripheral meanings that may be subject to political controversy, and the former suffice to give rise to a 
solid legal practice” (Koskenniemi 1989: 590). The strong argument he lays out finds even this professional standard 
to be contradictory and inextricable from the political purposes of powerful actors, even in the absence of bad faith 
(ibid., 591).   
92 McAdams 2008: 26 
93 Schelling 1980: 54-67. This is the famous example of asking faculty at Yale where they would meet in New York 
City without giving any parameters on place or time. Their shared cultural and historical and geographic setting 
made “Grand Central Terminal” a more likely solution, even though it was in no way superior to other options. 
94 Goldsmith and Posner 2002: 133-134. 
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many Pareto-improving options, politics determines the choice between them.  
 Others note that the mere belief that there is a functional solution to problems of multiple 
equilibria is a shibboleth; such faith places the scholar one on side of a great divide on the 
question of “historical efficiency.”95 Those who see history as efficient do not discount the 
theoretical possibility of multiple equilibria, but see exogenous factors as sufficient to determine 
a unique and efficient solution, if only temporarily. Those who believe history to be inefficient, 
the product of endogenous and sometimes contradictory forces, believe the possibility of 
convergence on, say, a unique liberal norm on any issue of social importance is near zero.  
The “inefficient” thesis is compelling in the case of China and the EEZ. It approximates the basic 
properties of the EEZ, the characteristics of China’s historical encounter with international law, 
and the path-dependent structure of PRC legal institutions. As will be explored at length 
throughout the study, many of the vital norms of the EEZ are the products of compromise among 
the over 150 participants in the negotiations of UNCLOS III. In some cases, these compromises 
effected reasonably determinate rules; in others, the rules remained indeterminate and susceptible 
to varied interpretations. This is not necessarily problematic for TLP if the empirical record 
subsequent to the agreement bears out some gradual convergence around a singular, determinate 
norm to regulate the domain. In the case of the EEZ, this is emphatically not the case. State 
practice, not just China’s, shows rather substantial variance.96 
                                                
95 Legal institutions may temporarily “solve” problems of cooperation, but are always subject to historical 
contingencies and seldom stable in the face of crises. “On the one side are those who see history as following a 
course that leads inexorably and relatively quickly to a unique equilibrium dictated by exogenously determined 
interests and resources. On the other side are those who see history as inefficient, as following a meandering path 
affected by multiple equilibria and endogenous transformations of interests and resources” (March and Olsen 1998: 
954). 
96 Kopela 2009: 2-15 and Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 277-304 catalogue the considerable diversity (and adversity) in 
state practice in EEZs. 
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The fraught history of China’s encounter with international law and the PRC’s subsequent 
development of its own modern legal institutions are likewise cause to expect Chinese 
interpretations of indeterminate norms to differ from those expected in rationalist accounts and 
observed in liberal, Western nations.97 Coordination on the basis of some shared focal point – be 
it legal professionalism or efficiency – presumes the preeminence of those values. China’s 
identity – and thus conception of its interests and preferences for coordination – was forged in 
part through a fraught experience with western international law;98 contemporary PRC legal 
institutions bear the distinct imprint of this historical experience, and are not configured to reach 
an efficient, liberal determination on important political matters. In fact, indeterminacy is a 
pervasive and seemingly deliberate characteristic of Chinese laws and regulations.99   
The model must accommodate the possibility that no single “equilibrium” will emerge in state 
interpretations of key norms in the EEZ. Interpretation is more than a lawyerly process wherein 
some reasonably coherent epistemic community transnationally negotiates its way to an 
understanding of a norm that is mutually satisfying, as Koh insists. Implicitly, the focal points 
that can coordinate in cases of multiple equilibria rely on some significant body of common 
knowledge, accumulated historically, and interpreted in similar terms. Broadening the aperture of 
the interpretation phase in the TLP model to account for varied historical experiences and 
cultural-institutional settings that produce actors with different identities vis-à-vis international 
law is one way to address this problem. With these adaptations intact, TLP can be productively 
applied to understanding China’s complex relationship to the EEZ. 
                                                
97 Historical and institutional factors are dispositive when we consider how they inform judgments about what 
values or interests a given rule should serve. “[P]arties’ arguments, and to some extent their preferences, appear to 
have been shaped by competing general conceptions of what ‘legal’ institutions, rules, and arguments should look 
like, and what role international law and institutions should play in international relations” (Reus-Smit 2004: 8).  
98 This claim is the empirical focus of Chapter 3. 
99 This claim is the empirical focus of Chapter 4. 
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IV. Tracing the Four i’s: Methods of Analysis 
The theory of transnational legal process employed in this study consists of four linked “i” 
processes: interaction, interpretation, internalization and implementation. Methodologically, the 
inquiry follows the TLP model’s emphasis on historical process tracing, but departs from it in 
four crucial respects. (1) We drop the idea that “obedience” is the necessary (or desirable) 
endgame, recognizing that this is only one possible effect of participation in transnational legal 
processes. (2) Obedience can be replaced with the process of implementation, which gives 
broader play to those “disobedient” possibilities and acknowledges that state practices are a 
necessary, untheorized part of any iterated transnational legal process. (3) The internalization 
process is circumscribed to include only its “political” variant, thus accounting for the properties 
of illiberal states like China that lack public inputs and institutionalized legal checks on 
executive discretion. Finally, (4) the key role of indeterminacy is given its due consideration, 
especially as it pertains to the interpretation phase. The solutions to problems of “multiple 
equilibria” do not lie merely in professional competence or efficiency, but depend upon the 
identities of the actors faced with choices and opportunities to exercise political discretion. 
These processes may be traced through China’s historical relationship to the law of the sea, aided 
by the partial explanatory punch of some of the insights from power, contract and norms laid out 
in Section I. Rather than adjudicating between them, the empirical analysis accepts that each of 
the four i’s describes a process involving power, contract and norms to varying degrees; 
excluding one or the other weakens their collective capacity to explain reciprocal influence 
between China and the EEZ regime. This catholic attitude does not amount to “all of the above.” 
Rather, it presents us with a limited menu of choices for explaining observed phenomena, which 
can be consulted systematically while those observations are recorded.  
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An inductive look at a specific state practice tells us something about a state’s intentions that 
deduction from revealed preferences (a basic method implicitly shared by power and contract 
theories) cannot. Such induction enables us to trace a process from the decision to exercise some 
particular jurisdictional competence in an EEZ, to organize, equip and train people for the task, 
to expend budgetary (or deploy military) resources in their defense, and to seek diplomatic 
recognition for the legitimacy of that jurisdiction and associated practices. The deductive 
reasoning employed in strict power and contract approaches infers a state’s interests from its 
behaviors. Yet when those behaviors are irregular over time and space,100 contradictory over the 
same issue area, or consistent with multiple “basic causal factors,”101 explanation requires closer 
scrutiny of the actual practices involved.102 
The four i framework structures the analysis. Each phase involves different actors and highlights 
distinct phenomena: interaction calls attention to the interests motivating PRC interactions in 
UNCLOS; interpretation reckons with the historically- and culturally-based identity informing 
Chinese elites’ beliefs about the purpose and function of the regime; internalization maps how 
domestic institutions adopt and alter UNCLOS norms; implementation shows how those norms 
prompt the agents who carry out Chinese maritime law in practice. Considered in light of this 
case, where the EEZ norms enable China’s pursuit of closure, the four i’s present a story about 
what might be called the dysfunction of international law.  
                                                
100 From a formal standpoint, we might say that observations of the same phenomenon which vary across different 
ranges on the independent variables are evidence of heteroscedasticity. This leads to bad things like causal 
heterogeneity – untheorized differences in treatment effects that may result from expanding your n and thus 
introducing unlike units or new variables (Keohane, King and Verba 1994). 
101 Krasner 1982b: 499. 
102 I am following Kratochwil 1989, Adler and Pouliot 2011, and Meierhenrich 2013 in distinguishing practice from 
unintentional or automatic “behavior” in response to some stimulus or incentive; it is also different from the more 
intentional and purposive “action.” Practice is intentional and purposive, includes behavior components of “natural” 
responses, but is also patterned, routinized, recognized intersubjectively as having a certain sort of meaning. For 
example, a practice of routine coast guard patrols of a particular area or consistent diplomatic protest to another 
state’s claim using legal language would be undertaken to pursue defined goals (Chinese claims to jurisdiction and 
sovereign rights) that are recognizable to other states as an assertion of legal (and other) interests.  
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Tracing this pattern of Chinese participation in transnational legal processes allows us to observe 
whether and how expected, salutary effects of participating in transnational legal processes break 
down. Obedience is the most visible and significant of these presumed salutary effects, and one 
from which China’s practice departs in observable ways. China’s deviation from the “teleology 
of obedience” is especially remarkable in its maritime disputes. The disputes showcase a Chinese 
version of “the rules” that differs substantially from those of other states engaging those same 
law of the sea norms, providing a venue to observe how China uses those norms as instruments 
to pursue closure of disputed space. Koh recognizes that such disobedience is possible,103 but 
neglects any exploration of what leads to that outcome and where the transnational legal process 
goes off the rails. The Chinese case presents a corrective to this explicitly normative vision, 
presenting us with a practical question about what other attitudes and behaviors result from 
participation of powerful, non-Western states in transnational legal processes.  
Comments on Case Selection 
 
The choice of this particular case of China and the law of the sea may be understood as fitting 
certain desirable selection criteria for social science. Specifically, the proposed substantive legal 
focus on the EEZ regime as creating specific kinds of rights and obligations gives us two kinds 
of valuable leverage that may be used to generalize from a “crucial case.” Furthermore, the 
procedural focus on China’s overall engagement with international law bears all the 
characteristics of an “influential case” that should lead us to think that observations in the 
                                                
103 Indeed, in his seminal essay on TLP he announces his purpose as answering the question “If transnational actors 
do generally obey international law, why do they obey it, and why do they sometimes disobey it?” (Koh 1997: 
2600). He also recognizes strong agency, for the United States in particular, when he “predicts that nations will 
come into compliance with international norms if transnational legal processes are aggressively triggered by other 
transnational actors in a way that forces interaction in forums capable of generating norms, followed by norm-
internalization” (Koh 1996: 206). Focusing on the positive, pro-social outcome of obedience leads him to neglect 
why and when and how transnational legal processes do not work in desired ways. 
Chapter 1 – Four i’s: A Practical Theory for China and the Law of the Sea 
	 72 
Chinese case are more important than most other cases, and may generate further testable 
propositions about how relationships between sovereign states and international law vary 
historically and geographically.  
A “Sinatra” Case for Law-as-Constraint. An international legal regime like the EEZ is an 
attractive candidate for study as a “crucial, least-likely” case104 for the constraining (or 
regulative) effect of international law. This is the principle expectation of the contract theorists 
and the principle foil for power theories that question law’s capacity to hinder a state’s freedom 
of action. It is “least likely” because any rule of international law that has bearing on the 
territorial integrity of the state is a prime candidate for being irrelevant. States jealously guard 
this sovereign prerogative – it is requisite for survival (Waltz 1979) – and are unlikely to brook 
uninvited encroachment on their territory (or any geographic space under their jurisdiction, like 
an EEZ). Similarly, a strong state should not be expected to honor a rule that infringes on its 
security or national defense strategy. If a navy has the capability to operate in a particular space 
and a security interest in doing so, we may reasonably doubt the capacity for any law to curtail 
its freedom of action in the breach. These are laws that seem highly likely to exist only in the 
minds of the bureaucrats who drafted the Convention, and among the least likely of laws to 
constrain states when it counts.  
The selection of China also adds significant weight to the “least-likeliness” of this case. In the 
first place, most scholars believe great powers to be less constrained by international law than are 
smaller states. China is even less likely to be constrained than the typical great power (if such a 
thing could exist) because of its traditional hostility to “Western” or “hegemonic” international 
law (Cohen and Chiu 1974; deLisle 2000, Pan 2011). Most directly, that the laws in question 
                                                
104 Gerring 2007: 659-663 
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would constrain China’s ability to pursue its interests in maritime disputes with major historical, 
economic and strategic significance make for an especially hard case. Chinese elites and top 
leaders have placed defense of China’s sovereignty to disputed islands and protection of the 
various “maritime rights and interests” that this sovereignty entails among their “core interests.” 
The proposition that a rule of international law could meaningfully shape their pursuit of these 
basic state goals puts the question of law-as-constraint to a very hard test. 
China’s geography also warrants doubt that it would “obey” such a regime: the vast space 
enclosed by EEZs effectively “zone-locks” China, in the sense that vessels leaving China must 
pass through another state’s EEZ to reach the high seas. In peacetime or otherwise, no strong 
navy would voluntarily submit to having its freedom of action curtailed. Finally, for a political 
regime that jealously guards its territorial integrity, the idea that a multilateral treaty and 
associated legal obligations could occasion any slackening in its maritime vigilance seems far-
fetched. The combination of these factors (i.e., a law likely to be ignored, and a state primed to 
reject international laws of that type) makes this into something of a “Sinatra” case: if 
international law can make it here, it can make it anywhere (Levy 2008).105 
A Prime Candidate for Law’s Transformative Effects. Parallel to the unlikelihood of the EEZ 
imposing meaningful constraints on China, the case also fits the bill as a “crucial, most-likely” 
case106 for the transformative effects of international law upon state identity and interests. This is 
principally because the EEZ regime actually creates new legal rights where none existed before. 
Virtually all of the area that is now claimed as state-regulated EEZ was previously high seas in 
                                                
105 In other words, if contract is operating strongly in this case, it should also operate in other, less challenging 
circumstances. Matthew Evangelista suggests that this be further specified as a “New York, New York” variant of a 
“Sinatra Case,” noting that Soviet foreign ministry spokesperson Gennadi Gerasimov's invoked the “My Way” 
variant of the Sinatra Doctrine to replace the Brezhnev Doctrine in Eastern Europe. 
106 Gerring 2007: 659-663 
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which no state enjoyed any sovereign rights or jurisdiction beyond its own flagged vessels and 
nationals. As such the EEZ is an example of a distinct type of bargaining problem for which 
international law is a possible solution – “division of new or potential benefits…obtainable by 
cooperation” (Fearon 1998).107 This is the legal equivalent of a free lunch, and quite naturally 
creates new rules of the game and new reasons for action – because there was in fact no game to 
speak of in the EEZ for the state prior to the development of the regime.  
In this case, the logic of law as a constraint is especially unlikely to be in play. There is virtually 
no circumstance produced by the new EEZ regime in which some agency or actor is asked to 
renounce some former privilege or rent in order to come into compliance and serve some broader 
state interest. Instead, the incorporation of a vast new space is a massive job-creation engine for 
any state that cares to cash in on its EEZ entitlement: lucrative new real estate for fishing, oil and 
gas development, mineral exploration, scientific research, eco-tourism, and of course all of the 
associated law enforcement responsibilities that go with it. How could any decent bureaucrat 
resist? What state would reject a contract that endowed them with new resources and real estate 
without levying any direct costs? How could that state fail to adapt itself to accommodate this 
windfall with its domestic institutions? 
The historical process by which the EEZ came into existence also contributes to its likelihood of 
constituting new state interests and identities. Specifically, the fact that the extension of 
jurisdiction was principally a project of the unwashed masses of the global South gives it a high 
degree of representativeness and legitimacy in the eyes of most of the states party to UNCLOS 
III. Many of these states had not participated in a major international legal regime before – the 
                                                
107 The other type of problem in international cooperation for Fearon results from “attempts to renegotiate an 
existing cooperative arrangement,” which has a different strategic structure and requires a different sort of analysis. 
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People’s Republic of China most prominent among them, having been excluded from the UN 
until 1971. There are especially compelling reasons such novice states are prone to be 
“socialized,” or otherwise learn about international law, how to internalize it, how to practice it, 
and how to use it instrumentally.108 This is a compelling circumstance for international law to 
exert a transformative influence on states, and vice versa. We need only to assume that states are 
likely to want the law on their side to expect that their behaviors will be shaped, in some way, by 
the desire to influence how rules of international law are interpreted and practiced. 
A Canary in the Coal Mine. China’s relationship to an international legal regime is also a 
prototypical “influential case” that might encourage a “substantive reinterpretation of the case – 
perhaps even of the general model.”109 Simply put, China matters much more than a randomly 
sampled case (unless that case happens to be China or the US). This axiom holds across virtually 
any aspect of international relations, regardless of the analyst’s theoretical stripes. China has the 
world’s biggest population, boasts the second-biggest and fastest-growing economy, fields a 
nuclearized and rapidly modernizing military, maintains a distinctive socialist ideology, a 
resilient authoritarian Leninist party-state, a profoundly “non-Western” culture, and is 
dissatisfied with present distribution of territory.110 And all of this while buying up trillions of 
dollars of the most “Western” power’s debt and becoming the indispensable trading partner to 
most of the developed world. It is governed by an illiberal, unelected authoritarian regime under 
severe economic, social, environmental, and political strain. The fate of this highly dynamic 
China and the fate of the international system are inextricably bound, and this is nowhere more 
                                                
108 See Johnston 2008: 39-43 
109 Gerring 2007: 657 
110 This is the case by definition, independent of our evaluation of whether or not China is “a dissatisfied revisionist 
power” or not (Schweller 1999; Johnston 2003). Another state controls territory that China claims, so its preferences 
necessarily entail a change in the distribution of territory. Disputes over Taiwan, other offshore islands, and 
(arguably) sovereign rights and jurisdiction over maritime space all fit the bill. 
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obvious than in the international legal domain. If China’s relationship to international law cannot 
be explained by our dominant theoretical models, then those models are not properly adjusted to 
contemporary international relations. 
Testing an influential case “begins with the aim of confirming a general model.”111 Yet there is 
no such general model accepted by consensus across IR and IL disciplines. This study distills the 
main contenders – the arguments from power, contract and norms – and evaluates their 
effectiveness in explaining a particular transnational legal process. If we find that China confirms 
one or more of these theories, then we have strengthened our existing grasp of an important 
subject with more research (and maybe added some theoretical bells and whistles). If, as seems 
likely, the existing apparatus doesn’t reliably predict (or retrodict) China’s influence on 
international law, and vice versa, we have strong reason to begin revising our general model. An 
IR or IL theory that needs to exclude China has limited utility in the modern world. This is 
something like the obverse Sinatra doctrine: if it can’t make it here, it can’t make it anywhere.  
Going beyond China specifically to a system-wide appraisal, this influential case directly 
engages conflicts in the maritime domain involving the major security and economic interests of 
at least three of the great powers in the system: China, Japan and the United States. At the 
present moment, how international law is influencing each of them individually may be roughly 
accountable under existing theory, but there is obvious systemic importance in these parties’ 
negotiation over how international law is going to “work” among them. Even if the effects are 
contained within the region (an unlikely restriction), a suitable framework for understanding how 
international law shapes East Asian international relations is a necessity for scholarly and 
practical reasons. In broad tectonic terms, China’s rising power (relative to the region and the 
                                                
111 Gerring 2007: 658 
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United States) is already straining the rules and rights that underpin the post-war order (Gilpin 
1981). This process contributes to an uncertain hierarchy of prestige as China demonstrates a 
capacity to erode American alliances and influence in a region in which it has long been the 
indispensable actor (Ikenberry 2001; Katzenstein 2005). Signals of decreased American 
commitments to these alliances and the liberal order they uphold are further reason to consider 
this case as an influential for anticipating and understanding developments in international law. 
Extending this system-level appraisal, there are many reasons to consider how international law 
will work in a global system increasingly defined by “sinicization,” making “the world suitable 
to China and the Chinese.”112 Chinese influence on the basic patterns of international relations 
may be conceptualized in terms of creation of an Eastphalian (Ginsburg 2010) legal regime or 
establishment of a tianxia (Carlson 2011; Khong 2014) political system in East Asia or globally. 
This means, at a minimum, that international law’s function will vary where China is involved 
and may even be transformed more generally by virtue of China’s structural power. More 
prosaically, we should not expect much external validity from a model that excludes “as many as 
20%-30% of the observations of major power behavior”113 by failing to adequately study and 
describe China (and Japan). The larger the sample, the less important the individual cases. But in 
this arena of international law among great powers, our cases are severely limited and each one 
counts a great deal. This case strongly recommends itself as a canary in the coal mine for 
evaluating how well our conventional understanding of international law explains important 
international political phenomena. It is not general or radical enough to overturn any grand 
theoretical conceits, but it is positioned to make modest theoretical and empirical contributions 
that will help us make sense of a few contemporary problems of international politics. 
                                                
112 Katzenstein 2012: 9 
113 Johnston 2012: 56 








China’s Interaction with the Law of the Sea:  






“At present, the international situation is most favorable to the developing 
countries and the peoples of the world. More and more, the old order based on 
colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism is being undermined and shaken to its 
foundations. International relations are changing drastically….The struggle to 
defend sea rights initiated by Latin American countries has grown into a 
worldwide struggle against the maritime hegemony of the two superpowers.” 
 
- PRC President Deng Xiaoping1 
 
 
“The adoption of the Law of the Sea Convention is a victory in the long-term 
struggle of the Third World countries for equal maritime rights against the 
superpowers’ maritime hegemony.” 
 
- Editorial, 人民日报 [People’s Daily] (4 May 1982) 
 
The Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (“the Conference”), held from 1973 to 
1982, marked China’s first participation in “international legislation”2 with its newly-
gained seat on the UN Security Council.3 The Conference produced a new treaty, the 
Third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), with ambitious aims to 
realize “codification and progressive development of the law of the sea.”4 It remains the 
                                                 
1 People’s Daily 1974, “Speech by the Chairman of the Delegation of the PRC, Deng Xiaoping” 
2 “国际立法” is a commonly used term in Chinese writing on international law and international relations. 
3 The PRC replaced the Republic of China in the UN in October 1971. 
4 UNCLOS III, Preamble  
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largest multilateral treaty other than the UN Charter itself, and establishes a 
comprehensive legal regime designed to govern the use, protection and development of 
the world’s oceans and their living and non-living resources. The proceedings prompted 
unprecedented international participation (158 nations by the later stages), most of them 
colonized or non-existent throughout all but this late but productive stage in the long 
historical development of the international law of the sea. Beijing strongly and explicitly 
identified itself as a core member of this Third World group, then joined 116 other states 
in signing the Convention at the conclusion of negotiations in December 1982.5 
This Chapter analyzes the first of the 4 i’s in the adapted transnational legal process 
theory: interaction, the process by which states debate and create new international legal 
norms. We observe this process through the PRC’s participation in multilateral treaty 
negotiations at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (the “Conference”), 
where its representatives met with those of other states to forge UNCLOS III. From 1968 
(when the UN General Assembly began considering another law of the sea treaty) 
through 1982, these states engaged in repeated interactions to reconcile their varied 
interests in control of maritime space. Ultimately, this process not only codified existing 
customs but also established new norms – among them, norms underpinning the new 
regime of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The object of the Chapter is to start 
plotting the reciprocal influence between China and the EEZ regime at the point of initial 
contact between the state and international law – namely its national interests in 
                                                 
5 The PRC ratified UNCLOS III on June 7, 1996. The negotiation of the content of the Convention closed 
in 1982, though a long period of negotiation of an additional Implementing Agreement for Part XI ensued 
to deal with provisions concerning deep seabed mining which do not touch directly on the questions of state 
jurisdictional zones at issue in this study. The “package deal” adopted in 1982 is therefore the text of most 
consequence for this analysis and can be reliably treated as the “contract” to which the PRC consented.   
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participating in the treaty-making process. What were China’s interests in the EEZ and 
how did its delegates represent them in interactions at the Conference?  
Questioning China’s Interests in the Law of the Sea 
China’s positions at the Conference are inconsistent with its conventionally understood 
national interests, rendered in terms of wealth and security. PRC negotiators supported 
various disadvantageous aspects of the treaty, then ratified it as part of a broader Third 
World “struggle against maritime hegemony,” not to directly advance any material 
interests. In fact, PRC delegates adopted and promoted the specific treaty preferences of 
developing states whose material interests in the content of a law of the sea treaty 
differed substantially from China’s own. Evidence from China’s participation in the 
Conference supports a conclusion that China treated the law of the sea treaty as 
instrumental to a meta-political aim, shared with the Third World, to overturn Western 
dominance over “the rules” for the world’s oceans.  
Despite manifest costs, China pressed for greatly augmented authority for states to 
determine the allocation of legal rights, in direct opposition to the Western, liberal 
doctrine of market-based allocation (Krasner 1985). This illiberal doctrine underpins 
China’s efforts to promote indeterminate legal principles rather than determinate laws 
that could be invoked equally and uniformly by all states, and renders intelligible China’s 
idiosyncratic preferences for substantive rules promoting closure. China’s leaders 
expected that the indeterminate legal norms thus created would not constrain them, in 
practice, from the exercise of domestic political discretion about the depth and breadth of 
their binding legal obligations.  
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Not only did China consent to be bound by this new legal regime, the PRC delegation to 
the Conference enthusiastically promoted rules that guaranteed it an inferior allocation of 
marine economic resources, failed to mitigate known maritime security threats, 
exacerbated political-military strife over its several existing maritime disputes, and even 
generated several new disputes over maritime boundaries.6 The PRC delegation also 
bargained for procedures that explicitly denied China advantages in voting and drafting 
of the treaty text, and accepted a “package deal” from which it could not dissent with 
reservations.7 By nearly any measure, the substance of the treaty imposes major costs on 
China; the benefits, meanwhile, are distributed in such a way that China is relatively 
worse off. This relative loss was especially clear in view of the benefits to maritime great 
powers like the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan, whose traditional law of the 
sea regime China and its Third World collaborators aimed to renovate so as to promote 
greater equity and control for weaker states in this important domain. Those weaker states 
were much better served by the new law of the sea arrangement than the geographically 
disadvantaged Chinese, who nonetheless ratified a treaty that mostly satisfied Third 
                                                 
6 China disputes sovereignty to three island groups in the South and East China Seas, with associated 
disputes of maritime jurisdiction and boundaries. Independent of those sovereignty disputes and their 
jurisdictional implications, China also has undelimited maritime boundaries with all of its maritime 
neighbors (Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia due 
to overlapping exclusive economic zone claims. It also contests its jurisdictional rights in undisputed zones 
related to its claims to additional coastal state rights (especially the rights of warships in the territorial sea 
and exclusive economic zone).  
7 Nor could China exempt itself from compulsory dispute resolution that might infringe on its jealously 
guarded sovereignty. Despite this, Tao Jing 2014 argues that China successfully insulated itself from 
“sovereignty costs” by joining the treaty only with reservations about the issues that could be brought to 
compulsory third-party dispute resolution through the Convention. Although China did formally declare 
such reservations, it could not legally exempt itself from arbitration under UNCLOS on a broad class of 
issues (see UNCLOS III Articles 298, 309, 310, discussed at length in Part III of this Chapter). Tao’s 
argument is, in fact, falsified by events: China was subject binding arbitration with the Philippines under 
UNCLOS Annex VII dispute resolution procedures: The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s 
Republic of China, Permanent Court of Arbitration (2013). China rejects the legitimacy of the arbitration, 
claiming it infringes upon its sovereignty – but the award is considered binding under international law 
because China explicitly consented to its jurisdiction when it ratified the treaty. 
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World demands. With such commitments, practicing strict compliance with UNCLOS III 
obligations would inevitably hurt China, in both relative and absolute terms.  
The manifest costs of UNCLOS have not (yet) led the PRC to renounce or withdraw from 
the treaty, nor do they prevent Chinese officials from continuing to laud UNCLOS III – 
and stress China’s adherence to its interpretation of the treaty – in front of domestic and 
international audiences. Chinese leaders advocate UNCLOS rules and principles as 
appropriate for the resolution of various maritime disputes, even as they reject their 
practical use for such purposes.8 Beijing even devotes growing personnel and state 
resources to achieving nominal compliance with the treaty, and continues routine 
participation in its management at the UN.9 As costs related to its maritime disputes 
mount, private dissent about the wisdom of remaining within the treaty is circulating 
among Chinese elite, but for the foreseeable future Beijing appears bound to the treaty, 
even if it is not willing to comply with important provisions.10 The reasons for PRC 
ratification of such a treaty are mysterious if we rely on conventional rendering of their 
interests, so this chapter explores the ways Chinese experts and diplomats identified their 
interests and assessed the purposes of UNCLOS III. 
                                                 
8 Wang 2015. For China’s rejection of the role and UNCLOS in determining important maritime questions, 
see its practice regarding the Philippines’ UNCLOS arbitration, e.g. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People’s Republic of China 2014.  
9 The Department of Marine and Boundary Affairs was established in the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in 2009 and now devotes the largest volume of personnel to UNCLOS affairs of any other state 
party (author interview with MFA official, November 2014). Its domestic maritime law enforcement and 
administrative agencies have grown by several orders of magnitude over the last two decades. On these 
bureaucratic changes, see PRC State Oceanic Administration 2014; Zou 2001, 2005; Martinson 2015. 
10 Author interviews, Hainan and Beijing (August 2014). 
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Section I examines China’s participation in the Conference, drawing extensively on the 
official records of PRC delegates’ participation in the meetings,11 formal position papers, 
domestic legal scholarship and commentary.12 The dominant pattern that emerges from 
this evidence is China’s illiberal, indeterminate and “closed” positions on substantive and 
procedural elements of the treaty. Section II then evaluates Chinese elites’ internal 
assessment of the new regime, which demonstrates clear awareness of its various 
“defects” yet supports ratification. The Chapter concludes that explaining China’s 
position demands a prior account of how China’s identity and historical circumstances 
produced its particular constellation of interests in the treaty, a subject taken up in the 
subsequent Chapter on interpretation. 
I. China’s Interaction: Forging a New Convention on the Law of the Sea 
The PRC delegation to the Conference represented Chinese interests that were, by design, 
nearly indistinguishable from those of the large group of Third World states known as the 
G-77. That caucus included over 120 states, over two thirds of the participants in the 
Conference over its long negotiation between 1973 and 1982. These states adopted 
consensus positions in order to bargain from strength against the big maritime powers. 
China had precisely this goal in mind – supporting the Third World against “maritime 
hegemony” – in considering its own interests in a new law of the sea. This meant 
                                                 
11 The complete transcripts of all open sessions of the Conference and limited documents preceding it are 
available in United Nations 1973-1982, The Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, 
Vols. I-XVII. Henceforth these records will be cited according to their U.N. Document numbers (e.g., 
A/CONF.62/WS/37) 
12 This commentary draws on published writing as well as author interviews with members of the PRC 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bureau of Treaty and Law (Beijing, November 2014); PRC Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Bureau of Maritime and Boundary Affairs (Hainan, August 2014); and one member of the 
PRC delegation to the Conference, now at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (March 2015). 
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adopting substantive positions that promoted greater equity in marine resources for the 
developing world. It meant pushing for a regime to incorporate principles and procedures 
that ensured a greater degree of authority and control for sovereign states based only 
upon their geography – an illiberal, authoritative allocation that supported a 
programmatic goal of closure of coastal maritime space.  
The words of the Chinese head of delegation early in the Conference offer a striking 
account of how the PRC conceived of its interests within the treaty negotiation: 
The new legal regime of the sea should accord with the interests of the developing 
countries and the basic interests of the peoples of the world. The superpowers 
[are] trying to exploit certain differences among the developing countries in order 
to control, dominate and plunder them. All developing countries, although they 
might differ on specific issues, must unite against hegemonist policies [of the 
maritime powers]. The fundamental and vital interests of developing countries 
[are] closely linked, and unity [will] bring victory in the protracted and 
unremitting struggle. China [is] a developing socialist country belonging to the 
third world. Its Government [will], as always, adhere to its just position of 
principle, resolutely stand together with the other developing countries and all 
countries that [cherish] independence and sovereignty and [oppose] hegemonist 
policies, and work together with them to establish a fair and reasonable law of the 
sea that [will] meet the requirements of the present era and safeguard the 
sovereignty and national economic interests of all countries.13 
China’s delegation, in its rhetoric at least, conceived of the Conference as an opportunity 
to develop new international norms in the maritime domain by supporting the interests of 
the Third World as a foil to the “superpowers’ maritime hegemony.” Blustery, 
ideological rhetoric aside, Chinese interaction at the conference was quite substantive. A 
small but vocal Chinese delegation spoke out and wrote position papers prior to the 
Conference, played active roles in drafting committees and general meetings, and 
advanced G-77 positions in its interactions in formal and informal interest groups. 
                                                 
13 A/CONF.62/SR.25 
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Indeed, it caucused with the G-77 and adopted the group’s positions even when they were 
not its own prior to the Conference, and were costly compared to available alternatives. 
China chose to defer to the developing world on everything from technical questions of 
fisheries management and environmental conservation to highly politicized issues of 
redistribution of state control over strategically and economically salient maritime space. 
China’s substantive participation reveals clear-cut preferences for rules promoting a 
“closed” regime for the EEZ – i.e., one in which coastal states enjoy greater rights over 
maritime space. Closure is the creation and enforcement of additional rights for states in 
maritime space. The broader the geographic scope of those rights and the greater the 
substantive jurisdiction assigned to the holder of those rights, the higher the degree of 
closure. The doctrine underpinning this closed regime is illiberal in the basic 
presumption about the autonomy of individuals or states: where there is no law expressly 
granting a state (or a flagged vessel) a specific right, the coastal state can regulate or 
forbid its action.14 As opposed to the liberal norms that allowed “first-come-first-served” 
access, a market-driven system in which the more powerful maritime user states would 
prevail, China adopted the position of weak, small, developing states to carve out 
authority for states that could undermine the prevailing open regime. China joined Third 
World efforts to augment the content and scope of rights explicitly granted to coastal 
states, effectively limiting the rights held by user states, and granting the coastal state 
                                                 
14 This presumption or principle stands in contrast to the “Lotus principle” in international law, which holds 
that “all that can be required of a State is that it should not overstep the limits which international law 
places upon its jurisdiction” (Permanent Court of International Justice 1927, at 47). The liberal character 
of this principle lies in its granting freedom to a state (or any individual or unit) unless that freedom is 
expressly abridged by a positive rule of law. China’s stance is the inverse: where there is no law otherwise, 
the state enjoys a prerogative to abridge rights according to its discretion. 
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discretionary authority to decide when and where its jurisdiction can be exercised over 
other states. In this respect, PRC authorities tended to prefer that rules be constructed in 
ways that left them indeterminate – that is, permitting multiple and possibly contradictory 
interpretations. Due to the steady efforts of China and its Third World comrades, many of 
the critical rules governing the EEZ were vague, left to be interpreted based on principle 
(and political discretion) rather than on the basis of precisely defined statutes that leave 
little room for ad hoc judgments about its application.  
These key elements – illiberalism, closure, and indeterminacy – are manifest in China’s 
record of participation in creating the new oceans regime. Specifically, they are found in: 
(a) The various proposals for norms set out by Third World states that would lead to the 
creation of a new zone beyond the territorial sea; (b) the near-verbatim appearance of 
these Third World norms in Chinese statements and working papers in the UN prior to 
the Conference; (c) PRC delegates’ specific proposals during the Conference on 
procedural issues like voting rules and representation; and (d) PRC inputs regarding a raft 
of substantive questions about how to engineer desired rules in to the Convention – 
notably, in a consistent effort to afford maximum discretion to coastal states to determine 
the contours of the emerging EEZ regime. Finally, with these preferences intact, we can 
analyze (e) how norms help explain China’s interest in committing to the treaty.  
This section consults the record of this extensive Chinese participation in rule-making for 
UNCLOS III, available in exquisite detail through Conference records, a host of 
specialized commentaries by conference participants,15 and in official legislative 
                                                 
15 Center for Oceans Law and Policy 1985, 1993 
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histories16 of various elements of the treaty, all published by the UN. These documents 
provide an authoritative and precise account of PRC interests and specific preferences for 
the treaty. 
Pre-Conference Interactions: The Third World Defines EEZ Norms 
The direct catalyst within the UN for a new round of law of the sea negotiations came in 
November 1967, in the form of a dramatic speech in the General Assembly by the 
Maltese UN representative, Arvid Pardo.17 He introduced his remarks in explicit 
opposition to the maneuvering of the United States to keep his “premature proposal” off 
of the floor. The existing, market-based legal regime gave open access to the vast 
majority of the world’s ocean and seabed to the US and a small number of other 
advanced, industrial users capable of raising capital and deploying technology. In Pardo’s 
reckoning, “[c]urrent international law encourages the appropriation of this area by those 
who have the technical competence to exploit it.” That liberal regime effectively 
excluded the developing world. Pardo poignantly articulated the Third World’s call for 
equity, justice and non-market allocation – not only of resources, but of strategic space 
monopolized by the superpowers. Pardo advocated a new regime that could better deal 
with negative externalities of pollution and unsustainable fishing and mining.  
His speech gave publicity to the notion that the Third World had an equal stake – or, 
given the composition of the nations in the UN, a majority stake – in preserving the 
“common heritage of mankind” in the world’s oceans. Pardo’s words precipitated the 
                                                 
16 United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs 1992, 1995 
17 Pardo 1967  
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formation of a 35-nation UN Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-
Bed and Ocean Floor (the “Seabed Committee”)18 to consider the question of how to treat 
resources beyond the limits of state jurisdiction. Despite American and Soviet efforts to 
keep this movement from gathering momentum, it garnered widespread support 
throughout the developing world – a group that had recently come to dominate the 
UNGA – and ultimately became a permanent, 42-member committee whose work gave 
rise to the Conference.19 These discussions initially dealt with the deep seabed beyond 
state jurisdiction, but also produced a concomitant effort to determine the limits of state 
jurisdiction. Although they did not draft articles in advance, as had been done by the 
International Law Commission prior to the first two UNCLOS conferences, the Seabed 
Committee established certain core norms for the Convention that would follow. 
Following the work of the Seabed Committee from 1968-1973, the UNGA went on to 
authorize a third attempt20 to codify and develop the law of the sea “in response to the 
advance of technology, to the demand, especially by the developing countries, for greater 
international equity, and by the new uses of the sea and its resources.”21 The Seabed 
                                                 
18 A/Res/22/2340 (XXII) UNGAOR, UN Doc A/6716 (18 December 1967)  
19 UNGA Resolution 2467 A (XXIII) (December 21, 1968) established a Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, consisting of forty-two 
Member States. Subsequently, the General Assembly decided by resolution 2750 C (XXV) (December 17, 
1970) to convene a third conference on the law of the sea in 1973, and instructed the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction to act as 
preparatory body for the conference.   
20 Lacking a UN seat, the PRC had not been eligible to participate in the prior two UN conferences on the 
law of the sea, held in 1958 and 1960. Only the first of those sessions produced any agreed laws, in the 
form of the four Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea: Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone, 29 April 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 206 (entered into force 10 September 1964); Convention on 
the High Seas, 29 April 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into force 30 September 1962); Convention on 
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, 29 April 1958, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 
(entered into force 20 March 1966); Convention on the Continental Shelf, 29 April 1958, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 
(entered into force 10 June 1964). 
21 Koh 1983: 6 
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Committee’s work was dominated by Third World states who advocated a set of new 
norms for state jurisdiction well beyond the traditional limits of the territorial sea. The 
principles underlying these norms were abstract: justice and equity for states 
marginalized by advanced industrial countries’ dominance in the world’s oceans. They 
directly influenced the PRC position – and remained the core principles espoused by the 
Chinese long after their initial positions were diluted in negotiations (Yuan 1984). 
These ideas had been promoted and refined over years of discussion within the UN and in 
regional groupings. The emerging notion of the EEZ, in particular, was fundamental to 
narrowing the scope of great maritime power dominance of the seas. Beginning in 1952 
with the “Santiago Declaration” by Chile, Ecuador and Peru at the First Conference on 
the Exploitation and Conservation of the Maritime Resources of the South Pacific,22 
Latin American states pioneered the concept of a new zone that could guarantee “food 
supply and economic development” (Santiago Declaration, Article 1) for the developing 
world by endowing those coastal states with “sole sovereignty and jurisdiction…[over] 
not less than 200 nautical miles.” That Declaration also advanced the view that islands, 
no matter their size or geological characteristics, would generate zones.  
The negotiations of UNCLOS I created four Conventions in 1958 – one on the territorial 
sea, another on fisheries, another on the continental shelf, and another on the high seas – 
in which less developed countries were badly underrepresented and unable to effectively 
push forward these proposals. Only 86 states attended and less than 50 states, mostly 
European, acceded to each of these Conventions. A failed effort by a somewhat more 
                                                 
22 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of the Geographer 1979: 6 
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representative group to address some of the lingering issues from UNCLOS I (in the form 
of UNCLOS II in 1960) produced no new treaties. These failed efforts set the stage for 
continued struggle throughout the 1960s to develop an oceans regime that would codify 
the limits of coastal state jurisdiction, and to define the rights and duties of states beyond 
that limit.  
The push for a new oceans regime culminated in a series of declarations from the Third 
World that spilled out of the Seabed Committee and into the complex and contested arena 
of international oceans politics (Nye 1975). By 1970, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Uruguay circulated a call for the UN member 
states to recognize that “any norms governing the limits of national sovereignty and 
jurisdiction over the sea, its soil and its subsoil, and the conditions for the exploitation of 
their resources, must take account of the geographical realities of the coastal States and 
the special needs and economic and social responsibilities of developing States.”23 This 
statement crystallized a sentiment that some form of codified jurisdiction over a vast 
space beyond the territorial sea would be under the coastal state’s authority, totally 
independent of its means to actually exploit the resources contained, under a principle of 
equity for the Third World. Such authoritative allocation based on geography not power 
(manifest in the form of capability to exploit and use ocean resources and space) is 
perhaps the central norm underlying the eventual EEZ regime (Dutton 2012). 
By 1971, the writing was on the wall that an economic zone beyond the territorial sea 
would eventually become part of the law of the sea. At the twelfth meeting of the Seabed 
                                                 
23 “Montevideo Declaration on the Law of the Sea,” NV/185 (June 9, 1970), italics added. 
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Committee, Asian and African states found considerable common purpose in this 
endeavor, uniting in a pan-Third World sub-group, the Asian-African Legal Consultative 
Committee on the Law of the Sea. This group, a precursor to the G-77 group that would 
eventually dominate the Conference, concluded that “[v]irtually all states agree to some 
kind of exclusive jurisdiction in a zone adjacent to the territorial sea.”24 Caribbean 
countries followed suit in 1972 with a “Santo Domingo Declaration” that formulated the 
notion of a “patrimonial sea” in which the coastal state had specified “sovereign rights,” a 
duty to promote and a right to regulate marine scientific research, a 200nm maximum 
extent of jurisdiction, and a carve-out for freedoms of navigation and overflight with “no 
restrictions other than those resulting from the exercise by the coastal state of its rights 
within the area.”25 That formulation balances the rights and duties of states quite strongly 
in favor of closure by granting coastal states discretion to define their rights within zones 
under their jurisdiction and, on this basis, regulate other potential users.  
Defining the basic negotiating principles on this basis was fundamental to the Third 
World Effort to use legal norms to carve out space in the oceans that could not be 
subjected to the authority of advanced industrial states. The Santo Domingo statement 
made clear that this was an effort to “define, through universal norms, the nature and 
scope of the rights of states, as well as their obligations and responsibilities relating to the 
various oceanic zones, without prejudice to regional or subregional agreements, based on 
said norms.” The emphasis on legal and practical norms in this statement reflects a clear 
interest in revising the international legal regime for the law of the sea, and in particular, 
                                                 
24 United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs 1992: 4, in 
“Report of the Subcommittee on the Law of the Sea (18-27 January 1971). 
25 Ibid., 5, at Specialized Conference of the Caribbean Countries on the Problems of the Sea (9 June 1972). 
Rising Power, Creeping Jurisdiction: China’s Law of the Sea 
 92 
for redefining its scope and content such that coastal states have universally recognized 
authority to enact their own laws and policies in ever-increasing maritime zones (i.e., 
creeping jurisdiction).  
The steady movement toward closure in the EEZ took more specific, substantive form in 
a 1973 Declaration at Addis Ababa by the Organization of African Unity.26 This 
declaration directly informed the content of the draft articles of the pending Conference 
to begin later that year. In it, African states drew on the accumulated efforts of the Third 
World to propose norms that would redress the prevailing circumstance under which 
resources were “constantly being exploited by only a few states” and grant “permanent 
sovereignty” to the coastal states over “all the living and mineral resources.” Those states 
would enjoy unfettered rights to “manage the zone without undue interference with other 
legitimate uses of the sea; namely, freedom of navigation, overflight, and the laying of 
cables and pipelines.”  
This balance between coastal state management and flag state usage approximates the 
compromise struck at the Conference. It entails a wholesale replacement of the previous, 
liberal default norm, imposing geographically-based entitlements over once-unregulated 
high seas. Coastal states now enjoyed a specified group of sovereign rights that, in 
theory, did not infringe on various freedoms insisted upon by the maritime powers. Yet 
because the new dominant norm afforded the coastal state some discretion to determine 
                                                 
26 A/Conf.62/33, “Declaration of the Organization of African Unity on the Issues of the Law of the Sea” 
(1973). 
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what type of management was required in order to protect and enforce its rights, the 
system was indeterminate and allowed states to pursue closure. 
Pre-Conference Interactions: PRC Adopts Third World Norms 
The PRC’s stance on the law of the sea took shape only after it joined the UN in 1971, an 
interaction exposing it to Third World states’ views on ocean issues and leading PRC 
representatives to greater appreciation of the demand for a new treaty. China’s professed 
interests in the law of the sea were soon indistinguishable from those of Latin American 
and African states; the specific norms promoted by the PRC prior to and during the 
Conference were cut from the whole cloth of the various proposals by Third World. They 
were even justified within China on the basis of supporting the Third World struggle – 
not, indeed, as a function of any specific PRC interest in maritime jurisdictional issues.27 
China’s representative to the Seabed Committee, Shen Weiliang, made this orientation 
abundantly clear and professed total solidarity with Third World causes. He denounced 
the previous regime as “fundamentally in the interests of the superpowers in pursuing 
maritime hegemony and not to the advantage of the large numbers of developing 
countries in their just struggle to defend their sovereignty and national economic 
interests.”28 In this context, Shen confirmed that “the Chinese delegation firmly supports 
the opinion of the delegations of many small and medium-sized countries that at the third 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, a new and comprehensive convention should be 
worked out to replace the four Geneva conventions [i.e., UNCLOS I]. We are deeply 
                                                 
27 See Beijing Review 1971: 13 for specific reference to the various Latin American claims that informed 
China’s arguments in its early position papers. 
28 Xinhua Weekly 1973: 18 
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convinced that this will be in the interests of the people of all countries.” His conflation 
of Chinese interests with those of small, weak countries is clear, though it bears closer 
observation whether the reality of their participation matches the rhetorical commitments 
ventured by PRC representatives. 
To this end, we can analyze the three position papers the PRC submitted to the Seabed 
Committee in 1973 prior to the start of the Conference.29 Each of these papers – one on 
the “limits of national jurisdiction, one on “general principles for the international sea 
area” and another on “marine scientific research” (MSR) – announced positions that were 
virtually identical to those of the Third World, as expressed in the series of declarations 
examined above. These positions would reappear in PRC statements throughout the 
negotiating process, espousing illiberal doctrine via indeterminate rules that permitted a 
norm of closure. In these respects, China’s interests match those of the Asian and African 
states who led the drive to the Conference, and found expression in a fixed set of 
preferences that did not change throughout the negotiations. 
The first of the PRC working papers discussed the “Sea Area within the Limits of 
National Jurisdiction,” i.e., the emerging EEZ regime as well as the territorial seas 
landward of that new zone. It should be considered the first and most comprehensive 
statement of PRC principles regarding EEZ rules. The paper asserts that the scope and 
content of the EEZ should be determined by the coastal states in accordance with their 
subjectively assessed interests. The thrust of the PRC position in this first working paper 
                                                 
29 A/AC.138/SC.II/L.34, Working Paper on Sea Area within the Limits of National Jurisdiction (16 July 
1973); A/AC/138/SC.I/L.25, Working Paper on General Principles for the International Sea Area (2 August 
1973); and A/AC.138/SC.III/L.42 Working Paper on Marine Scientific Research (19 July 1973). 
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parrots the statements and working papers of the Latin American and African states.30 
Subsequent PRC participation in the Conference negotiations led only to additional 
parameters placed on this unmistakable call for an illiberal regime that would allow 
individual states to promote closure at their own discretion, through indeterminate 
principles rather than precise, statutory rules.  
The key issue at stake in the first working paper is the limit on coastal state jurisdiction 
over maritime zones extending from its coast, and China staked out a maximalist position 
on how that limit is defined and how much jurisdictional content can be claimed.  Article 
I(2) of the working paper states that “[a] coastal State is entitled to reasonably define the 
breadth and limits of its territorial sea according to its geographical features and its needs 
of economic development and national security and having due regard to the legitimate 
interests of its neighboring countries and the convenience of international navigation.” 
Article II(1) extends this same reasoning to the zones seaward of the territorial sea, 
stating that “[a] coastal state may reasonably define an exclusive economic 
zone…beyond and adjacent to its territorial sea in accordance with its geographical and 
geological conditions, the state of its natural resources and its needs of national economic 
development.” The 200nm limit that had become normal in the later Latin American and 
African positions did not appear in this first Chinese paper, although eventually China 
                                                 
30 Of particular influence on the content of the Chinese statement are EEZ draft articles from Kenya: UN 
Doc. A/AC/138/SC.II/L.10 (1972), 27 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 21) at 180, UN Doc. A/8721 (1972), then 
submitted as Revised Draft Articles on the Exclusive Economic Zone (submitted by Kenya), Asian-African 
Legal Consultative Committee, Report of the 14th Session (New Delhi, Jan 10-18, 1973) at 61; and the 
Santiago Declaration on the Maritime Zone (18 August 1952), UN Treaty Series, no. 14758, 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201006/volume-1006-I-14758-English.pdf. The 
language of the Chinese papers and statements were also constructed in such a way as to contradict the 
basic premises of statements by Japanese and (A/AC/138/SCII/L.12 188) and Soviet delegations 
(A/AC.138/SC.II/L.6 158).  
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fell into line with this emerging norm. The initial Chinese stance was even more broad 
and indeterminate. 
Affording total discretion to the coastal state in determining the limits of its jurisdiction is 
a radical departure from existing norms in which the balance of rights beyond the 
territorial sea is held by user or “flag” states. Rather than strictly limiting jurisdictional 
zones to areas within a state’s capacity to exploit or regulate, China’s argument would 
determine the scope of a state’s geographic control over maritime space on the basis of 
that state’s subjective determination of its security and economic interests. The specific 
content of the rules within that scope, moreover, would also be entirely within the state’s 
discretion. To this end, China’s working paper claims in II(6) that “[a] coastal State may 
enact necessary laws and regulations for the effective regulation of its economic zone. 
Other states, in carrying out any activities in the economic zone of a coastal state, are 
required to observe the relevant laws and regulations of the coastal State.” This 
indeterminate “domestic” principle – that the coastal state may regulate its jurisdictional 
zones entirely according to its lights, based on its subjective understanding of the law of 
the sea – underlies most of China’s substantive positions throughout the Conference. 
China’s other two pre-Conference working papers telegraphed substantive positions that 
would later be elaborated by its delegates during negotiations. The paper on “General 
Principles for the International Sea Area” sketches Chinese views on areas beyond 
national jurisdiction – namely that they are “jointly owned by the people of all countries” 
(Article 1) as the “common heritage of mankind.” China’s vague position here later 
crystallized around the idea of putting economic activity in this non-sovereign area under 
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the auspices of the “Enterprise,” an international body promoted by developing states to 
check the unregulated use of deep seabed minerals and other resources by maritime 
powers. This subject of deep seabed mining in the “Area” beyond national jurisdiction 
(i.e., the high seas) was a highly contentious one throughout and after the Conference 
(and also the ostensible reason for American non-accession to the treaty). It proved a red 
herring, as this activity has yet to become commercial. The stakes were always lower 
than those of the near-shore zones, but China’s diplomatic efforts in support of Third 
World causes reflected the specific interests of those weak states in checking market-
driven use of resources in all zones. 
China’s third paper, on “Marine Scientific Research” (MSR), advocates maximum 
discretion for coastal states to regulate activities of other states in their EEZs. Foreign use 
would be subject to “relevant [domestic] laws and regulations” as a function of the 
“sovereignty” of the coastal state within that zone. This conflation of non-exhaustive 
coastal State sovereign rights in EEZs and its unlimited sovereignty recurs in Chinese 
proposals and statements throughout the Conference proceedings. The black letters of the 
EEZ negotiated at the Conference plainly restrict coastal states to less than full 
sovereignty in this resource zone, but Chinese and Third World advocacy for a broadly-
construed, indeterminate account of how those coastal state rights are constrained plays a 
big role in subsequent practice. In concert, the PRC’s position papers telegraph the PRC 
delegation’s desired role as a staunch advocate of Third World interests, and in parallel, a 
spoiler to the preferences held by strong maritime states.  
Procedural Justice for the Little Guys 
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Discussion of the procedures by which the treaty would be drafted dominated early stages 
of the Conference. China weighed in consistently for an arrangement that would give 
maximal representation to the interests of the Third World and thus constrain the 
maritime powers’ capacity to dictate substantive rules. To this end, the Chinese delegates 
argued strenuously to limit their own privileges as a UNSC member by engineering 
specialized committee leadership and composition, and general voting procedures that 
formally assured equal voice to all participants in developing the substance of the treaty. 
To law of the sea experts in the West, the Chinese contribution and its decision to caucus 
with the states of the Third World yielded a “complex, cumbersome and inefficient 
decision system” with “a high probability of official failure.”31 The unwieldiness of the 
process and its inability to produce a totally coherent text do not appear to have troubled 
Chinese negotiators, whose thoroughgoing commitment to opposing the “superpowers’ 
maritime hegemony” in some cases led to contradictory positions.  
(i) Committee composition. Drafting a treaty covering so many substantive areas required 
a determination of how specialized committee posts would be allocated among the 
different states negotiating the treaty. These committees were composed of 
representatives put forward by regional groups, which were formal caucuses known as 
the Asian Group, the Latin American Group, the African Group, and the Eastern 
European Group. An informal Western European and Others Group was considered a 
residual category and denied any special privileges on committees, a procedural 
disadvantaged locked in by the vastly superior numbers of the other regional groups.32 
                                                 
31 Miles 1977: 159. See also Johnston 1975: 357-372; Friedheim 1993. 
32 Miles 1977: 163 
Chapter 2 – China’s Interaction with the Law of the Sea 
 
 99 
China and others also insisted that a large group of non-states were admitted as observers 
and sat in committees.33 Despite widely various interests based on their geography and 
levels of development, the G-77 group was able to maintain “ideological and political 
integrity” with strong encouragement from the Chinese delegation, who had Chairman 
Mao Zedong’s explicit endorsement to promote Third World interests.34 
(ii) One State, One Vote. Although UN decision-making has an undemocratic voting 
procedure that grants extraordinary privileges to the permanent members of the UNSC, 
the Conference established a one-state-one-vote rule over the persistent objections of 
American and Soviet delegates. In refusing to extend its own UN voting privileges into 
the law of the sea negotiations, China demonstrated remarkable commitment to defending 
the interests of smaller states at its own expense. The Chinese head of delegation, Ling 
Qing, disputed this point extensively with the French, American, and Soviet 
representatives, siding explicitly with the “Asian, African and Latin American groups 
[which] had indicated their support for that [one-state-one-vote] principle, a position 
which [the PRC] delegation endorsed in view of its long-standing conviction that all 
countries, large or small, should have equal rights and that no country, however powerful, 
should enjoy a privileged position at an international conference. It should be noted that 
only the two super-Powers were asking for more than one seat. That was an unfair and 
unreasonable manifestation of super-Power hegemony, which his delegation firmly 
                                                 
33 See A/CONF.62/SR.98; A/CONF.62/L.29. Papua New Guinea, the Cook Islands, the Netherlands 
Antilles, Niue, Surname, the West Indies Associated States, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands 
invited to the Conference and allowed to participate in drafting meetings, as were national liberation 
movements like the Organization of African Unity, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the League 
of Arab States. These groups caucused with the Asian, African and Latin American groups as the G-77. 
34 Within months of the beginning of the Conference, Mao pronounced his theory of “Three Worlds” – see 
Mao 1974 and Miles 1977: 163. 
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opposed.”35 China’s individual vote counted far less as a result of this procedural move. 
In its strong advocacy for this provision it made a costly concession that demonstrated far 
more than mere rhetorical support for the Third World agenda at the Conference.  
(iii) “Gentleman’s Agreement” on Consensus. Although equally apportioned voting 
rights were already intact from the first session of negotiations (in Rule 37), the question 
of the standards by which those votes would be counted in decision-making was hotly 
contested (Rule 39).36 The argument over the required number or proportion of votes 
eventually produced an informal agreement, reached in desperation during the early 
stages of the second round of negotiations in 1974 in light of “the desirability of adopting 
a convention on the Law of the Sea which will secure the widest possible acceptance.”37 
The aim of this so-called “Gentleman’s Agreement” was to “make every effort to reach 
agreement on substantive matters by way of consensus…there should be no voting on 
such matters until all efforts at consensus have been exhausted.”38 Nominally, a majority 
rule prevailed over the American and European proposals for a two-thirds supermajority 
vote on the final text,39 but the consensus rule was well-understood to be the agreed 
procedure.40 No clear agreement was ever reached on the required majorities for specific 
substantive issues. The Conference had established the norm that the text would be 
                                                 
35 A/CONF.62/4-14. See also A/CONF.62/ SR.4, A/CONF.62/2 and Add.1-3 for further discussion on this 
procedural point. 
36 Extensive discussion of these rules occurred during the first session of the Conference, A/CONF.62/SR1-
13.  
37 A/CONF.62/WP.2 
38 UNGA 28th Session (1973) Supplement No. 21 (A/9021 and Corr.l and 3). 
39 Such a rule would have given American and other western negotiators more leverage to “divide and 
conquer” the large but diverse group of developing states, requiring only a small number to abandon 
solidarity with the Third World bloc and vote for their specific interests (as coastal states, landlocked states, 
major fisheries states, etc.). See Friedheim 1993; Chiu 1981 for detailed analysis of how different 
groupings’ preferences over specific rules were (in theory) distributed. 
40 Center for Oceans Law and Policy 1985: 4 
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harmonized over the course of formal and informal committee discussions, meetings and 
consultations, obviating the need for a “showdown vote.”41   
China’s desire for Third World solidarity and equity in the treaty was fulfilled, in the 
words of its delegation, because the “text would necessarily have to reflect the positions 
and interests of the majority of countries; in particular, it would have to be consonant 
with the interests of the developing countries, as voiced by the Group of 77.”42 This loose 
procedural arrangement could be construed to give any state a veto – including the 
maritime powers against whose will the various substantive provisions were being 
developed – and therefore negate the effect of the one-state-one-vote principle. But in 
practice, it meant that the agreed treaty would reflect the dominant role of the Third 
World throughout Conference drafting committees. China initiated neither of these 
procedural moves, but endorsed both without acknowledging their contradictory effects, 
standing on the principle that “the text should be drafted democratically and serious 
consideration should be given to the views of the developing countries.”43 It took this 
incoherent view with an eye towards supporting Third World interests, rather than its 
own narrowly-construed interest in maximizing its own voice. 
(iv) Reservations to the treaty. In its one notable departure from positions borrowed from 
the Third World, China lobbied for the possibility of individual reservations to 
substantive provisions of the treaty. That is, it came around to the position that states 
should be allowed to become party to the treaty while taking exception to one or more of 
                                                 
41 Chiu 1981: 12 
42 A/CONF.62/C.3/SR.21 
43 A/CONF.62/SR.78 
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its rules and stating an intention not to follow them – or, at least, to follow them with a 
particular interpretation that is not evident in the black letters of the treaty text.44 PRC 
comments in committee and plenary sessions on this issue came only late in the 
Conference (1980),45 when certain articles in the “single negotiating text” (SNT) that 
emerged from the drafting committees were insufficiently deferential to the interests of 
the developing world. China was especially adamant about reserving its domestic legal 
rights to regulate innocent passage and EEZ activities for military vessels, and was 
therefore unwilling to accept the contract as fully binding on its own practices.  
Chinese delegates were disappointed by their failure to explicitly empower states to 
enforce domestic law regulating foreign military vessels in coastal jurisdictional zones, 
and stressed the need for reservations on that account. They argued that “provisions 
[articles 309 and 310 of the Convention]46 were tantamount to preventing States parties 
from expressing reservations which would not be incompatible with the principles of the 
convention in respect of articles affecting their essential rights and vital interests.”47 
Although the final treaty text expressly forbids any state to make reservations that are 
incompatible with the Convention, the PRC did ultimately make declarations upon 
signature of the Convention that telegraphed its intention to practice the law of the sea 
                                                 
44 The default rule for treaties is that states are free to make reservations to parts of a treaty, provided they 
are not “incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty” (Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UN Treaty Series 331). 
45 See in particular PRC comments during A/CONF.62/SR.126 and A/CONF.62/SR.135. 
46 These articles obligate states to bring its domestic law into line with UNCLOS. “Article 309 
“Reservations and exceptions”: No reservations or exceptions may be made to this Convention unless 
expressly permitted by other articles of this Convention; Article 310 “Declarations and statements”: Article 
309 does not preclude a State, when signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, from making 
declarations or statements, however phrased or named, with a view, inter alia, to the harmonization of its 
laws and regulations with the provisions of this Convention, provided that such declarations or statements 
do not purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect of the provisions of this Convention in their 
application to that State.” 
47 A/CONF.62/SR.126 
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according to its own lights – especially where issues of coastal state discretion to apply 
its domestic law are concerned. This was a rare deviation from the interests of the Third 
World nations, who favored mandatory compliance by all states. It demonstrates China’s 
even more prepossessing interest in maintaining sufficient indeterminacy such that it 
could “auto-interpret” the treaty in light of its illiberal principles and domestic laws. 
(v) General move towards procedural obstruction. The variety and complexity of 
procedural points on which China expressed a view precludes comprehensive treatment,48 
but invites a general characterization of the motives underlying PRC efforts in this vein: 
it sought maximum voice for the Third World states participating in the Conference, and 
corresponding diminishment of the direct influence of the traditional maritime powers. 
The upshot of these efforts, given the overall composition of participants in the 
Conference, was a protracted debate about procedure that led to an unwieldy decision-
making system. China lent unequivocal support to the many procedural hurdles thrown 
up by the various Third World delegates. These mostly illiberal states shared an 
indifference, or even aversion, to the technically sound procedure and precise, binding 
language preferred by Western delegates.49 
These qualities of the PRC’s interaction – and especially its preference for principled 
indeterminacy – should be borne in mind as the analysis proceeds through the Conference 
and into the practical implementation of treaty obligations. The procedural negotiation 
                                                 
48 For example, China argued for an onerous credentialing process at each meeting (A/CONF.62/ SR.20), 
for representation from non-state “national liberation movements and organizations” (A/CONF.62/SR.25),  
49 One leading law of the sea authority remarked that the treaty did not employ “the kind of language that 
could have been drafted by the International Law Commission [as had previous UNCLOS treaties], nor 
indeed could the Commission have devised such a doctrinally confused regime” (Shearer 2014: 59). 
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was slow and cumbersome, matching the PRC’s professed desire that “[t]he future 
convention would have to take account of the needs of all nations of the world, and 
sufficient time should therefore be allowed for consultations. No convention which 
reflected the one-sided interests of a few major Powers will be respected or last.”50  
Substantive Chinese Contributions: Indeterminacy, Illiberalism, and Closure 
In consequence of the procedural system adopted by the Conference, the debates over 
substantive provisions were not only slow, but, in several key respects, inconclusive. The 
Chinese delegation steadily advanced the substantive goals first expressed in their pre-
Conference working papers. These goals were best served by indeterminate treaty text 
that allowed maximum discretion to coastal states. This principled move toward 
indeterminacy is particularly evident in China’s staunch support for closure of the EEZ 
through (i) balancing rights in favor of the coastal state, (ii) maximizing the scope of 
territorial seas (and archipelagic waters), (iii) curtailing traditional freedoms of the seas, 
especially for military vessels, (iv) advocating a strict regime for marine scientific 
research in the EEZ, and (v) resisting compulsory dispute resolution that might be used to 
clarify and enforce otherwise indeterminate rules. 
To these ends, the bulk of PRC delegates’ rhetoric at the Conference expounded on 
abstract principles, the source of no small frustration to Western delegates who prized 
determinate, coherent language and liberal norms. Much to the chagrin of the American 
delegation in particular, Chinese delegates repeatedly dragged their feet about what they 
deemed to be “premature consideration of specific or technical questions was not 
                                                 
50 A/CONF.62/SR.70 
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conducive to progress,” insisting that “important questions of principle should be allotted 
more time and considered on a priority basis.”51 Characteristic of future PRC statements 
and practice of the law of the sea, Chinese delegates generally avoided technical 
precision, favoring the more abstract goals of the Third World and “the principles to 
which they adhered—namely, the safeguarding of national independence, the equality of 
all States large or small, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and 
respect for the legitimate rights and interests of States.”52 This language is indicative of 
the overall thrust of Chinese contributions, calibrated to undermine the liberal system that 
enshrined maritime powers’ rights to use and exploit maritime space, replacing it with an 
illiberal regime under which weaker states’ authority could limit those freedoms. 
Focus on such illiberal goals led to Chinese advocacy for a set of substantive positions 
that were neither well-adjusted to its particular geographic and strategic circumstance, 
nor readily practicable as a coherent set of maritime norms. The latter incoherence in 
critical aspects of the treaty is connected to PRC and Third World efforts to design a 
system that would cordon off vast areas of maritime space under domestic jurisdiction 
that would otherwise have been subject to the relatively liberal, international legal norms 
that prevailed prior to UNCLOS III. This stance centered on defeating the agenda of the 
maritime powers, a negatively defined goal that goes some way towards explaining the 
incoherence of many of their substantive positions. Countering great maritime powers’ 
presumed manipulation of the Conference process emerged as a main operational goal for 
the PRC delegation, which characterized the alleged US and Soviet position as follows:  
                                                 
51 A/CONF.62/C.1/SR.36 
52 A/CONF.62/SR.98 
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It gave recognition to the 200-mile economic zone in words, yet insisted that the 
economic zone was a part of the high seas. It opposed the exclusive jurisdiction of 
coastal States over scientific research activities in the economic zone. It insisted 
that foreign military vessels need not give prior notification to or obtain 
authorization from coastal States for passage through the territorial sea and the 
straits lying within the territorial sea. It ignored the just proposals of the 
developing countries and refused to make compromises in substance, blaming the 
developing countries for lack of progress….The basic contradiction of the present 
work on the law of the sea was that, while the third world countries wanted to 
safeguard their maritime rights and interests, the one or two super-Powers were 
not reconciled to the loss of their privileged position of monopolizing the seas.53  
Examined in detail, the PRC’s substantive positions reflect a thoroughgoing commitment 
to negating the advantages that the existing open, liberal regime had allowed maritime 
powers to enjoy. At every juncture, their delegates espoused illiberal principles that 
allowed coastal states the discretion to promote closure on the basis of subjective 
determinations of their interests in security, economic development, and general 
protection of their sovereign prerogatives. These objectives are abundantly clear in the 
PRC contributions on a variety of subjects related to the emerging EEZ regime. 
(i) Supporting a balance of EEZ rights and jurisdiction that favors coastal states. In 
discussing the EEZ (often called simply the “economic zone” while still in its nascent 
form during the Conference), Chinese delegates promoted authoritative allocation that 
negated market-driven advantages enjoyed by maritime powers. The unresolved tension 
between these norms emerged in the articles of Part V of the Convention. The text 
reflects a fragile compromise between constructing a zone as the extension of a coastal 
state’s territorial waters (as preferred by China and the group of “territorialist” states) and 
leaving it as a part of the high seas with preferential rights carved out for the coastal state 
(the so-called “preferentialist” position favored by the Soviets as well as the US and their 
                                                 
53 A/CONF.62/ SR.76 
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western European allies).54 Ultimately, a third way – the so-called “zonist” position – 
prevailed in the text of the Convention. The EEZ regime defined specific jurisdiction and 
sovereign rights for coastal states, identified rights and duties for “user” (or “flag”) states, 
leaving indeterminate the precise method for balancing the interests of coastal and user 
states.  
This compromised design was effected by a deeply divided Second Committee, in which 
the many Third World states pressed their numerical advantage. The President of the 
Conference (a Sri Lankan) acknowledged it to be a concession to “the special character of 
this new legal concept (EEZ), which calls for a clear distinction to be drawn between the 
rights of the coastal State and the rights of the international community in the zone. A 
satisfactory situation must ensure that the sovereign rights and jurisdiction accorded to 
the coastal State are compatible with well-established and long-recognized rights of 
communication and navigation, which are indispensable to the maintenance of 
international relations, commercial and otherwise.”55 This question of “compatibility” 
between the rights of users and the rights of the coastal state under whose jurisdiction the 
EEZ falls was the crux of the debate. The “zonist” position did not so much resolve that 
debate as paper it over with indeterminate language pressed upon the committee by China 
and other Third World delegates seeking to undermine the liberal rights granted to all 
users. A regime lacking precise language would make “creeping jurisdiction” possible for 
coastal states seeking greater authority over this new ocean frontier. 
                                                 
54 See Lupinacci 1984 for extended discussions of the various EEZ positions. These distinctions became 
clear in Conference discussions, especially in: A/Conf.62/L.8/Rev.1 (1974) Annex II, App. I 
[A/Conf.62/C.2/Wp.1] Provisions 88-123, III Off Rec 107, 120. 
55 A/Conf.62/L.12/Rev.1, Paras 11-13, VI. 
Rising Power, Creeping Jurisdiction: China’s Law of the Sea 
 108 
China’s contributions extended the positions it established in the pre-Conference period 
at the Seabed Committee, where it had acknowledged that the emerging EEZ beyond the 
territorial sea was not fully sovereign, but neither was it by default open to foreign use. A 
PRC representative argued that “other countries can engage in activities in the EEZ of a 
given country [i.e., the coastal state] only when they have secured its consent by 
concluding necessary agreements with it through consultations on an equal footing and 
on the basis of respect for its sovereignty.”56 This argument draws on the principle that 
the coastal state may use its discretion to advance some undefined set of interests – some 
of which pertain to its security and other subjective considerations, not merely those 
relating to sovereign rights over economic resources firmly established in the text.  
For the Chinese, establishing the EEZ as a sui generis zone distinct from the unregulated 
high seas meant treating it as something like a territorial sea, an integral part of the state 
with only slightly attenuated entitlements to rights and jurisdiction. This aim manifested 
in PRC support for some of the more outlandish claims to 200nm territorial seas (by Peru 
and El Salvador), maximal bargaining positions that China endorsed due to its stated 
principle that the new one should “be delimited by each country in accordance with its 
legitimate needs and for the purpose of defending its national sovereignty, independence 
and resources. Some other developing countries favoured, for the same purposes, the 
establishment of a 200-mile territorial sea with different regulations for individual sectors 
of it.”57  
                                                 
56 Zhuang 1973: 7 
57 A/CONF.62/SR.55 
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The coastal state rights ultimately acknowledged in Article 5658 sit uneasily with the flag 
state rights accorded in Article 58,59 both of which appeal for “due regard” to the rights 
of the other without specifying how that regard is to be exercised in practice except in the 
indeterminate Article 59.60 The method prescribed is basically ad hoc: “where this 
Convention does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to the coastal State or to other States 
within the exclusive economic zone, and a conflict arises between the interests of the 
                                                 
58 UNCLOS III, Article 56 “Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the exclusive economic 
zone”:  
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has: 
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and 
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to 
the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the 
economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from 
the water, currents and winds; 
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard 
to: 
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; 
(ii) marine scientific research; 
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment; 
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention. 
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the exclusive 
economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and 
shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention. 
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the seabed and subsoil shall be exercised in 
accordance with Part VI. 
59 UNCLOS III, Article 58 “Rights and duties of other States in the exclusive economic zone”: 
1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the 
relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and 
overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful 
uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, 
aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this 
Convention. 
2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive economic 
zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part. 
3. In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention in the exclusive 
economic zone, States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall 
comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the 
provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law in so far as they are not 
incompatible with this Part. 
60 UNCLOS III, Article 59 “Basis for the resolution of conflicts regarding the attribution of rights and 
jurisdiction in the exclusive economic zone”: 
In cases where this Convention does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to the coastal State or to 
other States within the exclusive economic zone, and a conflict arises between the interests of the 
coastal State and any other State or States, the conflict should be resolved on the basis of equity 
and in the light of all the relevant circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of 
the interests involved to the parties as well as to the international community as a whole. 
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coastal State and any other State or States, the conflict should be resolved on the basis of 
equity and in the light of all the relevant circumstances, taking into account the respective 
importance of the interests involved to the parties as well as to the international 
community as a whole.” The indeterminacy of this language reflects, in large part, the 
aggressive efforts spearheaded by China and other members of the “territorialist” group 
to forestall a complete accounting of the exact rights enjoyed by foreign users of EEZs 
and thus maximize the coastal state’s discretion to recognize them on an ad hoc basis. 
This maneuver created a possibility that due regard for coastal state “interests” entails 
unspecified authority for closure according to domestic laws and regulations. 
(ii) Maximizing the breadth of the territorial sea out to 12nm. The extension of 
“seaward” limits of the EEZ to 200nm was partially realized by the establishment of a 
territorial sea with a breadth of 12nm.61 China enthusiastically promoted the Third 
World’s efforts to expand the territorial sea to 12nm, far broader than the customary 3nm. 
This move had a direct effect on the EEZ, whose inner “landward” origins were 
correspondingly expanded. Even as they bargained away the maximal position adopted in 
the 1973 working paper on the limits of coastal state jurisdiction (that states determine 
the breadth of their own territorial sea), the PRC delegates remained staunch in the face 
of what they perceived to be “superpowers trying to impose a strict limitation on the 
breadth of the territorial sea. To them, the narrower the territorial sea and the wider the 
so-called high seas, the better, so that they could do as they pleased in the open sea.”62  
                                                 
61 See Koh 1988 for analysis of the shifting of the norm for a fisheries zone from 50nm to 200nm over the 
course of the 1970s. 
62 A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.48 
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Over the course of the negotiations, 12nm emerged as a consensus norm among the Third 
World States with respect to the breadth of territorial sea, and China joined ranks even as 
it maintained the principle that there was no determinate limit on the coastal state’s 
discretion in this regard.63 China’s advocacy for that maximal principle, however, was 
among the factors that led to the adoption of a considerably broader territorial sea – a 
determination that the first efforts to codify the law of the sea at Geneva in 1958 and 
1960 (UNCLOS I and II) failed to produce. The overall effect of this hard bargaining is 
reflected in the comment of the US representative in October 1979, who conceded that “it 
remains the firm position of the United States that a comprehensive convention on the 
law of the sea offers by far the best, and perhaps the last, opportunity to establish a 
universally agreed and conflict-free regime governing all uses of the world's oceans and 
their resources. We have indicated that, as part of such an agreement, we could accept a 
12-mile territorial sea coupled with transit passage of straits used for international 
navigation, all within the context of the over-all package deal.”64 The Third World and 
their Chinese patrons exacted a painful compromise from the maritime powers in 
expanding the sovereign territorial sea well beyond its traditional limits. 
(iii) Curtailing traditional freedoms of the seas for military vessels. Among a small 
number of very specific, substantive arguments consistently forwarded by Chinese 
delegates was opposition to military activities in coastal state jurisdictional zones. This 
entailed (1) a strict requirement for permission from the coastal state for warships to 
                                                 
63 As late as 1979, when 12nm had been fully agreed, a Chinese delegate said it was  “the basic position of 
his Government that no international law existed establishing a uniform limit to the breadth of the territorial 
sea, the delimitation of which was a matter of State sovereignty” (A/CONF.62/SR.118). 
64 A/CONF.62/92, statement by the representative of the United States of America in response to the 
statement by the Vice-Chairman of the group of coastal States contained in document A/CONF.62/90 
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exercise the right of “innocent passage” when transiting that coastal state’s territorial sea, 
(2) a comparable restriction on “transit passage” for warships through international 
straits, and (3) some unspecified authority for coastal states to regulate military activities 
in EEZs. Collectively, these positions reflect the Chinese preference that the new 
Convention should grant vastly expanded authority to coastal states to limit the activities 
of this specific class of vessels on the basis of their infringement on subjectively-
determined security interests of the coastal state. 
Unrestricted freedom of action for warships was among the key sticking points for the 
maritime powers, and the records of the committee and plenary discussions bear out a 
stark debate on this question at many junctures. The Chinese were most vocal with 
respect to innocent passage (and ultimately made a signing statement to the effect that 
they would practice according to their minority interpretation about the right of innocent 
passage), and relatively silent on the other two except for the repeated assertion that 
warships, like other vessels, “should observe the laws and relevant regulations of the 
coastal States.”65 In the Chinese view, “[a] coastal State may, in accordance with its laws 
and regulations, require military ships of foreign States to tender prior notification to, or 
seek prior approval from, its competent authorities.”66 This provision for notification or 
approval under domestic law remained a Chinese reservation, despite its unequivocal 
defeat in the final text. 
The substantive arguments China forwarded tended to leave ambiguous which rights the 
coastal state enjoyed in these zones, leaving open the possibility that coastal states could 
                                                 
65 A/CONF.62/SR.25 
66 A/AC 138/SC II/L.34, italics added. 
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claim authority to limit free navigation of warships. The PRC delegation maintained that 
“[c]oastal States were entitled to define a territorial sea of an appropriate breadth and, 
beyond it, their exclusive economic or fishery zones with appropriate limits in the light of 
their specific conditions and the needs of their national economic development and 
national security. In so doing they should naturally take account of the legitimate interests 
of neighbouring countries and the convenience of international navigation.”67 The term 
“convenience” has no legal meaning, but serves as a minor concession to the established 
rights of user states upon which the new EEZ regime encroached. The overall thrust is 
towards maximizing coastal state discretion to enact a closed regime that could limit 
military use of maritime zones. 
China opposed the maritime powers’ purported view “that the exclusive economic zone 
under the jurisdiction of the coastal State was part of the high seas.”68 The high seas 
freedoms enjoyed in the EEZ, China claimed, should be radically limited by coastal state 
jurisdiction of indeterminate scope and content, as preferred by the Third World:  
The majority of developing and other countries favoured an exclusive economic 
zone not exceeding 200 miles and measured from the baseline of the territorial 
sea, to be delimited by each country in accordance with its legitimate needs and 
for the purpose of defending its national sovereignty, independence and resources. 
Some other developing countries favoured, for the same purposes, the 
establishment of a 200-mile territorial sea with different regulations for individual 
sectors of it. The proposals stemmed, in each case, from the same position, 
namely, the need to safeguard State sovereignty, oppose aggression, expansion 
and plunder by the hegemonic Powers, and defend maritime rights within a 200-
mile zone.69 
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The Chinese and their Third World partners were not ultimately successful in achieving 
definite black letters that regulated the navigation of military vessels. This outcome was 
the result of maritime powers placing a high priority on “freedom of navigation,” with the 
US leading this effort to anticipate the various strategic implications of new zones long 
before the Conference began (Hollick 1981). In one particularly telling declassified 
conversation, US National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger told President Richard 
Nixon in 1971, after several Latin American states began to claim 200nm zones, that 
“unless we tell them we’re willing to negotiate the fisheries issue with them, they will 
have to start enforcing [their 200nm limit]….[I]f we don’t do it [i.e., negotiate] on 
fisheries, the Latin Americans will oppose us on the more important issue of navigation, 
which comes up on the law of the seas [sic] conference later this year.” Nixon, with 
characteristic charm, responds: “I don’t give a damn about the fisheries anyway. Let 
everybody have 200 miles to fish. They’re all poverty-stricken down there 
anyway….Navigation we want. Let them fish if they want.”70 Facing the concerted 
opposition of the maritime powers, who at least exercised a veto in the consensus-based 
process, the Chinese later took a more nuanced tack to close off EEZs from unauthorized 
use. This move enabled “creeping” coastal state jurisdiction into related functional 
regimes over which maritime powers were more inclined to negotiate. 
(iv) Augmenting coastal state jurisdiction over marine scientific research (MSR) in the 
EEZ. The PRC’s generic gripe about unrestricted freedoms for warships in coastal state 
zones took more substantive form in the discussions of the regime for MSR. The PRC 
joined Third World delegates in fighting to include a broader, less determinate class of 
                                                 
70 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian 2005: Document 395 
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activities under the MSR designation. They lobbied to subject military intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance activities that might be plausibly thought to contain a 
“scientific research” component to the strict regulation of the coastal state. While they did 
not succeed in establishing any defined coastal state authority over these activities, this 
effort to shoehorn non-economic interests – especially those concerning security – into 
the rights of coastal states in the emerging EEZ regime influenced the final, indeterminate 
text of the MSR provisions in Part XIII of the Convention (see Appendix B). 
The Conference negotiations began with an assumption that the new EEZ would entail 
only economic rights, a parameter reflected in its name and in its enumeration of specific 
legal authorities for coastal and user states. Nonetheless, it presented a new conceptual 
container for legal authority – namely, “sovereign rights and jurisdiction,” inferior to the 
plenary bundle of sovereign rights that constitutes sovereignty itself, but lacking a clear 
jurisprudential distinction. Chinese and Third World delegates sought to fill that 
container with more extensive and significant coastal state jurisdiction, largely by 
maintaining the principle that the state, rather than the user, would make a determination 
about whether or not the activity in question qualified as a regulated activity. This 
arrangement stood in contrast to the European-led objection to any need for coastal 
consent when the research in question was “unrelated to the exploration and exploitation 
of the living and nonliving resources of the [exclusive economic] zone.”71  
A PRC delegate explained the objection to this proposal on the grounds that it nullifies 
“the reasonable principle that, in order to safeguard their sovereignty and security, the 
                                                 
71 A/CONF.62/C.3/L.26 
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coastal state’s consent should be required for any MSR carried out in waters over which 
it has jurisdiction. It is impossible in practice to determine whether or not such research is 
related to marine resources. The pretext of scientific research is used by super-powers to 
undermine the security and economic interests of the many developing countries which 
are coastal states.”72 In short, the coastal state would have near-total discretion to classify 
any activities in its jurisdictional zones and to require compliance with its domestic rules 
on the matter. If competent authorities determined that there was an MSR component to 
the activity, they would be able to forbid or regulate it. 
This is a concerted push for “creeping jurisdiction,” and is evident in the bargain 
expressed in Article 56. That seminal article establishes a coastal state’s “sovereign rights 
for exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether 
living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its 
subsoil, with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of 
the zone.” Those specifically enumerated rights are complemented by jurisdiction over 
artificial islands and structures, MSR, and protection and preservation of the marine 
environment. On paper, these articles constitute an exhaustive account of coastal state 
legal authorities in the zone – save for the carve-out for “other rights and duties provided 
for in this Convention” in Article 56(1)(c). The lens applied by the PRC and other 
developing states who sought to maximize the scope of their authority gave full play to 
this “other” category and the interpretative license they deemed it to confer. 
                                                 
72 UA/CONF.62/C.3/L.13/REV.2 
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The Chinese delegation’s stated views on this issue demonstrate general satisfaction with 
the text, which they felt supported their more closed interpretation of the MSR regime. 
The Chinese representative made this much clear when he stated that the PRC was taking 
what it viewed as a majority position regarding the principles underlying the new rules:  
[The PRC representative] associated himself with the views expressed on the 
issue of marine scientific research by the representatives of the United Republic 
of Tanzania, Brazil, Kenya and many other developing countries. His delegation 
was greatly encouraged by the positive efforts which many countries, especially 
those of the Third World, had made during the current session to find a reasonable 
solution to the issue. Nevertheless, he could not but note that the super-Powers 
were still clinging to their position of maritime hegemonism and opposing the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal States over marine scientific research….Both 
the economic zone and the continental shelf were within national jurisdiction; 
accordingly, it was natural and proper that the coastal States should exercise their 
jurisdiction over scientific activities carried out in those areas….His delegation 
shared the view of many developing countries that it was essential to provide in 
that article that the coastal States should have “exclusive jurisdiction” in regard to 
marine scientific activities in their economic zones and that express consent 
should be obtained for such activities. Only then could that article serve as a basis 
for future negotiations.73  
Indeed, the PRC felt their views had been vindicated in the black letters of the treaty, 
basing this interpretation on a presumption that the coastal state is within its rights to 
make ad hoc judgments about whether or not a given activity qualifies as MSR as defined 
in Part XIII of the treaty.74 
                                                 
73 A/CONF.62/C.3/SR.30 
74 UNCLOS III, Part XIII: Marine Scientific Research, Section 1. General Provisions: 
Article 238 “Right to conduct marine scientific research”: All States, irrespective of their 
geographical location, and competent international organizations have the right to conduct marine 
scientific research subject to the rights and duties of other States as provided for in this 
Convention. 
Article 239 “Promotion of marine scientific research” States and competent international 
organizations shall promote and facilitate the development and conduct of marine scientific 
research in accordance with this Convention. 
Article 240 “General principles for the conduct of marine scientific research” In the conduct of 
marine scientific research the following principles shall apply: 
(a) marine scientific research shall be conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes; 
(b) marine scientific research shall be conducted with appropriate scientific methods and 
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As early as 1975, the Chinese recognized that these interpretive differences were 
producing an agreed text that reflected some fundamentally different views about how the 
law of the sea would function with respect to MSR and other important functional areas. 
The PRC delegation made this concern clear at several junctures, recognizing that the 
“struggle for international legislative power”75 was not limited to the treaty’s black letters 
and would require perpetual contestation in practice: 
The superpower which claimed to be the natural ally of the developing countries 
and professed to have their interests at heart adhered to the position that the area 
beyond the territorial sea was the “high seas” and that the exclusive economic 
zone under the jurisdiction of the coastal State was part of the high seas. It 
insisted on the so-called “freedom of scientific research” in the exclusive 
economic zone, alleging that it was unrelated to marine resources. It clung to the 
so-called freedom of navigation for warships in the exclusive economic zone and 
even in straits lying within the territorial sea of other States, and opposed the 
regime of innocent passage in such areas. It had never abandoned the worn-out 
doctrine of the freedom of the high seas, which was the core of the old law of the 
sea, and that was a clear manifestation of its desire for maritime hegemony. In 
such circumstances, how could agreement be reached, even though great efforts 
were being made by the many developing countries and by others?76 
 
We may infer that China’s delegation believed that the binding effects of treaty rules 
were probably limited. The practical meaning of the treaty would depend upon norms 
established afterwards, especially through the practice of great powers. The agreement 
reflected in the black letters of the text thus appeared to the PRC as falling somewhat 
                                                 
means compatible with this Convention; 
(c) marine scientific research shall not unjustifiably interfere with other legitimate uses of 
the sea compatible with this Convention and shall be duly respected in the course of such 
uses; 
(d) marine scientific research shall be conducted in compliance with all relevant 
regulations adopted in conformity with this Convention including those for the protection 
and preservation of the marine environment. 
Article 241 “Non-recognition of marine scientific research activities as the legal basis for claims” 
Marine scientific research activities shall not constitute the legal basis for any claim to any part of 
the marine environment or its resources. 
75 Yuan 1984: 417-419 
76 A/CONF.62/SR.55 
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short of a binding contract, in that it did not specify determinate rights and duties in a 
way that was likely to uniformly influence all parties.  
(v) Resistance to compulsory dispute resolution that might be used to clarify and enforce 
otherwise indeterminate rules. The Conference participants recognized this 
indeterminacy. Anticipating conflicts arising from differing views on the treaty’s text, 
they created a compulsory dispute resolution system in Part XV to resolve questions of 
“interpretation and application of the treaty.” This mechanism was a part of the treaty 
itself, an unusual and ambitious feature in a multilateral treaty.77 This exotic condition 
reflects the Third World’s realization that without such a compulsory mechanism, 
maritime powers might easily opt out of inconvenient rules. 
In this respect, the PRC’s view differed quite clearly from the G-77 consensus position. 
As a once-and-future great power, it perhaps anticipated smaller states use of legal 
adjudication and arbitration as a “weapon of the weak” and avoided endorsing this 
significant aspect of the final agreement.78 Given that the PRC delegation held views 
about the meaning of various contentious provisions that were plainly at odds with those 
of some other delegates, they reasonably anticipated formal disputes about compliance 
with the new Convention. Specifically, the Chinese anticipated “problems within the 
scope of the State sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction of a sovereign State” which they 
                                                 
77 Typically, consent is given on a case-by-case basis for adjudication of treaty disputes. See Ginsburg and 
McAdams 2004 on this subject.  
78 Tao 2014 does not fully explain how China dealt with this feature of the Convention. Although they did, 
indeed, “opt out” of compulsory dispute resolution over a certain class of issues by way of an Article 298 
declaration in 2006, they could not exempt themselves from arbitrations over other issues. The Convention 
creates a compulsory dispute resolution procedure that is binding for all State parties. China attempted to 
“reserve” the issue of compulsory dispute resolution when it ratified, but given the treaty’s clear prohibition 
of this action, its reservation was legally meaningless. 
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continued to hold “should be handled in accordance with its laws and regulations. That 
was why [the Chinese] delegation considered that the provisions in document 
A/CONF.62/WP.9 concerning the compulsory jurisdiction of the law of the sea tribunal 
were inappropriate. Since the question of the settlement of disputes involved the 
sovereignty of all States, the procedures to be followed must be chosen by States 
themselves. If most States agreed to draft specific provisions on dispute settlement 
procedures, those provisions should not be included in the convention itself but should 
form a separate protocol so that countries could decide for themselves whether to accept 
it or not.”79 The Chinese were never reconciled to the idea that determinations could be 
made by third party arbitration, though this mechanism was firmly established in the 
Convention. They held, and continue to insist, that sovereignty permits states to exclude 
such legal measures and resolve disputes through “consultation and negotiation.”80 
Even one of the lone international legal scholars on the PRC delegation, Wang Tieya, in 
1979 rejected “any compulsory and binding third-party settlement,”81 though the PRC 
was obliged to accept it as part of the consensus deal that it duly signed in December 
1982. Considered in light of the various substantive provisions in which the PRC’s 
preferences for closure did not prevail in the text, this refusal could be reasonably 
expected to produce considerable legal difficulty and political friction once the treaty 
entered effect. The PRC’s adamant refusal to participate in or accept the Philippines’ law 
                                                 
79 A/CONF.62/SR.60 
80 This view is expressed in the PRC’s signing statement, analyzed in Section II. 
81 A/CONF.62/SR.112. In addition to Ni Zhengyu, Wang was the only international law scholar on the 
Chinese delegation (Kim 1987: 139). His 1981 textbook on international law remains the standard in 
Chinese law schools. Although his area of specialization was not the LOS, we can reasonably expect that 
his familiarity with Western scholarship law of treaties and their dispute resolution procedures was 
sufficient to recognize that the PRC had signed a treaty that made such resolution compulsory on all but a 
handful of exempted subjects. 
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of the sea arbitration, lodged in 2013 and completed in 2016, stands as a testament to the 
coherence of Chinese representatives’ stance on this issue. Fuller analysis of that 
arbitration is warranted – but on its face, this objection reflects a consistent preference.  
II. Post-Conference Assessment: Many Defects, But Close Enough 
When China signed the treaty on the closing of the Conference in December 1982, its 
leadership expressed satisfaction that the Convention was “a victory in the long-term 
struggle of the Third World countries for equal maritime rights against the superpowers’ 
maritime hegemony.”82 The maritime rights distributed by the text, however, could not be 
reasonably judged as “equal” in terms of China’s relative benefit from the agreed regime. 
Indeed, given China’s geography, demography, and maritime capabilities, the 
compromises for which it fought so diligently appear to put it at a severe disadvantage. 
Assessing the damage: codified disadvantages 
Chinese scholars still debate the success of PRC interaction at the Conference, but tend to 
maintain that it struck a beneficial deal. This leads them to cite the many provisions of 
the Convention in which PRC inputs were honored. One recent assessment touted the 
“correct lawful propositions” advanced by the Chinese delegation as influencing the 
articles on the territorial sea, the EEZ and continental shelf, the high seas, the 
international seabed area, marine environmental protection, marine scientific research, 
and dispute resolution mechanisms.83 Indeed, the PRC’s substantive and procedural 
                                                 
82 People’s Daily 1982 
83 Yu 2012: 55. He even names the specific articles upon which China purportedly exercised substantive 
influence: territorial sea: Arts 2-3, 15-16, 19.1, 21; EEZ and continental shelf: 55-58, 62.2, 69-70, 73, 77-
79, 74.1, 83.3; high seas: 87, 92, 116, 118-119, 12; international seabed area: 136-137, 141-143, 145, 157-
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contributions matched those of the large majority of developing states of the Conference, 
and consequently found their way into the treaty text. 
Still, the many disadvantages codified in the treaty were not lost on the Chinese 
delegation, which in its closing statement lamented that “there are still shortcomings and 
even serious defects in the provisions of a few articles in the Convention. The 
Convention is not entirely satisfactory to us.”84 Five major sources of that dissatisfaction 
can be read from the black letters of the treaty and its negotiating history: 
 (1) Procedurally, China rejected an opportunity to use its UNSC seat to gain votes and 
committee memberships that would have allowed it substantially greater influence in 
drafting the treaty and engineering it to its own particular preferences. When, at later 
stages of the Conference, the text diverged from the original positions China presented in 
its working papers and from the consensus views of the G-77, China was not in a position 
to authoritatively demand changes. 
(2) Geographically, as a state with only one oceanic border surrounded by enclosed and 
semi-enclosed seas, it received truncated EEZ (and continental shelf) entitlements. The 
continental landmass of China is immense, but its coastal frontage is comparatively short 
and surrounded by other states in close proximity. While Chinese experts typically 
calculate 14,000 km of coastline, and an additional 18,000 km from offshore islands,85 
foreign assessments generally measure China’s coastline at 14,500 km. This figure omits 
                                                 
160, 170; marine environmental protection: 192, 194, 209-210, 213-218, 220, 23; MSR: 143, 242, 244-245; 
and dispute resolution mechanisms: 279-280, 283, 297-299. 
84 A/CONF.62/SR.191 
85 Yu 1995: 213.  
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long stretches of coastline because of the disputed sovereign title to of virtually all of 
those offshore islands.86 The United States (19,924 km) and Japan (29, 751 km), by 
contrast, have open ocean flanks and longer coastlines that allow them to realize virtually 
all of their possible entitlements. Meanwhile, however optimistic the Chinese 
assessments of their territory, the Convention’s EEZ guarantees that China is “zone-
locked” by the EEZs of other states, and that its own EEZs are inevitably delimited at less 
than 200nm due to adjacent and opposite coasts less than 400nm away from Chinese 
territory. This is probably the most significant problem created by the Convention for the 
conventional, geopolitical view of Chinese interests.  
(3) Economically, the Convention is plainly inferior to the previous regime as far as its 
Chinese welfare is concerned. For one, as a state with a large population and 
correspondingly large fishing fleet, it endorsed a new regime for the EEZ that closed off 
the vast majority of the world’s fisheries under strong coastal state jurisdiction.87 Chinese 
protein demands could not be met by the catch from its own jurisdictional waters even 
prior to the Conference, so a much more open regime that afforded first-come-first-serve 
access would have been materially far better for the Chinese than the alternative 
represented in the final text (Chiu 1975; Yuan 1984). China has no preferential access to 
other states’ EEZs, which would have been open to its fishing fleet had the new regime 
not been so ambitious in scope and content. After all, coastal states enjoy exclusive rights 
and jurisdiction regarding the living resources of their EEZs, entailing substantial 
                                                 
86 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 2015, “Coastline” 
87 China’s demand for fish was already among the world’s highest throughout the negotiations, and has 
steadily increased since then. It employs some 15 million people in its fisheries industry, now by far the 
world’s largest, and deploys the world’s largest distant water fishing fleet. See Mallory 2013, 2015 for 
complete analysis of this phenomenon. 
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economic costs for the Chinese from any economic vantage. On oil and gas, the 
opportunity costs are greater in absolute terms: now well-capitalized and technically 
advanced Chinese offshore drilling capacity could be used throughout the world’s oceans 
had the EEZ regime not been so closed.88 Ironically, Chinese negotiators were among the 
main contributors to the very strength of those rights and jurisdiction, promoting 
authority for other states to limit China’s economic access. 
(4) Politically, the PRC accepted a system of maritime entitlements that gave large 
jurisdictional effects to islands. This was especially disadvantageous because of the four 
island groups over which China has territorial sovereignty disputes: the Spratlys, 
Paracels, and Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, and the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands 
in the East China Sea. By endorsing a regime that potentially created massive zones 
around these islands in the form of EEZs out to 200nm and extended continental shelves 
that might extend as far as 350nm, China’s disputes became much more salient and 
invited other states to bargain harder for their claims (Nyman and Hensel 2008).89  
(5) Strategically, China attempted but failed to introduce treaty rules that would 
unambiguously limit the access of foreign warships into jurisdictional zones. For all of its 
railing against “superpower maritime hegemony,” China accepted a compromised treaty 
in which the freedoms of navigation and overflight were preserved. The indeterminate 
text with which that compromise is forged is the only consolation for the Chinese. 
Differences over the degree to which it grants sovereign states discretion to apply their 
                                                 
88 Author interview with analyst at China National Petroleum Company (Beijing, June 2014). 
89 The discovery of substantial oil and gas resources in East Asia’s littoral waters preceded the Conference, 
a fact of which Chinese negotiators were well aware but which evidently did not disrupt their preference for 
closure.  
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domestic law on this subject has subsequently led the PRC to “auto-interpret” the treaty 
to match their strategic interests. Further, given China’s disadvantaged geographic 
position, the EEZ regime also created a circumstance in which Chinese warships would 
have to transit foreign zones in order to reach the high seas (i.e., “zone-lock”). They 
could reasonably expect that other states would enact reciprocal restrictions on PRC 
military access, another highly disadvantageous feature of the treaty from a strategic 
standpoint. 
These “defects” and disadvantages were not lost on Chinese analysts at the time, nor are 
they ignored in contemporary discourse – even as China’s practice of the law of the sea 
puts it into increasing conflict with its neighbors and powerful maritime states like the 
US. Ling Qing, the lead PRC delegate to later sessions of the Conference, published 
memoirs in 2008 in which he recounts his own recognition of some of the problems in the 
Chinese negotiating positions. He notes that the “big maritime powers” – namely the US, 
the Soviets and Japan – all benefitted handsomely from the 200nm EEZ, which gives the 
US far and away the largest entitlement and makes the “Japanese think they are the fourth 
biggest country in the world.”90 The Chinese delegation advanced the Third World’s 
agenda of creating an the EEZ that could, in principle, limit the freedom of action of 
those maritime powers (thus “opposing the superpowers’ hegemony at sea”91), but “we 
neglected to point out that it represented a redistribution of ownership rights of marine 
resources. Our understanding of this was apparently not thorough enough….[W]hen we 
first started out we did not fully investigate how the 200nm economic zone affected 
                                                 
90 Ling 2008: 8 
91 Ibid. 
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China’s own interests.” Ling came to these views during the Conference, he claims, after 
consultations with a Latin American delegate who had emphasized how costly the regime 
would be for a state like China. Even with this awareness, however, Ling declined to 
redress the Chinese negotiating position for fear of creating the impression that he was 
“wavering in [his] politics and not resolute in supporting the 200nm rule.”92  
Decision to commit – with reservations 
Whatever the “wavering” of some delegates over the manifest disadvantages of the 
treaty, it was obviously not sufficient to override the PRC’s interest in ratification. We 
can understand this commitment only in terms of its interpretation of the relevant norms – 
specifically the degree to which China expected itself to be truly bound to the obligations 
it undertook by acceding to the Convention. Some evidence of this attitude came through 
clearly in the Conference discussions, and an even more emphatic proof of this normative 
view revealed itself in China’s declarations upon finally ratifying the treaty in 1996 after 
most of its Third World colleagues had done so. 
The PRC’s formal declaration upon ratifying blatantly contravenes the black letters of the 
treaty itself by making reservations. The Convention, adopted as a package deal, 
expressly forbids any reservations that “purport to exclude or modify the legal effect of 
the provisions of this Convention in their application to that State” (Article 310). Yet, 
China’s four-point statement conveys confidence that China will practice the law of the 
sea according to its own interpretation of the treaty: 
                                                 
92 Ibid., 7 
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(1) China reserved the right to delimit a 200nm EEZ as described in the Convention. This 
can be read to suggest that it planned to claim the full extent of the zone despite the 
inevitable overlap with the 200nm zones of other states. (2) China implicitly denied the 
compulsory jurisdiction of dispute resolution bodies in Part XV by electing to solve these 
inevitable delimitation problems “through consultations” with opposite or adjacent states. 
(3) China pronounced its sovereignty over disputed islands and archipelagos, making a 
territorial claim that was well beyond the solely maritime scope of the Convention. 
Describing those islands as “archipelagos” is also directly odds with the clear 
proscription of archipelagic status for states that are not wholly composed of islands.93 (4) 
China reaffirmed its fervent opposition to the “innocent passage” regime established in 
the Convention, which lacked the PRC’s preferred stipulation that “innocent passage 
through the territorial sea shall not prejudice the right of a coastal state to request, in 
accordance with its laws and regulations, a foreign State to obtain advance approval from 
or give prior notification to the coastal State for the passage of its warships.”94  
                                                 
93 China claims archipelagic baselines around these island groups, despite the fact that only states that are 
themselves archipelagic are entitled to close off the entire sea area around and in between their constituting 
islands: UNCLOS III, Part IV: Archipelagic States, Article 46, “Use of terms”:  
For the purposes of this Convention: (a) "archipelagic State" means a State constituted wholly by 
one or more archipelagos and may include other islands.” 
94 “In accordance with the decision of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress of 
the People's Republic of China at its nineteenth session, the President of the People's Republic of China has 
hereby ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 and at the same 
time made the following statement: 
1. In accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 
People's Republic of China shall enjoy sovereign rights and jurisdiction over an exclusive 
economic zone of 200 nautical miles and the continental shelf. 
2. The People's Republic of China will effect, through consultations, the delimitation of the 
boundary of the maritime jurisdiction with the States with coasts opposite or adjacent to China 
respectively on the basis of international law and in accordance with the principle of equitability. 
3. The People's Republic of China reaffirms its sovereignty over all its archipelagos and islands as 
listed in article 2 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on the territorial sea and the 
contiguous zone, which was promulgated on 25 February 1992. 
4. The People's Republic of China reaffirms that the provisions of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea concerning innocent passage through the territorial sea shall not prejudice 
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These reservations targeted some of the norms enshrined in the Convention that put 
China at a disadvantage. Some of the considerations underlying that decision to commit 
can be found in a 1996 statement by Vice Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, presented to the 
Standing Committee of the Eighth PRC National People's Congress.95 He cited four 
principal reasons to do so: 1) to preserve and protect PRC “maritime rights and interests” 
and to “enlarge PRC maritime jurisdiction”; 2) to maintain “pioneer investor status” in 
deep seabed development; 3) to benefit from participation in UNCLOS by bringing PRC 
role in global maritime affairs into full play; and 4) because ratification will be useful in 
shaping a good image for the PRC. The first of these supposed advantages reflects the 
PRC’s satisfaction that the treaty was sufficiently indeterminate to allow it to pursue 
closure in line with its interests. The latter two demonstrate its clear normative 
commitment to participating in a multilateral treaty process – that is, an interaction – that 
advanced its broader interests in supporting the Third World and exercising Chinese 
voice in shaping the international legal system. 
PRC leaders, however, did not lack for misgivings. Li also cited four concerns in parallel 
to those benefits: 1) he noted a discrepancy between PRC domestic laws and regulations 
and those of UNCLOS regarding innocent passage; 2) he expressed concern about the 
influence of maritime boundary settlement on East China Sea delimitation; 3) he 
anticipated controversy over the South China Sea issue, especially the Chinese claims to 
                                                 
the right of a coastal State to request, in accordance with its laws and regulations, a foreign State 
to obtain advance approval from or give prior notification to the coastal State for the passage of its 
warships through the territorial sea of the coastal State.” (UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the 
Law of the Sea, “Declarations and Statements” [7 June 1996], 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm) 
95 Zou and Song 2000: 308-309 (document on file with authors, discussed with both in interviews June 
2014 and January 2015) 
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historic waters; and 4) he lamented the compulsory dispute settlement processes. These 
foreseeable costs are not a comprehensive account of all those facing China by 
committing to this treaty, but are indicative of the somewhat weak binding effects of 
treaty obligations on China’s intended practice of the law of the sea. 
China partially hedged its fourth concern (compulsory dispute resolution) ten years later, 
when it submitted an additional statement exercising its right under Article 298 of the 
Convention to opt out of certain types of compulsory dispute resolution, including 
boundary delimitation and issues involving military activities.96 This was a puzzling 
delay given the delegation’s vehement opposition to any such mechanisms during the 
Conference and its consequent vulnerability to arbitrations against it on issues like 
boundary delimitation and military activities, both of which it legally exempted in this 
later statement. This casual attitude about the binding provisions of the treaty regarding 
dispute settlement stands as further evidence that China did not expect that treaty norms 
would impose meaningful constraints on its practices. 
III. Towards Interpretation 
China plainly understood the various “defects” in the Convention, yet there was no public 
second-guessing of the decision to ratify and (nominally) comply with the treaty. The 
above account of the PRC delegation’s interaction at the Conference demonstrates, at a 
minimum, that Chinese leaders in fact achieved many of their substantive and procedural 
                                                 
96 Declaration made after ratification Declaration under article 298: “The Government of the People's 
Republic of China does not accept any of the procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the 
Convention with respect to all the categories of disputes referred to in paragraph 1 (a) (b) and (c) of Article 
298 of the Convention.” 
UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea 2006, “Declarations and Statements” 
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goals. At a minimum, they viewed accession as superior to the alternative of not joining 
the treaty. That purposive and fully-informed commitment reflects Chinese elites’ belief 
that the treaty was in the PRC’s national interest, despite its manifest disadvantages. The 
treaty evidently satisfied China’s interests in an illiberal doctrine, its principled support 
for indeterminacy, and its specific preference for closure.  
Conventionally understood interests do not adequately explain this interaction, which 
confounds expectations from power (that China was somehow coerced into an agreement 
that serves the interests of stronger powers); nor does the institution-centered account 
from contract (that it enabled some cooperative action unavailable without legal 
institutions) help us fully understand why China chose rules and norms that were worse 
than available alternatives. The story is potentially explicable under an approach from 
norms, but this analysis demands that we turn to the context that informed the PRC’s 
interpretation of the treaty. This requires analysis of how PRC actors grasped the 
purposes of the interaction the Conference and assigned practical meaning to treaty 
norms thus created.  
These interpretations are in large part a function of China’s collective identity, an 
analytical subject that falls out of contract and power analysis but is essential for an 
account from norms. We need to ask how China (or, rather, individuals representing the 
state) determined the appropriate thing to do under given circumstances. The story of 
China’s relationship to the law of the sea thus properly turns to an account of its historical 
relationship to the international legal system, its domestic legal traditions, its specific 
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experiences with maritime security, and its radical, revolutionary orientation towards the 
US-led order of the post-World War II era.  






China’s Interpretation of the Law of the Sea:  
Rectifying the Unequal Treaties 
 
 
“International law is one of the instruments for settling international problems. If this instrument 
is useful to our country, to the socialist cause, or to the cause of peace of the people of the world, 
we will use it. However, if this instrument is disadvantageous to our country, to the socialist 
cause, or to the cause of peace of the people of the world, we will not use it and should create a 
new instrument to replace it.”  
- Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily], 18 September 1957 
 
“After World War II, The United States attempted to dominate the world and increasingly 
extended its activities from the sea surface to the sea bed and carried out expansion over vast 
areas….It dispatched its warships and vessels everywhere to intrude into the territorial seas and 
plunder the sea-bed resources of other countries and even commit outright armed intervention and 
aggression….[O]nly the superpowers have the final say, while the other one hundred and scores 
of countries in the world can only submissively obey….Can this be ‘international law’?! It is a 
crude violation of the principle of state sovereignty. It is imperialistic logic, pure and simple.”1 
 
- An Chin-Yuan, PRC representative to United Nations Seabed Committee 
“So far as our country is concerned, [international law] is an indispensable legal means to realize 
socialist modernization construction. For instance, in order to explore resources near our coast, 
we must study the legal status of the continental shelf, fishing zone and exclusive economic zone 
and international norms and customs between states in delimiting these regions….we must 
actively join international legislative activities and strengthen the struggle with the UN so as to 
form the broadest international united front for anti-hegemonism.”2 
 - Liu Fengming, from leading PRC international law textbook 
 
The PRC’s encounter with the law of the sea in the latter part of the twentieth century was only 
the latest in a long series of Chinese interactions with the “Western” system of international law. 
The third UN conference to forge a new law of the sea (1973-1982), however, was the very first 
instance in which the Chinese government played a prominent role in creating a multilateral 
                                                 
1 An 1972: 654 
2 Liu 1982: 5 
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treaty constituting that system. Sitting in a newly-assumed seat on the UN Security Council 
(UNSC), China’s voice was both significant and distinct from those of the other great powers. 
That voice was further amplified by the PRC’s deliberately close association of its interests with 
those of Third World nations, who by the 1970s composed a majority in the UN General 
Assembly (UNGA). Even in a circumstance where the United States and the Soviet Union 
(joined by the rest of the UNSC permanent five, Japan, and other European powers) found an 
unusual common cause in opposing a challenge to the existing, liberal order of the seas, the 
Third World’s sheer force of numbers was sufficient to create a new treaty. The “counter-
hegemonic” support of the Chinese was essential to the adoption of a Third UN Convention on 
the Law of the Seas that radically transformed the maritime legal system. 
“China’s participation in UNCLOS was historically significant,” according to a leading Chinese 
diplomat, in that it “marked new China’s [i.e., the PRC’s] first participation in international 
legislation.”3 China’s evident contribution to the “legislation” enacted at the Conference, both in 
process and substance, was to advance the interests of the Third World. China’s statements and 
positions at the Conference uniformly tracked those of the G-77 group (which represented some 
120 Third World states) despite significant strategic, economic, and diplomatic reasons for 
distancing itself from the group’s preferences. The PRC’s positions did not change in any 
significant respect over the long and eventful period of negotiations in the UN Seabed 
Committee and eventual ratification (1968 – 1996), which spanned remarkable domestic political 
and economic changes in China. China’s negotiators and experts recognized the costliness of 
                                                 
3 Ling 2008: 1. Ling Qing was the head of the PRC delegation to some of the Third UN Conference on the Law of 
the Sea, and later PRC Ambassador to the United Nations (1980-1985). He is the great-grandson of the famous Lin 
Zexu, the Qing official who led China’s opposition to the British Opium trade and was among the leading 
proponents of studying foreign “barbarians” and using their technologies and practices for Chinese ends (People’s 
Daily 2000).   
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practical compliance with the specific obligations for which it advocated, yet proceeded with 
ratification anyhow. The treaty evidently satisfied a particular constellation of interests and 
preferences that PRC leadership interpreted to outweigh the manifest costs.4 
We are left, still, with the question of why these were in fact China’s priorities in the new law of 
the sea treaty. What are the sources of China’s interests in illiberalism, indeterminacy, and 
closure? Why did China match its substantive and procedural preferences to those of the Third 
World? Beyond the PRC delegation’s rhetoric about Third World solidarity and opposition to 
“maritime hegemony of the superpowers,” the origins and intentions animating PRC positions 
remain obscure. This Chapter picks up where that analysis leaves off, with the question of why 
China arrived at this distinctive set of interests and preferences for the law of the sea.  
That question is effectively one about China’s interpretation of the treaty, both at the level of the 
individual rules and norms it promulgates, as well as at a broad level concerning the treaty’s 
purpose and expected binding effects on Chinese practice. Through analysis of China’s historical 
attitudes toward and practice of international law, this Chapter demonstrates that China’s 
interpretation is best understood a product of its identity as a once-and-future great power with 
particular views about “Western,” “hegemonic” international law. Those views bear the weight 
of a long “century of humiliation” on the wrong side of the “unequal treaty system,” through 
which international legal agreements abetted Western domination of a weak China. The Chinese 
experienced the maritime aspects of that system as particularly pernicious, marked by repeated 
                                                 
4 As detailed in Chapter 2, these may be summarized as: (1) consistent support for an illiberal doctrine underpinning 
the new regime by replacing the prior system of market-based maritime rights (i.e., first-come-first-served) with a 
system that authoritatively allocated rights on the basis of geography; (2) a principled campaign for indeterminate 
rules and procedures that grant maximal discretion to the sovereign states (to whom those rights were authoritatively 
allocated) to make domestic legal judgments about the extent of their own authority; and (3) a preference for closure 
as the basic norm in the EEZ, where China championed the Third World effort to radically expand the scope of the 
sovereign states’ effective territorial boundaries and resisted efforts to dilute that authority. 
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seaborne invasions and resulting in special concessions granting European, Japanese and 
American maritime trade and access to Chinese coastal waters, ports and river systems. In 
consequence, another important feature of China’s identity contributing to its positions on the 
law of the sea is a “maritime victim complex,” with a corresponding perception of acute 
vulnerability to specifically maritime threats (typically from the Western powers and Japan). 
This perception tracks Chinese leaders’ traditionally “continental” strategic orientation, based 
both in timeless geography and traumatic historical experience. Collectively, these facets of the 
PRC’s identity, grounded in Chinese history, provide a rich explanation of why its leaders 
approached the interaction at the Conference with such unconventional goals and interpreted its 
meaning in such a distinctive fashion. 
Given the Chinese historical experience and cultural-institutional context, we have no reason to 
privilege a default position that the rules are considered legitimate. The assumption that 
international law enjoys near-universal legitimacy is a theoretical leap that is often smuggled in 
without particular scrutiny, but which should be questioned directly—especially in the case of 
China. Legitimacy, in this study, is a subjective quality of a rule, norm, process, or institution 
that endows it with a sense of “oughtness” or normativity. Independent of any coercion or 
material self-interest, legitimacy can incline an actor to make a choice to obey a given rule – 
even one that puts it at a disadvantage – because that actor accepts his obligation to do so.5 There 
are historical and cultural reasons to doubt that China accords a great deal of legitimacy to 
international law; in fact, this Chapter goes to great lengths to demonstrate a profound Chinese 
sense of the illegitimacy of “Western” international law, and a correspondingly cynical belief 
                                                 
5 See Hurd 1999 for a careful analysis of how legitimacy operates as a mode of social control distinct from coercion 
and self-interest. 
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that it is used only instrumentally. If we accept the theoretical premise that “the basis of 
obligation is located anterior, not only to individual rules of international law, but even to the 
processes that give rise to those rules,”6 then we need to understand how China interprets those 
processes and the rules to which they give rise. How have those processes, in the form of China’s 
historical experience as a “victim” of international law, shaped Chinese identity? What have 
Chinese leaders learned about how to operate in a system dominated by Western powers whose 
international law reflects a cultural and institutional context that differs substantially from that of 
the Chinese? The mere fact that Chinese decision-makers do not accord a high priority to 
obedience to international law as an obligation does not mean they do not value law as an 
instrument to be wielded in practice. 
This Chapter therefore establishes an account of the maritime dimension of the PRC’s identity 
and corresponding interpretation of the UNCLOS III treaty. Part I examines China’s historical 
attitudes toward international law, both traditionally and in the era of Marxism-Leninism. Part II 
explains China’s specific encounter with the law of the sea, and its perception of special 
vulnerability to maritime security threats. Finally, Part III reintegrates this account of identity 
into the performance of the PRC delegation at the Conference and beyond, exploring the 
domestic and international political context that colored China’s specific preferences for the 
EEZ. This domestically-oriented, inductive account of China’s interpretation of UNCLOS 
discovers consistently instrumental Chinese views about the purpose of the treaty, and modest 
expectations about the extent of its impact on China’s sovereignty and freedom of action. A 
concluding section signals the need to press further into the transnational legal process to 
                                                 
6 Byers 1999: 7 
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examine into how these interpretations become legally and politically meaningful as they find 
their way into Chinese practice, by way of internalization and implementation.  
I. China’s Interpretive Frames: Li, Lenin, and the Unequal Treaties 
The small PRC delegation7 to the first full session of the Conference arrived in Caracas, 
Venezuela in June 1974 with a great deal of baggage. They carried not just suitcases, but a heavy 
burden of hostility against virtually the entire existing body of international law – the law of the 
sea in particular. Standard treatises on the law of the sea or textbooks on public international law 
were almost certainly not weighing them down, as they were traveling from a China in which 
such books and their formal study had been banned for the last eight years of Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution.8 The Chinese representatives’ rhetoric throughout the Conference was often 
bombastic and grandiose, decrying the “hegemonic superpowers monopoly over the high seas,” 
while celebrating the glory of the Third World’s struggle to wrest back sovereignty and dignity 
from the malign forces of “colonialism, imperialism and hegemony.”9 Protests over the 
illegitimacy of the existing law of the sea regime, and embrace of China’s identity as a non-
Western, post-colonial, socialist state were frequent tropes in PRC statements. 
The delegation’s preferences over substantive and procedural aspects of the treaty must be 
considered in light of this interpretive attitude. They demonstrated little interest in securing treaty 
terms that advanced PRC security and wealth, preferring to co-opt Third World positions on 
                                                 
7 The MFA archives were closed to researchers during my period of fieldwork in China (April 2014 – March 2015), 
but author interviews with an MFA official (Beijing, November 2014) confirmed that the group started around a 
dozen, then added members throughout the negotiating rounds, reaching as many as 20. 
8 The “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” ran from 1966 through Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, and among other 
radical aspects, led to the shuttering of PRC universities and law schools. 
9 A/CONF.62/SR.25; this is representative of most of the delegates’ remarks during the Conference, which are dealt 
with at length in Chapter 2. 
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substance that were ill-suited to its geographic and political circumstances. These disadvantages 
were secondary to Chinese efforts to secure the following: (1) the illiberal doctrine of the new 
regime (such that it would broadly curtail the prior freedoms of strong maritime powers), (2) the 
indeterminacy of the rules and the procedures for applying them (such that sovereign states 
would exercise discretion over their implementation), and (3) the substantive norm of closure 
(such that the balance of rights under those indeterminate rules would go to the coastal state). 
China’s revealed interest in promoting these qualities in the new law of the sea reflects the PRC 
delegates’ interpretation of the purposes and function of international law in general, which 
informed their specific concerns about how the law of the sea would bear on threats to China’s 
maritime security and development.  
While the precise content of the delegates’ beliefs and its relationship to their behavior cannot be 
determined from their statements, we can infer a great deal about the factors that framed their 
interpretation of the Conference and the treaty it produced. With focus on the system of legal and 
political education these men received, and attention to the organization and mission of the 
bureaucracy and party apparatus in which they were embedded, significant conclusions can be 
drawn about the ways the PRC delegates and their superiors approached the law of the sea. The 
cultural-institutional context in which they acted and recognized their identities, and the 
historical experiences which shaped their organizations and roles are relevant factors in a 
discussion of how they interpreted the purpose and function of the law of the sea.  
This section first analyzes traditional Chinese attitudes toward international law during the 
imperial period, then offers a stylized account of the attitudes developed by modern regimes, as 
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represented in diplomatic practice, as well as in leading textbooks and educational materials 
commenting on the power and class elements of international law.  
Law and Li: Traditional Chinese Attitudes Toward (International) Law 
Long-standing Chinese practice and attitudes about international law shaped the training and 
professional roles of the Chinese elite involved in negotiations at the Conference, and more 
importantly, informed decision-making in Beijing regarding how China would interpret the 
regime. We need not equate their interpretations with some timeless “Chinese” view of 
international law to appreciate that traditional attitudes are a part of Chinese actors’ basic identity 
vis-à-vis international legal institutions and processes. On balance, their conception of China as a 
victim of international law that was used as an instrument by malign foreign powers makes it 
more likely that Chinese actors would reject the legitimacy of the process and rules surrounding 
the law of the sea. In fact, a strong bias towards the illegitimacy of international law pervades 
Chinese doctrine on the subject, rooted both in classical conceptions of the appropriate function 
of international law in statecraft and in China’s generally unfortunate encounters with Western 
international law. This context is an important prior consideration in explaining how illiberalism 
and indeterminacy came to dominate PRC contributions to the law of the sea; it also begins to 
explain Chinese expectations about the instrumental function of international law in general. 
Illiberalism is a defining feature of the imperial tradition; it also pervades the governance and 
ruling philosophy of both major Chinese regimes during the twentieth century, the Kuomintang 
(KMT) Party of the Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) of the PRC. 
Modern Chinese leaders “inherited a set of institutionalized attitudes and historical precedents 
not easily conformable to the European tradition of international relations among equally 
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sovereign nation states.”10 Rather, Chinese statesmen applied to international affairs the same 
principles that applied internally. Most relevant to this analysis is the Confucian-oriented view 
that hierarchical relationships among different actors in society are the basis of order. Law was 
but one of several institutions expected to regulate those hierarchical relationships, and was 
highly limited in the scope of social affairs in which it had legitimate application.11 
Indeed, law in imperial China “did not enjoy the prestige and importance that it gradually 
attained in Western countries. In China, it was not regarded as a major social achievement and a 
symbol of rectitude, but rather as a regrettable necessity, principally an instrument to be used by 
the state to enforce its will upon subjects who had not submitted to other means of social 
control.”12 Law did not confer rights upon individuals to be enforced against the state and thus 
limit its arbitrary authority, as it does in the liberal ideal.13 Proficiency in law and legal 
administration was not among the prized qualities for bureaucrats, and was not part of the 
imperial examination system that determined the professional outlook for all state officials.14 
The illiberal quality of China’s legal affairs is perhaps their most distinctive feature from the 
standpoint of Western legal theory. The rules were dictated, amended, and abridged by the 
emperor and his magistrates without procedural checks and “were not framed in terms of 
individual rights and equality. Instead [law] largely buttressed the authority of the imperial 
                                                 
10 Fairbank 1968: 4 
11 See Alford 1984 for a particularly nuanced discussion of this prevailing view, with some caveats. Chiu and Cohen 
1974; Cohen 1967; deLisle 2000, and Potter 2013 all advance some version of this claim. 
12 Chiu and Cohen 1974: 17 
13 “…[I]n China, perhaps even more than in most other civilizations, the ordinary man's awareness and acceptance 
of such [legal] norms was shaped far more by the pervasive influence of custom than by any formally enacted 
system of law. The clan into which he was born, the guild of which he might become a member, the group of gentry 
elders holding the informal sway in his rural community - these and other extra-legal bodies helped to smooth the 
inevitable frictions in Chinese society by inculcating moral precepts upon their members, mediating disputes, or, if 
need arose, imposing disciplinary sanctions and penalties” (Bodde 1963: 375-376). 
14 Alford 1984: 1193  
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government and family. The law accorded vastly different treatment to persons depending on 
their relative statuses, with the most crucial distinctions being those of ruler-subject, husband-
wife, and father-son.”15 The foundational norms of equality and procedural fairness that inform 
so much of Western legal doctrine are not only absent in the Chinese tradition, but inverted. 
Hierarchy is the foundation of order, in this view, and the appropriate obligations and attitudes of 
subjects of the emperor flow from correct practice of those hierarchical relationships. Processes 
for implementing law are subject to the arbitrary discretion of the hierarchically-superior actor, 
who is constrained only by his sense of propriety and expectation of efficacy. 
The preferred institution for regulating social relations was li (礼), which “refers to the use of 
moral rules to regulate individuals…[including] all aspects of behavior and social position 
ranging from politeness and propriety to social status. Li establishes rank (or unequal status) 
between people.”16 Li is typically counterposed with fa (法), which is comparable to the Western 
notion of criminal law – punishments to be applied by the state in cases where li had been 
insufficient. Law’s principle function thus lay at the very far end of the spectrum of governance, 
tending to be invoked only in criminal (rather than civil or administrative) cases.17 Punishments 
tended to be severe and non-uniform, inflicted publicly for purposes of deterrence and calibrated 
not only on the basis of statutes, but on the relationships among the plaintiff and defendant and 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 1195 
16 Pan 2011: 234 
17 Chinese scholars rank “various instruments through which the state might be administered and social harmony 
maintained into a hierarchy ranging downward in desirability from heavenly reason (tianli), the way (dao), morality 
(de), ritual propriety (li), custom (xixi), community compacts (xiang hue), and family rules (jia cheng)” (Alford 
1995: 10). 
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the discretion of the local magistrate. In general, “li is persuasive, preventive and enforced by 
social sanction, while fa is compulsive, punitive, and enforced by legal sanction.”18  
Li was the Confucian ideal, with fa representing only a last resort in cases where actors in society 
did not appropriately self-regulate.19 Meanwhile, fa was the preferred instrument in the 
“Legalist” school, which saw legal punishment as the appropriate mechanism for regulating a 
disorderly society that would function best under coercion. Although the schools of Legalism 
and Confucianism competed for prominence in imperial governance, the Confucian model of 
stable social relations guided by cultural norms defining virtue remained the ideal – and probably 
remains so, despite the radical upheaval of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Traditionally, 
at least, “li was upheld as creating and maintaining a harmonious relationship while fa was 
criticized as disrupting peaceful relations….Fa just functions as a supplement to li.”20 Law was 
“neither the primary instrument for ensuring that people genuinely understood what was 
expected of them nor a means for encouraging rulers to discharge their responsibilities in a 
suitable fashion.”21 Rather, the law was an adjunct, at best, to a diverse array of governance tools 
developed over the long and varied course of Chinese imperial history. The relationship of the 
rulers to the ruled was not defined on a contractual basis, as it was in the theories that prevailed 
in Europe; rather it was defined normatively, on the basis of collective, cultural knowledge that 
determined and even institutionalized appropriate relationships.  
                                                 
18 Pan 2011: 234 
19 A commonly-cited saying attributed to Confucius goes: “Lead the people with governmental measures and 
regulate them by law and punishments, and they will avoid wrong-doing, but will have no sense of honor or shame. 
Lead them by virtue and regulate them by the rules of propriety [li] and they will have a sense of shame and, 
moreover, set themselves right” (Alford 1995: 20). 
20 Pan 2011: 236 
21 Alford 1995: 20 
Chapter 3 – China’s Interpretation of the Law of the Sea 
 142 
Traditional Li Meets Modernity under the Unequal Treaties 
This relatively narrow conception of the function and scope of law was equally applicable in the 
international domain. Formal equality among sovereigns was an entirely foreign concept, as was 
the very notion that there was a legitimate basis for political authority beyond the emperor. 
Formal inequality, i.e., hierarchy, was in fact the ordering principle (Kang 2007, 2010). By virtue 
of his status as “Son of Heaven,” the emperor was the origin of all political authority, not only in 
China, but throughout the world: “lesser rulers acquired legitimacy, at least in Chinese eyes, only 
after investiture by the Chinese emperor.”22 The hierarchical relationships ordering domestic 
society extended to nations on China’s periphery – a system of “tribute” in theory, if not always 
in practice (Cohen 1967; Fairbank 1968; Wang 1990a). This presumption was under threat from 
the beginning of large-scale European trade in the region in the sixteenth century, and was 
probably defunct by the time of the First Opium War (1839-1842) during which the Qing 
dynasty suffered the first of a series of major military and commercial defeats to foreign powers. 
Following these defeats, the waning Qing Empire accepted Western terms for trade and granted 
them substantial political and legal autonomy on Chinese territory. These arrangements were 
formalized in treaties, most plainly signed under duress.  
These “unequal treaties” not only ceded to Europeans, Japanese, and Americans both permanent 
and leased concessions to as many as ninety-two “treaty ports” along China’s eastern and 
southern seaboard, but also created a legal regime of extraterritoriality without any reciprocal 
access granted to the Chinese in those countries. 23 The terms of these treaties became more 
                                                 
22 Cohen 1973: 475; see also Peerenboom 2004: 40-43 
23 Some estimate the total number of treaty ports as sixty-nine (Wang 1991: 257); others figure it reached ninety-two 
by the early twentieth century (Cassel 2012: 5). Other states with “unequal” privileges in China included Peru, 
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onerous over time, as foreign states matched and exceeded the stipulations of prior agreements. 
The U.S., joining the enterprise in earnest only after the Spanish-American War of 1898, 
negotiated an “Open Door” such that all foreign nations would enjoy equality of rights (most-
favored nation status) within the various “spheres of influence” carved out by England, France, 
Germany, Japan, Italy, and Russia over the course of the nineteenth century.24 There was indeed 
a hierarchical order in China during this period, but not one that maintained the Qing emperor’s 
position at its pinnacle. The imperial court did not recognize the legitimacy of this system, with 
its imposition of norms and principles at odds with their traditional hierarchic order. This 
cultural-institutional context is also generally believed to have hindered Chinese actors’ capacity 
to fully appreciate the practical implications of signing away legal rights. In any event, these 
unequal arrangements were generally imposed after military defeats, so Chinese officials had 
little choice but to accept. 
Standard conditions in China’s unequal treaties included not only the outright acquisition of 
Chinese territory conquered in battle, but far-ranging provisions for consular jurisdiction over 
specific territory and foreign individuals, naval and commercial access to coastal ports and river 
systems, recognized foreign courts and police to administer and enforce foreign law, permanent 
military presence in key points surrounding Beijing (and corresponding prohibitions from those 
zones for Chinese imperial forces and destruction of fortifications), various payments and 
indemnities for damages, rights to use foreign currency, rights to proselytize and educate, and 
                                                 
Mexico, Brazil, Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Portugal, the Netherlands, Spain, and Austria-Hungary 
(Wang 1990b: 241, 252). 
24 United States Library of Congress 1968: “Commercial Rights in China (‘Open Door’ Policy): Declarations by 
France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan and Russia accepting United States proposal for ‘open door’ 
policy in China, September 6, 1899 – March 20, 1900,” 278-295; see also Wang 2005. 
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fixed low-tariff rates.25 The Qing court acceded to this litany of unequal provisions and was in no 
position to renegotiate from strength at any point during its decline throughout the nineteenth 
century. The extra-territorial rights enjoyed by foreign powers no doubt hastened that process. 
Chinese historiography on this issue is uniformly critical, tending to draw the same conclusions 
and list the same facts without citation. Estimates vary as to the exact number of such unequal 
treaties – some figure over 1,000, others place the figure at 745, and others at 500.26 The 
accounting issue arises in large part because the major treaties following the First and Second 
Opium Wars (1839-1842 and 1858-1860), the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), and the Boxer 
Rebellion (1900) were followed by a host of subsidiary agreements with other states capitalizing 
on those treaties, adopting their terms and imposing additional stipulations. In addition to these 
public instruments, Chinese sources estimate over 1,000 private contracts were linked to unequal 
treaty terms, concluded between the nationals and firms of the treaty states and Chinese 
government and commercial entities.27 These treaties codified a set of formally unequal political, 
military and commercial relationships between the Chinese and foreign states. 
Instrumental Adoption of International Law: Using the Barbarian to Check the Barbarian 
Through the unequal treaty regime, the Qing and their successors were compelled to accept that 
foreign governments and their citizens were subject to only very circumscribed Chinese authority 
throughout Chinese territory. Among many strategic, economic, cultural and political 
consequences of this “century of humiliation,” China’s elite developed a particular conception of 
the function and purpose of international law. It differs from the uniformly critical attitude of 
                                                 
25 Wang 1991: 252-253 
26 See Wang 2005: 2 at fn 3-5 for review of this literature. 
27 Wang 1990b: 248 
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rejection found in much of the post-colonial world, in part because China was only “semi-
colonized” and its social and political institutions stayed reasonably intact through major periods 
of foreign encroachment. More substantive engagement with foreigners, largely on their terms, 
led to gradual institutionalization of methods to “use the barbarian to check the barbarian” – that 
is, borrowing the barbarian’s repertoire of international law and using it as an instrument to limit 
their domination over  Chinese society.28 China’s intellectual, military, and economic elites 
attributed the nation’s weakness in part to superior Western technologies and institutions, and 
took particular note of Japan’s success in adapting these tools to a Confucian society.29 
Reformers encouraged “rights consciousness” and recognition of the grim reality that Chinese 
conceptions of legitimate order were no longer practicable.30 
China’s encounter with international law upset traditional, hierarchical modes of diplomacy. 
Where the tribute system operated on the basis of imperial rules about how foreign delegates 
were to conduct relations within Chinese territory, the succession of nineteenth century defeats 
and unequal treaties made it necessary for the court to accept foreign diplomats and trade 
legations on the basis of different norms. The Chinese response to these external pressures 
                                                 
28 This became a hallmark of Chinese thinking about how to manage foreigners and leverage their superior 
technologies and organization, reflected in the notion of 中体外用, or keeping China’s core while utilizing foreign 
tools. The original formulation of “using the barbarian to check the barbarian” was developed by the late Qing 
reformer Wei Yuan, in perhaps “the first significant Chinese work on the West” (Hao and Wang 1978: 148). Yuan 
drew on research by an earlier Qing official, Lin Zexu, to create an “Illustrated gazetteer of the maritime kingdoms” 
in which he exhorted the late-Qing government to use international law (and other knowledge of the ways of foreign 
states) “for the purpose of using barbarians to attack the barbarians, using barbarians to negotiate with the 
barbarians, and learning the superior techniques of the barbarians to control the barbarians” (Alford 1984: 1180 at fn 
9) 
29 Howson 2009: 821 
30 The influential reformer Liang Qichao wrote several colorful essays on this subject, speaking at the turn of the 
twentieth century about “formless, psychic pain that [a Chinese person] feels on being invaded, oppressed, or 
insulted [by deprivation of rights]. Others have misunderstood the true characteristic of rights, believing that it 
involved nothing more than the continuous calculation of physical, material benefit. Ah! Isn’t that despicable? This 
is the opinion of superficial people. For instance, suppose I have an item that I took from another by force. The one 
whose item was taken will angrily resist [my appropriation] in court, wherein his goal is not [attaining] the thing 
itself, but [attaining] sovereignty over the thing” (Liang 1989). 
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included the creation of a new foreign office on the European model in 1861, the Tsungli Yamen 
[总理衙门] or General Administration Office. The officials in this new organization studied 
foreign texts on international law31 and advised the court on the foreign practice of conducting 
relations on equal, rather than hierarchical terms, with other states. Remarking on an influential 
text in circulation among Chinese intellectuals in the 1860s, representatives from the new foreign 
office told the emperor that “your ministers find that although this book on foreign laws and 
regulations [i.e., Wheaton’s Elements of International Law] is not basically in complete 
agreement with Chinese systems, it nevertheless contains sporadic passages which are useful.”32 
Beliefs about appropriate li were in tension with the normative bases of Western legal theory, 
which drew its legitimacy from natural law tenets of Christian and, later, liberal provenance. Yet 
to the extent the norms, however illegitimate, had practical value, the Qing and later Chinese 
regimes made efforts to learn and utilize them in diplomacy. 
The instrumental value of international law was easily recognizable to the small cohort familiar 
with Western practices, though its practical implementation was difficult to integrate into 
China’s existing diplomatic repertoire. The new class of diplomat-officials were the first to 
engage with foreign powers according to international protocols favored in the West, and which 
hinged on a norm of formally equal relationship among sovereign entities. As a new organization 
appended to an imperial court committed to maintaining at least the pretense of hierarchical 
Chinese superiority, they lacked internal prestige and autonomy (Fairbank 1968; Chiu and Cohen 
1974). Furthermore, their diplomatic maneuvering room was badly constrained by Chinese 
weakness and the liabilities inherited from the existing stock of unequal treaties. Lack of 
                                                 
31 Most influential was a translation of Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International Law undertaken by the American 
Presbyterian missionary W.A.P. Martin. 
32 Cited in Wang 1990b: 234 
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expertise compounded these difficulties: international law was not introduced into Chinese 
curricula until 1879, when the Beijing College of Foreign Languages opened the first school for 
legal education and enrolled nine students to specialize in international law.33 With these 
institutionalized disadvantages, Chinese students learned to treat international legal agreements 
as a kind of “defensive weapon,” a weak substitute for powerful diplomacy but still “the only 
way to maintain ‘peace’ with Western powers and protect its interests.”34 The peripheral nature 
of international law to the core of Chinese education on politics and statecraft persists into the 
present (Minzner 2013). 
Predictably, the new Chinese foreign office did not wield the new instrument for conducting 
international relations with much success. Indeed, probably the “most glaring example of 
Chinese unequal treaties”35 came as late as 1915 when Japan issued its “Twenty-One Demands” 
to the barely-sovereign ROC. Although the Americans and British helped mitigate some of the 
more extreme wartime claims of expansionist Japanese military-industrial power (especially its 
bid for outright cession of the Shandong peninsula), China was not able to prevent massive legal 
disadvantages from accruing well into the Republican period. Only in the 1920s did the concept 
of “unequal treaties” gain widespread currency. Their abrogation and replacement with “equal” 
treaties became a nationalist cause shared by both Leninist regimes vying for authority in China, 
the KMT and CCP.36 The KMT’s first National Congress, in January 1924, announced that 
                                                 
33 Wang 1990b: 236 
34 Ibid.: 258 
35 Ibid.: 247 
36 The Soviet Union supported and trained both parties during this period. Chen 2008 discusses the KMT guidelines 
for bilateral renegotiations of the unequal treaties: “(1) the already-expired ‘unequal treaties] should be abrogated, 
and replaced with new treaties; (2) the Nationalist [KMT] government would terminate, through proper means, the 
‘unequal treaties’ that had not yet expired and replace them with new ones’ (3) for cases in which the old treaty had 
expired but a new one was not yet in effect, the Nationalist government would furnish provisional regulations to 
meet the situation” (Chen 2008: 139). See also Ibid.: 135-150 and Wang 2005: 1-6, 113-125. 
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abolition of all “unequal treaties” was a central premise of Chinese foreign policy, linked to its 
recognition as an equal entity in international affairs.37 Protecting Chinese sovereignty – 
especially its “dismembered” territorial integrity – has remained a core objective for the CCP 
regime, and the animus behind much of its interpretation and practice of international law in the 
contemporary era.  
The KMT’s campaign to abrogate the unequal treaties led to the creation of an International 
Commission on Extraterritoriality, composed of officials from the United States, Japan, the 
United Kingdom and nine other European states holding extraterritorial rights in China. The 
Commission’s initial recommendations in 1926 demonstrated awareness of the inequity of the 
treaties and ultimately recommended the phased dismantling of the unequal treaty regime.38 
Their conditions for doing so effectively made China a “probationary” member of the 
international community of sovereign equals, linking renegotiation of extraterritorial rights with 
institutionalization of legal and judicial procedures sufficient to protect the rights of foreign 
nationals and business interests in China. The Commission concluded that “there could be no 
relinquishment by the Powers of their extraterritorial rights until the judiciary of China was 
effectively protected against any unwarranted interference by the executive or other branches of 
the government, civil or more particularly, military.”39 The Commission also demanded 
completion and implementation of laws, including a “civil code, commercial code, revised 
                                                 
37 Chen 2008: 127 
38 “The commission finds that while the system grew out of the necessity of devising some modus vivendi whereby 
harmonious relations might be fostered between China and the several powers, because of the profound difference 
between Chinese and foreign legal and judicial conceptions, the Chinese have come to feel that the practice of 
extraterritoriality is a limitation upon the sovereign rights of China. The commission finds that this feeling is due to 
the growth of nationalistic feeling in China, along with the rapid expansion of foreign interests in the country, 
bringing more frequently into prominence the anomalies of the present system" (Commission on Extraterritoriality 
in China 1927: 59-60) 
39 Ibid., 63 
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criminal code, banking law, bankruptcy law, patent law, land expropriation law, and law 
concerning notaries public,” and demanded that China “should establish and maintain a uniform 
system for the regular enactment, promulgation, and rescission of laws, so that there may be no 
uncertainty as to the laws of China.”40 If the Chinese achieved “[r]easonable compliance with all 
the recommendations” under this “progressive scheme,” the parties “might consider the abolition 
of extraterritoriality” on an ad hoc basis.41  
Mired in instability, Japanese invasion, and Civil War, the KMT was not organizationally 
capable of implementing the Commission’s demands in full, even had they intended to do so.42 
Nonetheless, the unequal treaty regime was gradually dismembered as the young Chinese 
republic developed rudimentary legal institutions and, probably more significantly, diplomatic 
competence. The American government was the last power to conclude a treaty renouncing 
extraterritorial privileges in 1943,43 in an effort to support a beleaguered wartime ally and 
delegitimize a system that, since the beginning of Japan’s conquests of mainland territory, had 
mainly accrued to the benefit of the Japanese.44 Generations of Chinese have learned that the 
Western renunciation of the unequal treaties was not undertaken in good faith,45 nor even fully 
                                                 
40 Ibid., 64 
41 Ibid. 
42 “China’s inability to accomplish legal institutionalization showed ipso facto that it had failed to fulfill the 
American and British prerequisites for the abolition of extraterritoriality. This American and British prerequisite 
under the rubric of a modern legal system was a demand for a legal order characterized by positivist legal 
understanding and discourses about the scope, application, and underlying values of law” (Kayaoglu 2010: 165). 
43 See “Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China and the regulation of related matters (11 
January 1943),” United Nations Treaty Series 1947 (vol. VII, no. 66): 261-284. Belgium, Italy, Denmark, Portugal 
and Spain concluded treaties by the end of 1928, and the British concluded a phased agreement in September 1931 
that completed in 1943. These treaties “transformed the legal-political tenet of extraterritorial jurisdiction from a 
permanent institution to an ad hoc arrangement, waiting to be phased out” (Chen 2008: 151).  
44 By this stage, Japanese nationals and entities occupying vast swathes of Chinese territory enjoyed a vast majority 
of the extraterritorial privileges (Chen 2008: 61). 
45 For example, during an author interview with a Ph.D. student in international law from Nanjing University 
(Haikou, June 2014), he noted that a U.S.-China treaty from 1946 maintained many significant aspects of 
extraterritoriality (“Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the 
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completed. The terms of the post-World War II surrender of Japan remain ambiguous and, in the 
Chinese view, do not properly restore China’s sovereignty over various disputed territories – 
Taiwan and the offshore islands of the East and South China Sea in particular. 
Law, Li, and Lenin: A Revolutionary Turn 
The successor to the KMT regime, the CCP and their “New China,” inherited their predecessors’ 
emphasis on sovereign inviolability, and carried on the purely instrumental conception of 
international law that reflected at least a century of accumulated hostility to illegitimate, Western 
international law. The CCP took power in China after a long civil war as a nationalistic, Marxist-
Leninist regime committed to clawing back China’s international status after the “century of 
humiliation.” Redressing those historical grievances was and remains central to the CCP’s claim 
to legitimate authority over China, an objective inextricably linked to overturning the unequal 
treaty system and thereby restoring China’s territorial integrity and political autonomy. For the 
CCP, however, imperial and Confucian traditions were rejected outright, rendered as vestiges of 
an illegitimate “feudal” order, in Marxist terms.46  
In this rejection, however, Mao Zedong and his revolutionary comrades shared the general 
nationalist objection to the weakness and corruption of the old regime. Feckless and backward – 
and now also bourgeois and capitalist – elites had relegated China to inferior status over the past 
century, in part by failing to adequately represent and defend China’s rights and interests as a 
                                                 
Republic of China (November 4, 1946),” United Nations Treaty Series 1949 (vol. 25, no. 359): 66-150). See Li 1999 
and Xiao 2003 for summaries of how this episode is generally taught and understood. 
46 Whatever the continuity between tradition and modernity in Chinese statecraft, it is abundantly clear that the 
rejection of tradition by the CCP has had pronounced effects. Jerome Cohen notes the frequent scholarly emphasis 
on “traces of the tribute tradition in the style of Communist diplomacy…the sense of uniqueness, righteousness and 
superiority that appears to inhibit friendly relations on the basis of equality. But these are resonances the existence 
and significance of which are the subject of academic dispute. What is beyond dispute and what is of overriding 
importance is not the impact of the imperial tradition but the impact of its destruction” (Cohen 1967: 110). 
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sovereign equal.47 Regaining that sovereignty demanded, inter alia, revocation of the treaties that 
gave extraterritoriality to foreign states and denied Chinese autonomy. The Marxist-Leninist 
leaders of China now regarded these treaties in terms of historical materialism: they partly 
constituted the superstructure of the international system, which expresses the fundamental 
economic and social substructure of bourgeois capitalism.48 It is not necessarily significant 
whether the illegitimacy of international law derived from its incompatibility with Confucian 
modes of governance or its offense to Marxist-Leninist scruples. The CCP did not have to revise 
the hostile, instrumental views about international law they had inherited from imperial and 
Republican regimes. At least the illegitimacy of the underlying norms was a constant. 
Certainly, the rhetoric with which the CCP marketed this opposition to Chinese and global 
audiences had different ideological packaging from that of prior regimes. Yet the substance, if 
not the style, of China’s grievance with international law was continuous. Even before the PRC 
“stood up” as an independent sovereign state in October 1949, the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (a high-level political advisory body to the CCP) announced a Common 
Programme for governance in which “[t]he Central People’s government of the PRC must study 
the treaties and agreements concluded by the KMT government with foreign governments and, 
depending on their contents, recognize, annul, revise or reconclude them.”49 In this respect, they 
adopted the KMT’s position on unequal treaties, differing only in the sense that the CCP wanted 
to claim all of the credit for righting those historical wrongs.50 The PRC, however, confronted 
                                                 
47 “CCP activists and the leftist Nationalists interpreted China's long-standing weakness as a dynamic effect of an 
alliance between the feudalistic and parasitic Chinese political elites (bureaucrats, militarists, and gentry-turned 
capitalists), and the encroaching Western imperialism” (Chen 2008: 124). 
48 Chiu and Cohen 1974: 26-64 extensively review Marxist writing on international law by Chinese scholars and 
officials. 
49 Wang 1990b: 262, citing Collection of Documents Relating to the Foreign Relations of the PRC, Col. 1 1949-
1950, 29 September 1949 Common Programme, Article 55 (Beijing: 1957), 1. 
50 See Wang 2005: 94-95 
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political circumstances that dramatically limited its capacity to conduct such diplomatic 
negotiations – namely, that the defeated KMT regime, now on the island of Taiwan, enjoyed 
recognition by virtually all non-Communist states as the “legitimate” government of China.  
By any standard of legitimacy, the fact of PRC near-total exclusion from the international 
community defined by public international law made normative opposition to the binding force 
of international legal norms inevitable. During the twenty-two year period in which the PRC was 
not represented in the UN, that organization was judged to be “an instrument of American 
aggression against and intervention in the affairs of other states,”51 and could be easily dismissed 
as an illegitimate source of international norms. The ideological repertoire provided by Marxism-
Leninism, adapted to China’s position vis-à-vis the international legal system, bolstered this 
view. It furnished ready rhetoric for contesting “the formulation, the registration of power 
relations”52 represented by Western international law.53 Law’s legitimacy was not only denied, 
but actively contested as the “legitimizing instrument [of] the exploiting class or nation.”54 
The move from treating international law as “an instrument of Western domination” over a weak 
imperial China to “an expression of the will of the ruling class”55 consisting of those same 
Western states is convenient. Both demonstrate hostility and cynicism about the purpose and 
function of international law; both denigrate the process by which it is formed and implemented. 
Lenin’s view of law sits neatly with traditional Chinese conceptions – especially in regarding law 
                                                 
51 Chiu and Cohen 1974: 45. This was more than an ideological position: the intervention on the Korean peninsula in 
1950 was a UN action, and led Chinese “volunteer” troops into combat with nominally UN forces. 
52 Lenin 1932, cited in Carr 1946: 176 
53 “From its birth date, Mao's China challenged the Western powers in general and the United States in particular by 
questioning and, consequently, negating the legitimacy of the ‘norms of international relations,’ which, as Mao and 
his comrades viewed them, were of Western origins and inimical to revolutionary China” (Chen 2001: 4). 
54 Kim 1978: 325 
55 Lenin 1932, cited in Carr 1946: 184 
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as one element of a hierarchical relationship, used not for the liberal purposes of granting rights 
to actors at lower levels, but rather as a coercive instrument for superior individuals, states, or 
classes to impose their will from the top down.56  
Whatever the theoretical reasoning, the practical imperatives motivating Chinese Communists 
were largely consistent with those that motivated prior Chinese governments: limiting the degree 
to which international legal agreements infringed upon China’s sovereignty and autonomy. 
“International law,” explained the CCP mouthpiece newspaper, the Renmin Ribao, “is one of the 
instruments for settling international problems. If this instrument is useful to our country, to the 
socialist cause, or to the cause of peace of the people of the world, we will use it. However, if 
this instrument is disadvantageous to our country, to the socialist cause, or to the cause of peace 
of the people of the world, we will not use it and should create a new instrument to replace it.”57 
There is no ambiguity whatsoever in this instrumental conception, and emphatically no belief in 
the legitimacy of obligations associated with the law.   
This attitude dictated the way international law was taught to future generations of Chinese elite. 
The most influential Chinese international law scholar of the twentieth century, Wang Tieya, 
taught at Peking University and instructed current and future Chinese diplomats, lawyers, and 
officials that the basis for any binding, legal effect for international law “can only be attributed to 
states themselves, that is, the will of states.”58 He and others propounded the standard view that 
                                                 
56 Virtually all of China’s first generation of international law scholars were trained in the Soviet Union, and 
imported the illiberal Leninist conception of law from Soviet authorities, especially A.Y. Vyshinsky, who helped 
reconcile the problem of using law despite its bad class origins. His theory saw Communist parties as representing 
the will of the proletariat, capable of revoking illegitimate laws and creating new positive law in its stead that 
reflects the “dictatorship of the proletariat” (Howson 2009: 824). He cites an influential Soviet legal theorist, 
Marchenko, who argues that “[c]itizens obtain freedom, justice, and security from the state’s exercise of control and 
power, rather than the state and its leaders deriving authority from its citizens.” 
57 Chu 1957, cited in Chiu and Cohen 1974: 32 
58 Wang and Wei 1981: 206 
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all law prior to the effective representation of that sovereign will – that is, unequal treaties and 
any other law generated under illegitimate circumstances – was null.59 That will was starkly 
differentiated from the positive law view that consent is the basis of legitimate public 
international law. Another prominent early PRC international law scholar sounded a typical 
grievance that the “[s]o-called ‘consent’ [from small countries] is reached under circumstances 
of compulsion…various big imperialist powers used the threat of force to compel various weak 
and small countries to ‘consent’ to the conclusion of a large number of unequal treaties.”60 The 
Chinese interpretation reads quite like the view of international law from power. PRC leaders 
and intellectuals prescribed more power as the only viable counterweight. 
Although radical shifts in China’s international orientation and domestic ideology were afoot 
throughout the period from the founding of the PRC through the beginning of the reform period 
in 1978, the orthodox view of international law (as basically illegitimate, useful only insofar as it 
is an instrument) was not in question. The political climate curtailed the range of permissible 
opinions in academic and public life, and led to withering criticism for “Rightists” who placed 
too much stock in the normative underpinnings of international law. Even eminent scholars like 
Wang Tieya were subject to purges for teaching international law as a technical field with some 
legitimate basis, rather than as an instrument of power. Public criticisms of divergent views were 
                                                 
59 Legal scholars in the PRC found international law prior to the present to reflect “not only the will of the ruling 
class of a state, but also the will of the ruling classes of the respective states participating in the agreement” (Cohen 
and Chiu 1974: 33, citing Wu-Shang and Chun 1957, A Criticism of the Reactionary Viewpoint of Ch’en T’i-ch’ing 
on the Science of International Law. Another leading international law scholar and teacher, Zhou Gengsheng, 
explains in his widely-used textbook that “international law is formulated in the process of international transactions 
and recognized generally by various countries. It expresses the will of the ruling class of these countries and is the 
aggregate of norms and behaviors with legally binding force on countries in their international relations, including 
principles, rules and institutions” (Zhou 1981: 3). See also standard views on prior treaties as intrinsically coercive 
in Cohen and Chiu 1974: 70-71, citing Ying t’ai 1960, “Recognize the True Face of Bourgeois International Law 
from a Few Basic Concepts.” 
60 Ying 1960, cited in Cohen and Chiu 1974: 36-37. 
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damaging, even before the chaotic purges of the Cultural Revolution. The “Anti-Rightist 
Movement” of 1957 persecuted legal theorists gullible enough to assign any degree of legitimacy 
to international law independent of its instrumental use, and effectively ended the legal 
profession in China until after the Cultural Revolution.61 “[T]his comrade,” wrote one prominent 
critic of the denounced “Old-Law Viewpoint of Teaching of International Law” espoused by 
Chen Ti’Chiang, “failed to recognize that international law is a legal instrument in the service of 
our foreign policy.”62 This emphatically instrumental view, rooted in historical experience, 
survived not only imperial decline but also the dizzying political instability of the Mao era. 
Toward a Legitimate Basis for International Legislation 
Without allegiance to a system from which they were excluded, the PRC experimented with a 
variety of different ways to put international law into its service as an instrument of statecraft. 
The clearest and most enduring Chinese articulation of an alternative normative framework by 
which to interpret international law is found in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: 
“mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-
interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-
existence.”63 Developed over the course of treaty negotiations with India and Burma during the 
early 1950s, this indeterminate and sovereignty-focused approach to international relations 
appealed to the large number of post-colonial states who shared China’s lack of enthusiasm for 
the existing stock of international rules.64  
                                                 
61 Kim 1987: 119 
62 Sung et al 1958, cited in Cohen and Chiu 1974: 31 
63 These principles have endured in Chinese diplomacy for sixty years, well-reflected in the remarks of the present 
Chinese president at a conference commemorating their enduring normative weight (Xi 2014).  
64 The Five Principles garnered widespread global appeal at the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, Indonesia in 
April 1955, where twenty-nine post-colonial states endorsed a modified version of the Chinese proposal.  
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It bears remark as an indication of the basic principles that the PRC uses to interpret international 
law, which differ substantially from those of the liberal west – not least in prescribing direct 
application of international law as an instrument of foreign policy. The formulation of these 
norms, grounded especially in the Chinese and Indian experience, represents a diplomatic 
response to a system that “include[d] many obligations which obviously encroach upon the 
sovereignty of other states, invade other states domestic jurisdiction, and are detrimental to other 
states’ interests.”65 The Five Principles are readily recognizable as core components of China’s 
attitude toward international law long after its accession to the UN.66 They are nothing if not 
indeterminate, granting wide interpretive scope for China to place illiberal emphasis on the 
inviolability of state sovereignty67 that endured throughout the law of the sea negotiations and 
beyond.  
II. Preferred Norms to Mitigate Maritime Vulnerability 
The PRC’s official account of China’s “century of humiliation” gives prominent play to 
maritime threats. According to the frequently-cited (but unsourced) official count, some 470 
invasions of China came from the sea.68 These seaborne conquests led to the formal imposition 
                                                 
65 Ying 1960, cited in Cohen and Chiu 1974: 37 
66 Leading international law generalists described China's contemporary attitude as follows: “China’s vision of 
international law rests on the principle of sovereignty. Under the Chinese view, sovereign states have an inalienable 
right to exercise jurisdiction over their territories and their people without interference from other states. The 
internal affairs of a state are left for the state’s own people to govern; international affairs are decided by 
consultation among states acting on the basis of equality and mutual benefit” (Bradford and Posner 2011: 25). 
67 In the words of an influential PRC study of international law, “[w]e all know the the principle of inviolability of 
territory is one of the fundamental principles of generally accepted modern international law and that it is also 
prescribed in a series of international law documents. According to the viewpoint of modern IL, state territory is the 
material expression of state independence and state sovereignty. An encroachment of the territorial integrity of a 
state is an infringement of its sovereignty and is [therefore] an aggressive act in violation of international law” (Shih 
1958, cited in Chiu and Cohen 1974: 355) 
68 This figure is repeated in over three-dozen articles and books consulted by the author, and was frequently cited in 
interviews, workshops and conferences with Chinese experts during fieldwork in 2014-2015. One interviewee 
explained that this is the number taught in elementary and junior-high classes, and which is always on history exams 
(author interview with law professor, Renmin University, Beijing, December 2014). See, for example, Peng 2010: 
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of foreign demands represented in the unequal treaty regime, limiting China’s sovereign 
authority over its own territory. China’s earliest experiences with international law indicated that 
it was also potentially useful as an instrument that could mitigate this vulnerability. The desired 
instrumental function is, effectively, closure – that is, the law should limit the rights of users of 
maritime space under Chinese jurisdiction. The Chinese preference for the norm of closure – and 
the tendency to interpret the law of the sea as promoting it – arises at least in part from historical 
experiences with maritime law and maritime security. By the twentieth century, Chinese 
statesmen had learned to conceive of the law of the sea as a potentially useful instrument to 
mitigate China’s maritime vulnerability. This facet of China’s identity, what we might call a 
“maritime victim complex,” powerfully shapes the way China’s political and military elite 
interpret their interests in the law of the sea. 
Historical Development of a Maritime Victim Complex 
The Treaty of Nanjing was signed August 29, 1842 aboard a British Royal Navy frigate, HMS 
Cornwallis, anchored in the Yangtze river over 200 miles inland from China’s eastern coast. 
British vessels had devastated the Qing’s fleet and penetrated China’s major riverine systems, 
exploiting weak coastal defenses to deliver highly unfavorable terms in this first of China’s 
unequal treaties. They secured permanent access to – and even territory in – major coastal ports 
                                                 
“In Chinese modern history, most invasions from powers exterior to China came from the sea. During China’s 
history prior to 1949, China suffered 470 invasions from the sea, including seventy large-scale invasions, such as 
those during the Opium Wars. From Dagushan on Liaodong Peninsula to the port of Sanya on Hainan Island, nearly 
all of China’s major harbors, ports, and islands suffered external invasions. Taiwan, Penghu, Hong Kong, Jiulong, 
Macao, Lüshun, Dalian, Weihaiwei, Jiaozhou Bay, and Guangzhou Bay were all forcibly ceded or “rented,” 
becoming springboards and bridgeheads for exterior powers to attack China’s inland regions. At the same time, the 
invaders grabbed coastal trading and navigation rights from China. Therefore, an important conclusion to be drawn 
from both history and reality is that China’s coastal area is the linchpin of its national security” (Peng 2010: 15-16); 
NB – Ji 2009 cites 479 invasions, 84 of which were large scale, 1860 attacks on Chinese ships and casualties to 
470,000 Chinese people in order to coerce the Qing into more than 50 unequal treaties (Ji 2009: 14).  
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like Shanghai and Canton, and paved the way for European and American navies and 
commercial interests to extract similar concessions in later treaties. Chinese students in the PRC 
have learned that “[t]he unequal treaty regime thus formed was essentially based on force. Force 
was symbolized by gunboats and naval vessels on the rivers, in the ports and along the coasts.”69 
While this critical view is alive and well in Western legal scholarship, it is not just the 
mainstream but the only stream of public discussion in China: foreign coercion is the well-spring 
of international law, and none of its high-minded, liberal principles are spared this stigma. 
Chinese elites came to recognize the instrumental role of international law in the Western 
powers’ consolidation of their strategic gains. By concluding binding “contracts” in unequal 
treaties, these foreign nations secured favorable and enforceable terms for their continued 
commerce in China. Chinese actions in breach of their duties to honor contracted foreign rights 
warranted military reprisals – usually undertaken with naval force, and tending to further extend 
extraterritorial privileges. Chinese historiography is unanimous in the view that “[t]he reality of 
history is that trade followed gunboats, not contracts.”70 Treaties concluded under duress induced 
by superior Western naval firepower led the Qing to gradually recognize that “international law 
could be useful as a device for defending China’s interests.”71  
The Second Opium War (1858-1860) initiated another round of unequal treaties with the British, 
French, Americans and Russians. This latest humiliation inspired the Qing court to study 
international law in earnest – the law of the sea in particular – commissioning translations of 
                                                 
69 Wang 1990b: 252; see also Wei 1957, who notes that “vessels belonging to imperialist countries not only plied 
between our coastal ports to engage in trade, but even sailed freely to Chungking – a port 1350 nautical miles from 
the seashore – and did business all along the way. Moreover, warships also cruised up and down at will, invading 
and encroaching upon our rights under the excuse of protecting their merchant vessels” (cited in Chiu and Cohen 
1974: 467-468). 
70 Zhang 2012: 10 
71 Chiu and Cohen 1974: 8 
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influential European treatises and invoking Western international legal norms in asserting 
China’s own rights.72 Foreign missionaries helped promote major works by Vattel, Wheaton, and 
Grotius, the latter the key publicist of the “freedom of the seas” doctrine that had facilitated 
liberal, commercial competition for access to Chinese ports and markets. Where law had long 
been regarded as a trivial foreign curiosity and a cultural mismatch with the Qing court’s 
preferred modes of intercourse with foreign tributaries, Chinese weakness made knowledge of 
these new diplomatic norms necessary, even if they were still held in contempt. 
The first commonly-cited example of such instrumental use of international law occurred in 
1864, after a Prussian warship seized Danish vessels in the harbor at Tianjin. Loosely invoking 
the concept of China’s “territorial sea” (the actual terminology used was “inner ocean” [内洋]), 
Qing diplomats denied Prussia’s legal competence and secured the release of the vessels and 
compensation to China for the violation of their rights.73 In registering their complaint with the 
Prussian envoy in terms explicitly linked to those same treaties that denied China equal rights, 
the Qing ministers stated that “[t]he various oceans under China’s jurisdiction have, as a rule, 
been specifically stipulated in all her peace treaties with the foreign nations, and in the peace 
treaty with your nation [Prussia], there is such a term as ‘Chinese ocean.’ You know this more 
clearly than any other country and how can you say it is beyond your comprehension?”74 In their 
memorial to the court, the ministers noted the somewhat surprising utility of international law in 
advancing China’s claim: “For instance, in connection with Prussia’s detention of Danish ships 
in Tianjin harbor this year, your ministers covertly used some statements from that law book 
                                                 
72 Chiu and Cohen 1974: 9-10 
73 Wang 1990b: 232-234 recounts this story in detail, citing official records “The Memorial of the Tsungli Yamen to 
the Court,” (30 August 1864), Beginning and End of the Management of Barbarian Affairs, Tongzhi Period, Vol. 
XXCII, p 30; see also Wang 1985: 84-90; Gao 2009: 267; and Hsü 1960: 133. 
74 Wang 1990b: 233 
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[Wheaton’s Elements of International Law] in arguing with [the Prussian minister]. Thereby, the 
Prussian minister acknowledged his mistake and bowed his head without further contention. This 
seems to be proof of its usefulness.”75 This high official’s statement speaks directly to the pure 
instrumentality of China’s international legal practice, and basic disinterest in the basis of law’s 
normativity to the curiously obedient Europeans. 
The lesson of that first, moderately successful invocation of the law of the sea in dealings with 
foreign powers paved the way for later efforts to establish various Chinese maritime rights under 
international law. Clauses recognizing some kind of Chinese territorial sea remained vague, 
however, and tended to lack any specificity about the scope of Chinese authority in its coastal 
waters.76 Qing China’s legal institutions were not adapted to Western international law and did 
not have any language or precedent for dealing with foreign rights. Thus, the jurisdictional 
distinction between China’s “inner” and “outer” oceans “did not develop into a sophisticated 
regime similar to that of the territorial sea in Western international law.”77 It was not until 1899 
that any fixed limit was set, in the Sino-Mexican Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and 
Navigation, wherein the parties acknowledged territorial waters extending to 9nm.78 Less 
formally, an incident in 1908 in which a Japanese vessel was seized operating at 2nm from 
China’s coast led to negotiations under the presumption that China’s jurisdiction extended to at 
least 3nm as a matter of custom.79 Such formal claims were new in Chinese diplomatic practice 
and did not constitute a major part of their repertoire. They are nonetheless notable as first efforts 
                                                 
75 Ibid., 234 
76 See, for example the 1844 US-China Treaty of Peace, Amity and Commerce and the 1856 Great Britain-China 
Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Commerce, where some Chinese waters were acknowledged but not defined or 
delimited. 
77 Chiu 1975: 34 
78 Wang and Wei 1981: 936 
79 Chiu 1975: 36 
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to effect closure by asserting a rudimentary legal basis for China’s jurisdiction over maritime 
space. 
In the midst of a disintegration facilitated by vulnerability to Western maritime power, the Qing 
court did not formalize its own maritime laws nor uniformly enforce its rights under the 
customary law of the sea. The ROC, however, was far more familiar with Western methods and 
intent on employing legal means to dismantle the unequal treaty regime and restore China’s full 
sovereign territoriality. In Year 1 of the ROC (1912), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to 
consider the question of the width of China’s territorial sea. An internal memorandum 
recommends that “we should extend our territorial sea [to 10nm] to protect our maritime 
rights.”80 That recommendation languished until a 1931 proposal to the Executive Yuan which 
argued that because a weak state’s “national power is not sufficient to protect its rights within the 
territorial sea, it can only think of relying on public international law to deter a strong power’s 
encroachment on its fishery, to maintain its neutral rights in time of war and to facilitate its 
measures of sea defense.”81 Eventually, the ROC enacted an “Order Prescribing the Scope of the 
Territorial Sea as Three Nautical Miles,” including a 12nm zone in which it claimed jurisdiction 
to investigate and interdict smuggling.82 This was the first in a succession of formal, legal 
pronouncements by Chinese governments to specify the scope of their maritime jurisdiction.  
Holding Chinese representation in the UN until 1971, the ROC participated in the negotiations 
over the law of the sea beginning in the UN International Law Commission (ILC) and continuing 
into the First Conference on the Law of the Sea, at Geneva in 1958. Their delegation deferred to 
                                                 
80 Chiu 1975: 37, citing Sino-Japanese Fisheries Negotiations [中日渔业交涉], June 2 - Nov 19, 1912, Academia 
Sinica Diplomatic Archives, Taipei, ROC. 
81 Diplomatic records cited in Chiu 1975: 38 
82 Chiu 1975: 38 
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the “maritime powers” in not claiming that states should enjoy unilateral rights to determine the 
extent of their territorial sea, recognizing that Taiwan was now a treaty ally of the United States 
and dependent upon their good will and “essential services.”83  
The government of the PRC, by contrast, had no such allies. Excluded from this first round of 
“international legislation” on the law of the sea, Chinese officials rejected the legitimacy of 
UNCLOS I. Mainland diplomats and scholars, however, took note of the law of the sea 
developments84 at the UN and began to ask: “How wide should the breadth of our territorial sea 
be? This question should be decided by jointly considering the concrete situation of our sea 
coast, national defense and security, and the welfare of the people. He author cannot give a 
definite figure, but under no circumstances should it be less than 12nm.”85 These indeterminate 
principles of “national defense and security” and “welfare” supported norms of closure, later 
advanced by PRC delegates at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea.86 Taiwan was 
now not only “redeemed” from the injustices of the unequal treaties and firmly in the camp of 
the United States, it was geographically delinked from the mainland. The PRC interpretation of 
its maritime interests, however, reflected both of those conditions. Its leadership began to press 
for an interpretation of the law of the sea that promoted closure.  
Continental strategic mindset and norms of closure 
                                                 
83 U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/39. Chiu argues that this position was also based on its desire to join the U.S. in opposing 
Soviet proposals for more extensive coastal state rights (Chiu 1975: 42). 
84 For example, the draft articles of the law of the sea developed in the ILC as early as 1956 were translated into 
Chinese and circulated within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Chiu 1975: 45). 
85 Wei 1957: 25 
86 See Chapter 2, Part III 
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The PRC in the 1950s assumed the historical legacy of previous mainland regimes with respect 
to maritime threats. The new state remained transfixed by rectifying the injustice of unequal 
treaties, and, with its inheritance of the mainland of China, was saddled with maritime 
vulnerability rooted in geography. Again facing a hostile international environment dominated 
by materially-stronger Western powers, the leaders of the PRC interpreted the law of the sea in 
terms that promoted norms of closure that might deny some degree of access to its coastal 
approaches by the superior naval forces of the United States and its allies, forward-deployed in 
East Asia since World War II. This “continental mindset” – a desire to simply limit vulnerability, 
rather than project power, in the maritime domain – is a distinctive feature of China’s identity. It 
leads Chinese strategists to perceive a special interest in closure, as a function both of timeless 
geography and harsh historical experience. The maritime domain presents a peripheral challenge 
to a Chinese strategic tradition predicated on threats to its security from the Eurasian continent. 
China is surrounded on three of four sides by terrestrial neighbors, and historically focused on 
the “barbarian” threats from the north and west of its coastal and riverine heartland. Invasions 
from this steppe frontier ushered in the non-Chinese Mongol Yuan dynasty (1271-1368) and 
Manchu Qing dynasty (1644-1911), inscribing profound lessons in the Chinese strategic outlook 
regarding the unwisdom of neglecting a continental orientation. Maritime threats, in the 
conventional geostrategic reading, are a second-order problem for a state firmly lodged in the 
Eurasian continent; if they are prioritized above threats emanating from land-based adversaries, 
the result is misallocation of resources and strategic attention, and eventual defeat.87 With the 
                                                 
87 Ross 2009: 47-54 surveys strategic writing on “optimal strategies” for land and sea powers. He argues that 
historically, a continental power is generally “unable to resolve its land border insecurity, [and thus] cannot 
approach military parity with the maritime power” (Ross 2009: 53). He argues that “nations are land or sea powers 
not because of cultural or historical predisposition, but because of enduring geopolitical circumstances that tend to 
reward particular defense strategies” (Ibid., 47). 
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exception of the Ming fleet in the late fifteenth century, commanded by the legendary eunuch 
Zheng He, successive Chinese dynasties focused their strategic attention and resources on the 
continent. Maritime defenses were rudimentary, with minimal resources allocated to passive 
defense-in-depth.88 This is summarized in the phrase “heavy on land, light at sea” [重陆轻海], 
often used in Chinese discussions of its traditional, continental strategic outlook.89  
China in the contemporary era shares land boundaries with fourteen states. Several are major 
powers with whom the PRC has engaged in limited military conflicts over its short existence 
(India in 1962, Russia in 1969, and Vietnam in 1979). The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and 
prior to 1949, the Red Army of the CCP, is named appropriately: it is an army first and foremost. 
The organization was forged in the crucible of intense land conflicts. With inferior technology 
and organization, it relied on irregular, guerilla warfare (“people’s war” in Mao’s writings) that 
drew enemy forces away from their logistical and firepower advantages along the coasts and into 
the interior.90 The ranks of the leadership, its force structure, and the budgetary and political 
balance of the military organization as a whole have long been dominated by the land forces.91 
This organizational identity is a function of historical experiences that shaped how military 
leaders understand the imperatives dictated by China’s continental geography. 
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A firmly continental identity informs closed Chinese interpretations of the law of the sea (Cole 
2010). China’s maritime strategic outlook is principally defensive, given its geographic 
configuration as well as entrenched beliefs about how to allocate resources to properly defend its 
population centers. Chinese military leaders prefer to establish interior lines from a fortified 
coast, thus denying access and securing the continent – rather than using the seas as a platform 
for strategic mobility and offensive maneuver. Subsequent developments in Chinese strategic 
thinking about how to utilize the law of the sea as a “defensive weapon” reflect these 
preferences.92 For armed forces and strategists without strong capabilities for projecting maritime 
power and lacking well-developed doctrine for “blue water” operations, using international legal 
norms to effectively push out China’s territorial boundaries is a cheap and appealing option. This 
legal instrument is meant as a complement to military modernization and reorganization towards 
engaging in “military struggle in the maritime direction,” a strategic goal laid out by the current 
administration.93  
Still, simply maintaining a closed interpretation and protesting foreign access is hardly a sound 
basis for expecting to meaningfully limit maritime vulnerability. Credible enforcement of 
preferred norms of closure would require significantly greater defensive capabilities, which 
demands modernization of China’s navy and coastal defenses. Allocating resources to these 
purposes was only possible with attendant shifts in doctrine to emphasize what current Chinese 
strategists have come to call China’s “dual land-sea power” [海陆兼备国家].94 This slow 
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reorientation to address maritime threats began under Mao, who argued in the 1960s that “in the 
past, we had the sea but did not have defense on the sea, so we were bullied by foreigners.”95 It 
did not come to fruition until after his death, however, when China’s “reform and opening up” 
period made international law’s value as an instrument value far more significant and 
ideologically reconcilable with China’s interests in integrating with the world economy. 
III. Fashioning An Instrument From the Law of the Sea 
The historical and cultural-institutional basis for China’s views about the illegitimacy of 
international law, and its specific experiences of weakness in an open law of the sea regime, 
contribute to a PRC interpretation of UNCLOS III that is otherwise unaccountable. The trauma 
of unequal treaties and the hard lessons of maritime vulnerability do not in themselves produce 
the observed outcome, but they furnish a rich normative context for understanding how and why 
the PRC came to the interpretive stance that it did at the Conference and beyond.  
The PRC’s closed interpretation of the law of the sea emerged during the period of the new 
treaty’s negotiation through its ratification, spanning the late 1960s through the late 1990s. In the 
midst of radical changes in China’s domestic and external political orientation, certain cultural-
institutional factors and historical context remained constant. These manifested in a consistent 
attitude toward international law as fundamentally illegitimate but potentially useful. 
International law was an instrument which Western powers used to “dismember” Chinese 
territorial integrity and degrade its sovereignty, but could in principle be used for other purposes. 
The process of operating within this international legal system eventually led to some learning 
about how international law could also be used to defend against such incursions. China’s 
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maritime vulnerability in a period of military weakness made law appear to be a suitable means 
for transforming, or at least challenging, the liberal norms promoted by the West. 
This orientation was on display from the first formal PRC legislative act on the law of the sea, a 
declaration of a 12nm territorial sea in direct response to the threat posed by the American navy 
during the “Second Taiwan Strait Crisis” in late summer 1958. During this limited engagement 
with the ROC, Beijing faced the problem of American vessels and aircraft escorting and 
supplying Taiwanese vessels up to the 3nm mark from the mainland coast. PRC forces avoided 
operating beyond 12nm and shelled ROC vessels operating in this range, but not beyond,96 later 
codifying this practice in the PRC’s 1958 Declaration on the Territorial Sea.97 Responding 
directly to the incursions of American surface vessels, the PRC advanced an international legal 
claim as an instrument to limit its vulnerability. In claiming a 12nm zone surrounding its 
coastlines – as well those of Taiwan and the disputed islands of the South and East China Seas – 
the PRC announced that “while navigating Chinese territorial seas, every foreign vessel must 
observe the relevant laws and regulations laid down by the Government of the People’s Republic 
of China.”98 In this first legislative act, we see the rudiments of a later preference for 
indeterminacy in its pronouncement that unspecified domestic law would be authoritative in this 
domain. We also observe a direct challenge to the liberal norm under which American vessels 
could operate with impunity up to the Chinese coast. The declaration served an illiberal goal of 
making those navigational rights dependent upon the discretion of the state.  
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The PRC’s exclusion from the UN prior to 1971, however, eliminated Beijing’s capacity to 
participate directly in “international legislation” to that end. The domestic events of the Cultural 
Revolution, meanwhile, limited Chinese officials’ practical knowledge of how to fashion a useful 
instrument out of legal norms and rules. The following section summarizes the political context 
in which the PRC dispatched its diplomats to negotiate the Convention, then describes 
recalibration of Chinese attitudes toward law leading to China’s eventual ratification of 
UNCLOS III in 1996. By focusing especially on how it was taught to future practitioners in the 
PRC over this period, we can observe basic continuity in the Chinese attitude toward 
international law – but now in a context of a growing appreciation for the range of practical 
functions it might play. Chinese identity vis-à-vis international law is more continuous than its 
violently discontinuous political history over this period. As victims of Western aggression for 
which international law was a potent tool, at no point was this law regarded as having any 
independent legitimacy – only instrumental efficacy when wielded with sufficient power and 
appropriate purpose. 
From Revolutionary Neglect to Reformist Respect 
Among the many radical and destructive aspects of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) was the 
total disestablishment of China’s system of higher education. International law, with its Western 
origins and its “bad class background” as a tool of bourgeois capitalism, was among the most 
reviled disciplines. Ideological attacks on law “led to the spread of legal nihilism of despising the 
law, negating the legal system and ignoring legal education.”99 Law schools were shuttered and 
used as psychiatric hospitals, storage for vegetables, and military barracks.100 Law professors and 
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practitioners were “sent down to the countryside for reeducation” in menial agricultural tasks. 
Diplomats were recalled en masse from their postings abroad. 
By the time the PRC took its seat in the UN in 1971, its lead representative, Huang Hua, did not 
have any politically viable legal experts to place on the UN’s Sixth Committee, “the primary 
forum for the consideration of legal questions in the General Assembly.”101 For that role, he 
appointed his wife, He Liliang, who was trained as an economist.102 The PRC UN delegation’s 
lack of experience in international law compounded the long-standing lack of respect for its 
legitimacy. However, PRC “socialization” in this institutional setting likely catalyzed growing 
appreciation of the potential utility of international law for a permanent member of the UNSC.  
Among the first major issues confronted by the PRC was the law of the sea, then becoming a 
major Third World cause in the General Assembly.103 The diplomat Ling Qing declined an initial 
appointment to lead the Chinese negotiation efforts because he “had never before researched the 
law of the sea.” Eventually he agreed to serve because “by then China had participated in the 
Seabed Committee for two years….and had already openly explained our positions in meetings 
and other fora. [He] just needed to do follow up work.”104 Adjustment of Chinese positions in 
light of new understandings reached by a group of non-specialists appeared impossible during 
the process of negotiations, as PRC delegates represented a set of political goals that were 
determined independent of the content of the treaty itself.  
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The diplomats tasked with representing China’s law of the sea interests were not trained in that 
highly specialized field, obscure even to international lawyers without specific training. Even if, 
over the course of the long negotiations, they came to new understandings of the law of the sea’s 
function and purpose, the individuals themselves faced dire political consequences for espousing 
any belief in the normativity of international law. Some manifestly came to recognize that the 
substantive positions adopted by the PRC were not in its material interest, but had no reason to 
alter their diplomatic tack in an “international legislation” process that was conceived in entirely 
political terms. Ling Qing, the diplomat who had resisted taking the lead in negotiations, 
discussed the 200nm EEZ with experts from other states and came to the conclusion that it was 
indeed disadvantageous to China. Still, he recognized that “he had no choice to accept it if [we] 
wanted to ensure solidarity in the group of developing nations. Afterward I revisited this issue in 
a discussion with the Chinese delegation…[some of whom] believed I was wavering in my 
politics and not resolute in supporting the 200nm rule.”105 The PRC’s substantive positions 
appear secondary to the political role they set out to play as a champion of the Third World, 
demanding a revision of an illegitimate old liberal order to secure rights for weak developing 
states who could not secure them otherwise.  
With the death of Mao and the initiation of major “reform and opening” under newly-appointed 
CCP Chairman Deng Xiaoping that began with the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central 
Committee in December 1978, a focus on development – “socialist modernization” – came to 
supplant the ideological hostility to international legal institutions. Over the course of 
negotiations and China’s long deliberation (1982-1996) over whether to ratify the law of the sea, 
international law was greatly rehabilitated in China’s educational system and government as a 
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suitable means to achieve a range of essentially economic ends. China’s ability to participate 
directly in the “international legislative” process allowed Chinese preferences about norms and 
principles of international law to influence the law’s “progressive development and 
codification.” So too did its growing economic and military power. International law became 
more practicable due to the combination of increasing knowledge among Chinese scholars and 
officials, new imperatives of reform, and growing capacity to use it as an instrument. 
International Law as an Instrument of Closure 
Beginning in 1979, prominent Chinese experts began to call for a renaissance in the PRC 
approach to legal questions. Chinese academic institutions began to heed Deng’s dictum that “we 
must attach importance to and strengthen the research work of international law.”106 Deng’s call 
was followed by a major proliferation of academic work on the subject of practical participation 
in international law. Remarkably, the only international law scholarship that had been published 
in the PRC during the period 1965-1979 was Wang Tieya’s Collection of Materials on the Law 
of the Sea, which was published for internal circulation in 1974.107 In 1979, Wang Tieya and Wei 
Min published an article in the Party mouthpiece, People’s Daily, entitled “We Must Strengthen 
International Law Research,”108 opening the floodgates for general and specific work on the 
subject. An unpublished textbook written in the 1950s and 1960s by one of leading Chinese 
international legal jurists of that era, Zhou Gengsheng, was finally released to the public in 
1981,109 and followed by an influential text that immediately became the core of Chinese 
international law curricula, authored by twenty Chinese international law scholars, and edited by 
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the eminent Wang Tieya.110 This latter text in particular sought to instruct Chinese students in 
international law’s practical, policy-related utility rather than its theoretical basis – that is, its 
instrumental, not normative, components.111  
In short, international law was restored to academic curricula and diplomatic statecraft as a 
means to facilitate China’s “socialist modernization.” The rehabilitation of international law 
reflected an authoritative decision to participate in international trade and investment and seek 
access to global resources and technologies.112 In order to train personnel to this end, Chinese 
scholars throughout the 1980s began a comprehensive reconfiguration of the old ideological 
aversion to international law. No normative belief in the appropriateness or legitimacy of the 
system was necessary for the practical purposes for which legal instruments like the law of the 
sea were to serve. Marxist-Leninist objections to the basic enterprise of international law were 
largely muted or even reversed. The influential Wang textbook led the way, pronouncing that 
“[i]n international society there is no ruling class, nor is it possible to have such a class.”113 This 
reconfiguration allowed later scholars to embrace the long-appreciated instrumental value of 
international law: “[i]n our country, we need to use the instrument of international law to serve 
the realization of the task of socialist modernization.”114   
The law of the sea was the first major multilateral treaty in which the PRC played a role. 
UNCLOS thus garnered a high degree of scholarly and official attention in light of this 
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reconsideration of international law as a viable instrument of statecraft. Major textbooks 
advocated disciplined study of the law of the sea in order to support China’s modernization 
goals, and made emphatic note of the fundamental mutability of major international legal norms. 
Goal-oriented participation in the international legislative process and concerted state practice 
could change the functions and purposes of international law in desired ways.115 The Wang 
textbook called special attention to the fact that the regimes of the continental shelf and EEZ 
took less than twenty years to develop in the postwar period. These regimes were susceptible to 
change because states “legislated” new norms.116 This attitude was well-represented by the 
newly established China Society of International Law, which held each of its first two meetings 
(in 1980 and 1981) on the subject of the law of the sea.117 The inaugural meeting’s keynote 
address emphasized that “the general trend of international law is development and change. In 
what direction will it develop and how will it change? At present the most vital issue is to fight 
for legislative power of international law.”118 This was not so much a reassessment of the nature 
of international law, per se, but rather an upgraded appraisal of China’s capacity to “exert the 
influence [of its] foreign policy during international legislative proceedings.”119  
The consensus view was and remains that a disadvantageous maritime legal regime could be 
reformed to suit Beijing’s interests; not simply material capabilities but knowledge of the 
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discipline were necessary to wield international law as a tool to protect its sovereignty and 
maritime rights. Study of the law of the sea became one of the central components of 
international legal training in the PRC over the course of the 1980s. “So far as our country is 
concerned,” argued one influential author (whose strong Marxist-Leninist views were further 
“left” than most of his colleagues and thus less amenable to international law), “[international 
law] is an indispensable legal means to realize socialist modernization construction. For instance, 
in order to explore resources near our coast, we must study the legal status of the continental 
shelf, fishing zone and exclusive economic zone and international norms and customs between 
states in delimiting these regions….we must actively join international legislative activities and 
strengthen the struggle with the UN so as to form the broadest international united front for anti-
hegemonism.”120 Spurred by this “anti-hegemonic” motivation but lacking knowledge about the 
specifics of the regimes, PRC goals were initially more about process than substance; as Chinese 
scholars studied these particularities of UNCLOS, certain substantive problems became clear. 
The ratification of the treaty, however, proceeded because that act served the purpose of 
undermining a liberal, Western-dominated regime, an aim far more politically salient than any 
particular rule.  
The indeterminacy built into core rules of the treaty made this decision even more easily 
reconciled with any potential material costs. On the question of how maritime boundaries could 
be delimited from the various features in the East and South China Seas subject to disputed 
sovereignty, the Convention provides only the sparest of interpretive guidelines. A group of 
Chinese legal scholars noted that “[a]fter years of discussing the concept of ‘equity’ in 
international law at UNCLOS III, the participating States could find no universally agreed 
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meaning of the term. Accordingly, they settled for the broader reference to delimitation ‘on the 
basis of international law,’ and a specific indication of the objective, viz., ‘to achieve an 
equitable solution’ in Articles 74 and 83 of the Convention. However, this provision is so general 
that only by further interpretation can it be made practically applicable. China’s position on the 
application of the principle of equity is also indeterminate, and subject to different 
interpretations, and cannot by itself be used as practical method for boundary delimitation.”121 
Given the high degree of political salience attached to disputed territory, it was inevitable that a 
viable “practical method” would honor Chinese interpretations of the relevant rules reflecting its 
preference for closure. Growing familiarity with legal processes surrounding the law of the sea, 
especially the domestic legislation and practice of state parties to UNCLOS, led Chinese scholars 
to recognize that “[t]he vagueness and equivocality of the Convention is a great weakness, which 
can be taken advantage of by any party to the Convention.”122 With ratification, it became clear 
that a variety of issues would require not just distinct Chinese interpretations, but a “practical 
method” for realization. Lacking such a method, China was likely to be saddled with a regime 
that crystallized around norms disadvantageous to China – that is, conventional, liberal 
interpretations of the rules enshrined in the black letters of the treaty.  
Recognizing the costs of the Convention and the imperative for China to influence its 
interpretation and practice, a Chinese researcher argues that “the EEZ and new continental shelf, 
which have been said to be able to expand China's jurisdiction, have actually become a true “soft 
underbelly” or “troublemaker” for China…it is precisely because of the new system of expanded 
maritime jurisdiction in the Convention that China and its neighbors are having disputes over the 
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delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf….Thus, the argument that the provisions of the 
Convention and China's claims will expand the maritime space under China's jurisdiction to 
‘three million square kilometers’ has become a purely theoretical deduction that ignores the 
reality of China's geography.”123 Other maritime security and regional diplomacy experts lament 
the fact that UNCLOS rules have now encouraged “provocative” acts by other states with claims 
to island territory claimed by the PRC.124 Chinese academics also express reservations about the 
treaty on economic grounds, recognizing that a standard interpretation does not serve China’s 
material interests. One scholar notes that “UNCLOS cannot achieve a Pareto optimum…as 
demonstrated in growing overfishing….and the huge transactions costs in signing and 
implementing the treaty.”125 Others question the salutary effects of joining a major treaty that 
lacks legal efficacy given the great powers’ capacity to act unilaterally without honoring 
obligations under the Convention.126 The thrust of these comments about the treaty is that the 
disadvantages of the treaty are substantial, and require study and ultimately revision through 
concerted Chinese action. 
At a minimum, China’s ratification of the treaty indicated to international law specialists that the 
law of the sea presented a variety of political challenges requiring PRC experts to wield greater 
practical knowledge of the regime that would soon go into effect. The manifest disadvantages of 
UNCLOS III would have to be managed, in part through publicizing a coherent and persuasive 
Chinese interpretation of relevant rules and norms. In the words of one Chinese scholar: 
We should keep abreast of current affairs and make use of this weapon of international 
law to expose and attack the aggressive and expansive policy of the superpowers 
including hegemonism. We should first oppose Soviet hegemonism. In coordinating our 
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diplomatic struggle, we should utilize international law to safeguard our territorial 
sovereignty and legitimate interests. We should direct our research effort in a down-to-
earth manner to such issues as our claims to sovereignty over the Xisha (Paracel) Islands, 
the Nansha (Spratly) Islands and the Tiaoyutai (Senkaku) Islands. Delimitation problems 
with our neighboring countries on the continental shelf, and in the economic zones should 
also be given attention. We should carefully study the various issues confronting our 
present day struggle in the field of international law and support the struggle waged by 
the Third World for the establishment of a new international order, both politically and 
legally. For instance, the statement made by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1971 in support of a 
200 nautical mile maritime right generated an important impact in this struggle.127  
Chinese experts appreciated that “this weapon of international law” required knowledge of its 
intricacies (thus the call for research efforts) and meaningful expression of that knowledge in the 
form of practice that would position China to participate in the struggle to shape this important 
“international legislation” to better reflect its interests and preferences in a closed law of the sea 
in which its security, sovereignty, and access to resources would be better served. 
IV. Conclusion: Learning to Play the Instrument of International Law 
This Chapter addressed the question left open by the interaction phase of China’s participation in 
the transnational legal process surrounding UNCLOS III: why are PRC positions on the law of 
the sea incongruous with its apparent interests? In treating the second phase of the transnational 
legal process, interpretation, we arrive at more complex picture of Chinese interests in 
international law that partially answers the question. While the treaty did not serve China’s 
conventionally-rendered material interests in power and wealth, it satisfied a desire to wrest sole 
control of the “instrument” of international law away from the advanced, industrial West. The 
UNCLOS III treaty’s substance may be largely disadvantageous to the PRC, but China’s 
conception of its interests was considerably broader than the costs and benefits delivered by 
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discrete rules and norms of the regime. By leading the Third World to enact a regime that defied 
Western “maritime hegemony,” China took initial steps toward creating an illiberal regime with 
sufficient indeterminacy to allow China’s closed interpretation of the law of the sea to serve as 
the basis for its future practice.  
The origins of this indeterminate, illiberal perspective, and preference for closure lie in China’s 
identity, observable in its historical and cultural-institutional background vis-à-vis international 
law in general, and maritime law in particular. This background manifests in part as a belief in 
the basic illegitimacy of the Western-dominated international legal system that facilitated 
China’s historical “humiliation” in the unequal treaties. It manifests also in a set of governing 
institutions that prioritize custom (li) well above law (fa), trusting in the discretion of rulers – not 
the application of fixed rules – to continuously promote an idealized notion of orderly, 
hierarchical social relationships. Finally, mated to ideological opposition on Marxist-Leninist-
Maoist grounds and strong perceptions of maritime geostrategic vulnerability, the PRC’s closed 
interpretation is more easily reconciled to its self-perceived interests. PRC participation was 
premised on a purely instrumental notion of international law that differs considerably from the 
more normative purposes and functions of international law idealized by the Western world.   
With Third World majorities in the UN and virtually all of its subsidiary organs, Chinese 
diplomats had reasonable success in “taking over legislative power in international lawmaking 
from the two superpowers”128 at the Conference. This supposed triumph only initiated the 
political struggle to make the law of the sea serve China’s interests: “the emergence of the 
Convention, as well as its universality and persistence as a ‘constitutional’ foundation for 
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international societal discussion of maritime and law of the sea issues, are inseparable from the 
Chinese contribution. However, the grim, unavoidable fact is that the EEZ and continental shelf, 
to which China agreed and supported, caused China serious disadvantage and distress.”129 The 
EEZ was only one of several substantive provisions that were not necessarily to China’s 
advantage. Yet by contrast to prior efforts at codification, the norms that prevailed in the new 
Convention better addressed the legacy of unequal treaties and other disadvantages faced by 
post-colonial states operating in a liberal system that conferred advantages to states that were 
already developed. Emphasizing preferred principles like illiberalism and indeterminacy in 
constructing the new law of the sea, the PRC acted consistently with its interpretation of the 
function and purpose of international law. Having done so effectively, and having announced its 
interpretations of the treaty and its norms as promoting closure, the PRC still faced the question 
of how those interpretations would affect the practical function of the treaty and its bearing on 
questions of high political import, like its maritime disputes.  
With this interpretative basis intact, we are still left to reckon with what it means for China to 
wield the law of the sea as an instrument. What are the implications of a Chinese interpretation 
of the law of the sea that approaches its underlying principles and norms as fundamentally 
mutable? Does the PRC’s explicitly instrumental conception of international legal rules, lacking 
normative basis, influence their practical function? Interpreting international law as a potentially 
useful instrument is not, in itself, sufficient to guide effective use of legal instruments. This 
practical question demands further inquiry into the process of internalizing the rules and norms 
of UNCLOS III into China’s domestic law, and implementing it in the form of practice. 
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Internalizing and Implementing International Law: 
The Politics of Ratified Treaties in the PRC 
 
 
“Strictly speaking, international treaties, even after ratification, accession or approval, do 
not automatically become part of [PRC] law and consequently do not automatically have 
domestic legal effect.” 
- Xue Hanqin, PRC’s sitting judge on the International Court of Justice1 
 
The influence of international law on China, and vice versa, depends in substantial measure on 
the concrete ways that treaty norms emerge in PRC domestic institutions and practices. In 
treating those domestic manifestations of the original treaty norms, this Chapter continues the 
narrative tracing those norms from their creation at the Conference, through their interpretation 
by Chinese elites, and now finally to the doorstep of the Chinese political-legal system. The 
phenomenon now at hand is the transformation of the international law of the sea into the 
domestic maritime law of China. What are the formal and informal processes by which treaty 
norms enter China’s legal system? How do those norms influence domestic institutions? How 
does UNCLOS III become PRC law, policy and practice in the EEZ? These questions bring us to 
examine the conjoined internalization and implementation processes, the last two stages of the 
transnational legal process. 
Chapter 2 analyzed PRC interaction with the emerging EEZ regime established in the UNCLOS 
III treaty, noting China’s ardent support for seemingly disadvantageous rules and procedures. In 
ratifying that treaty, the PRC pursued not material interests but a broader conception of an 
                                                          
1 Xue and Jin 2009: 300 
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illiberal international legal order. Their participation was geared toward ensuring that the treaty’s 
text remained indeterminate in several key respects, permitting Chinese discretion to push for 
norms allowing closure of maritime zones around China – i.e., exclusion of other states and 
consolidation of Chinese control. Chapter 3 unpacked how China came to this specific set of 
interests and preferences by inquiring into the historical context and cultural-institutional 
framework through which the PRC interpreted the treaty. China’s experience of victimization by 
international law and sense of maritime vulnerability during the “century of humiliation” 
produce a hostile attitude toward international law in general, and the law of the sea in particular. 
The normative illegitimacy of Western international law in Chinese eyes, however, does not 
negate its instrumental efficacy. International law is just another arena of international politics, 
and in the maritime domain it enables China to pursue closure of zones along its vulnerable 
periphery.  
Still, if law can be an instrument (of socialist modernization, of illiberal statecraft, of maritime 
closure, or any number of ends), then we are still obliged to specify how that instrument is forged 
within state institutions and wielded by state actors. That is the subject of the next two 
analytically-linked Chapters. The present Chapter 4 addresses the generic ways international law 
is internalized and implemented in China; these processes are further explored in Chapter 5, by 
way of a specific inquiry into the processes through which Chinese political-legal institutions 
transform the EEZ into a practical instrument to advance political goals. Through these 
processes, those norms reciprocally transform the PRC, creating new state functions and 
capacities to administer and enforce domestic law in the vast new “blue territory” of the EEZ.  
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Internalization is the process by which norms from international law are institutionalized within 
a state. It is observed in the enactment of domestic laws and regulations that declare a state’s 
intention to comply with its international legal obligations.2 As such, internalization proceeds 
through the various legislative and regulatory mechanisms by which treaty or customary law is 
“domesticated,” or rendered in domestic law and transmitted to agents of the state. The process 
generates functional responsibilities to implement domestic laws derived from international legal 
norms. Depending upon the nature of domestic political and legal institutions of the state, many 
different stakeholders may be involved at different stages of the process, including political 
parties, legislators, government officials, courts, and non-state interest groups. Some or all of 
these stakeholders will be involved in agenda-setting, determining which norms require formal 
internalization, drafting and review, managing legal and political challenges to proposed laws, 
delegating and undertaking oversight and implementing authorities, and so on.  
Implementation is the process by which those laws are put into practice by agents of the state. It 
is the informal complement to the formal process of internalization. It focuses not on “black 
letters” but on the observable implications of having such rules on the books. The operational 
element here is the individual agencies (or the actors themselves), whose conduct and relative 
authority are influenced by internalized rules. While there is inevitably a formal component to 
this process – namely domestic administrative rules about how authority is delegated and how 
conflicts between agencies are managed – it is principally about the informal political process by 
which new norms are expressed in observable practices. Implementation therefore depends to a 
                                                          
2 Koh describes the process as one in which “states internalize international law by incorporating it into their 
domestic legal and political structures, through executive action, legislation, and judicial decisions which take 
account of and incorporate international norms” (Koh 1996: 204). 
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significant degree on the character of the political as well as the legal institutions of the state 
internalizing international law.  
Part I consults the “black letters” of Chinese law to explain the formal role treaty norms play in 
the PRC. The weakness of China’s legal institutions and the indeterminacy of China’s legal 
procedures grant substantial discretion to political elites in deciding whether and how 
international legal norms become a part of Chinese domestic law. Part II considers how treaty 
norms are shaped by the broader political arena in which law operates, demonstrating the 
necessity of high-level political prioritization – first to determine which norms survive 
internalization and in what form, then to mate those norms with practical implementation. Part 
III establishes that legal issues linked maritime disputes pass through this threshold of political 
importance, enabling both internalization and implementation of UNCLOS norms to be 
championed by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) elites. The analytically-linked Chapter 5 then 
analyzes the enactment and practical implementation of maritime legislation, administrative 
regulations, and departmental rules as they pertain to the various functional demands of the EEZ.  
I. The Formal and Informal Role of (International) Law in Contemporary China 
In order to develop appropriate expectations for how China engages in processes of 
internalization and implementation, we must assess the formal and informal institutional 
arrangements in the PRC for incorporating norms from international treaties into domestic law 
and practice. Analysis of the PRC constitution(s), relevant statutes, and various precedents 
makes evident that these processes are irregular and determined outside of the legal institutional 
hierarchy. At each stage, political elites in the government and CCP exercise considerable 
discretion about which treaties and agreements are recognized as binding upon China, which 
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obligations survive the internalization process into domestic law, and how administrative and 
law enforcement agencies implement the laws, regulations and rules thus adopted. After 
consideration of the formal, legal bases for ratifying treaties, this section examines the 
circumscribed role of law in contemporary China, noting ongoing reform efforts to utilize law as 
one of several instruments of domestic governance and international statecraft.  
These considerations support a conclusion that legal institutions play only a subsidiary role in 
political decision-making in the PRC, which should further limit expectations that norms from 
ratified treaties will survive internalization and implementation in unmodified form. Any 
“obedience” in implementation is to the transformed set of rules internalized into PRC law, not 
the original norms. The formal legal hierarchy is deeply penetrated by an informal political 
hierarchy that upsets its “rational” function to the extent that it is probably not appropriate to 
refer to the Chinese legal system as a “system” at all;3 rather, it is a collection of institutions that 
in some respects resemble those composing legal systems foreign states, but that lack authority 
reposed in law itself. In consequence, political priorities like maritime disputes can and do 
override formal constraints imposed by legal obligation. Nonetheless, political campaigns that 
promote the aim of “ruling the country through law” demonstrate that PRC elites increasingly 
prize the value of legal mechanisms, legal language and internationally legitimated norms as 
instruments to pursue both generalized and particular political goals. 
                                                          
3 A leading scholar of the Chinese legal system writes that “because of the lack of a unifying concept of law, and 
even more so because of the fragmentation of authority that marks China today, I have nowhere in this book referred 
to a Chinese legal system, only to Chinese legal institutions” (Lubman 2006: 3). This assessment, if not the language 
itself, is widely shared among students of Chinese law in China and abroad. Another authority on Chinese law notes 
that “as a practical matter, there is no single source of ultimate authority in the system. Indeed, to make this claim 
might be the equivalent of saying that there is no single Chinese legal ‘system,’ that there are instead many Chinese 
legal systems, each with its own jurisdiction, hierarchy of authority and way of operating” (Clarke 2005: 64). 
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Formal processes for “bringing international law home” 
As a jumping off point into China’s legal institutions, we should consult the black letters of its 
basic procedures for “bringing international law home”4 If we are to assess the indeterminacy 
that characterizes the law as it operates within China, these formal elements are certainly among 
“the various processes by which institutions are continually reproduced and modified 
through…actors’ practices.”5 By attending first to the prescribed steps under law and noting 
where they fail to determine exactly how actors and organizations are charged with internalizing 
and implementing international law, the groundwork is laid for examining the actual practices 
that emerge. How does international law figure into the formal hierarchy of PRC legal 
institutions? 
A PRC constitution that does not constitute 
The first step to mapping the internalization process is to identify the formal domestic procedure 
for incorporating ratified treaties. What does the most authoritative source of law in the PRC 
legal hierarchy, its national constitution, have to say on this issue? Very little, it turns out. The 
most recent iteration of that document was promulgated in 1982, and represents the fourth 
constitution in the short history of the state. Like the prior 1954, 1975 and 1978 PRC 
constitutions, the 1982 constitution is characterized by a large volume of ideological language 
and relatively spare description of the structure and authorities of the state. Each begins with a 
preamble reciting the CCP’s creation myth about the PRC, recounting China’s exodus from 
“semi-colonial” and “semi-feudal” bondage and its deliverance to socialist modernity under the 
                                                          
4 This is the title of a seminal lecture by Koh focusing on the internalization process and linking it directly to 
obedience (Koh 1998). 
5 Koslowski and Kratochwil 1994: 227 
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“revolutionary leadership” of the Chinese Communist Party. It lauds the “marked increase in 
agricultural production” as well as “significant advances” in “education, scientific and cultural 
undertakings,” and reaffirms its pledge to the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” 
(Preamble, 1982 PRC Constitution) a proxy for China’s overall attitude toward inviolable 
sovereignty as the heart of the international legal system. Amended in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 
2004 to match then-prevailing political priorities, the current constitution is better conceived as a 
relatively authoritative statement about the current policies and political mood of the CCP.6  
Only secondarily does the constitution lay out “the basic system and basic tasks of the State” by 
establishing “the fundamental law of the State” (Preamble, 1982 PRC Constitution). 
International law does not figure prominently. In four chapters and 138 articles, the constitution 
addresses international law in only three articles: Article 67, which provides that the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC), the leadership of China’s supreme 
legislative body, will “decide on the ratification or abrogation of treaties and important 
agreements concluded with foreign states;” Article 81, establishing that the President, following 
the NPC decision, “ratifies or abrogates treaties and important agreements concluded with 
foreign states;” and Article 89, which grants the State Council, China’s executive cabinet, 
authority to “conclude treaties and agreements with foreign states.” Nowhere in the text are 
“treaties” or “agreements” defined, and nowhere does the constitution stipulate any specific 
procedure by which international law bears on domestic law or creates any type of binding legal 
                                                          
6 The history of the prior constitutions bears out this judgment: the 106 articles of the 1954 document codified the 
CCP’s revolutionary success in seizing power in China and forging a socialist state; the 1975 edition followed 
Mao’s Cultural Revolution and consists of only 30 vague clauses that exhort the nation to continuous revolution, 
abolishing virtually all of the individual rights contained in the 1954 document and placing the state directly under 
the CCP in formal terms; the 1978 constitution came on the heels of the ouster of the Gang of Four and reversed the 
radical tendencies of its immediate predecessor; finally, the 1982 constitution deleted the explicit control of the CCP 
and reoriented the state organs around the urgent tasks of socialist modernization and development of a market 
economic structure. 
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obligation for the state. The President, State Council and NPC appear to have broad, almost 
undifferentiated authority to make decisions about the degree to which international law will 
matter. 
The constitution’s indeterminacy is tantamount to silence on the subject of international law. It 
reflects a basic ambivalence among Chinese elites about the purpose and function of 
international law within the PRC, though it bears noting that this is not at all a settled subject 
even in countries with comparatively rigorous legal systems. Western international law scholars 
usually identify two basic “theories” of international law: monism and dualism. A monist 
conception of international law considers law as a unified whole, in which “international law is 
automatically a part of a state’s domestic legal system.”7 The dualist position is that domestic 
and international law are “essentially different bodies of law” in which the “state determines for 
itself whether, when, and how international law is ‘incorporated’ into domestic law, and the 
status of international law in the domestic system is determined by domestic law.”8 Where many 
countries elect to follow a clear monist or dualist doctrine in their constitutions or other major 
legal instrument, China’s constitution scrupulously avoids pronouncements on this subject. 
Leading Chinese international law scholars maintain studied ambivalence about where the PRC 
sits along the monist-dualist spectrum.9 There is no default presumption about the status of 
                                                          
7 Dunoff, Ratner and Wippman 2006: 267. See also Frank and Thiruvengadam 2003 for a helpful survey of varying 
constitutional orders vis-à-vis international law. They argue that “States, as a matter of practice, make a deliberate 
decision as to whether to approach the international legal system from the dualist or monist perspective. That choice 
will have important ramifications for the state's legal order and its relation to the community of states,” (Frank and 
Thiruvengadam 2003: 470) though such a deliberate decision has been deferred in China and cannot be clarified by 
a constitutional court, because no such authority exists. 
8 Dunoff et al. 2006: 268 
9 Wang Tieya, the most widely read and taught international law scholar in China, merely lays out these categories 
and declines to describe China as falling into one or the other category (Wang et al., 1981: 44); Zhou Gengsheng 
(1981) rejects these choices as a false dichotomy (cited in Chiu 1987: 1145-1146). Contemporary scholars inherit 
this ambivalence, some staking out a position that there are two distinct systems of law but that domestic law 
remains subordinate to international law (Jiang 2014: 43-45); Others argue that the system is in fact monist, but that 
the state retains discretion to incorporate only selected international legal norms (He 2001: 50). In author interviews 
with international law professors at Tsinghua Law School (June 2014, December 2014), they explained that China’s 
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international law in the Chinese constitution, and no audible calls for more determinate 
relationships to be established in future amendments.10 The same indeterminacy reigns in lower-
level legal instruments’ treatment of the subject of international law. 
Indeterminate statutory terms for internalization of international law 
The next step in mapping the formal internalization process is to look one step down in the legal 
hierarchy. Legislation (立法) created by the NPC, the “highest organ of state power” (1982 PRC 
Constitution, Article 57), is the next-most authoritative source of law in the PRC. The NPC is an 
appointed legislative body that convenes only once annually. It holds nominal authority to amend 
the constitution as well as enact and amend “basic laws” (基本法), which are binding on all other 
organs of state and hierarchically superior to legislation enacted by People’s Congresses at 
provincial, autonomous region, municipal levels. The NPC’s Standing Committee, a permanent 
body, is also empowered to enact “other laws” (其他法律), and to amend basic laws (1982 
Constitution, Article 67). At this level of national legislation, several statutes make 
pronouncements about how international law should function in PRC domestic law in certain 
functional areas, but do not establish a default norm for application to treaties or custom.11 
Internalization does not have a determinate pathway through China’s legal institutions. Xue 
Hanqin, the PRC’s sitting judge on the International Court of Justice, confirms that “[u]nder 
Chinese law, there is no statute that explicitly regulates the forms or modalities for implementing 
                                                          
system is sui generis and that students are taught to treat such distinctions as monist-dualist as Western imports that 
do not have direct bearing on China. Others, including Judge Xue, argue that both exist simultaneously (Xue and Jin 
2009: 305). 
10 One scholar notes that “China has not established a general rule on the reception of international treaties within 
the Chinese legal system and the direct applicability of these treaties before Chinese courts,” arguing that such rules 
are unnecessary because the system functions without such determinacy (Shan 2002: 564). 
11 Guo 1988 provides a highly detailed review of the de jure legislative hierarchy, and characteristic of Chinese 
scholarship on the subject, notes but does not explore the undefined role of international law. 
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treaty provisions at the domestic level or in national courts.”12 She further notes, “as is obvious, 
treaties vary in terms of their status and legal effect on the domestic legal system; not all treaties 
constitute part of [China’s] domestic law.”13 This statement reflects a basic indeterminacy on the 
question of what sorts of instruments ought to be considered positive sources of international law 
requiring domestic legal effect. Consistent with this ambivalent attitude toward what should 
actually be considered international law, Wang Tieya’s authoritative work on the subject elides 
distinctions between formal treaties ratified through legal processes and informal agreements 
undertaken among politicians. He includes the 1972 Shanghai Communique between the U.S. 
and the PRC as an agreement of equal standing with a treaty, though it was not treated so by the 
U.S. or the international community.14 The lack of a basic definition of what “counts” as 
international law is problematic, and pervades all legal processes naming “international law” as 
though it had determinate content. 
This problematic conceptualization of the basic nature of international law is amply reflected in 
PRC statutes. The most significant piece of legislation on the subject is the 1990 PRC Law on 
the Procedure of the Conclusion of Treaties (Treaty Law).15 That no formal procedure for 
incorporating treaties existed prior to 1990, despite a long-standing practice of ratifying 
international treaties dating back to 1949, speaks volumes to the non-essential role of formal 
laws in the conduct of the Chinese state.16 The Treaty Law is “applicable to bilateral or 
                                                          
12 Xue and Jin 2009: 305 
13 Ibid., 300, italics added.  
14 Wang 1984: 195; See Also Kim 1987: 130-148 
15 Full text available at: http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383893.htm 
16 According to conflicting data from the 世界只是年鉴 [World Knowledge Yearbook] and the 1990 中国通就年鉴 
[Statistical Yearbook of China] (available by year at http://tongji.cnki.net/overseas/brief/result.aspx), by 1990 China 
had signed somewhere between 113 and 150 multilateral treaties and anywhere from 48 to thousands of bilateral 
treaties. This divergence reflects the lack of a consensus definition about what counts as a treaty and what processes 
must occur for it to be considered “ratified.” In interviews with Tsinghua University and Peking University law 
professors in August and November 2014, different scholars suggested that the process was conducted by the NPC, 
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multilateral treaties and agreements and other instruments of the nature of a treaty or agreement 
concluded between the People's Republic of China and foreign States” (Treaty Law, Article 2, 
italics added), restating the constitutional ambiguity on the subject of what, properly, may be 
considered a treaty.17 Article 3 goes on to enumerate the various powers established in the 1982 
Constitution (for conclusion, ratification and abrogation), and authorizes the State Council, with 
its mixed executive and legislative powers, to manage most other parts of the process, from 
negotiating and drafting to formally concluding the treaty. Through its diplomatic organ, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the State Council is also empowered to “administer specific 
affairs concerning the conclusion of treaties and agreements with foreign states” (Treaty Law, 
Article 3). This broad “administration” requires further analysis, as the statute effectively grants 
an executive agency (the MFA) the balance of formal authority in the negotiation of the terms of 
the treaty, delegates to it the authority to implement the treaty, and to engage in the “execution of 
formalities” (Article 8) related to the treaty (depositing with the UN, publicizing, etc.). 
The Treaty Law further stipulates that “the State Council may formulate regulations in 
accordance with this Law for [treaty] implementation.”18 This language is puzzling in that 
implementation appears to be optional (“may formulate [可以…制定]”). The statute indicates that 
                                                          
as suggested in the Constitution; others said that this would be impossible, and that decisions would simply have 
been taken by the CCP Central Committee Political Bureau; others argued that the principle organ involved was the 
State Council.  
17 Article 7 of the Treaty Law does offer greater specificity about the subject of the legislation, while avoiding any 
definition of the “treaties and agreements” themselves:  
The treaties and important agreements referred to in the preceding paragraph are as follows: 
(1) treaties of friendship and cooperation, treaties of peace and similar treaties of a political nature; 
(2) treaties and agreements relating to territory and delimitation of boundary lines; 
(3) treaties and agreements relating to judicial assistance and extradition; 
(4) treaties and agreements which contain stipulations inconsistent with the laws of the PRC; 
(5) treaties and agreements which are subject to ratification as agreed by the contracting parties; 
and 
(6) other treaties and agreements subject to ratification. 
18 1990 Treaty Law, Art. 20 
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administrative regulations are sufficient, but not necessary, for an international treaty to take 
domestic effect.19 Such an arrangement may be interpreted to mean that treaties and agreements 
should be presumed “self-executing” (a term used in Western legal systems to refer to a treaty 
whose norms immediately take effect in the domestic sphere, especially in the sense that they 
become judicially enforceable) without the need for legislative or regulatory action. However, 
whether or not they are enforceable by China’s non-independent judiciary is not at issue here, so 
the Treaty Law’s indeterminacy can be construed to mean that treaty norms may pass directly to 
administrative organs without any implementing legislation or regulation.  
Yet language borrowed from the text of China’s various treaties, UNCLOS among them, does in 
fact appear in many pieces of domestic legislation, suggesting that the 1990 Treaty Law cannot 
be the exclusive source of law for introducing international legal obligations into PRC domestic 
law. Indeed, in Article 10 the Treaty Law makes reference to unnamed other “domestic legal 
procedures for [a treaty’s] entry into force,” implying some other statutory basis for 
incorporating international treaties and agreements. There are, however, no clear statutes to this 
effect. The NPC evidently considered regulating these different pathways during the drafting of 
the 2000 PRC Legislation Law,20 but “no specific proposal was formally tabled before the 
People’s Congress, due to the complicated nature of implementing treaties.”21 It might be argued 
that the complicated nature of implementing treaties is in fact the reason that the NPC should 
have codified a procedure. It may be that the NPC preferred to do so but lacked political support. 
                                                          
19 The 2000 Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China (“2000 Legislation Law”) defines the hierarchy of 
legal rules in the PRC. 
20 Full text available at: http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/207419.htm 
21 Xue and Jin 2009: 305, fn 12 
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This inability to agree to precise procedures regarding international law speaks to an important 
quality of Chinese legal processes: there are few reasons to promulgate laws that may challenge 
the political prerogatives of other actors in the Chinese state and Communist Party.22 Absent 
consensus from key stakeholders achieved outside of the legislative arena, the NPC has no 
practical authority to legislate. This arrangement amounts to a preemptive executive veto. That 
veto is not held only by the office of the executive as a defined power, but as an ill-defined but 
ever-present possibility intrinsic to the informal, competitive and unregulated political system as 
a whole. This political priority shines through in Article 4 of the Legislation Law, which affirms 
that laws “shall be made…on the basis of the overall interests of the State and for the purpose of 
safeguarding the uniformity and dignity of the socialist legal system.” Such a vague, hortatory 
declaration evinces thorough commitment to avoiding language that would subordinate the 
authority of PRC political organs to any foreign norms bearing on issues of consequence. 
Those domestic statutes that do touch upon international law do so in highly circumscribed, ad 
hoc fashion. Reading across various PRC legislative provisions and normal practices, Chinese 
legal authorities discern “three forms or modalities to implement treaty obligations, namely, 
execution by administrative measures, transformation of treaty obligations, and direct application 
of treaties under specific national legislation.”23 These pathways span everything from a 
determinate need for new or revised legislation to incorporate treaties, to an informal expectation 
that agencies, courts, and private actors will simply treat these international norms as binding.24 
                                                          
22 Li 2007: 341-344 provides a summary of much of the writing in this subject; an earlier, more comprehensive 
study by Tanner 1999: 12-40 also treats the various models of Chinese lawmaking processes. 
23 Xue and Jin 2009: 305. 
24 In the case of UNCLOS, each of these three modalities appears to be in effect. We have seen no action on certain 
obligations, new legislation on others (e.g. the 1998 PRC Law on the EEZ and Continental Shelf, analyzed in depth 
below), and no legislation but implementing regulation and rules on others.  
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In effect, the existence of multiple pathways but no rule for choosing between them has meant 
that some international laws trump some PRC domestic laws some of the time, and vice versa. 
While there is no general rule, law covering certain functional areas touches upon the appropriate 
way to reconcile conflicts between Chinese domestic law and treaty law. These statutes and 
regulations tend to retain a discretionary “off-ramp” for executive agencies to ignore such 
conflicts when higher political priorities are in play. The 1986 General Principles of the Civil 
Law of the PRC (Civil Law) states in Article 142 that “application of law in civil relations with 
foreigners shall be determined by the provisions in this chapter. If any international treaty 
concluded or acceded to by the People's Republic of China contains provisions differing from 
those in the civil laws of the People's Republic of China, the provisions of the international treaty 
shall apply, unless the provisions are ones on which the People's Republic of China has 
announced reservations.”  
Three observations from this important article are warranted: (1) it limits the scope of application 
of this rule to “civil relations with foreigners,” a specific class of legal interaction (i.e., a “rule of 
conflict”) that does not include most legal issues; (2) it assigns higher legal priority to treaty law 
in cases of difference with domestic law, indicating that treaty provisions may be directly applied 
without additional legislation; and (3) it dramatically limits the scope in which treaty norms 
trump domestic ones by referring to “reservations” by which that effect can be averted.25 
Identical constructions appear in the 1989 Law of Administrative Procedure (Article 72),26 the 
                                                          
25 Reservations are permissible in some treaties, provided they do not undermine the intent and purpose of the treaty. 
UNCLOS III forbids any reservations, though the PRC issued several (discussed in Chapter 2). 
26 Full text available at: http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/207335.htm 
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1991 Civil Procedure Law (Article 238),27 1993 Maritime Procedure Law (Article 268),28 the 
1999 Special Maritime Procedure Law (Article 3),29 and the 2000 Marine Environmental 
Protection Law of the PRC (Article 97), among others.30 Other statutes refer to international 
treaties (or international “practice,” perhaps referring to customary international law) and 
domestic law without making clear hierarchical distinctions between their applicability when 
they are in conflict.31 Alternatively, statutes like the 1997 PRC Criminal Law, allow for norms in 
international treaties to supplement existing Chinese code where the crimes in question are not 
described, but rely on the criminal procedure of the PRC (rather than the international norms 
criminalizing the act). Without describing how these conflicts are supposed to be resolved, nor 
specifying even which agency or institution makes such a decision, the typical PRC statute 
touching on international law implicitly permits the state organs with most at stake to use their 
discretion in enactment and enforcement.32  
This mode of dealing with domestic and international law conflicts confounds systematic legal 
analysis. Even among PRC international law experts, consensus exists that there is no default 
rule about the application of treaty law, and the relevant procedure must be considered on a 
statute-by-statute or sector-by-sector basis.33 Where there are treaty obligations that cover 
sectors that include substantive areas of law for which no domestic law already exists, Chinese 
                                                          
27 Full text available at: http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/207339.htm 
28 Full text available at: http://www1.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=191 
29 Full text available at: http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/11/content_1383565.htm 
30 Full text available at: http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384046.htm 
31 e.g., 1982 Trademark Law, 1984 Patent Law, 1985 Law of Succession, 1986 Fishery Act, 1986 Postal Law, 1992 
Maritime Law 
32 Full text available at: http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384075.htm; this 
interpretation was laid out in “Decision of NPC Standing Committee” (23 June 1987) 21stt Session, 6thth Congress, 
NPC Bulletin, Issue 4. 
33 See, for example, Shao 2000: 26-28; Zhou 2004: 174-179; Jia 2009: 98. This interpretation was presented by a 
Chinese law professor in an international law class at Tsinghua University in December 2014. 
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practice for the most part shows that new legal questions “require special internal legislation to 
be transformed into domestic law and applied indirectly.”34 There remains, however, no 
procedure nor any uniform practice for the practical enactment of legislation to cover new 
substantive domains of law – as is the case in the EEZ. Legal institutions themselves do not 
determine when, how and even whether to incorporate ratified treaty norms into domestic law.  
In light of this indeterminacy, one PRC legal scholar suggests only that when China 
“formulates domestic law it should take international legal requirements into consideration (考
虑打国际法的要求).”35 “Consideration” falls far short of a binding, defined prescription. By this 
logic, in omitting to formulate domestic law – which is after all only optional – certain 
international legal requirements may be ignored without violating any domestic rule. The words 
of Judge Xue capture the basic indeterminacy of China’s rules for adopting international legal 
obligations: “[t]he Chinese constitution and basic laws do not contain any provision on the legal 
status of international treaties and their hierarchy in the domestic legal system. Strictly 
speaking, international treaties, even after ratification, accession or approval, do not 
automatically become part of national law and consequently do not automatically have 
domestic legal effect.”36  
So lacking any clear statutory basis, and given the remarkable weakness of the PRC judiciary, 
the only positive source of law that categorically obliges China to respect its treaty and 
                                                          
34 Xue and Jin 2009: 305. An example is found in Article 36 of 1985 Law of Succession of the PRC, which 
stipulates: “Where treaties or agreements exist between the People’s Republic of China and foreign countries, 
matters of inheritance shall be handled in accordance with such treaties or agreements.” (Full text at: 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgny/eng/lsqz/laws/t42224.htm). 
35 Jiang 2014: 45 
36 Xue and Jin 2009: 301 
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customary law obligations may be pacta sunt servanda.37 This general principle of international 
law amounts to a promise to honor treaties in good faith because contracts should be honored in 
good faith. Pacta sunt servanda is binding in the international sphere mostly as a matter of 
reciprocity rather than enforceable sanction.38 Chinese representatives reiterate the PRC’s 
commitment to this obligation in frequent pronouncements by political authorities that China 
respects and upholds international law, especially the UN system. This commitment, however, 
relies on the state demonstrating its intent to practically perform its treaty obligations. As the 
PRC representative to the UN’s Third Committee announced to his colleagues, “[p]ursuant to its 
legal system, once China had ratified or acceded to an international treaty and the treaty had 
entered into force, there was no need for additional domestic legislation to give effect to the 
treaty.”39 Such a declaration of intent, however, is not adequately supported by the black letters 
of PRC law, nor reflected uniformly in PRC practice.  
While it is itself an international treaty, perhaps the strongest legal instrument confirming 
China’s obligation to adopt domestic law consistent with its treaty obligations is the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), to which China has been a party since 1997 and in 
which the pacta sunt servanda norm is expressly articulated. That authoritative multilateral 
convention states in Article 27 that “[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justification for its failure to perform a treaty.” The same treaty, nonetheless, in Article 46 grants 
the sovereign discretion to invalidate its consent to a treaty if it concerns “a rule of its internal 
law of fundamental importance.” China’s domestic legislation on the law of the sea routinely 
                                                          
37 Interview with Tsinghua Law School professor (New York City April 2015).  
38 There is a large body of work on the purely international component of compliance that need not be addressed 
here in a discussion of how domestic institutions are involved in that process. Hathaway 2005, Guzman 2008, and 
Simmons 2009 provide strong summaries of the existing scholarship on this subject. 
39 Zhang Kening, PRC UN rep to UN Third Committee A/C.3/46/SR.41 (14 November 1991) 
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comes into tension if not outright conflict with UNCLOS treaty obligations, touching on 
questions of sovereignty and development that are plainly enshrined among China’s designated 
issues of “fundamental importance.” Capturing this process requires extension of our analysis to 
encompass how international law functions at lower levels in the Chinese legal hierarchy, where 
the political discretion of administrative agencies tasked with implementing law comes to bear. 
The overwhelming discretion of administrative agencies to manage internalization 
Lacking a clear, determinate procedure by which international norms must be internalized into 
domestic law, the balance of authority and discretion in such matters falls to the implementing 
agencies. This fact makes the separation between internalization and implementation purely an 
analytical convenience: in practice, the two are intimately linked. The nature and extent of 
internalization depends upon the discretion of the agents of implementation. The appearance of 
black letters in PRC code referring to nominally internalized treaty law is meaningful to the 
extent they are further specified and put into practice by lower-level organs. In effect, the State 
Council and its various administrative, regulatory, and law-enforcement agencies and 
commissions are in position to decide if and how treaty law becomes a practical reality. Because 
of the generalized indeterminacy of domestic laws, they are also empowered to adjust how the 
laws are put into practice in accordance to changing political demands without a necessity for 
revision or amendment of the enabling legislation and implementing regulations. 
Formally, the State Council is the “executive body of the highest organ of state power; it is the 
highest organ of state administration.”40 In addition to its executive function, the State Council 
possesses substantial legislative powers: under Article 89 of the Constitution, the State Council 
                                                          
40 1982 PRC Constitution, Article 85 
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may “adopt administrative measures (办法), enact administrative rules and regulations (行政法规) 
and issue decisions (决定) and orders (命令) in accordance with the Constitution and statutes.” 
While these legal instruments are, in theory, inferior to legislation enacted by the NPC, the 
Legislation Law (Article 86) is vague and perhaps contradictory in allowing the State Council to 
issue administrative regulations on matters that are not covered by statutes nor expressly 
delegated to it.41 In practice, the State Council and its subsidiary bodies are in a position to 
implement policy and then, if so desired, advise the NPC Standing Committee to draft and enact 
laws that retroactively justify their conduct. Prior to a legal reform campaign initiated only in the 
late 1990s, even this perfunctory nod to the necessity of legal authorization was not commonly 
employed. There is no meaningful role for the judicial review envisaged in any of the major acts 
of legislation, meaning that when the State Council does not request legislation authorizing its 
regulatory and administrative decisions, they cannot be legally challenged. 
Subordinate to the State Council are a host of other state bodies with legislative and regulatory 
authorities granted under the Legislation Law. Provincial-level People’s Congresses, the 
People’s Congresses of “relatively large cities,” and the Standing Committees of these People’s 
Congresses adopt local regulations (地方性法规) as well as resolutions (决定) and decisions (建议); 
autonomous regions adopt autonomous regulations (自治条例) or separate regulations (单行条例); 
special economic zones (SEZs) adopt regulations (法规); and State Council ministries and 
commissions, as well as provincial-level people’s governments, issue rules (规章). While the 
hierarchy among these is laid out in the Legislation Law, each depending upon statutory 
                                                          
41 Corne 2002: 373. The State Council, in cases of regulations that conflict with laws, may make 
“recommendations” to the NPC Standing Committee about how to prioritize between competing rules. See also 
Hand 2013: 166. 
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authorities granted by the NPC, the relative authority of these various legal instruments is subject 
to perpetual contestation.42  
The Constitution and NPC legislation do little to remedy this incoherence – characterized, as 
they are, by “principle-like pronouncements, vagueness and ambiguity, broadly worded 
discretions, undefined terms, omissions, and general catch-all clauses.”43 The Constitution, in 
particular, fails to make clear the limits on law-making authority among the various law- and 
rule-making organs; Article 90 allows State Council ministries to make rules “within their own 
authority,” yet neglects to define that authority. In effect, that authority lies in their practical 
wherewithal to implement policy – to act first and ask questions later, if at all. The indeterminacy 
of national legislation leaves State Council leaders (especially those heading specialized 
ministries and commissions) to determine their own responsibilities in line with their 
expectations of political efficacy and self-assessed risk of political challenge by superior bodies. 
The upshot is that the State Council and its various ministries and commissions exercise 
substantial discretion in determining how international law is implemented. They are able to act 
without statutory authorization where the law is silent, indeterminate or incomplete, as it is in 
many substantive areas in which China has entered treaty arrangements. Generally, politically 
sensitive issues are not subjected to constraining law or regulation, at least not until long after a 
political outcome has been reached and law can be safely enacted without risking non-
compliance or subversion by party elites, or stakeholder administrative agencies and the actors 
                                                          
42 Each of these bodies also issues unofficial “normative documents” (规范性文件), which further muddy the waters 
of legal authority. 
43 Corne 2002: 374 
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they regulate.44 According to one long-time Western practitioner of law in the PRC, 
“[a]dministrative bureaucracies under the State Council have long dominated the process of 
governance in China, to the extent that administrative decision making often eclipses the law-
making authority of the NPC system.”45 Unlike the reasonably well-publicized legislation issued 
by the NPC, these administrative agencies are under no obligation to make their work 
transparent, and therefore routinely amend, abridge, or create regulations and rules to adapt to 
immediate demands without any possibility for judicial review of unlawful administrative 
practices.46 The authority to make such legal decisions is not codified in any statute, but is rather 
a product of the political system that dominates and penetrates legal institutions at every level, 
with the CCP at its apex – fully “above” the legal hierarchy.  
Party politics in command of internalization and implementation 
The preceding discussion laid out an indeterminate set of formal processes by which treaties 
become a part of PRC law and are conveyed as commands from the center to to state organs. The 
authority to make practical determinations of when and where a treaty norm becomes meaningful 
– including the interpretation of the meaning of the norm – lies with state agencies dominated by 
the Chinese Communist Party. The legislative, regulatory and administrative hierarchy described 
                                                          
44 “Structurally, China’s bureaucratic ranking system combines with the functional division of authority among 
various bureaucracies to produce a situation in which it is often necessary to achieve agreement among an array of 
bodies, where no single body has authority over the others” (Lampton and Lieberthal 1992: 8). For example, the 
seven-year drafting process of the 2000 Legislation Law (1993-2000) speaks to the political complications entailed 
in promulgating any generic law that will bear on a wide range of stakeholders. See Paler 2004: 303-309. 
45 Potter 2013: 60 
46 “There is as yet simply no concept, as exists in some Western legal systems, that law or delegated legislation can 
be struck down [by courts]” (Corne 2002: 375). There have been some legislative measures that afford the courts 
some de jure authority to hear complaints against administrative decisions (e.g., the 1990 Administrative Litigation 
Law and the 1991 Civil Procedure Law), but even these formal statutes are badly compromised by their 
indeterminate drafting and deliberate loopholes (Party decisions cannot be reviewed, nor can discretionary decisions 
by administrative officials, nor any actions that are outside the scope of official duties, nor where the complainant 
has been judged to cause any harm, nor “under other circumstances prescribed by law.” See Potter 1999: 683. 
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above is penetrated at every level by the CCP. Because the leaders in these state organizations 
are themselves typically CCP members with party roles and loyalties (or at least share 
responsibility with a Party Secretary), they are unlikely to accept adverse legal consequences 
based on what appears to be a secondary set of legal rules. Legal norms are inferior to the 
political norms of the Party, which has its own constitution and rules.47  
This subordinate status for law is not surprising; in fact, the greater surprise would be if the 
relatively brief campaign to introduce legal institutions over the past few decades had subverted 
long-standing structures of power and authority in Chinese society and, more recently, in the 
CCP. Legal institutions, after all, were never the principle instruments of governance in imperial 
China. They were still less so during the early period of the PRC, and were rejected entirely 
during the Cultural Revolution in favor of ephemeral party norms. In the post-Mao era, the 
demand for market-based economic development helped resuscitate legal institutions in certain 
significant ways, but the architects of that reform have never embraced the law as a substitute for 
better-established and more robustly institutionalized modes of social control embodied in the 
party and society. There is little scholarly debate that “[l]aw is not a limit on the party-state, but 
rather is a mechanism by which political power is exercised and protected.”48 The CCP 
dominates the state apparatus, and utilizes law as a complement to its existing political power, 
exercising a monopoly that persists despite – and perhaps even because of – a lack of legal 
authority.  
                                                          
47 Indeed, there is an argument to be made that the law is largely “epiphenomenal” to observed changes in the 
actions of administrative agencies. One empirically thorough study develops a set of criteria for judging whether or 
not the law, per se, is the independent variable “causing” various administrative outcomes and concludes that “we 
have not uncovered solid empirical evidence showing whether a formal Chinese law has any significant independent 
effect on the behavior of implicated parties” (Li 2014: 128). 
48 Potter 1999: 674 
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Among the post-1978 reform initiatives to “achieve socialist modernization” and develop 
economically was a concerted campaign to establish a viable legal order. A series of reforms 
grafted legal institutions onto a political system that long existed and operated independent from 
law, and could continue to do so even alongside imported legal constraints. Soviet and then 
European and American models of legal order furnished the basic rules and structure of the 
emerging legal order of the PRC, but none of the liberal norms of individual rights and 
institutionalized constraints on arbitrary exercise of state power survived internalization into 
Chinese legal forms. This discussion of the political overlay on PRC legal institutions in the 
post-Mao period focuses on reforms promoting legally-coordinated bureaucratic and 
administrative processes, framing the institutional context in which the EEZ enters Chinese law 
and practice. 
The 1975 and 1978 PRC constitutions both affirm that the CCP stands astride the legal order: 
“the Chinese Communist Party is the core of leadership of the whole Chinese people,” 
announces Article 2 of the 1975 and 1978 documents. The 1982 Constitution’s seeming reversal 
on this matter49 should not be taken as a repudiation of the dominant role of the CCP in the 
lawmaking process, only a reflection of the CCP’s revised assessment of the efficacy of law as 
an instrument of governance in a state transitioning from a planned to a market economic system. 
Reforming the PRC legal system to be more compatible with international legal norms – 
especially those concerning trade and investment – became a major goal of the post-1978 
“reform and opening” period. The limited scope of these reforms and the continued primacy of 
                                                          
49 1982 Constitution, Chapter 1, Article 5 states: “No organization or individual is privileged to be beyond the 
Constitution or other laws.”  
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the CCP should be considered fundamental factors in understanding the narrower processes of 
internalization and implementation of the law of the sea. 
The CCP controls appointments of the agents of the state charged with formal legal 
responsibilities. Through a variety of mechanisms, the Party can dictate legal instruments for use 
toward political objectives determined by Party leaders, who often hold dual roles as state 
officials and bureaucrats. This symbiosis is most clearly realized in the CCP’s political-legal 
committees (政法委) at central, provincial, municipal, and local levels, which “supervise” legal 
affairs including public security, courts, prosecutors (the “procuratorate”), and, at a minimum, 
play agenda-setting and veto roles in the development of legislation, regulation and rules at all 
levels.50 Party authority operates through official “guidance” in the form of political and 
ideological campaigns, formal control over personnel and promotions, and informal, 
interpersonal connections (关系) that permeate the entire bureaucratic and administrative edifice 
in varied ways, depending on the locality and personalities involved.  
The mechanisms of control are largely informal, but as legal reforms devolved more decision-
making to bureaucrats and administrators, the Party took pains to codify some of them. In a 1991 
document called Certain Opinions on Strengthening the Party Leadership over the State 
Legislative Work, the CCP claimed an explicit authority to weigh in on lawmaking in the 
following ways: “(a) amendment of the Constitution, major laws in the political area, specially 
major laws in economic and administrative areas, should be examined and reviewed by the 
                                                          
50 There are many dimensions of CCP control of legal processes. One author summarizes the “four dominant 
organizational forms” in which the Party dominates the lawmaking process: “organizational penetration of the NPC 
leadership and control over key NPC appointments through the NPC Party Group system and the nomenklatura 
[personnel] system; control over meeting agendas, as well as heavy influence over the general tone of legislative 
debate; organizational oversight of legal drafting…; and [CCP Central Committee Political Bureau] and Secretariat 
pre-approval of draft laws to be promulgated by the NPC” (Tanner 1999: 56). 
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Political Bureau and the Party Congress before they are referred to the NPC; (b) the drafting of 
laws in the political area should be approved by the Party; (c) draft laws in the political area and 
major draft laws in economic and administrative areas, should be examined and approved by the 
Political Bureau or its members before they are deliberated in the NPC; and (d) the Party 
exercises the unified leadership (统一领导) to the law drafting work.”51 China’s legal reforms 
have given rise to periodic surges of liberal thought in state and elite circles, expectations that 
CCP leadership has taken significant formal and informal measures to quell.  
In short, the law (and the state officials tasked with creating and implementing it) are not 
autonomous, and the legal hierarchy in which they operate is meaningful only to the extent it is 
reinforced by the more fundamental hierarchy established within the Party itself, “the locus of all 
important political and legal decisions.”52 The growing array of legal institutions in China are not 
nearly as robust as the party-state political institutions that they notionally constrain.53 The laws 
are designed to avoid outright conflict with more fundamental political choices undertaken 
outside of legal institutions. Indeed, China’s indeterminately drafted, irregularly applied law is 
“remarkable for its lack of institutional anchoring. Like the policy documents it has come largely 
to replace, it appears expected to be read as a set of hortatory instructions by those it regulates 
(and not just their lawyers), and continues…to contain broad statements of policy and legally 
unenforceable norms.”54 State officials bound nominally by that law act primarily as surrogates 
of the party, and remain subject to political decisions undertaken outside the reach of courts or 
other institutional checks. Critically, however, some of those political decisions have tended 
                                                          
51 Zou 2012: 150 
52 Creemers 2015: 109 
53  In consequence, from an analytical standpoint “accurate detecting, measuring, and reporting of any behavior 
modification caused by a statutory change, independent of the influence of non-legal variables, is an inherent 
challenge to any study of the effects of a formal legal change, especially in the Chinese context” (Li 2014: 127-128) 
54 Corne 2002: 396 
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towards giving greater authority to legal institutions, largely because of law’s propensity to 
promote orderly administration and enhance the legitimacy of CCP rule. 
II. The Domestic Political Utility of International Law  
The fact that legal institutions do not fully determine the process by which treaty norms are 
internalized and implemented in the PRC does not, in itself, diminish the importance of the black 
letters of the law. While the formal hierarchy of Chinese legal institutions is compromised and 
even subverted by political authority to which it is subjugated, there are ample reasons to pay 
close attention to the frequent, high-level invocations of law as a means, or instrument, of state 
policy. The steady increase in elite political attention to the project of creating a political-legal 
system to facilitate “ruling the country by law” (依法治国), accompanied by massive reforms to 
administrative and law enforcement agencies, provides strong evidence in support of the idea 
that law matters in any explanation of Chinese maritime conduct. Law is not intrinsically 
important as a command that constrains the state – rather, it enables the Party center to set 
defined goals and communicate them to lower-level actors. When a political judgment is reached 
that the law matches or advances policy ends, it provides a relatively efficient vehicle for their 
realization.  
Reforming the legal system to support state affairs – including foreign policy goals related to 
maritime disputes – has been exactly such a high political priority for the last three generations 
of CCP leadership. This section identifies key Party and state initiatives to entrench “ruling the 
country by law” as a central pillar of governance in the contemporary PRC, and demonstrates the 
transformative effects of this reform effort on the way the state is organized to pursue political 
goals. It is in this context that international treaty norms, internalized as law, become a part of 
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the repertoire of state agencies charged with its implementation. Such norms enable the state to 
more precisely define the domains of its competence, and in the case of maritime law, to 
transform state functions for the purposes of administering and enforcing those aspects of the law 
of the sea that survive the internalization process and become part of the state agenda. 
Ruling the Country By Law (依法治国) 
Deng Xiaoping and other CCP elite who survived the purges and instability of the Cultural 
Revolution took the decisive, early steps toward imposing rules on some of the arbitrary politics 
that nearly consumed the party-state during that tumultuous period. On the eve of the watershed 
Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP in December 1978 (in which Deng 
and his reform-minded allies consolidated their control over the party-state), an ascendant Deng 
told a CCP Working Conference: “We must strengthen the legal system in order to safeguard the 
people’s democracy. We must make the democracy systematized, legalized, and ensure that this 
system and its laws are immune to the changes of leaders and to shifts in the leaders’ opinions or 
focus.”55  Whatever the normative (or even psychological) components of the decision, the 
instrumental purpose of these reforms mirrored that of China’s contemporaneous warming to 
international law: law would enable socialist modernization to proceed.56 Not only did legal 
reform hold the prospect of diminishing political instability, but it was deemed essential to the 
establishment of markets and creation of an economic system receptive to foreign investment.57 
A legal system akin to those in the industrialized West was the established “best practice.” 
                                                          
55 Deng 1978: 146 
56 Recall discussion in Chapter 3 on a reevaluation of international law as a useful instrument of modernization. 
57 One volume written by Western China law scholars expounds on the prevalence of the “rights hypothesis” in 
China during this era, which holds that “economic growth requires a legal order offering stable and predictable 
rights of property and contract” (Clarke et al 2008: 421). 
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Among many consequences, the ongoing legal reform campaign has created a stable political 
norm that international legal obligations like UNCLOS III would be internalized and 
implemented according to something resembling a legal procedure. 
By the 1990s, the third generation of CCP leadership under Jiang Zemin adopted the concept of 
“ruling the country through law” (依法治国). This agenda satisfied the various stakeholders 
within the party-state committed to establishing a more reliable institutional framework within 
which reforms to promote economic development could take root. First uttered at the Fifteenth 
National Party Congress in 1997,58 and later enshrined in a 1999 amendment to Article 5 of the 
1982 Constitution, this awkward formulation reposes significantly less power in legal institutions 
than does the idealized “rule of law,” which places the state itself in a subordinate role to the 
legal system and implies a liberal order in which individual rights are paramount. That cynical 
Western “weapon” was and remains anathema to Chinese elites.59 To Chinese scholars, “ruling 
the country through law” is a carefully-crafted variant of the traditional Chinese “Legalist” 
conception of “rule by law” (法治), typically counterposed as a superior alternative to the wholly 
arbitrary “rule of man” (人治).60 Though sharing both the cognates of “rule by law” and the 
connotation of legalized governance, the “ruling the country through law” concept highlights 
Party supremacy over the legal process through which the state governs. State organs are 
                                                          
58 Jiang 1997  
59 The authoritative CCP mouthpiece the People’s Daily (人民日报) published an editorial noting that “There is a 
debate as to what kind of road rule of law construction should take in our country. Hostile forces [敌对势力] take rule 
of law as their own “weapon,” hyping Western rule of law concepts and rule of law models, their objective being to 
use “rule of law” as an opening to deny the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and our country’s socialist 
system. We must be clearly alert to this, increasing our strategic force and resolutely taking our own road” (People’s 
Daily: 2015). 
60 For an extensive review of the theory and practice of rule of law, applied to Chinese reforms, see Peerenboom 
2004: 55-109. For a Chinese legal scholar’s explanation of the distinctions between “rule by law” and “rule of law,” 
see see Wang 2010: 10-13. The former is a much thinner concept, and does not presuppose other liberal norms like 
transparency, individual rights, a constitutional order, nor prescribe any particular economic system. 
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subordinate to the Party, but are themselves defined by and authorized to operate within the 
constraints of legal institutions. 
Legal reforms in this vein were intended to replace “a system of internal bureaucratic 
communication where the authoritativeness of particular documents was often unclear. The old 
system was incapable of imposing unity and order upon the process of government….A key 
ambition of those promoting legal reform was to bring regularity to government operations and 
to policymaking as a cure for the excessive devolution of power from the center and the resultant 
policy inconsistencies.”61 The political goal was for legal norms to help stabilize policy and 
strengthen expectations about its rational implementation. Law enables the Party to better 
coordinate the orderly operation of the government. In good Leninist fashion, law is an effective 
means for the head to speak to the hands and feet.  
The political impetus for embarking on the “legal path” had international as well as domestic 
components. It is not coincidental that Jiang and CCP elites doubled down on legal reform at this 
juncture. During the late 1990s, China was in the process of negotiating its accession to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and faced onerous legal requirements to do so. Deepening its 
integration with the global economy was a high political and economic priority for Chinese 
leadership, and especially for Jiang’s number two, Premier Zhu Rongji.62 Like the earlier, 
Republican episode of developing legal institutions to roll back the unequal treaty regime, this 
initiative was catalyzed by an explicit demand issued by an international organization 
                                                          
61 Clarke et al 2008: 377 
62 Chinese leaders explicitly linked China’s accession to the WTO with domestic economic reform goals, 
internalizing international legal obligations as a spur to policy. For Chinese scholarly analysis of this move, and 
assessments of the appropriate procedures for incorporating WTO rules, see Zeng (2000); He (2001); Wu (2001). 
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representing foreign governments and firms.63 Further, as in that earlier episode, the function did 
not necessarily follow the form. Close observers of China’s legal system noted in the wake of its 
WTO accession in 2000 that “as a practical matter, China’s WTO obligations will not become a 
part of its domestic law, binding on courts and government bodies, until the enactment of 
appropriate domestic legislation and regulations incorporating those regulations.”64 Given Zhu 
and Jiang’s high levels of commitment to the WTO and to China’s export-led growth model, the 
internalization of WTO norms has been fairly substantial, if uneven and incomplete. The clear 
political priority assigned to joining the global trading regime to promote economic development 
facilitated this legislative and regulatory process, ensuring that internalization proceeded at least 
to an extent sufficient to plausibly comply with China’s onerous accession agreement.65  
In other functional areas that promise less immediate economic impact than trade, legal reforms 
are hamstrung by political and bureaucratic resistance. Countless CCP and government 
conferences, workshops, planning documents, leadership speeches, political campaigns, and 
departmental rules encourage officials and cadres to redouble efforts to promote the as-yet 
unrealized goal of ruling the country through law. A particularly clear statement of this challenge 
is found in a 2004 State Council “Implementation Program for Comprehensively Promoting the 
Exercise of Administrative Functions in Accordance With the Law,” which advocates 
strengthening legal reforms to discipline the administrative agencies:    
Administrative policy-making procedures and mechanisms are not sufficiently sound. 
Non-compliance with the law, low enforcement of the law, and failure to investigate 
violations of the law happen from time to time, causing significant resentment among the 
                                                          
63 Cf. Commission on Extra-territoriality in China 1927, addressed in Chapter 3. 
64 Clarke 2003: 99 
65  “The instrumentalist approach to law in the PRC privileges the party-state and permits significant variation in the 
content and performance of specific legal and regulatory regimes depending on policy priorities. The contrast 
between the regime’s apparent commitment to strengthening the role of law in economic transactions and its refusal 
to be bound by legal restraints in the management of political order reveal the extent to which law remains a 
contingent process” (Potter 1999: 678). 
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people. Mechanisms for supervising and restraining administrative acts are not 
sufficiently sound; some unlawful and improper administrative acts are not stopped or 
corrected in a timely and effective manner; and there is no timely recourse for the harm 
done to the legitimate rights and interests of the parties that are subject to administrative 
management.66 
Absent overwhelming consensus among Party and state elites about devolving their specific 
political authority to legal institutions, China’s best efforts to “rule the country through law” are 
frustrated by an array of pathologies rooted in the vast scale of the state’s governance enterprise, 
its decentralization and resulting pattern of local autonomy, and its weak legal institutions.67 
“Perfecting” the legal and administrative processes desired for more orderly operation of the 
state is a political priority that, ironically, is likely unattainable precisely because of the Party’s 
felt need to maintain its discretion over any and all legal reforms. Unwilling to relinquish 
authority to ignore, revise or distort laws and regulations inconvenient for immediate 
circumstances, the Party ensures that the scope and depth of legal reforms will remain marginal. 
Nonetheless, political efforts to advance that slogan continue, and are periodically promoted in 
State Council white papers,68 Party newspaper editorials, Party study groups, and most recently, 
in a renewed campaign, announced at the Fourth Plenum of the Eighteenth Party Congress in 
October 2014, to promote “ruling the country through law” as one of the Party’s four highest 
governance objectives (Xi Jinping’s “Four Comprehensives” [四个全面]).69 Among the priorities 
                                                          
66 Cited in Lubman 2006: 86 
67  On the difficulties of ensuring local implementation of central dictates, see Mertha and Zeng 2005. Another 
analyst of the Chinese legal system notes that “[f]or many issues, there is simply no single institution that has the 
authority, the power, and the desire to have the last word. As a result, what appears at times to be a kind of anarchy 
in the system, where government agencies do not follow the law, is perhaps better explained as a kind of 
hyperarchy, where there are too many legal authorities, each empowered to make law for as far as it has the power 
to stretch its jurisdiction, and there exists no institution capable of discovering and reducing inconsistencies” (Clarke 
2005: 71) 
68 e.g., PRC State Council Information Office 2008, 2011 
69 The CCP newspaper, People’s Daily, hosts a webpage devoted to explaining this campaign: “The Four 
Comprehensives: The Strategic Layout Leading the Way to the People’s Rejuvenation,” 
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/8198/394083/ 
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identified in the “Decision” issued by the CCP Central Committee emerging from the long work 
conference on the subject was a redoubled commitment to improve China’s instrumental use of 
international law to advance political aims: 
Strengthen foreign-related legal work. Adapt to the incessant deepening of opening up to 
the outside world, perfect foreign-oriented legal and regulatory systems, stimulate the 
construction of new structures for an open economy. Vigorously participate in the 
formulation of international norms, promote the handling of foreign-related economic 
and social affairs according to the law, strengthen our country’s discourse power and 
influence in international legal affairs, use legal methods to safeguard our country’s 
sovereignty, security and development interests.70 
Even if their legitimacy is in doubt, there is significant political support for participating in 
international legal regimes and influencing the norms composing them. This effort requires, 
among other things, a strengthening of China’s own internal “legal work.” Still, formal legal 
requirements associated with incorporating ratified international treaty commitments into 
international law are indeterminate, and afford considerable discretion to political elites within 
the Party and state administrative agencies regarding how to adopt legislation and regulation. 
Necessary legislative and regulatory steps cannot occur without elites judging them to be a high 
political priority. China’s maritime disputes are evidently such a priority.  
III. Mobilizing for maritime disputes: expanding rights and transforming interests 
Maritime disputes easily meet the threshold of political importance that appears necessary for 
transnational legal processes relating to the law of the sea to reach deep into the Chinese state.  
These disputes touch on sovereign integrity, resonating with the strong nationalist narrative of a 
“century of humiliation” at the hands of malign Western and Japanese forces. There are 
                                                          
70 “CCP Central Committee Decision concerning Some Major Questions in Comprehensively Moving Governing 
the Country According to the law Forward” (23 October 2014), translated at: 
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/28/ccp-central-committee-decision-concerning-some-
major-questions-in-comprehensively-moving-governing-the-country-according-to-the-law-forward/ 
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considerable economic resources at stake, particularly oil and gas, as are the fortunes of other 
maritime industries like shipping, fishing, and tourism. The disputes surface increasingly divisive 
issues in diplomacy with all of China’s maritime neighbors, and serve as a major point of 
geopolitical friction with the region’s dominant military power, the United States. By any 
account, these disputes generate the political urgency necessary for party-state elites to initiate 
meaningful internalization and implementation processes. They are at the very top of the present 
leadership’s political agenda, and have been cited by authoritative voices as among China’s 
“core interests,” elevating their political salience to an extraordinary level sufficient to make any 
laws and regulations touching upon them significant. Meanwhile, the qualities of original EEZ 
norms – i.e., largely constitutive, indeterminate, creating an entirely new domain for state 
activity – reduce obstacles to implantation because of a relative absence of entrenched 
bureaucratic impediments.71 High-level political prioritization of maritime issues, coupled with a 
set of legal norms that are susceptible to reconfiguration by the Chinese political-legal system 
create favorable conditions for transformative internalization and implementation processes.  
Defining and protecting maritime rights and interests 
PRC legal institutions cannot independently internalize or implement international law. They do 
so as only a function of political decisions that particular aspects of that law are useful for 
political ends; these processes effectively transform law into policy and practice where those 
political ends are of sufficiently high salience. The established method for communicating that 
salience in a one-party Leninist system is sloganeering. The CCP signals its priorities through 
                                                          
71 “The most drastic changes may also be seen in those sectors with little established institutional structure such as 
distribution or insurance, because of the absence of co-ordinated bureaucratic obstruction” (Mertha and Zeng 2005: 
321). 
Chapter 4 – Internalizing and Implementing International Law 
 213 
repetition of rhetorical tropes that convey very little of substance of the goal itself, but indicate to 
lower levels of the party-state that the named goal is important and demands further elaboration 
in law and practice. 
Since at least the landmark 1992 PRC Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 
(Territorial Sea Law),72 the concept of “maritime rights and interests” has become such a vehicle. 
That formulation connects the legal concept of “rights” (权利) to the political concept of 
“interests” (利益), joining them in a compound word that neatly expresses their inextricable 
connection in China’s political-legal system. It serves as a convenient and powerful mode of 
official communication about the imperative to use the law as an instrument to achieve political 
goals.73 China’s specific maritime rights and interests remain undefined, but stand in as the 
rhetorical embodiment of nearly every PRC political, economic and strategic goal associated 
with the maritime domain. Planning documents, white papers, newspaper editorials and scholarly 
works also embark from the assumption that various rights and interests are under threat and 
must be defended, nearly always following the approved formulation: China needs to defend (or 
safeguard) its maritime rights and interests (维护海洋权益) from foreign threats. 74  
The public political salience of maritime rights and interests corresponds with the internal 
discussion of ratification of the UNCLOS III treaty.75 Throughout the 1980s, domestic 
                                                          
72 Article 1 of the Territorial Sea Law states: “This law is formulated in order to enable the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) to exercise its sovereignty over its territorial sea and its rights to exercise control over its contiguous 
zone, and to safeguard State security as well as its maritime rights and interests.”  
73 This construction is common in party-state documents, appearing in the 1982 Constitution 11 times in both 
general and specific form (though not referring to those rights and interests in the maritime domain in that 
document). 
74 Beginning in 1984, Chinese law and politics journals have published some 2960 articles with “maritime rights and 
interests” as a keyword (CNKI China Academic Journals, author search, 3 February 2015). Some 2,236 articles in 
that database use the construction “defend maritime rights and interests” (维护海洋权益) (author search 22 July 
2016).  
75 Author discussion with MFA official in Department of Marine and Boundary Affairs (Hainan, December 2014). 
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consideration of the treaty was muted, and legal internalization was a low priority in light of far 
more urgent development demands accompanying the PRC’s ambitious reform and opening 
program. Until the early 1990s, there was little probability of achieving the 60 ratifications 
required for the treaty to enter force (as stipulated in UNCLOS III, Article 308) due largely to 
opposition of the U.S. and other major maritime powers to the deep seabed mining provisions of 
Part XI. An implementing agreement for that part resolved this impasse in 1994,76 by which time 
sufficient ratifications were achieved for the treaty to go into effect in November 1994.   
Chinese officials began to prepare the bureaucracy for ratification in the early 1990s.77 A State 
Council-led National Ocean Working Conference was held in Beijing in January 1991, 
producing an (internal) report on China’s Ocean Policy and Working Outlines, a precursor to the 
1992 Territorial Sea Law.78 Whereas prior state and party discussion focused primarily on 
development of marine industries, the impending entry into force of the treaty renewed interest 
in the various disadvantages the treaty posed for China, not least the potential for the new EEZ to 
further complicate long-standing maritime disputes.79 In order for the ratification of the treaty to 
pass political muster, officials working on maritime law and policy needed to reconcile the 
purpose of the law of the sea and the function of its various norms to the state’s broader political 
priorities. The possibility that other states’ claims in maritime disputes would improve as a result 
of their accession to the treaty was among the risk factors that prompted China’s decision.80 
                                                          
76 “Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the Convention,” 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindxAgree.htm 
77 Peter Dutton suggests that among motivations for ratifying the treaty at this stage was not just the global trend 
towards doing so, but China’s desire to improve its chances for entry into the WTO by demonstrating that it was 
capable of constructive participation in international legal institutions (discussion with author June 2016). 
78 Li 1998: 303 
79 Author interview with member of Hainan Foreign Affairs Office, June 2014. See also discussion in Chapter 2, and 
Zou 2005: 338-345. 
80 Author discussion with MFA official (Beijing, December 2014); a similar point was made by the professor in a 
Tsinghua Law School class audited by the author (Beijing, December 2014). 
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According to a PRC official, “[a]fter UNCLOS was made public, each country began the process 
of drawing boundaries for territorial seas, contiguous zones, and EEZS. Each country sought out 
UNCLOS articles that benefitted its cause.”81 As a matter of political expedience, if not legal 
obligation, China was motivated to parallel the internalization efforts of other states whose 
claims would inevitably challenge its own. 
Over the course of the 1990s, a series of political documents defining the various legislative, 
administrative, and law enforcement tasks on the horizon appeared in the Chinese public sphere. 
Prominent among them was China’s “Oceans Agenda 21” (中国海洋 21世纪议程)82 a widely-
referenced planning document produced by the NPC in 1996. Drafted by the leading State 
Council agency with maritime responsibilities, the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), it 
identified the Convention with an expansion in the scope of China’s maritime rights and 
interests: “UNCLOS has brought opportunities for the development and exploitation of the 
oceans over a wider area.” The Agenda further noted that UNCLOS provided a legitimate basis 
for establishing state authority over this broad area, having “established a formal international 
legal basis for comprehensive management of the oceans, defense of maritime rights, and 
protection of maritime environment and resources…[in an area of] approximately 3 million km2 
of waters.”83 The agenda laid out the principle internalization and implementation goals for the 
state as it prepared to ratify the Convention later that year.84 The agenda mentions “maritime 
                                                          
81 Xu 2012: 1, quoting Wang Shuguang, former head of the State Oceanic Administration. 
82 PRC State Oceanic Administration 1996  
83 Ibid., Ch. 10 and preamble.  
84 The principle tasks, as paraphrased in Zou 2012: 148, are (1) establishment and development of ocean industries 
by following the principle of sustainable development; (2) promotion of ocean development activities by 
incorporating social and economic development of coastal areas; (3) promotion of sustainable development of 
coastal islands; (4) conservation of marine living resources; (5) promotion of science and technology for sustainable 
development; (6) establishment of an integrated ocean management system; (7) protection of the marine 
environment; (8) strengthening ocean observation, alert, and disaster reduction; (9) enhancing international 
cooperation; and (10) promotion of public participation. 
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rights and interests” eight times, in five instances accompanied by the imperative that the state 
take deliberate action to “defend” them. Among the means available to do so, the agenda 
prescribes legislation and implementation measures that would enable management, use and 
protection of marine resources.85  
This document also highlights the need to “perfect” (完善) the PRC’s still-incomplete maritime 
legal scheme and coordinate its unruly maritime bureaucracy. Recognizing that the small number 
of existing laws and regulations pertained mostly to narrow, administrative areas (like oil and gas 
leasing, and fisheries permits), the agenda urged broader legislation and regulation to achieve 
comprehensive management (综合管理). It further laments that much of China’s maritime law in 
1996 was simply an extension of existing terrestrial law, and thus did not create norms and 
political priorities distinct to the maritime domain, leaving this task largely up to administrative 
agencies like the SOA.86 The consensus among political elites codified in this document was that 
extant legal rules governing maritime issues failed to take into account China’s political interests 
“in the ocean as a whole.”87  
As the treaty came into effect and crystallized other states’ competing claims to resource rights 
and jurisdiction, Chinese leaders recognized a political imperative to better define and enforce 
                                                          
85 PRC State Oceanic Administration 1996: Article 7.6 
86 Pursuant to the 1990 Legislation Law, the SOA adopted the Regulations on the Procedure to Make Ocean 
Regulations in November 2007. The SOA is assigned broad discretion in overseeing maritime-related regulations, 
including authority over: (1) drafts of laws entrusted by the legislature; (2) administrative regulations subject to the 
approval of the State Council; and (3) department regulations subject to the approval of the Ministry of Land and 
Resources (Article 2). The legal department of the SOA is responsible for organizing and preparing drafts on ocean 
lawmaking projects, organizing and preparing the lawmaking plan and monitoring its implementation, organizing 
the review of lawmaking projects, guiding local ocean lawmaking, and organizing the work for ocean law 
interpretation, revision and compilation (Article 5). For the purpose of lawmaking, the SOA establishes the Law-
Making Group led by a chief administrator of the SOA and also an Ocean Law Expert Committee which provides 
advice and review opinions. 
87 PRC State Oceanic Administration 1996: Article 7.8; Author interview with SOA official, September 2014. 
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China’s claims. This imperative remains salient today, as the “perfection” of various states’ 
maritime claims and their legal underpinnings has been a slow and iterative process throughout 
the globe.88 Practical enforcement of claims, especially disputed ones that are not under the 
state’s effective control, requires constant attention and steady resource inputs; it is thus an 
ongoing process in China, as it is elsewhere. UNCLOS-based domestic maritime laws defining 
claims and assigning responsibilities to state actors and regulating maritime industries are the 
global norm, and in this respect, China’s push to internalize the law of the sea is not distinctive. 
The extent to which the original norms are transformed in their transit through Chinese political-
legal institutions, however, is distinctive in the level of discretion in this process exercised by 
political elites.  
One prominent law of the sea scholar at the premier state think tank, the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences, captures the role that political elites intend domestic law to play in light of a 
perceived competitive dynamic to claim rights and jurisdiction: “In order to protect maritime 
rights and interests, we must have national mechanisms that are organized according to the law – 
specifically, domestic law…In designing and implementing a perfect legal system for the oceans, 
UNCLOS will play a fundamental role.”89  UNCLOS furnishes the raw materials, in the form of 
internationally legitimized norms, for a broader policy apparatus whose motive force is defense 
of maritime rights and interests; as the policy demands for their proper defense change, so too 
does the domestic use of the maritime law.  
From Propaganda to Practical Planning: The State Seizes Maritime Responsibilities 
                                                          
88 Schofield (ed.) 2014 is an especially helpful volume on the present state of global maritime claims. As noted, a 
majority of maritime boundaries remain undelimited, largely as a consequence of overlapping claims to jurisdiction. 
89 Liu 2013: 1 
Rising Power, Creeping Jurisdiction: China’s Law of the Sea 
 218 
With the treaty ratified and the broad national political agenda set, the broad discretion of 
administrative agencies to use law towards policy ends came to the fore. In 1998, the State 
Council released its own authoritative political statement on the maritime-related political and 
legal tasks facing the PRC, in the form of a White Paper on “The Development of China’s 
Marine Programs.”90 It builds on the Agenda, noting that “the basic ideas of the strategy [in 
Oceans Agenda 21] are as follows: “to effectively safeguard the state’s maritime rights and 
interests, rationally develop and utilize marine resources, give positive protection to the marine 
eco-environment and realize the sustainable utilization of marine resources and the marine 
environment as well as the coordinated development of the work in this field.”91 This document 
is, in effect, the state’s highest executive and administrative organ speaking to itself about its 
basic policy goals, and acknowledging that it is not yet properly adapted to the functional tasks 
prescribed in the new law of the sea regime. Although the internalization process was nascent at 
this stage, the White Paper nonetheless takes note of substantial progress in bringing Chinese 
domestic law into line with UNCLOS III to date, observing that “[i]n content, these laws and 
administrative regulations are all consistent with the principles and relevant provisions contained 
in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The formulation and implementation of these laws, 
rules, and regulations has, on the one hand, protected China's state sovereignty and marine rights 
and interests, and on the other, promoted the rational development of marine resources and 
effective protection of the marine environment. Comprehensive management of China's marine 
areas is beginning to be contained within a legal framework.”92 
By 2001, the ascendant “maritime rights and interests” construct made its way into the text of the 
                                                          
90 PRC State Council Information Office 1998 
91 Ibid., Section I. Sustainable Marine Development Strategy 
92 Ibid., Section V. The Implementation of Comprehensive Marine Management 
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NPC’s Tenth Five Year Plan (5YP). There is no stronger political endorsement for state agencies 
to prioritize tasks than an imprimatur in this most authoritative planning document for economic 
development. In it, a new section on protecting China’s land and water resources devolves 
authority to the State Council and its various agencies to “strengthen use and management of 
maritime areas and defend maritime rights and interests.”93 The rights-and-interests concept had 
already been enshrined by top leadership and codified in the Territorial Sea Law as well as 
hundreds of pieces of implementing regulation and other normative documents at local levels; its 
elevation into an article of central economic planning is strong evidence of its political 
ascendancy. Linking disputes to the urgent demands of economic development, generally 
considered the party’s first policy priority, sends a signal to act that could be readily interpreted 
by the various, peripheral actors involved in drafting and implementing legislation. By this stage, 
the challenges posed by the UNCLOS treaty for China’s maritime disputes were recognized – 
indeed, it was already in diplomatic negotiations with the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) to develop a Code of Conduct for Parties in the South China Sea to check 
growing frictions over sovereignty and usage rights in that semi-enclosed waterway.94 
Consolidating gains in effective administration and heading off mounting diplomatic and 
operational opposition to China’s creeping control over the space were widely accepted political 
objectives by this stage, and have only become more so over time. 
Subsequent 5YPs have devoted ever-increasing space to the priority of defending maritime rights 
and interests in the context of growing tensions over these disputes. In the 11th 5YP (2006), 
China’s leading economic planners announced the imperative to develop resources in the EEZ 
                                                          
93 PRC National People’s Congress 2001  
94 This initiative followed China’s 1994 seizure and 1995 infrastructure-building on the unoccupied and aptly named 
Mischief Reef (美济礁), also claimed by the Philippines and Vietnam (Fravel 2008: 296-298). 
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lest they be developed by other states.95 Beginning in 2011 with the 12th 5YP, these maritime 
imperatives were reiterated and expanded, then elaborated in far more specific form in an 
entirely separate report, the “12th Five Year Plan for Marine Development,”96 issued by SOA. 
Laying out principally economic goals for the agency, this agency planning document devotes an 
entire chapter (16) to “Maritime Laws and Regulations.” A section in that chapter identifies the 
priority of “Strengthening Marine Legislative Work” and emphasizes the need to “build a sound 
legal and regulatory system that enables coordination between the top and bottom.” Officials are 
encouraged to “promote the popularization and propaganda of those maritime laws and 
regulations.” This 5YP makes abundantly clear the connection between, on the one hand, the 
political demands of maritime disputes and marine economic development, and on the other, the 
need for an effective domestic legal scheme to bolster those efforts.  
The CCP’s promotion of maritime rights and interests to the utmost political priority reached a 
crescendo alongside those 2012 5YPs. Then-President Hu Jintao’s work report to the CCP’s 18th 
Party Congress declared China’s ambition to become a “strong maritime power” (海洋强国), and 
to that end announced imperatives to “enhance our capacity for exploiting marine resources, 
develop the maritime economy, protect the marine ecological environment, and resolutely 
safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests.”97 His successor, Xi Jinping, took office that 
year and immediately complemented Hu’s pronouncement with a continuing series of statements 
and foreign policies that further elevate the salience of China’s “maritime rights and interests” in 
                                                          
95 PRC National People’s Congress 2006 
96 PRC State Oceanic Administration 2011; see Martinson 2016b for detailed discussion of the sequence of 5-year 
plans and their relationship to maritime policy. 
97 Xinhua 2012 
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realizing the goal of becoming a strong maritime power.98 State officials, especially those from 
the principal maritime agency, the SOA, have followed suit, noting that “[t]he most important 
prerequisite for the building of a maritime power is to…protect the nation's maritime rights and 
interests from being violated. If our nations core maritime interests and the basic maritime rights 
and interests cannot be effectively protected, there is no way to talk about building a maritime 
power.”99 These statements mark a further amplification of authoritative commands to use 
domestic maritime law to promote maritime rights and interests and the maritime power goal.  
The new administration is not leaving the “perfection” of PRC maritime law solely to the 
discretion of the apparatchiks running their respective agencies. Beginning 2012, Xi organized 
representatives from the SOA as well as those from the Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of 
Agriculture, and leading CCP Politburo members into a “Central Leading Small Group on the 
Defense of Maritime Interests.”100 Such “leading small groups” (领导小组) indicate the highest 
possible political priority for a given issue, positioning the small group in a meta-bureaucratic 
rank that confers supreme decision-making status to the body. The efficacy of that decision-
making depends upon the existence and coordination of a large state administrative and law 
enforcement apparatus that had been developed over the prior two decades of internalization and 
implementation of the law of the sea.  
The prior survey cites various state and party pronouncements establishing the overwhelming 
political importance of maritime rights and interests as they pertain to maritime disputes. 
                                                          
98 See, for example, Xi’s extensive remarks on maritime power and maritime rights and interests at the 30 July 2013 
Eighth Group Study Session of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee on the Development of Maritime 
Power (Xi 2013).  
99 Liu Kefu 2013: 1; see McDevitt (ed.) 2016 for a thorough sector-by-sector analysis of the “maritime power” 
project. 
100 People’s Digest 2013 
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Because the political-legal system lacks fixed procedures for incorporating international law, 
such communication is necessary for any meaningful internalization and implementation process 
to proceed. Notably, none of these documents and statements offer any precise account of the 
scope or content of the rights and interests to be defended – such determination is left to the 
discretion of the leadership of the party and relevant state organs, allowing for adjustments in 
light of policy priorities.  
Conclusion and transition 
 
The prior analysis of the black letters of Chinese law establishes that no formal process is in 
place that obliges treaty norms to become a part of PRC legislation or regulation. Instead, the 
determination of how, when and whether such norms are internalized and implemented lies with 
political elites – especially in the central CCP leadership – who turn indeterminate domestic rules 
into actionable commands for lower levels in the bureaucracy. The campaign to promote “ruling 
the country by law” indicates that law has become a preferred mechanism for transmitting such 
commands from the head to the hands and feet of the sprawling party-state apparatus. The 
associated legal reforms do not in themselves ensure that a particular treaty will be incorporated 
into domestic institutions, but creates a norm through which such a process can proceed. The 
necessary and sufficient condition for meaningful application of treaty norms is a central 
decision that a particular political issue warrants their internalization and implementation. 
China’s maritime rights and interests surrounding their many maritime disputes easily meet this 
threshold. The subsequent Chapter thus picks up from this starting point, exploring the specific 
pathways and processes through which UNCLOS III – and the EEZ in particular – finds its way 
into the Chinese state.  
 




Internalizing and Implementing the Law of the Sea:  




“[P]eace-loving countries will definitely use UNCLOS as a weapon to defeat maritime 
power politics.”1 
- PRC State Ocean Administration Director, Wang Shuguang 
 
“[A]ccording to UNCLOS and our country's claims, we possess around three million 
square kilometers of waters under administration. Of course, there is a significant area 
that is in dispute, which is to say, there is a long way to go and much difficult work to be 
done to genuinely roll out our maritime undertakings over three million square kilometers 
of blue territory.”2 
- PRC Minister of Land and Resources, Zhou Yongkang 
 
When the PRC signed UNCLOS III in December 1982, the state had almost no domestic 
maritime law, virtually no capacity for administering waters beyond port areas, and only 
rudimentary claims delimiting territorial seas.3 By the time of its accession to the treaty in June 
1996, the PRC had an embryonic maritime legal scheme consisting of broad, indeterminate 
public claims backed up a small handful of domestic statutes and regulations. These early legal 
instruments sketched the broad contours of a maritime apparatus that has continued to develop 
over the ensuing twenty years, steadily elaborating and institutionalizing claims to rights and 
jurisdiction that outstrip the provisions of UNCLOS III in several important respects.  
                                                
1 PRC State Oceanic Administration 2002: 40 
2 PRC State Oceanic Administration 1999: 10-11 
3 The principle formal act of state practice was the 1958 PRC Declaration on the Territorial Sea (discussed in 
2 PRC State Oceanic Administration 1999: 10-11 
3 The principle formal act of state practice was the 1958 PRC Declaration on the Territorial Sea (discussed in 
Chapter 3, Section III), which claims a 12 nautical mile territorial sea around all of China’s mainland territory as 
well as around disputed islands in the South and East China Seas. 
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The development of this maritime legal scheme may be reckoned as processes of internalizing 
law of the sea norms into PRC legal institutions, and implementing them with creeping 
administrative and law enforcement practices. In so doing, China has utilized international norms 
to claim broader and deeper resource rights and jurisdictional competencies than those permitted 
by the 320 articles and 9 annexes of UNCLOS. Due to limited effectiveness legal institutions in 
the Chinese political-legal system, the meaning and consequences of internalizing and 
implementing UNCLOS are obscure without inquiry into the specific functional areas covered in 
domestic law and how they are dealt with in practice, the substantive focus of this Chapter.  
Understanding China’s instrumental use of international law demands inquiry into how that 
instrument is forged and wielded by domestic legal and political institutions and actors. China’s 
political-legal system enables processes of internalization and implementation that promote the 
state’s exercise of steadily creeping jurisdiction in its claimed maritime zones – especially the 
EEZ. UNCLOS-derived norms for the EEZ provide a scaffolding upon which the PRC has 
constructed domestic law and regulation that, on balance, expand the scope and augment the 
content of claimed rights and jurisdiction. That new legal regime expanded the maritime space 
under PRC jurisdiction from 37,000 km2 to a claimed 3,000,000 km2 – yet not one of the PRC’s 
potential EEZ boundaries is delimited in PRC law.4 Each boundary (and the EEZ it delimits) is 
the object of a dispute with one of its nine maritime neighbors (Japan, North Korea, South 
Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, and Vietnam). A host of 
diplomatic, economic, and strategic challenges arising from these disputes furnish the political 
urgency required for the Chinese party-state to internalize and implement a distinct version of 
                                                
4 There is no precise, official claim that specifies the boundaries of this “3,000,000 km2” purportedly under China’s 
jurisdiction, but it is the figure used in all official and unofficial Chinese commentary on the question as a way to 
emphasize the large volume of “blue territory” that China owns but does not administer. The authoritative Academy 
of Military Sciences describes half of this area as “already controlled by other nations” (Ge 2006: 223). 
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EEZ norms that best support and extend PRC claims. These norms are the foundation of a broad 
political effort to build administrative and law enforcement capacity to “expand” and “defend” 
China’s maritime legal rights as an auxiliary support for its growing maritime interests. 
Laws to Create, Expand, and Defend China’s “Maritime Rights and Interests” 
The PRC’s legal institutions are not designed to directly internalize norms from international 
treaties. They are a means of coordinating the party’s political goals with the state’s practical 
actions, and use international legal norms instrumentally toward that end. Political discretion 
penetrates every level of the indeterminate legal hierarchy and ensures that party-state elites are 
in a position to determine whether and how any domestic legal rule is established. The purpose 
of enacting such rules in the case of law of the sea norms is not to constrain the state, but rather 
to enable more effective instrumental use of international law. The prior Chapter established that 
maritime rights and interests related to China’s maritime disputes have reached a threshold of 
political urgency such that meaningful internalization and implementation processes can 
proceed. This Chapter addresses how the politics of China’s maritime disputes shape these 
processes, on balance enabling – rather than constraining – Chinese elites, who use maritime law 
as an instrument to press maritime claims and mobilize domestic resources that augment the 
content and expand the scope of China’s claimed EEZ rights. This amounts to “creeping 
jurisdiction,” in which China enforces domestic laws that exploit indeterminate norms prescribed 
in UNCLOS to effectively supplant international law with PRC law in disputed zones.  
There are major differences between merely putting rules that contravene international law on 
the books and putting them into practice. Only in recent years has the PRC’s maritime legal 
scheme reached a level of development and sophistication – including major investments of 
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resources, personnel, and considerable organizational reform – that its implementation makes a 
splash. Now, with growing capacity to enforce a multiplying collection of domestic laws, 
regulations and rules governing EEZ resources and activities, Chinese actors can take 
progressively bolder steps to practically implement domestic maritime laws. That 
implementation is especially problematic within the roughly 1,500,000 km2 of maritime space 
under dispute with its neighbors. In these “grey zones” of contested sovereign authority, PRC 
law is in direct conflict with other states’ domestic maritime law. The problems this generates are 
increasingly of the operational sort: PRC domestic law generates new and expanded functional 
roles for maritime law enforcement and administrative agencies, which use that law as an 
instrument to assert Chinese rights and jurisdiction exceeding prescribed limits under UNCLOS 
and customary law of the sea.  
This Chapter analyzes not just the transformation of international norms, but how those norms 
enable the transformation of the state. The scope, content and function of state organs transform 
to take on these new and expansive roles. The process can be assessed in terms of the 
internalization of the new EEZ regime into domestic institutions and its implementation as 
policy and practice. These processes depart from the theoretical expectation that repeated 
transnational legal processes surrounding the law of the sea will ultimately produce obedience, as 
their empirical analysis demonstrates a pronounced decoupling from the original content and 
scope of the norms in UNCLOS III. Especially visible in the case of the EEZ, these UNCLOS-
based norms are repurposed and transformed in the course of becoming part of China’s domestic 
institutions. Reciprocally, in adopting these modified norms, the functions and capacity of the 
Chinese state change dramatically to reflect new and expanded interests transformed by China’s 
encounter with the law of the sea. By organizing the inquiry along the lines of the specific 
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jurisdiction and defined resource rights prescribed in black letters of the EEZ regime laid out in 
UNCLOS III, we can observe the various ways in which the state maritime apparatus has “grown 
into” the EEZ.  
Part I demonstrates how China’s national legislation, administrative regulation and departmental 
rules5 expand the scope of PRC maritime jurisdiction and resource rights. Part II connects these 
internalized laws to the new functions required for their practical implementation in China’s 
claimed zones. It tracks how this expanded authority transforms the state, creating new 
functional roles for its various agencies. Of the various ways in which the state maritime 
apparatus has “grown into” the EEZ, its maritime law enforcement agencies are the most 
prominent beneficiaries of new responsibilities and resources to perform these new functions. 
Part III analyzes how the PRC has internalized and implemented specific resource rights and 
jurisdictional competencies assigned under UNCLOS in such a way as to expand their 
substantive content. It demonstrates how broader and deeper claims to maritime rights and 
jurisdiction create demands within the state for new capacity, effectively enabling greater control 
over the EEZ (i.e, creeping jurisdiction towards the end of closure). A concluding section 
examines how China’s practices can potentially feed back into the international norms 
underpinning the law of the sea, a phenomenon that will ultimately depend on how other states 
respond to PRC implementation of its growing body of domestic maritime law. 
                                                
5 Unlike in many Western states, there is no meaningful transparency or publication requirement for state organs 
when they issue laws, regulations, or rules. They are sometimes publicized, and the banner legislation is compiled in 
yearbooks, but there is no searchable database or centralized collection of all the relevant laws and regulations. The 
author’s selection of legal instruments is based on the National People’s Congress Legislative Work Commission’s 
2014中华人民共和国啊现行法律行政法规汇编 [The Effective Laws and Administrative Regulations of the 
People’s Republic of China] and the PRC State Oceanic Administration, Department of Policy Legislation and 
Planning’s 2012 中华人民共和国海洋法规选编 [Collection of the Sea Laws of the People’s Republic China]. 
Where these sources are not comprehensive, I rely on other SOA publications (especially the annual Oceans 
Yearbooks and Ocean Development Reports), and supplementary interviews with Chinese law professors, maritime 
law and policy specialists, and state maritime officials over the course of 2014-2015.  
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I. Expanding the scope of PRC maritime rights and jurisdiction 
In internalizing and implementing its domestic laws and regulations, the PRC stakes claims to 
rights and jurisdiction that exceed those permitted under UNCLOS, in some cases substantially. 
The following section focuses on geographic scope of the PRC’s claimed rights and jurisdiction, 
taking stock of the transformation of various EEZ norms as they are internalized and applied. To 
do so, it analyzes Chinese legislation and regulations in light of the norms established UNCLOS 
III Part V (Articles 55-75),6 as well as other parts of the Convention that touch upon coastal state 
rights and jurisdiction in EEZs; where appropriate, departmental rules and other normative 
documents, official and scholarly comments, and interviews supplement the analysis.  
As anticipated during the Conference, China’s sovereignty disputes over islands in the South and 
East China Seas are directly implicated the question of the geographic limits of its EEZ. The 
degree to which these features influence the delimitation of EEZ boundaries remains a highly 
contentious question, and depends upon whether or not any of them can be considered a full-
fledged island under Part VIII of the Convention. It establishes a “regime of islands,” which 
states in Article 121(3) that “[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic of their 
own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.” China expressly states that its 
claimed features are fully entitled to these jurisdictional zones and practices as though it holds, at 
a minimum, sovereign rights to resources and jurisdictional competence over activities in the 
zones as if it had EEZs extending from those disputed features. Maps 1 and 2 below indicate the 
location and jurisdictional scope of various provisional claims in the disputed SCS and ECS. 
Map 1: South China Sea claims 
                                                
6 See Appendix A 
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(Source: Schofield and Arsana 2012) 
 
Map 2: East China Sea claims 
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(Source: Schofield and Arsana 2012) 
 
Stretching the Limits of EEZ Jurisdiction 
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The first and most fundamental characteristic of the Chinese domestic EEZ law and practice is 
its radical expansion of the limits of coastal state jurisdiction. It amounts to a wholesale 
redefinition of maritime space, transforming non-jurisdictional high seas to a zone under the 
jurisdiction of the coastal state. True to positions adopted prior to the start of the LOS 
Conference in 1973, China resists the application of a determinate rule on the geographic limits 
of that jurisdictional space.7 Although China’s delegates ultimately agreed to a 200nm limit and 
proclaimed that same limit upon ratification and in domestic legislation, the disadvantages of that 
rule were not lost on Chinese leadership. Consequently, many of disadvantages inherent to China 
from geographically-determined zone were not directly internalized.8 Instead, PRC law alters 
that seemingly straightforward norm to suit its preferences. Because the Convention is 
unequivocal on the limits of EEZ jurisdiction, China relies on extra-UNCLOS concepts (like 
some brand of historically-generated rights) and loose or distorted interpretations of other 
UNCLOS norms (like straight and archipelagic baselines). Even more basically, no seaward 
limits of Chinese jurisdiction have been formally declared.  
While it is indeterminate in PRC practice, the scope of EEZ jurisdiction is not among the 
indeterminate aspects of the regime as codified in UNCLOS. Article 55 defines the EEZ as “an 
area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in 
this part” and fixes its outer limit at 200nm from the coastal baselines (Article 57). This is not an 
guaranteed entitlement, like that of the continental shelf which exists independently of the 
                                                
7 China’s working paper in 1973 expressed this claim, as did its delegates to the Conference. See Chapter 2 and 
A/AC.138/SC.II/L.34, PRC 1973 Working Paper on Sea Area within the Limits of National Jurisdiction 
8 Chapter 2 discusses these disadvantages at length. The central issue is that China is surrounded by semi-enclosed 
seas and cannot, under any circumstance, reap the full 200nm entitlement due to the proximity of adjacent and 
opposite coastlines of neighboring states. 
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coastal state’s claim.9 An EEZ must be declared, delimited, and adjusted where it overlaps with 
the claims of other states. Where opposing or adjacent coastlines are within 400nm – as is the 
case for all of China’s maritime boundaries – the Convention prescribes that “delimitation shall 
be effected by agreement on the basis of international law” (Article 74).10 China has yet to reach 
any delimitation agreements for its EEZs, and has made no formal legal claim to the outer 
boundaries of its EEZs other than proclaiming upon ratification and in its 1998 Law on the 
Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (EEZ Law) that it enjoys 200nm economic 
zones from all of its baselines, which have been drawn around all of China’s claimed territory.  
Excessive Straight and Archipelagic Baselines  
Straight baselines. The expansion of the scope of PRC claims begins with its baselines, the 
origin of any delimitation effort. The PRC’s declared baselines surround its mainland coast, as 
well as the disputed Paracel Islands in the SCS and the Diaoyu Islands in the ECS. To date, the 
PRC has not promulgated baselines around the disputed Spratly Islands in the SCS, but has 
indicated in a Note Verbale to the United Nations and various MFA statements that they 
collectively rate an EEZ and continental shelf.11 The declaration that all of the PRC’s land 
territory, disputed and otherwise, is surrounded by straight baselines and 200nm EEZs stakes out 
an “excessive” position for the limits of PRC jurisdiction.12  
China’s internalization of the EEZ regime’s rules on delimitation begins with a systematic 
                                                
9 The ICJ ruled that “the rights of the coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf…exist ipso facto and ab 
initio by virtue of its sovereignty over the land. In short, there is an…inherent right” (North Sea Continental Shelf 
Cases [Denmark/The Netherlands v. Germany] [1969] ICJ Reports 3, at para. 19). 
10 The article refers to the ICJ statute as the authoritative statement of sources of that law (viz., treaties, custom, 
general principles of law; secondarily, “judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists.” 
11 See PRC Permanent Mission to the United Nations 2011; China’s baselines around the Paracels were lodged with 
the UN in 1996 (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1996); it lodged claims to baselines around the Diaoyu Islands in 
2012 (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012). 
12 US Department of State 1996; Roach 2013 
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expansion of the scope of PRC jurisdictional waters in the form of its default to “straight 
baselines” from which all zones are measured. Indeed, China’s 1992 Territorial Sea Law as well 
as 1996 and 2012 Declarations on the baselines around the Paracel and Diaoyu islands, 
respectively, delimit straight lines connecting basepoints that maximize the scope of China’s 
internal waters and push the boundaries of each UNCLOS zone further seaward. This decision is 
plainly at odds with the determinate text of the Convention, which prescribes a norm for 
baselines to follow the low-water line, and provides an exception for straight baselines only 
where “the coastline is deeply indented…or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its 
immediate vicinity” (UNCLOS III, Article 7). Although these special conditions obtain in certain 
areas along the mainland coast, Chinese law makes straight baselines its only mode of drawing 
baselines. PRC legislation baldly rejects the agreed international norm for baselines. 
Archipelagic baselines. Furthermore, China’s straight baselines around disputed territories are 
drawn around groups of islands, rather than around individual features. Describing the Paracels, 
Diaoyu, and Spratly Islands as “archipelagos” or “groups” or as somehow constituting “a 
geographic unity,” PRC officials and publicists claim that straight baselines are the appropriate 
practice, and delimit jurisdictional zones accordingly. In doing so, PRC law again systematically 
departs from the clear black letters of the treaty, which allow this special archipelagic baseline 
regime only in the case of states “constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos” (UNCLOS 
III, Article 46). China refers to each of its disputed island groups as archipelagos that themselves, 
by implication, warrant status as “archipelagic states.” In the case of the Diaoyus and Paracels, 
the PRC government has drawn archipelagic baselines enclosing them.  
China’s decision to enclose island groups contravenes the Convention’s definition of 
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archipelagic states, and even exceeds the determinate norm established for how much water 
space may be enclosed by an archipelago. Article 48 establishes clear maximum of water to land 
area enclosed in archipelagic baselines at 9 to 1, which ensures that archipelagic baselines do not 
encompass disproportionately large volumes of water space around very small terrestrial 
features. The ratio in the case of both island groups enclosed in PRC straight baselines (Diaoyu 
and Paracel) is three times greater than this unequivocal standard.13 While there is no legal 
ambiguity on this count, Chinese law is clear and determinate in establishing such unlawful 
baselines; its diplomats and officials always characterize the disputed islands as forming 
“archipelagos” (群岛).14  The political decision to enclose a larger volume of maritime space 
than UNCLOS permits has also been transmitted to the Chinese law of the sea community, who 
are currently working to retroactively discover a legal justification for this clear breach.15  
This this move to enclose all of China’s territorial claims by straight and archipelagic baselines 
demonstrates a deliberate and consistent commitment to expand the scope of PRC jurisdiction 
                                                
13 The ratio in the case of China’s baselines around the Diaoyu Islands is 27.1:1 (Roach 2013); the ratio in the 
Paracels is 26.1:1 (Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs 1996: 8). 
14 The key legal instruments defining China’s baselines (the 1992 Territorial Sea Law, and 1996 and 2012 
Declarations on baselines) refer to the Paracels, Spratlys and Diaoyus as “群岛,” or archipelago/island group. The 
Spratlys have yet to be the subject of a formal baseline claim, though one was implied in the 2011 Note Verbale. 
This presumption of “archipelagic” status for the Spratlys is also standard in Chinese diplomatic rhetoric, e.g. 
Xinhua 2016 “外交部：中国将南沙群岛作为整体主张海洋权益 [Ministry of Foreign Affairs: China takes the 
Spratly Islands as a Whole in Claiming Maritime Rights and Interests].”  
15 In one vivid example, the author attended a conference at the East China University of Law and Politics in 
November 2014 in which an entire 90-minute panel and 30 minutes of Q&A were devoted to papers by law 
professors and think tank experts seeking to “construct a legal argument for China’s archipelagic straight baselines,” 
during which many unusual proposals were presented. Some suggested there were linguistic issues that could be 
exploited; others argued that “western methodologies were misleading” and others simply started from the premise 
that China’s policy is ipso facto lawful and therefore must be the authoritative interpretation of the clear language of 
the Convention. Other Chinese scholars, writing in Taiwan and Singapore and familiar with the absurdity of the 
claim that China is an “archipelagic state” simply breeze past this problem, claiming that “UNCLOS leaves open the 
question of whether a continental state is entitled to draw straight baselines for its mid-ocean archipelagos” (Song 
and Zou 2012: 305) even while telling the author in discussions (Hainan, June 2014 and Taipei, January 2015) that 
there was no doubt that UNCLOS permitted archipelagic baselines only to archipelagic states. Rare Chinese scholars 
point to the possibility of disaggregating some of the features in the Spratlys for the purposes of drawing baselines 
and declaring zones (author discussions at workshops in Hainan, June and August 2014). 
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and rights by crafting domestic law that exploits real or perceived indeterminacy in the UNCLOS 
text.16 In essence, PRC law assigns itself maritime rights and jurisdiction encompassing a larger 
geographic space than the law of the sea permits, beginning by reinterpreting the most basic and 
clear norms concerning delimitation. Although straight baselines and 200nm EEZs are allowed 
under certain conditions established under UNCLOS, they are not applicable given China’s 
geography. In internalizing those norms, PRC law stakes out scope for its entitlements far 
broader than any reasonable reading of the black letters permits.  
“Other sea areas under PRC jurisdiction” 
The ostensible limits of PRC maritime jurisdiction, and thus the scope of their claimed rights, are 
further expanded in the enactment of a large volume of legislation and regulation tasking state 
agencies to administer and enforce laws within “other sea areas under PRC jurisdiction” (中华人
民共和国管辖的其他海域). Reference to this undefined geographic space usually appears in 
PRC legislation, regulation, and rules as the last in a list of the UNCLOS-prescribed maritime 
zones – viz., the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the EEZ and the continental shelf. In 
diplomatic discourse, PRC representatives refer to “adjacent” (附近) and “relevant” (有关) 
rather than “other sea areas,” a similarly vague construction that does not refer explicitly to any 
UNCLOS-prescribed entitlement. Sometimes they refer to the UNCLOS zones as well as “other 
maritime rights and interests.”17 This vagueness is permitted by a domestic legal regime that 
                                                
16 In this case of baselines, that indeterminacy is entirely perceived because the text of the Convention is 
unequivocal. In other cases, explored below, the process is more complex and relies more on the discretion of actors 
at lower levels, who exploit indeterminacy to gradually expand PRC rights and jurisdiction. 
17 E.g., PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016a. The MFA spokesman states that “[f]rom historical, geographical, 
political, economic and legal points of view, the islands, reefs, cays, sands and the relevant waters of China’s 
Nansha Islands are interrelated and have always been taken as a whole.” 
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does not provide determinate accounting of Chinese maritime zones. 
The undefined “other sea areas” formulation appears in some 69 legal instruments, among them 
20 acts of national legislation, 22 administrative regulations, and 23 departmental rules.18 Many 
of the major pieces of legislation that create new functional responsibilities for state agencies 
contain this language, which then reappears in lower-level implementing regulation, measures, 
and departmental rules intended to specify the practical duties of the relevant actors.19 Due to the 
indeterminacy of this phrase and the complications it presents for the coordinated administration 
and enforcement of some basic tasks – namely, in determining where, exactly, PRC agencies are 
authorized to exercise jurisdiction – it has given rise to some observable confusion within the 
bureaucracy.  
For example, in a 2003 review of the 1999 Special Maritime Procedure Law, the People’s 
Supreme Court issued an interpretation of the term, in which it addressed the vague language at 
issue by begging the question of which waters are under Chinese jurisdiction: “The phrase ‘the 
sea areas under jurisdiction’ as prescribed in Item 3 of Article 7 of the Special Maritime 
Procedure Law refers to the contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, continental shelves, 
and other sea areas that are under the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China.”20 The 
court’s reasoning indicates that legal clarity is inferior to the political demand facing the 
                                                
18 PKU Law database, search conducted Aug 2014 and verified in ChinaLawInfo search in June 2015 
19 Among prominent examples of national-level legislation and regulation including this problematic phrase are the 
Law on Fisheries, Law on Surveying and Mapping, Law on Marine Environmental Protection, the Law on 
Environmental Protection, the Special Maritime Procedure Law, the Regulations on Marine Scientific Research, 
Provisions on the Administration of the Protection and Utilization of Islands with No Residents, and in the Notice of 
the General Office of the State Council on Issuing the Provisions on the Main Functions, Internal Bodies an Staffing 
of the State Oceanic Administration. 
20 The Supreme People's Court Interpretations on the Application of the Special Maritime Procedure Law of the 
People's Republic of China, effective 1 February 2003 (Adopted at the 1259th meeting of the Adjudication 
Committee of the Supreme People’s Court on December 3, 2002, No.3 Interpretation [2003] of the Supreme 
People’s Court), italics added. 
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judiciary to maintain some degree of flexibility about the claimed scope of Chinese maritime 
entitlements. Certainly the court is not empowered to demand that the political leadership clarify 
the scope of PRC maritime jurisdiction, much less make that determination itself.21 
This “other sea areas” construct does not appear in every document, an inconsistency that may be 
explained by the necessity for some degree of precision about the practical implementation of 
Chinese domestic law by maritime law enforcement agencies. In the State Council’s 2007 
Departmental Rules on Maritime Law Enforcement by Public Security Organs, the “armed 
police force and coast guards” are instructed to enforce law only within the UNCLOS-designated 
zones. In the same sentence, the document states that such MLE activities should be carried “in 
accordance with the relevant laws and administrative regulations and rules of this country,” thus 
leaving open the possibility that an alternative domestic rule comprising broader, undefined areas 
of jurisdiction might be employed by MLE officials to justify activities beyond those normal 
zonal entitlements. This style of drafting also leaves open the possibility that mid-ocean features 
under dispute and lacking baselines and declared zones, such as those in the Spratlys, can still be 
subjected to PRC enforcement jurisdiction.  
For example, the 2003 Provisions on the Administration of the Protection and Utilization of 
Islands with No Residents, jointly issued by the SOA, Ministry of Civil Affairs, and the General 
Staff of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), allows them to “strengthen the 
administration…protect the ecological environment…safeguard the maritime rights and interests 
of the state and national defense and security, and to promote rational utilization” (Article 1) of 
islands within China’s interior waters, territorial sea, EEZ, continental shelf, and other sea areas 
under the jurisdiction of the PRC (Article 2). If an island is subject to China’s jurisdiction, it 
                                                
21 Author interview with international law professor at PRC Law and Politics University (Beijing, March 2015) 
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must also be regarded as sovereign territory and would generate at least territorial seas (if not 
EEZ and continental shelf) in which the normal functions of the state would be authorized under 
UNCLOS. Because no such zones have been determined in the Spratlys, nor in the Diaoyu 
(administered by Japan), these administrative regulations instruct the implementing agency to 
submit to “examination and approval of applications” by the higher-level organ of the SOA 
“with consent from the General Staff Department,” a central military body with broad decision-
making authority for the PLA. In so doing, political discretion is retained at higher levels to 
narrow or broaden the scope, depending on circumstance, in which maritime law enforcement 
agencies practically operate to implement domestic law.  
PRC internalization of norms governing the scope of its jurisdiction is not an impediment to 
implementation well beyond normal limits – nor even beyond those limits indicated in China’s 
own domestic law. Of special note are the essentially geographic effects of broad baselines and 
the political flexibility afforded by undefined “other” jurisdictional zones. Below, closer 
examination of how various state agencies operate, especially those dealing with enforcement of 
domestic maritime law, will demonstrate how closure and creeping jurisdiction can be observed 
within the specific functions of the state within China’s claimed jurisdictional zones.  
II. Functional Transformation of the State: Expanding to Cover New Zones 
Internalized PRC rules on the limits of its jurisdiction define a vast new space in which Chinese 
maritime rights and interests are in play. In implementing this maritime legal scheme, the PRC 
not only expanded the scope of its claimed authority, but created corresponding new and 
expanded functions for its administrative and maritime law enforcement (MLE) organs. Prior to 
the advent of the EEZ, these agencies had exercised no authority whatsoever beyond the 
Rising Power, Creeping Jurisdiction: China’s Law of the Sea 
 239 
territorial sea. In response to this new zone of rights and jurisdiction, the party-state mobilized 
resources and built capacity to effectively control that space. The constitutive quality of EEZ 
norms ensured a basic lack of conflict among various stakeholders in China, both within the state 
and in the private sector. Where in other regimes, the state has had to manage distributional 
conflicts among winners and losers under new rules (e.g., trade), no such trade-offs are directly 
in play with respect to the EEZ. Economic interests in developing China’s “blue” marine 
economy complement bureaucratic interests in seeking new responsibilities, resources, and rents 
on such activities; even the potentially constraining duty to protect and conserve fisheries and 
preserve the marine environment are sources of jobs and resources for the bureaucracy. Laws 
impose a negligible drag on barely-regulated marine industries, which have generally profited 
from access to greater geographic space and political support for marine economic 
development.22  
Meanwhile, the foreign policy priority to prosecute China’s maritime disputes creates conflicts 
with other states whose claims and access are challenged by China’s push towards closure of 
disputed zones in the South and East China Seas. Protecting China’s sovereignty from foreign 
invasion is a winning political formula for the party-state, which has coalesced around using 
maritime law instrumentally to defend China’s “maritime rights and interests.”23 No official 
definition of the content or legal implications of the terms has been issued by official sources, 
though the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) considers them to consist of UNCLOS norms, 
international law, and domestic law, and notes that they extend beyond China’s jurisdictional 
                                                
22 Ding, Ge, and Casey 2014 summarize the massive expansion of maritime enterprise in the PRC since ratification 
of UNCLOS, breaking it down by sector and province. There is no clear evidence of distributional conflict, as a 
rising tide seems to be lifting all boats – i.e., extensive growth is possible because the resource base has expanded. 
23 Recall discussion in Chapter 4, Section III. 
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waters.24 Whatever their content, these rights and interests are the subject of several 
transformative changes to the functions of the PRC’s domestic institutions.  
Corresponding to this heightened legal activity geared toward protecting state sovereignty and 
maritime rights and interests was a transformation of functional roles for the Chinese 
bureaucracy. Some of these were purely administrative, and involved changes to the distribution 
of existing authority within the state. Establishment of Hainan as a province in 1988, rather than 
a part of Guangdong province,25 is an example of such a modal shift. At a sub-provincial level, a 
comparable change occurred with the upgrade of the administrative status of Sansha City (on 
Yongxing Island in the disputed Paracel island group) from a county-level administrative 
division to a prefecture-level city in 2012. Although these administrative upgrades had 
significant effects on the bureaucratic ranks of various state actors, the degree to which such 
changes changed the practical responsibilities cannot be directly observed. The principle venue 
for careful observation of how the actual function of the state is transformed by internalization 
and implementation of the law of the sea is in the creation of new MLE agencies, with new 
missions and enhanced resources to implement PRC domestic maritime law. 
Transformation of China’s Maritime Law Enforcement 
Two maritime law enforcement agencies were the principle beneficiaries of this new political 
priority to prescribe and enforce UNCLOS-based rules. In 1999, immediately after China’s 
formal claim to a 200nm EEZ, the SOA began to devote substantial resources to its “China 
                                                
24 PRC State Oceanic Administration ODP 2014: 46. This official report vaguely notes that these maritime rights 
and interests emerge from “different legal positions” (在不同法律地位). 
25 From 1950 to 1984, Hainan was an Administrative Region Office (海南行政区公署) of Guangdong Province. 
From 1984 to 1988 it was the Hainan Administrative Region (海南行政区) of Guangdong province. 
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Marine Surveillance” force (CMS), tasked with enforcing the PRC’s growing body of maritime 
law.26 A CMS national headquarters was set up in Beijing in January 1999, signaling new status 
for a small, specialized agency created in the early 1980s primarily to implement the 1982 PRC 
Marine Environmental Protection Law.27 The 1999 reorganization created new missions that 
required vessels and personnel, which initially came from SOA regional bureaus, located in 
Qingdao, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, but later came from vastly expanded budgets and new 
shipbuilding initiatives.28 Following top-level approval from Premier Zhu Rongji and Vice-
Premier (and later Premier) Wen Jiabao, the State Council allocated 1.9 billion RMB to equip 
CMS with 13 large oceangoing patrol boats and five aircraft.29 A new round of acquisitions was 
initiated with the 12th 5YP and has led to even more rapid expansion of the MLE fleet.30 These 
capacity upgrades reflect the political urgency of the task facing the Chinese MLE fleet. In the 
words of the SOA director, “[t]he struggle over the defense of maritime rights and interests is 
escalating daily, and the contest in the maritime domain is intensifying day by day…We will 
                                                
26 According to official descriptions of the agency, it has broad authority to administer and enforce maritime law in 
China’s jurisdictional zones: “The State Oceanic Administration, a sub-ministerial agency in the State Council’s 
Ministry of Land and Resources, is the organization most directly linked to the definition and defense of these 
maritime rights and interests. Its annual report, the Ocean Development Report 2008 notes that “[the SOA’s] main 
responsibilities include (a) comprehensive coordination of ocean monitoring, scientific research, dumping of wastes 
and development and utilization, organization of drafting national marine development strategies and policies, and 
other marine programs; (b) establishment of ocean management systems and drafting of ocean laws relating to 
coastal belt, islands and sea areas under national jurisdiction, and dealing with foreign affairs concerning ocean-
related treaties and laws; (c) marine economic operation monitoring, assessment, and information publication, and 
organization of the work in the field of energy saving and emission reduction and the adaptation to cli- mate change 
for oceans; (d) regulation of the order to use seas under national jurisdiction; (e) protection of island ecology and 
legal use of unmanned islands; (f) protection of the marine environment, marine biodiversity and management of 
marine nature reserves; (g) organization of marine investigation and research; (h) marine environmental monitoring 
and forecasting of marine disasters; (i) organization of international cooperation and ex- changes; and (j) 
maintaining national maritime rights and interests, implementing regular law enforcement patrols and managing the 
China Ocean Surveillance (PRC State Oceanic Administration ODP 2008). 
27 Author interview with SOA official (Hainan, December 2014). 
28 Martinson 2015: 9 
29 Su 2007 
30 The demand for MLE resources and capacity is articulated several times in the 12th Five-Year Plan for Marine 
Development drawn up by the SOA, in particular in its calls for the agency to: “Constantly strengthen the maritime 
patrol and law enforcement capacity. Further increase the time and space coverage of maritime right patrols and law 
enforcement for the jurisdictional waters, significantly improve the capability of emergency response to handle 
maritime rights violations and other illegal acts as well as on-site incidents, and reinforce the support capability for 
participating in the protection of security of international key sea areas and maritime strategic channels.” 
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strengthen our patrol and law enforcement activities to routinely defend our rights and interests 
in sea areas under China’s jurisdiction, and develop a CMS-military-diplomacy trinity 
coordination mechanism.”31  
Another MLE agency took on functional responsibilities that more clearly fall in line with the 
norms established in UNCLOS. In 1998, the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC), was 
established under the Ministry of Agriculture in order to “adapt to the implementation of the new 
international maritime regime.”32 It complemented a vastly expanded set of administrative 
responsibilities for bureaucrats working on fisheries in the Ministry of Agriculture and those 
working on resource utilization in the SOA. FLEC received authorization for funding from the 
State Council to build another 14 mid-to-large sized cutters, adding capacity to enforce China’s 
fisheries laws in the vastly expanded EEZ.33 As of 2015, China’s MLE forces boasted 100 large-
displacement cutters in a fleet of some 205 vessels, several of which are recommissioned PLA 
navy vessels. The SOA has begun to train MLE operators with the navy,34 and to arm their main 
vessels to support increasingly confrontational “rights protection” missions.35  
The rights protection mission provided these agencies with a powerful argument for new 
resources and responsibilities. According to Chinese maritime policy experts, “as law 
enforcement activities in the EEZs increased, the CMS claimed that it needed to exercise police 
power while conducting law enforcement activities. CMS officials strenuously lobby for the 
right to command vital ‘rights protection’ missions.”36 Leaders of these MLE agencies 
                                                
31 PRC State Oceanic Administration ODP 2013: 2 
32 PRC State Oceanic Administration ODP 2001: 123 
33 PRC State Oceanic Administration ODP 1999: 11 
34 Martinson 2014 
35 United States Navy Office of Naval Intelligence 2015: 9-10 
36 Lin and Gao 2009: 84 
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understand their task as one of achieving “effective administration” (有效管理) and “actual 
control” (实际控制) of maritime space – especially in disputed zones – such that their practices 
would “embody present jurisdiction” (体现存在管辖) for the PRC.37 The SOA’s maritime-
specific 5YP also confirmed that the state’s MLE apparatus now holds dual functional 
responsibilities: to develop and manage the oceans and their lucrative “blue” economy, and also 
to “control” (控制) disputed maritime space with physical presence. These goals were explicitly 
linked, with SOA leaders reading the 12th 5YP to guarantee state “provision of resources to 
protect and expand space for development,” especially resources for MLE missions in “waters 
under Chinese jurisdiction, where rights-protection cruises provide spatial and temporal coverage 
to further enhance the response to maritime violations.” Closure had been implicit in much 
policy and practice to date, but this plan elevates closure (euphemized as “rights-protection”) and, 
necessarily, rights-denial to other states claiming rights in these areas into a core mission of a 
major state agency.  
These rights-protection missions became prominent with the operation of MLE forces in the 
territorial waters and contiguous zones surrounding the Diaoyu Islands. Beginning in 2006, at the 
behest of the PLA Navy East Sea Fleet commander,38 Premier Wen Jiabao directly authorized 
“regular rights-protection patrols” (定期维权巡航) conducted by CMS units (支队) in 
jurisdictional waters surrounding the Diaoyu that are administered by Japan but disputed by 
                                                
37 PRC State Oceanic Administration 2010: 127. The CMS also has a responsibility to “display jurisdiction and 
embody China's sovereign rights” in contested waters (China Oceans Yearbook 2006: 164).   
38 See Martinson 2015: 10-12 for discussion of the sequence of events leading to the implementation of regular 
rights patrols. 
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China.39 This decision followed on a commemoration of the 10-year anniversary of PRC 
ratification of UNCLOS, in which leading Party and state officials recognized that the new 
regime of the EEZ presented “challenges and opportunities.” Among the challenges were other 
states exercising jurisdiction in zones to which China lays claim; this phenomenon presented an 
opportunity for China to step up its demonstrations of jurisdictional control (管控) to deny those 
competing claims.40 The SOA’s 2006 yearbook likewise highlighted the importance of 
competitive law enforcement, stating that “[s]ince UNCLOS came into effect, the struggle 
among coastal states, and between coastal states and maritime states, has been increasingly 
intense.”41 The practical purpose of the regular rights patrols is to “manifest jurisdiction” (体现
管辖), a nebulous goal that plainly encompasses more than merely enforcing domestic law.42 
Indeterminately drafted PRC law easily accommodated this change to begin operating regularly 
in waters effectively controlled by Japan because it had not defined the limits of PRC jurisdiction 
– perhaps precisely in order to scale up MLE when capacity allowed.  
In 2012, China was operating at least nine vessels at all times in “rights-protection” missions but 
lacked sufficient capacity to conduct regular patrols of the disputed Senkaku area in response to 
what Beijing considered a Japanese provocation to directly lease four of the disputed islands 
                                                
39 Sun 2013: 4; Fan 2009: 11 
40 China Ocean News 2006, “纪念我国批准《联合国海洋法公约》十周年座谈会在京召开 [Forum marking 10th 
anniversary of our state’s ratification of UNCLOS held in Beijing]  
41 SOA 2006: 164; author thanks Andrew Chubb for identifying these 2006 quotes and events in an unpublished 
draft manuscript.  
42 See Xu 2012: 10-12. Chinese sources often describe the rights-protection missions with the 12- character phrase “
现实存在，体现管辖，宣示主权 [show presence, manifest jurisdiction, and declare sovereignty]” (Martinson 
2015: 13). 
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from their private, Japanese owner.43 Foreign policy considerations dictated a show of Chinese 
determination not to allow Japan to continue its uncontested exercise of jurisdiction over these 
disputed waters, and beginning in September 2012, the MLE fleet began to operate in the 
contiguous zone and territorial sea around the disputed features. The frequency and location of 
these patrols was modulated according to Beijing’s policy preferences, but succeeded in 
demonstrating that the PRC was capable of scaling up its MLE operations beyond waters 
normally patrolled.44 These practices were tailored expressly to undermine Japan’s 
administration of those waters and normalize the (irregular) enforcement of PRC domestic law in 
disputed zones. 
In charging MLE agencies to implement these tasks, authoritative documents explicitly framed 
their various activities in terms of their contribution to foreign policy, noting that: “the principles 
of ‘highlight presence, ensure safety, manifest our sovereign rights and administration of these 
waters’ were effectively implemented, and powerfully supported and complemented our 
government’s diplomatic actions.” These are nominally legal goals, yet lacking international 
legal basis. The constant recitation of these legal aims, untethered to legal rights secured in 
UNCLOS, constitute powerful evidence of the political drive to control maritime space. PRC 
practice is decoupled from the original norms, which assigned coastal states jurisdiction for the 
purpose of using resources and protecting the environment. Instead, PRC MLE agencies treat 
“rights-protection” and exclusion of other users as the principle aim, a prerequisite for other 
legitimate usage by commercial, scientific, and other actors in the PRC. 
                                                
43 Martinson 2015: 14 
44 Johnston and Fravel 2014. There is a wide range of reporting by Chinese, Japanese, and American specialists on 
the individual incidents of PRC MLE patrols in and around Senkaku territorial waters; close analysis of the 
individual events is not necessary to support the analytical claim that Chinese law permits flexible, ad hoc use of 
MLE assets to support foreign policy goals. 
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The political elements of the MLE mission and their decoupling from the more benign 
enforcement jurisdiction prescribed under UNCLOS are not at all obscure in the statements of 
leadership in the party and state. According to the director of the SOA: 
We will maintain the law enforcement patrols that have become normalized to safeguard 
rights and interests in the waters of the Diaoyu Islands. We will show our jurisdictional 
claims externally through ongoing patrols of the waters of the South China Sea under 
Chinese jurisdiction. We will move ahead in areas including selection of the scope of 
protection for territorial sea base points, management of place names in the South China 
Sea, research to determine the extent of the continental shelf extending beyond the 200-
nautical-mile limit, and the naming of seabed places. We will move further ahead with 
comprehensive administration, and we will strike a ‘combination blow,’ the main 
elements of which will be legal, administrative, and maritime activities and public 
opinion propaganda. We will undertake systematic deepening of research and external 
propaganda on hot issues of maritime rights and interests.45 
In order to better realize these multifarious functional purposes for MLE missions, a major 
bureaucratic overhaul went in motion with the 18th CCP National Congress in March 2013. This 
major transformation led to four of the so-called “five dragons” – state agencies responsible for 
MLE – being consolidated into one superagency, the China Coast Guard (CCG) under the SOA, 
with “operational guidance” from the Ministry of Public Security.46 The plan detailed the CCG’s 
“main functions and duties” as the following: “conducting ocean development planning, 
implementing maritime rights defense and law enforcement, supervising and administering the 
use of sea areas and the protection of the marine environment.”47 This reform remains a work in 
progress, but has established a broad functional responsibility for MLE as well as an 
organizational structure from which it can expand into new missions as circumstances dictate. 
                                                
45 Liu Cigui 2013 
46 All of its vessels and personnel will eventually be armed, reflecting a concerted effort to integrate MLE into 
China’s broader security apparatus (author meeting with SOA officials, Beijing, September 2014). 
47 PRC National Party Congress 2013  
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The “reorganization” (重组) combined CMS, FLEC, the Border Patrol Force (under the People’s 
Armed Police), and the maritime anti-smuggling police (under the State Council’s General 
Administration of Customs), leaving only the Marine Safety Administration (under the Ministry 
of Transport) independent.48 This move reflects the judgment of Chinese senior leadership that 
the MLE system was dysfunctional and had, in the words of one State Councilor, “insufficient 
ability to safeguard maritime rights.”49 By consolidating the MLE forces under one 
administrative roof, implementation could be centralized and coordinated in response to 
changing dynamics in maritime disputes.50 Prior to the reorganization, a Chinese maritime policy 
and law specialist noted that “there are no clear cut functions for each agency; neither are there 
clear divisions between jurisdictional zones”51 in which each of the five agencies had 
responsibilities. Internal bureaucratic coordination was deemed necessary for the MLE forces to 
perform the essentially external political mission with which they are tasked: using domestic law 
enforcement instead of military force as an instrument of foreign policy less likely to trigger 
strong reactions from other states. The use of civilian “white hulls” rather than navy “grey hulls” 
is judged to allow China to “pursue its maritime interests through a less assertive way.”52  
Official documents spell out the coercive function of Chinese “white hulls” as part of their 
formal repertoire. The SOA’s annual Ocean Report in 2014 defines the transformed functional 
tasks of China’s consolidated MLE force along the following lines: 1) declaratory 
implementation (宣示性措施) – showing presence and announcing to foreign users that the 
                                                
48 Ibid. 
49 Ma 2013; see also International Crisis Group 2013, “Dangerous Waters” report. 
50 Goldstein 2010; Yu 2012; Yu 2013; Hong 2014, Martinson 2015 
51 Hong 2014: 613 
52 Hong 2014: 614. The less escalatory nature of MLE paramilitary forces is a commonly cited example of China’s 
“restraint” (克制) in pursuing its maritime claims, articulated on dozens of occasions in the author’s interviews and 
workshops in China throughout 2014-2015. 
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space in question is under Chinese jurisdiction; 2) carrying out orders (责令性措施) – or 
practically enforcing Chinese domestic laws concerning sea use; and 3) coercive measures (强制
性措施) – to include bumping vessels, water cannons, arrests of foreign fishermen, and a range 
of other tactics.53 The SOA relied on domestic legal authorization to resource and carry out these 
new missions, noting that “MLE’s legal basis is in the constitution, laws, administrative 
regulations, rules, and other ‘normalizing instruments,’ including UNCLOS and international 
agreements.”54  
These new functional roles were conceived and internalized into law with central policy 
priorities in mind. Practical implementation required centralized control to keep their activities 
within bounds dictated by foreign policy objectives. To this end, the State Council 
simultaneously founded a National Oceanic Commission (国家海洋委员会) designed to 
coordinate the complex work of the new CCG and the still-numerous administrative organs with 
maritime responsibilities. The Commission holds yet-undefined executive authority to streamline 
decision making, and presumably to oversee the broader project to “perfect” China’s maritime 
legal system. Yet its precise composition remains unknown, and no evidence of the organ’s 
activities is yet publically available.55  Even Chinese experts with access to personnel in the 
Party and bureaucracy acknowledge that this process remains totally opaque and the practical 
                                                
53 PRC State Oceanic Administration ODP 2014: 262; See also Martinson 2016 for an excellent review of various 
MLE tactics. 
54 Ibid.: 259-265 
55 Hong Nong, May 2014 presentation at NISCSS; Author interviews with CCG and SOA officials (Hainan and 
Beijing July-August 2014). 
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extent of the reforms remains unclear.56 Domestic law and regulation are the most reliable 
indication of the practical directions that senior party-state leaders intend to push China’s 
maritime practices. 
The reorganization demonstrates that PRC leaders recognize an opportunity to leverage the 
standardization and growing efficacy of legal institutions in China to better coordinate an unruly 
maritime apparatus such that it can directly serve political goals. The characteristic ambiguity of 
the regulatory process in play here gives free rein to political leaders to use the law as a 
rhetorical screen as they apply ad hoc discretion about how to achieve foreign policy aims to 
defend maritime rights and interests and secure disputed maritime space from competing claims. 
The changes wrought to maritime agencies in this period are powerful evidence of the potential 
for international law to influence the functions and capacities of domestic political-legal 
institutions. The set of rights and obligations in the EEZ created by UNCLOS defined and 
enabled the state functions now observed in a well-resourced Chinese MLE fleet carrying out 
ambitious and flexible new missions. 
III. Augmenting the Content of PRC Rights and Jurisdiction 
The prior two sections establish that the geographic scope of jurisdiction internalized into PRC 
law is broader than that prescribed in UNCLOS, as well as that formerly allotted in PRC law. In 
turn, the demand to enforce domestic law in the vast and contested new space of the EEZ 
entailed expansion of the scope of state responsibilities, demanding new functions for state 
                                                
56 Hong 2014; Yu 2013. In author meetings in the fall and winter of 2014-15, members of the reorganized agencies 
(specifically, the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, General Administration of Customs, and the SOA’s 
Maritime Surveillance Force) wore their old uniforms (not the CCG’s new blue uniforms) and explicitly identified 
themselves with their old organizations. They indicated that the reforms were “in process” but that many aspects of 
them were administratively and bureaucratically “inconvenient” or otherwise obstructed. 
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agencies to implement domestic law. We are left to explore some of the substance of the laws 
that these agencies are tasked with administering and enforcing. These are principally rights to 
resources and associated jurisdictional competencies. This section tracks PRC law and practice 
with respect to the resource rights and specific jurisdiction allocated in UNCLOS III.  
The pattern of indeterminacy in domestic law enables Chinese actors to steadily augment the 
content of those UNCLOS norms – observable most clearly in legislation, regulation and 
departmental rules that claim PRC jurisdiction over security and navigational issues well beyond 
the purely economic rights and jurisdiction granted under the treaty. There are also fairly 
determinate elements of UNCLOS that find their way more or less intact into PRC code; in these 
cases, the content is faithful to the underlying norm, but because claimed rights lie in geographic 
zones exceeding limits of the EEZ, the scope is broader than that prescribed in UNCLOS.  
Augmenting the Content of Resource Rights 
Among the central elements of closure are broad PRC claims to sovereign rights over resources 
and accompanying jurisdictional “creep” to maintain those rights. They are also probably the 
most tangible effects of China’s internalization and implementation of EEZ norms. Media often 
portray China’s maritime disputes as a competition over scarce resources.57 This interpretation is 
incomplete at best, given opportunity costs of pursuing relatively modest resources of the SCS 
and ECS.58 Contested property rights to the resources of the EEZ, however, are plainly 
implicated in much of the operational-level conflict among claimants and provide a ready 
rhetorical explanation for why states feel their claims must be pressed or relinquished. 
                                                
57 E.g. Fabinyi 2015, whose piece “China and the South China Sea Resource Grab” is representative of hundreds of 
newspaper and magazine articles citing resources as the basis for conflict. 
58 See Kardon 2013 for discussion of the insufficiency of resource explanations for the disputes.  
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Exploitation of non-renewable resources like oil and gas is a zero-sum economic arena. 
Perceptions that other states must, at minimum, be prevented from leasing, exploring and 
exploiting oil and gas blocks in disputed zones tend to drive policy decisions.59 In theory, 
fisheries are more susceptible to non-exclusive control (fishing vessels of many flags can exploit 
the same fish stocks in the same areas); but in practice, the exercise of fisheries jurisdiction has 
also led to significant tension among claimant states competing to exercise administrative control 
over disputed fishing grounds. Resource rights are among the central goals for which domestic 
legal claims and rules are established. 
Virtually all of the resource disputes concern waters that, were they delimited, would be EEZ. 
The EEZ’s most significant economic feature is the exclusive authority it grants to coastal states 
over the resources of the zone – most notably, fish, oil, gas and minerals. The treaty regime 
prescribes a set of specific “sovereign rights” in Article 56(1)a, allocating to the coastal state 
what amounts to property rights over all of the living and non-living resources in the EEZ. Those 
rights are “for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural 
resources” of the zone, which include rich fisheries (resources living in the “superjacent” 
waters), and the lucrative minerals and hydrocarbons of the seabed and subsoil.60 Other articles 
in Part V lay out obligations associated with these rights, prescribing norms for the conservation 
and utilization of living resources (Article 61 and 62, respectively), precise rules for management 
of different types of fish and marine mammals (Articles 63 – 68), and procedures for allocating 
some resources to geographically disadvantaged and land-locked states (Arts 69 – 72). There is 
                                                
59 For a good summary of energy policy issues in disputed maritime zones, see Schofield 2012. 
60 These latter seabed and subsoil resources are also defined and regulated under the continental shelf regime in Part 
VI. The EEZ, however, is the dominant regime: it is later in time and explicitly encompasses all of the continental 
shelf rights (Article 56(3) states that the EEZ regime “shall be exercised in accordance with Part VI”) as well as 
additional rights and jurisdiction concerning resources in the water column above the shelf. 
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little indeterminacy in the wording of the main article conferring sovereign rights, nor in the 
basic principle underlying the regime: the coastal state exercises sovereign rights over the 
resources of the zone, but does not enjoy full sovereignty over the territory. 
Beginning with a frequently amended 1986 Fisheries Law, PRC has internalized these resource 
rights norms more or less fully intact. High political priority has been placed on staking out 
claims to resource rights in internationally recognizable ways, lest the full scope and content of 
China’s sovereign rights be underestimated by other aspiring users of China’s claimed zones. An 
SOA researcher wrote in 1988 that China’s resources are “under threat” and that its legislators 
and administrators need to “pay attention to the seriousness of the situation, be farsighted, and 
actively strive for China’s rights over maritime zones” lest it receive rights only in one million 
km2 rather than three million km2 of maritime space.61 This scarcity argument is widespread in 
public commentary in China on the subject, and feeds a perception that China’s economic 
development is threatened by foreign states attempting to expropriate long-held Chinese 
resources. Popular media and official comments demonstrate little or no appreciation of the fact 
that the EEZ created these rights during the 1990s. This reality is not lost on more specialized 
Chinese officials and scholars, who recognize that UNCLOS “has expanded the maritime space 
under Chinese jurisdiction, and provides the legal basis for China to develop and exploit the 
abundant resources there.”62  
Accordingly, PRC domestic law stakes claims to all of the substantive rights – which after all 
include any physical object within the zone.63 The way in which PRC laws and regulations are 
                                                
61 Xu 1988: 18-20 
62 Liu Zhenhuan 1996 
63 With the exception of submarine cables and pipelines, which user states are permitted to lay due to international 
high seas freedoms that survive the Convention, articulated in Article 87. 
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constructed regarding resources, however, tends to conflate them with something approaching 
full territorial sovereignty over the entirety of the “blue territory” in which the resources reside.64 
Furthermore, in implementing these rules in disputed zones, China discounts UNCLOS 
provisions and general international law that suspend the allocation of the property rights to 
resources where there is no agreement over whose sovereign rights are valid. In doing so, the 
PRC’s internalization and implementation effectively replace international legal norms and 
procedures. They purport to manage a disputed zone with PRC law, in which the scope and 
content of Chinese resource rights remains indeterminate and capable of swift redefinition or 
adjustment to correspond to present policy demands. The indeterminacy in PRC code leverages 
narrower indeterminacy in the treaty, but is amplified beyond recognition by dint of PRC 
standards for legal drafting and preferences for flexible rules that enable discretion for policy-
makers.   
The EEZ is first and foremost a zone of economic resources, but due to disputes and unsettled 
boundaries, a large proportion of the rights to those resources remain unsettled. This has given 
rise in many states to laws and implementing procedures that aim to mobilize the private sector 
to “use it or lose it” – that is, explore, exploit, and protect resources whose ownership remains in 
dispute. Chinese officials and scholars emphasize the centrality of resources, noting that “the 
raison d’etre of the institution of the EEZ and the continental shelf involves the conservation and 
management of natural resources. In this sense, the EEZ and the continental shelf can be 
                                                
64 Invocation of a “blue economy” or “blue territory” is ubiquitous in Chinese public discourse, and even among 
those who are well-versed in the law of the sea and recognize that an EEZ confers substantially less authority to the 
state than territorial sovereignty. For example, the most senior judge in the PRC views the entire maritime legal 
system as designed to defend China’s “blue national soil.” (Zhou 2015) http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-
asia/china-wants-to-be-global-maritime-judicial-centre. It is also a consistent theme for state and party conferences, 
where it is used as a slogan to encapsulate a variety of economic development goals, e.g., a Hainan provincial forum 
on the “blue economy” (China Ocean News 2016, “推动蓝色经济由理念走向实践 [Pushing China’s Blue 
Economy from Concept to Practice]).  
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considered as a ‘resource-oriented zone.’”65 Although these resource rights are widely 
recognized as the principle reason for state control, Chinese officials treat these sovereign rights 
instrumentally, a means to the end of establishing sovereignty, “embodying” jurisdiction, and 
effecting closure in its claimed maritime zones. In the words of then-director of the SOA, Liu 
Cigui, the PRC’s domestic maritime legal scheme should “scientifically develop fisheries 
resources, rationally develop its oil and gas resources, and energetically develop its maritime 
tourism industry. By developing and using marine resources, China can manifest actual presence 
in the South China Sea and demonstrate its sovereignty over the islands and their adjacent 
waters.”66 The subsequent analysis focuses on fisheries and hydrocarbons as the main economic 
sectors in which sovereign rights prescribed in UNCLOS norms are transformed into an 
instrument of closure. 
Fisheries sector. The origins of the EEZ concept lie in the demands of weak states that sought to 
secure their own rights and limit access of strong states with distant-water fishing (DWF) fleets 
capable of exploiting resources up to the limits of weak states’ territorial seas.67 The nature of the 
underlying property rights are substantially different from those to non-living, “non-fugitive” 
resources like real estate or minerals, which are fixed at a particular geographic point. Many 
species of fish migrate from one jurisdiction to another, for example by spawning in one state’s 
river systems and growing to maturity in another state’s EEZ (as in the case of anadromous 
stocks, addressed in Article 66). In consequence, the effective assertion of this particular class of 
sovereign rights means regulating fishing activities, rather than the fish themselves. This 
                                                
65 Wu and Zheng 2007: 1 
66 China Ocean News 2012 
67 Koh 1988 offers a compelling and thorough account of the development of EEZ norms as a coastal state response 
exploitation of nearby fishing grounds by larger powers with distant water fishing fleets (he also cites emerging 
technologies as driving the emerging norms). Tommy Koh (no relation to Harold) was President of the UN 
Conference on the Law of the Sea during its later sessions, and authoritatively confirms that protecting fisheries for 
weak states was the primary intent and purpose of the regime during negotiations. 
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characteristic of living resources has meant that China’s assertion of control in this sector has 
manifested mostly in the form of fisheries law enforcement. PRC laws and regulations in this 
sector deal mainly with issues of usage rights; secondarily, they assign functional competencies 
to various agencies for managing and enforcing the lawful exercise of those rights. 
The internalization of UNCLOS norms in this sector continues to be a high priority, touching 
directly on politically salient issues of economic development and maritime disputes. By 
claiming an EEZ and exclusive rights to its living resources, China stakes out a claim to a scarce 
and valuable resource. China’s fishing industry is the world’s largest, as is its DWF fleet.68 The 
fisheries sector as a whole employs some fourteen million people, making it a substantial 
economic priority even absent maritime disputes.69 It is also a sector facing urgent challenges in 
the form of rapid industrialization and scaling up of fishing practices that puts pressure on the 
large number of small-scale fishing enterprises. This growing exploitation is also a cause of rapid 
depletion and, in many instances, total collapse of China’s coastal fisheries over the last several 
decades. Total catch in the SCS is now between 5% and 30% of levels in the 1950s due to 
overfishing and pollution,70 leading to high rates of unemployment in the sector, underutilization 
of the fishing fleet, and a corresponding push by commercial and private fishermen to expand the 
                                                
68 Shen and Heino 2014 
69 Marine industries, broadly defined, are thought to account for 10-12% of China’s GDP – see Greer 2016. NB – 
The 12th Five Year Plan set a target for maritime industries to account for fully 15% of GDP by 2020. Acquiring 
additional resources animates much overtly nationalist commentary about the extent of China’s sovereign rights to 
resources. In one clear example, a popular maritime specialist and author Zhang Shiping argues that “China must 
really have its share of maritime rights and interests...to solve its issues relating to large population, inadequate 
resources, limited job opportunities, and so on! However, ‘there is no savior’ for China in its attempt to go to the 
ocean and take back its share of maritime rigths and interests. We the Chinese people can only rely on ourselves! In 
order to protect maritime rights and interests of our own, we Chinese people should be ready to use all effective 
means. These are the freedom and rights of the Chinese people!” (Zhang 2009: 169). 
70 See Heileman 2008 for a thorough report on the large marine ecosystem of the SCS. Not only have fish stocks 
themselves suffered, but the ecosystems that support their reproduction are severely degraded from environmental 
damage other than overfishing. According to a PRC fisheries official in 2016, such activities have destroyed 80 per 
cent of the coral reefs and 73 per cent of the mangroves present in the 1970s (Li Jing 2016b). 
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space in which they exploit these diminishing resources.71 From an administrative standpoint, 
these abuses were also difficult to manage because the sector was highly decentralized, relying 
until recently on local agencies at the county level to determine and implement their own rules 
under minimal central supervision.72 The various regulations for licensing, fishing equipment, 
fishing vessels, conservation, and ecosystem protection tended to vary substantially across 
China’s coastal provinces.73  
With the advent of the 200nm EEZ, however, the state had to manage a radical expansion of the 
geographic scope in which those decentralized responsibilities were to be resourced and 
coordinated. The banner piece of national legislation in this sector is the 1986 Fisheries Law, 
which has been revised and amended at intervals as China’s fisheries management and 
administrative apparatus has matured.74 Its main amendment occurred in 2000, accommodating 
the 1998 EEZ Law by finally extending fisheries provisions to formally cover the EEZ as well as 
the unknown “other sea areas under PRC jurisdiction.” Despite the vagueness in the scope of 
China’s claimed rights, the “rational utilization” and “comprehensive management” of living 
resources have been principle administrative ambitions in this sector, ends widely acknowledged 
to require a better-organized legal regime for fisheries. Most of the internalization and 
implementation of China’s growing body of fisheries rules should be attributed to this rather 
mundane, technocratic objective. However, fishing has also been at the forefront of China’s 
maritime disputes, and the MLE fleet nominally tasked with regulating the fishing enterprise has 
been an instrument of asserting China’s claims to rights and jurisdiction in practice. 
                                                
71 Author interviews with fishing vessel owners and fishermen (Tanmen, PRC July 2014). See Mallory 2013 and 
Lebling 2013 for clear discussions of challenges to fisheries ecosystems in the SCS and ECS.  
72 Zou 2005; Xue 2004, 2008 
73 Author interview with Hainan province FLEC official (Haikou, July 2014). 
74 Major amendments occurred in 2000, 2004, and 2013, but implementing regulation and rules have been steadily 
revised at local levels since 1986; one search of PKU Law revealed over 2,135 instances of changes to local fishing 
regulations and measures (search performed by author 12 August 2015). 
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This alternative function for fisheries-related EEZ norms is most evident in the areas around the 
Spratly Islands in the southern part of the SCS. They are the site of the most hotly disputed 
fisheries, and their development has significant political implications well beyond their economic 
value. Then-director of China’s South Sea Fisheries Law Enforcement Command,Wu Zhuang, 
told his detachment of law enforcement officers that the “development of fisheries near the 
Spratly Islands involves questions of sovereignty over China’s Spratly Islands. Development 
equals presence, presence equals occupation, and occupation equals sovereignty.”75 However, no 
such development, presence or occupation were in effect until the mid-1980s, and all required 
major state efforts to initiate. Beginning in 1985, local authorities ordered fishermen in Hainan 
and Guangdong provinces to begin operating in the disputed waters around the Spratlys.76 By 
1988, China had seized several features in a small-scale naval conflict with Vietnam77 and 
established rudimentary facilities on a number of unoccupied features.78 The gradual push 
through the South China Sea to develop, occupy, and assert sovereignty – and thus closure – has 
been a comprehensive effort including the military, state and private sector, all enabled by 
gradually developed fisheries law and policy.  
Among these enabling legal instruments are the 1987 Regulations for the Implementation of the 
                                                
75 Xiang 2012. Wu Zhuang told a conference attended by the Author in Beijing in September 2014 that he conceives 
of China’s “blue colored land” for fishermen as equivalent to farmland for farmers. He is also quoted in a Chinese 
state television program saying that “where there’s water there’s fish, where there’s fish there’s fishermen, and 
where there are fishermen, there are FLEC” (China Central Television 2013). These statements plainly indicate the 
complementary nature of MLE functions and Chinese claims to resource rights. 
76 Author interview with fishermen in Tanmen township, a major hub for fishing in the SCS (Tanmen, PRC, July 
2014); this pattern was confirmed in discussions with SOA and FLEC officials in Beijing (September 2014). Only 
13 vessels operated there in 1985, but today there are over 1000 with regular presence in the area (Bai and Luo 
2011: 5). 
77 The PRC occupies 7 of 100+ Spratly features as of June 2016. See Fravel 2008: 287-296 and Garver 1992: 1008-
1013. 
78 Garver 1992: 1009. At least one of these, on Fiery Cross Reef, was the site of an “oceanic observation station” 
established by the SOA and the PLA Navy (PLAN) in 1988 on the basis of a UNESCO authorization to conduct a 
“comprehensive global oceanic survey,” a body China had lobbied vociferously to acknowledge its “indisputable 
sovereignty” in this area. 
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Fisheries Law of the PRC.79 These regulations deal with the “other sea areas under the 
jurisdiction of the PRC” ambiguity by defining them in similarly imprecise terms as “sea areas 
under the jurisdiction of the PRC in accordance with its laws and international treaties, 
agreements or other related international laws which it has concluded or to which it is a party.” 
This plausibly refers to long-standing bilateral fisheries agreements with Japan, Vietnam and 
South Korea, although none of these acknowledge the exclusive Chinese fishing rights described 
in the regulation. The document directs fisheries authorities at the provincial and municipal level 
to determine areas for enforcement of domestic law “through consultation” with the central 
government (Article 4) but otherwise authorizes their discretion in implementing the terms of the 
1986 Fisheries Law with “approval” by those same local-level departments. Article 41 notes that 
“the right to interpret these Regulations rests with the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal 
Husbandry and Fisheries.” Wide interpretive berths granted for administrative agencies are, of 
course, the preferred norm in China’s legislative and regulatory drafting, and allow the 
bureaucracy to adjust to policy that varies over space and time. 
Until the late 1990s, local agencies under the Ministry of Agriculture were empowered to “lay 
down implementation measures of national laws according to the circumstances of their 
respective administrative regions. The fisheries authorities at all levels draw up local measures 
and rules to strengthen fisheries management.”80 But beginning in 1998, after China had acceded 
to the treaty and enacted its EEZ Law, Beijing began to exercise considerably greater centralized 
guidance over fisheries matters. The “seasonal fishing bans” (伏季休渔) are the clearest top-
                                                
79 PRC State Oceanic Administration 2012: 573-583 
80 Xue 2004: 89 
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down measure in this vein, invoked first in the ECS and then in the SCS beginning 1999.81 These 
were promulgated by the Fisheries Department in the Ministry of Agriculture, and forbid most 
fishing activity in substantial areas of waters that remain in dispute during the summer months 
when fishing stocks are most vulnerable. Defined by evolving Fisheries Department measures 
each year, the substantive restrictions of these summer fishing moratoriums have become more 
specific regarding the particular gear and catch that are permitted, while their geographic scope 
has expanded.82  The enforcement of these bans against Chinese vessels has generally been 
judged inadequate.83 Still, the ban has led to repeated diplomatic protests from Vietnam and the 
Philippines, whose fishermen are periodically arrested by Chinese MLE forces while operating 
in disputed waters.84 Imposing and enforcing bans has been one of several ways in which 
nominal compliance with its obligations under UNCLOS (in this case, conservation of fish 
stocks) has allowed for gradual closure of maritime zones in which China claims exclusive 
authority.  
Other laws and regulations stipulate various mechanisms by which the state can control and 
administer its fishing industry, which on balance enable the steady expansion of Chinese fishing 
practices to disputed zones, some of them beyond 200nm from any Chinese-claimed territory. 
Various province-level regulations empower local fisheries bureaus to license fishermen to 
operate south of 12 degrees north latitude (that is, in the Spratly area) without defining the outer 
                                                
81 Notice of the Ministry of Agriculture on Implementing the New Closing Fishing System in Summer Season on 
East China Sea and Yellow Sea (Promulgated by Order No.6 [1998] of the Fishery Management & Fishing Port 
Superintendence Division under the Ministry of Agriculture on April 2, 1998) 
82 At present the ban in the SCS is above 12 degrees north latitude, and in the ECS between 35 degrees and 26’30 
degrees north latitude. See, for example, PRC Bureau of Fisheries 2009.  
83 Xue 2004: 127. Others argue that it is effective during the summer, but encourages overfishing during the periods 
before and after that wipe out any beneficial effects (Shen and Heino 2014: 269). 
84 E.g., Reuters 2015 
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limits of the zone.85 The laws and regulations establishing and administering property rights and 
usage rights in sea areas86 create a host of new functional tasks for MLE agencies, whose 
capacities have increased remarkably as a result of vastly expanded space and variety of 
responsibilities they now administer. Among the more substantial functional changes for fisheries 
law enforcement has been their close coordination with the fishing practices of local fishermen. 
Many PRC-flagged fishing boats are now equipped with satellite-linked phones to alert MLE 
vessels when they are in distress;87 in Hainan and Guangdong, they receive fuel subsidies and 
MLE escorts from the provincial government for operating around the Spratly Islands.88  
The much-publicized standoff between the PRC and the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal in 
2012 vividly  illustrates the implementation of Chinese rules claiming exclusive rights to 
fisheries resources. In this case, a group of Chinese fishermen were confronted by a Philippines 
military vessel for illegal fishing in the waters around the disputed shoal. Utilizing their satellite-
linked phones, Chinese fishing boats summoned several armed CMS cutters who prevented the 
arrest of the Chinese fishermen and engaged in a 2-month standoff with Philippine vessels, 
barring their access to the shoal. The area is now under effective Chinese control, closed to 
foreign fishing and navigation (and potentially the site of artificial island building in the near 
future). Even in the midst the standoff, the Director of the SOA lauded the patriotism of the 
fishermen and professionalism of the CMS operators for carrying out their “vital functional 
                                                
85 See, for example, the PRC Ministry of Agriculture 2015, Regulations for Managing Spratly Fisheries Production 
86 e.g., the 2001 Law of the PRC on the Administration of the Use of Sea Areas (and associated 2006 SOA 
Regulations on Management of the Right to the Use of Sea Areas and Regulations on the Method for Registration of 
the Right to Use Sea Areas), the 2007 PRC Property Law, and an estimated thousands of local regulations and rules 
for managing fisheries in a variety of zones. 
87 “China’s Beidou navigation system, its version of the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS), is being installed on 
many Chinese fishing boats. It allows users to send distress signals and reach relevant authorities on shore in the 
event of a maritime conflict. Since 2010, Hainan province has spent $12.5 million on fitting navigation systems, 
subsidizing up to 90 per cent of the installation costs.” (International Crisis Group 2012: 8) 
88 McDevitt 2016: 107; see also Ruwitch 2014 
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duties.”89 This “Scarborough Model” is still discussed reverentially in Chinese official and 
expert circles, constituting strong evidence for that community that effective control and 
protection of China’s resource rights can be achieved with the MLE forces, and without armed 
conflict or unacceptable diplomatic consequences.90 The extension of practical Chinese claims to 
fishing rights, in this instance as in others, contributed to a broad foreign policy objective to 
“proactively” defend China’s maritime rights and interests.91 
Hydrocarbon sector. A 1968 geophysical survey conducted by the international Committee for 
Coordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources in Asian Offshore Areas confirmed the 
presence of potentially large oil and gas resources in the South and East China Seas. 92 In light of 
this news, China and other East Asian states swiftly mobilized to expand and reinforce their 
resource claims. China has an especially acute interest in the resource potential of the region. As 
a net importer of foreign oil (since 1993), deeply reliant on shipments from the Middle East and 
Africa to meet overwhelming growth in domestic demand, Beijing is vulnerable to threats to its 
energy security. China’s leadership and energy sector therefore prioritize diversification of 
energy supply, and especially prize any domestically owned hydrocarbon resources that are less 
vulnerable to disruption.93 Estimates of recoverable resources issued by Chinese firms and 
analysts describe the SCS as a “second Persian Gulf,”94 though such views are considered within 
the industry to be wildly overstated.95 The likely value of resources within disputed areas is not 
                                                
89 China Oceans News 2012.  
90 Zhang Jie 2013: 28; Qin Hong 2012; Xu Fangqing 2012 
91 International Crisis Group 2014: 16, citing Xu Fangqing 2012 and Zhang 2013. 
92 The report claimed “a high probability…that the continental shelf between Taiwan and Japan may be one of the 
most prolific oil reservoirs in the world.” Cited in Gao and Wu 2005: 1 
93 See Downs 2004; Kennedy 2010; Kirshner and Cohen 2012; and Kardon 2013 for discussions of China’s energy 
security. 
94 See Li and Chen 2004: 8-11; for other examples, see Chen 2009 and Gong 2012. 
95 A U.S. Energy Information Agency special report on the South China Sea aggregates data from several industry 
sources and offers a mean assessment. Their February 2013 report leads with the caveat that “it is difficult to 
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pertinent to this analysis; rather the issue to be treated is how the advent of the EEZ underpins 
China’s claims to a substantial portion of these resources.  
China’s ambition to assert exclusive control over these resources, like that of other states, was 
enabled by an EEZ regime that dramatically expanded the scope of potential property rights to 
this vast zone. Importantly, the substantial estimated hydrocarbon resource base in the SCS is 
distributed primarily in the near-shore areas far beyond the extent of any 200nm zone extending 





                                                                                                                                                       
determine the amount of oil and natural gas in the South China Sea because of under-exploration and territorial 
disputes.” This disclaimer intact, the EIA estimates 11 billion barrels of oil (BBO) in reserves and 190 trillion cubic 
feet (Tcf) of natural gas reserves in the SCS. Compared to the much lower figure reported by the energy consultancy 
Wood Mackenzie (2.5 BBO of combined oil and gas), the EIA claims to present a figure “closer to a high-end 
estimate.” See U.S. Energy Information Agency 2013. 
96 The distribution of probable hydrocarbon resources in the SCS is based upon geological and seismic surveys,  
discussed in detail in Owen and Schofield 2012. 
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Disputed offshore islands in the Paracels, Spratlys and Diaoyu thus provide the only link 
between China’s EEZ entitlement and these lucrative resources, providing the only legal mode of 
acquiring sovereign rights to exploit them. Lacking any determinate domestic legal definition of 
the limits of Chinese jurisdiction, the PRC has internalized EEZ norms to legally establish 
exclusive resource rights to these potentially lucrative and politically desirable oil and gas 
reserves. In implementing its domestic rules as if there were uncontested PRC jurisdiction, China 
has launched only two significant efforts to develop oil and gas resources in disputed zones.97 
Instead of this riskier course of direct use of the disputed resources, in which foreign operational 
                                                
97 The first effort was a contract with the US energy firm Crestone in 1992 for WB-21 near the Spratlys; the second 
was the “Haiyang Shiyou 981” exploration operation near Triton island in the Paracels in spring and summer 2014, 
treated more extensively below. 
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and diplomatic protests might disrupt these time- and capital-intensive deep-water expeditions, 
the state has generally mounted diplomatic and operational campaigns to deny other coastal 
states access to this resource base.  
Until recently, PRC state-owned energy firms lacked capacity to independently conduct offshore 
oil exploration and production, relying exclusively on foreign investment and technical expertise 
for that purpose.98 The very first PRC sector opened to foreign investment was offshore oil, a 
reform initiated in the 1982 Regulations of the PRC on the Exploitation of Offshore Petroleum 
Resources in Cooperation With Foreign Enterprises.99 These regulations were enacted “on the 
premise of maintaining national sovereignty and economic interests” (Article 1) and, 
correspondingly, have been applied in areas whose jurisdiction is disputed due to undetermined 
sovereignty over offshore islands. Despite tendering bids from foreign firms to develop resources 
in disputed oil and gas blocks in the SCS and ECS, China has not successfully contracted or 
unilaterally produced hydrocarbons in disputed waters.100 Larger-scale PRC efforts at 
exploitation will likely follow on the development of sufficient MLE capacity to protect these 
operations in disputed zones. Chinese energy firms have already developed or acquired most if 
not all of the technological wherewithal to carry out exploration, production and transportation of 
hydrocarbon resources to market.  
Despite manifest interest and growing technical capacity, there remains no definition of 
“offshore oil and gas” in the Chinese law. The main domestic laws establishing PRC claims to 
                                                
98 Zou 2005: 133; interview with US Department of Energy official (Beijing, June 2014); interview with China 
National Offshore Oil Company engineer (Beijing, June 2014). 
99 PRC State Oceanic Administration, Dept. of Policy, Legislation and Planning 2012: 534-541 
100 The American firm Crestone signed a contract with the PRC in 1992, but ultimately terminated it due to 
opposition from Vietnam, which also claimed the block in question, called Wan Bei-21 (Zou 2006: 88). A Chinese-
owned deep water oil rig conducted exploration in another zone disputed with Vietnam in summer 2014 but has yet 
to return and produce any oil or gas as of Fall 2016. 
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sovereign rights over hydrocarbon resources are the 1986 Mineral Resources Law of the PRC 
(amended 1996), which is focused on land-based resources, but also defines the state’s property 
rights over resources in “all maritime areas under [PRC] jurisdiction.” With the 1998 EEZ Law, 
that definition now covered jurisdictional areas not only in the new 200nm EEZ, but presumably 
in areas where China claims other “historical” rights beyond the UNCLOS-defined entitlement 
(Article 14). The Mineral Resources Law offers only a blanket statement that “[m]ineral 
resources belong to the State. The rights of State ownership in mineral resources is exercised by 
the State Council” (Article 3). The “relevant state organ” charged with managing these rights 
within the State Council has changed substantially over the years since PRC ratification of the 
treaty, cycling through several bureaucratic bodies.101  
The relatively underdeveloped law and unstable bureaucracy in this sector has left intact most of 
CNOOC’s authority to act under the 1982 regulations cited above;102 oversight over whether 
those exploration and production activities occur in disputed zones exists largely within the 
unobserved realms of economic and foreign policy-making. This political overlay has led to a 
checkered implementation pattern of PRC interference with foreign hydrocarbon exploration in 
disputed areas (e.g., around the Reed Bank, where the Philippines leased a concession, and in the 
western portion of the Spratlys, where Vietnam has attempted to develop resources). Until recent 
years, the principle mode of protecting Chinese-claimed sovereign rights to these resources has 
been physical interdiction of seismic survey vessels operated by other claimant states in the 
                                                
101 Authority for managing offshore oil and gas was at first dominated by the state-owned offshore oil firm CNOOC, 
which was nominally responsible to the Ministry of Land and Resources and high-level planners in the State 
Development Planning Commission, which was later reorganized as a National Development and Reform 
Commission. Efforts to centralize administration of this sector began with establishment of a National Energy 
Bureau in 2003, later reconfigured as a National Energy Administration in 2008, then as a National Energy 
Commission established in 2010 (see Downs 2004, Kennedy 2010). 
102 Author interview with Peking University international political economy professor, (Beijing, June 2014). 
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SCS.103 In the ECS, China has proceeded with exploration and exploitation of the Chunxiao gas 
fields close to the provisional median line between Chinese and Japanese EEZ and continental 
shelf claims.104  Domestic law, in principle, allows the State Council to authorize use of resources 
within all sea areas under China’s claimed jurisdiction.  
Implementation of China’s laws proclaiming exclusive property rights to all resources under its 
undefined jurisdiction has been relatively conservative; the law’s indeterminacy permits agencies 
to use their discretion in making decisions that will have foreign policy implications. In 
consequence, commercial exploration and production has for the most part been limited to 
undisputed zones. No permanent Chinese offshore oil and gas exploitation platforms have been 
established in zones beyond its mainland territorial seas. The only instance in which the implied 
scope of China’s non-living resource claims has been fully implemented by the state was the 
HYSY-981 (海洋石油 981) episode of spring-summer 2014.105  
CNOOC has tendered foreign bids for rights in disputed zones at several junctures in the past, 
most recently in 2012;106 however, it was not until 2014 that CNOOC had sufficient technical 
capacity to conduct complex deep-water operations independently.107 In May of that year, 
CNOOC began exploratory drilling some 17nm south of the Paracel Islands, in an area that 
                                                
103 Fravel discusses the pattern of Chinese MLE interference with Vietnamese and Philippine seismic surveying 
efforts, including cable-cutting and diplomatic threats (Fravel 2011: 306-307). 
104 International Crisis Group 2013: 29; Fravel notes that there has not been much competition for resource rights in 
this area beyond diplomatic accusations because of the relative weakness of the resource base in the area, according 
to a US Geological Survey, World Petroleum Assessment 2000 (Fravel 2010: 158). 
105 Author was based in Hainan during this period and analysis below draws on a roundtable held at the National 
Institute for South China Sea Studies and a series of follow-up interviews with maritime law and policy specialists, 
energy experts, and MFA officials in June-July 2014. 
106 Xinhua 2012, “中海油公布南海招标区块 [CNOOC announced SCS blocks open for bids].” With the exception 
of Crestone in 1992, no foreign firm has leased blocks in disputed zones. 
107 This capacity was gained through foreign acquisitions, most prominently of the Canadian oil and gas firm, 
Nexen, in 2013. See Rocha 2013. 
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Vietnam and China each considers to lie within its EEZ. This first foray into disputed waters 
involved not only the new, $1 billion HYSY-981 deep-water rig and its auxiliary vessels, but 
over 100 government vessels to protect the operation from anticipated Vietnamese opposition, 
drawing capacity from both local and national MLE fleets.108 Bolstered by a perimeter of 
nominally private fishing vessels,109 these forces protected the rig for three months, clashing a 
reported 1,416 times with Vietnamese private and government vessels seeking to disrupt the 
operation.110 This particular escort (护航) mission was substantially scaled up from normal MLE 
operations and required a far greater level of coordination among the various agencies. It is an 
important illustration of the relationship between internalization and implementation, showing 
that MLE practice will follow capacity to actually enforce domestic laws assigning China 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction within disputed zones of the ECS and SCS.  
“Other rights and duties provided for in this Convention” 
In addition to the sovereign rights to resources detailed in UNCLOS Article 56(1)a, the 
Convention provides for “other rights and duties” in the EEZ in Article 56(1)c. There are 
manifold possible interpretations of what this provision means,111 generating indeterminacy that 
has been exploited in China’s more expansive conception of its rights within and beyond the 
EEZ. The language itself does not appear in Chinese code, but has been treated extensively in the 
                                                
108 Martinson 2016: 201 
109 Author interview with Chinese maritime energy expert (Haikou, June 2014). 
110 One Vietnamese vessel was reportedly sunk by Chinese MLE “bumping;” as part of a conference, the author 
visited the damaged vessel in a shipyard in Danang, Vietnam in June 2016 with a large media contingent and heard 
remarks from the captain of the vessel then discussed the incident with Vietnamese fishermen and local officials. 
111 See Tanaka 2012: 131 for discussion on this article. 
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scholarly arena and in academic curricula.112 Undergraduate and graduate students specializing 
in maritime law, of which there are growing numbers, learn in Chinese law schools that a class 
of  “surplus” or “residual” rights (剩余权利) and “vested interests” (既得利益) must be read into 
the EEZ regime.113 These are unspecified rights and interests that the Chinese law of the sea 
community believes to have survived the codification of the new EEZ in UNCLOS III – 
especially those rights with supposedly “historical” character. Chinese legal experts argue that 
the indeterminacy of the Convention allows substantial interpretive leeway to coastal states in 
determining their own zonal entitlements: “[t]he systems of archipelagic waters, exclusive 
economic zone and continental shelf provided for by the Convention allow states to extend their 
sovereignty or sovereign rights to wider sea areas.”114 These rights do not need to be specified in 
any legal source, but may remain “tacit” or “latent” in the practice of states.115 
These rights and interests are not positively created by the law of the sea, but in the Chinese view, 
neither are they explicitly foreclosed by it. The prevailing Chinese understanding of a mutable, 
indeterminate international law accommodates evolution and adjustment according to political 
realities (i.e., China’s maritime interests) and can produce new rights to match changing 
circumstances.116 In the words of a leading UNCLOS scholar at the East China University of 
Politics and Law, “the Convention has left ample room and space for an adjustment process of 
                                                
112 The author spent several months auditing Chinese law of the sea classes at Tsinghua University and enjoyed an 
entire class on this subject; law of the sea syllabi from Peking University and Dalian Oceans University also devote 
a lecture to the subject and assign some of the readings cited below. 
113 For detailed and influential exposition of this thesis, see Zhao 2004. It is now a standard assumption in LOS 
scholarship in the PRC, e.g., Wei 2014, Ge et al 2015. The subject is frequently discussed as settled law, both in 
journals and academic conferences (based on author attendance in several university seminars, interviews with 
UNCLOS scholars). The concept is also commonly explored in Ph.D. dissertations. There are over 200 mentions of 
“residual rights” or “vested interests” in Ph.D. thesis abstracts, based on author’s CNKI Dissertation database search 
(14 Aug 2014). 
114 Zhao 2004: 147 
115 Gu et al 2015: 81 
116 Author interviews with law professors and maritime law experts in Beijing, Hainan, and Taipei (April 2014 – 
April 2015). 
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enlarging jurisdiction of the coastal states and reducing the freedom of high sea, largely due to 
residual rights contained in maritime law. Especially in the new area of the EEZ, the allotment of 
coastal state sovereign rights, exclusive jurisdiction, the freedom of high seas, and other states’ 
user rights is not very clear.”117 Another Chinese scholar argues that it is unwise to take such 
interpretive liberties with the Convention, but rather that specified sovereign rights can be 
broadened by building a domestic legal regime that facilitates expanded practical use of 
resources and maritime space. Sovereign rights in the convention “should be converted into 
management rights under domestic law, rights that are not equivalent to full sovereignty. How to 
administer these international waters and expand our usage rights is the key consideration for our 
country.”118 Whatever the formulation, the prevailing view is that rights created in international 
law do not foreclose domestic laws that read in augmentations of their content. 
These and other views are expressed in a growing body of Chinese work on the question of 
which rights exist in EEZs, and influence the vague legislation and regulations on PRC resource 
rights. An authoritative UNCLOS arbitration determined that the Convention cannot 
accommodate a “historic rights” claim on the basis of the U-shaped line claim.119 However, the 
extent to which surplus or residual rights not named in UNCLOS can exist in practice is now 
being tested by China’s assertion of these “other” rights, in the form of a historically-based claim 
to some type of resource rights that exist within its EEZ – as well as the EEZs of other states.  
A historical basis for maritime sovereign rights? The U-Shaped Line 
The discussion of “other” sovereign rights implies that the EEZ regime does not provide an 
                                                
117 Zhou 2004: 174 
118 Ge 2002 
119 This arbitration is the subject of an extension of this study, discussed in the Conclusion. 
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exhaustive account of the more broadly conceived maritime “rights” China attaches to its 
maritime interests. Although UNCLOS III is widely read to extinguish any other sovereign’s 
rights to resources in a coastal state’s EEZ, PRC law and practice demonstrate a claim to some 
kind of “historical” rights to resources within other states’ EEZs. These putative rights are most 
vividly expressed in a now-infamous map, the U-shaped or 9-dashed line (U-型线 or 九段线). 
Although maps do not, in themselves, constitute evidence of sovereignty or jurisdiction,120 the 
map is the most visible manifestation of a claim with other content found in indeterminate 
domestic law, frequent if unclear diplomatic protests, and a growing body of practice in using 
resources and space well beyond the scope of UNCLOS-based sovereign rights.121  
These rights are codified in only one national-level piece of legislation referencing the 
“historical” character of China’s resource rights, the 1998 EEZ Law. In Article 14, that law 
pronounces that the EEZ law itself “does not influence the historical rights enjoyed by the PRC” 
(不影响…享有的历史性权利). This “historical rights” term does not appear in other legal 
instruments, but it is a critical component of leaders’ characterizations of the claim. Discussing 
drafts of the EEZ law in 1996, Politburo Standing Committee member and State Premier Li Peng 
noted that these “historical” rights are an essential part of the undefined “maritime rights and 
interests” that the law is designed to “defend.”122 Earlier that year, the NPC Chairman Li 
Zhaoxing (also a Politburo member and later Foreign Minister) linked the existence of these 
                                                
120 Franckx and Benatar 2012: 90 
121 This study does not attempt adjudicate the legality of a PRC claim to some kind of historical rights within the U-
shaped line; for our purposes, the relevant qualities are the indeterminacy of the claim itself and the development of 
a domestic legal scheme that does not clarify its intended meaning. The deliberate vagueness of the claim enables 
continuous adjustment of its intended meaning through practice. The map and associated practice amount to a claim 
that Chinese rights are not exhaustively defined by the Convention.  
122 Xinhua (24 December 1996) quotes Premier Li Peng on the EEZ Law: “the draft law was aimed to guarantee the 
exercise of China's sovereignty and jurisdiction over its EEZs and continental shelf, and safeguard its maritime 
rights and interests.” 
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rights to the traditional fishing practices of the PRC, and announced that there was no conflict 
with UNCLOS because it “contains special regulations on historic waters.” Li referenced the 
now-infamous “nine dotted lines which have long been marked and delineated in the Chinese 
map of the South China Sea.”123 The legal justification for this claim has far lagged the political 
commitment to maintaining it, but the thrust of that legal argument is that international law 
beyond UNCLOS furnishes “an ample legal and historical basis” for China’s rights within the U-
shaped line. All that is required is a “proper interpretation” – that is, one based on Chinese 
attitudes toward international law and interests in controlling vital SCS waters.124 
China’s attempted enhancement of its rights in the EEZ is best captured by this “9-dashed line.” 
The map manifesting this claim was originally produced for internal use by the Republic of 
China (ROC) Interior Ministry in 1947, then published in a commercial atlas in 1948.125 That 
map consisted of eleven dashed and dotted lines126 circumscribing most of the water space of the 
SCS. No official pronouncement accompanied it at the time of initial publication, nor when the 










                                                
123 Li 1996: 278-279, cited in Song and Zou 2000: 332 
124 Quote from the former Director of the MFA’s Department of Treaty and Law, who further explained that the 
claim is a “complex legacy of the Republic of China” that his agency must deal with as best they can despite its 
ambiguity (discussion with author at NYU Law School, October 2013). 
125 Gao and Jia 2013: 103 
126 Two lines were removed in 1953 by bilateral agreement with Vietnam, followed by China’s relinquishment of its 
claim to White Dragon Tail Island (⽩白⻰龙尾岛) to North Vietnam (Fravel 2008: 268-269). 
127 PRC Permanent Mission of the UN 2009. 
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Map 4: China’s U-Shaped Line as Submitted to the UN in 2009
 
(Source: PRC Permanent Mission to the UN 2009) 
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Much analysis of the claim represented in the map has succeeded, at a minimum, in confirming 
that its legal meaning is intentionally unclear.128 Pressed to clarify, PRC officials have not been 
willing to offer any positive account of the substantive rights or functional jurisdiction depicted 
by the line. They have only asserted that it, at a minimum, composes part of China’s historical 
evidence of sovereignty over the features within the lines and that some type of traditional or 
historic Chinese rights to resources exists within it.129  
The map and associated practices lay out a highly controversial position that has generated 
substantial diplomatic fallout and growing foreign media scrutiny. Foreign law of the sea 
scholars insist that the treaty was designed to create uniform rights for all states, and cannot 
accommodate historical claims of this nature and scope.130 The EEZ regime, in particular, is 
generally considered to have extinguished all manner of “historical” rights in areas that were 
formerly high seas, assigning resource rights and jurisdiction to the coastal state, and denying 
exclusive rights to traditional users. 
Lacking any official government statements other than the inclusion of the map in its note to the 
UN and its now-mandatory use in official maps and PRC passports, the most authoritative 
Chinese brief on the subject to date was written by distinguished members of China’s law of the 
sea scholarly community. This widely-cited piece was published in 2013, co-authored by a 
sitting PRC judge on the UNCLOS arbitral body (the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea, or ITLOS), Gao Zhiguo. Gao also serves as an official in the SOA, and wrote the article in 
                                                
128 For discussion of this issue of maintaining vs. expanding claims, see Benatar and Franckx 2012; Li and Li 2003; 
Miyoshi 2012; and Thang 2012.  
129 The author met several times with officials from the SOA and MFA in the period between 2012 and 2016, none 
of whom was willing to offer a positive account of which specific historical rights are claimed. Increasingly, 
Chinese officials are referring to “traditional fishing rights” as the principle rights claimed in other states’ EEZs, but 
there has not yet been an official declaration, act of policy, nor legislative confirmation of this.  
130 See, for example, Kraska 2011; Dupuy and Dupuy 2013 
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the American Journal of International Law along with a Tsinghua Law School professor, Jia 
Bingbing. Both have substantial training and experience in Western international legal circles.131 
They argue that China’s claim is based in customary international law, which “supplements what 
is provided for under UNCLOS.”132 Its “legal purpose and status” is to confirm China’s 
sovereignty over the features within the line and to claim – not simply the rights and jurisdiction 
to which it is entitled under UNCLOS, but also undefined other rights that predate the 
Convention and that therefore cannot be extinguished by the new law of the sea.133 They do not 
attempt to establish the factual basis of China’s effective control over the resources, only that 
there is a colorable legal claim that sovereign rights to those resources exist independent of 
UNCLOS.134 
Chinese scholars like Gao and Jia work backwards from the fact of the 9-dashed line, claiming 
that the map means that some kind of historical rights must exist. PRC policy and practice are 
already in place, and PRC scholars and officials must therefore develop a legal justification. 
Despite their heroic efforts, the map confounds legal analysis in a variety of ways. The purported 
historical rights denoted in the map are nowhere specified in PRC law or policy – nor even fixed 
at any particular geographic location, contravening unequivocal mandates to make precise claims 
contained in UNCLOS Articles 16(2), 47(9), 75(2), 76(9) and 84(2).135 Specific latitudes and 
                                                
131 Jia Bingbing holds a D.Phil in international law from Oxford and worked as a legal officer in the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia. Gao Zhiguo holds law degrees from American and Canadian Universities, and 
has been a part of ITLOS and other international legal organizations for several decades. 
132 Gao and Jia 2013: 99 
133 One of their claims, widely shared by Chinese commentators, is that the rights survive the Convention because of 
a doctrine of “intertemporal law” which argues that the law contemporary to the claim should be applied to 
assessing its validity 
134 The authors conclude that “[w]hile UNCLOS is a comprehensive instrument of law, it was never intended, even 
at the time of its adoption, to exhaust international law. On the contrary, it has provided ample room for customary 
law to develop and to fill in the gaps that the Convention itself was unable to fill in 1982 – due to the inherent 
limitations of a multilateral process of drawn-out negotiations” (Gao and Jia 2013: 123). 
135 Article 74(2) states that “the outer limit lines of the exclusive economic zone and the lines of delimitation drawn 
in accordance with article 74 shall be shown on charts of a scale or scales adequate for ascertaining their position. 
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longitudes are the minimum required in customary norms of delimitation. Neither the crude map 
itself nor any Chinese official document presents any geographical information about the 
locations of the lines, dots and dashes on the map.136 The markings are not connected by any 
boundary line, offering no indication of how or whether the spaces in between them are to be 
understood. Even those lines, dots and dashes have been rendered in a variety of ways and in a 
variety of locations in different Chinese official and semi-official maps.137  
The 9-dashed line claim represents China’s most dramatic and large-scale transformation of the 
international norms underpinning the EEZ. It manifests the typical elements of expanded scope 
and augmented content, and represents an extreme in the Chinese tendency to construct legal 
claims to maximize flexibility at the expense of determinacy. In this case, the claim is based in 
part on norms that could not possibly derive from the EEZ itself. A US State Department study 
from 2014 notes that the map, as presented, plainly exceeds any possible entitlements based 
solely upon the EEZ regime: “all or part of dashes [2, 3 and 8] are also beyond 200 nm from any 
Chinese-claimed land feature. The dashed line therefore cannot represent the seaward limit of 
China’s EEZ” (see Map 5 below).138 Whatever the legal or historical bases for asserting such a 
broad and indeterminate claim, there is no doubt that this map and China’s practice within it 
departs substantially from norms prescribed by the EEZ regime. 139 
                                                                                                                                                       
Where appropriate, lists of geographical coordinates of points, specifying the geodetic datum, may be substituted for 
such outer limit lines or lines of delimitation” (UNCLOS III, Article 75.1) 
136 The Chinese law of the sea community periodically voices support for some clarification of the claims, though 
without directly assaulting the validity of the map. Some encourage marginal clarifications on the basis of non-
UNCLOS obligations, e.g., Zheng 2013: “China is a member of the International Hydrographic Organization [IHO] 
but did not follow the cartographic standards of this organization for international maritime boundaries in terms of 
territorial seas, contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, continental shelves, and fishing areas.” 
137 U.S. Department of State 2014: 5-7 
138 Ibid., 15 
139 The existence of “historic rights” (as well as “historic title,” “historic waters,” and “historic bays” is a possibility 
under customary law and perhaps also in the Convention (bays and titles at a minimum). China has not explicitly 
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Map 5: Comparison of 1947 and 2009 U-shaped line maps
  
(Source: State Dept. Office of the Geographer 2014: 6)   
                                                                                                                                                       
claimed rights under this customary regime, nor has any claim of this magnitude and boldness been tested in 
international courts or been negotiated bilaterally. This question may be addressed directly in the final award of a 
pending arbitration between China and the Philippines on this question (Republic of Philippines v. People’s 
Republic of China, Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2013). [The case is ongoing and will be treated in a 
supplementary chapter after defense.) Case information is available at: https://www.pcacases.com/web/view/7] 
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The enactment of Hainan provincial fisheries measures in 2013140 vividly illustrates this 
phenomenon of extending the scope in which China claims sovereign rights and augmenting the 
content of those rights on the basis of undisclosed “historical” factors. The Hainan provincial 
legislature’s measures are intended to implement amended rules from the Fisheries Law, and 
state that those rules apply within the 2 million km2 of maritime space under Hainan’s 
jurisdiction. Neither the measures nor any other official normative document delimits that space, 
stating only its surface area. Only a partial account of the northern and eastern limits of Hainan’s 
provincial jurisdiction is defined – and then, only in the relatively obscure 12th Five Year Plan of 
the Hainan Province Maritime Safety Administration (see Map 6 below).  
Given that the proposed two million km2 volume of water space is substantially greater than any 
calculation of EEZs,141 relevant agencies appear to be tasked with enforcement of PRC fisheries 
laws within the (undefined) U-shaped line, thus claiming fisheries rights that extend well beyond 
the scope allotted under UNCLOS.142 The map and associated measures vividly demonstrate the 
indeterminacy that enables that scope to be enlarged or modulated according to the discretion of 
the local agents of PRC law. They are drafted with obvious disregard for the need to delimit or 
otherwise define the outer boundaries of those rights, and neglect to place any specific 
constraints the state’s jurisdiction to administer Chinese activities pursuant to those rights. 
 
 
                                                
140 Hainan Provinces adopted implementing measures for the revised 2013 PRC Fisheries Law, called simply 
“measures” (办法) and available at http://www.hinews.cn/news/system/2013/12/07/016278991.shtml 
141 The PRC has not specified its EEZ claims, which would necessarily be provisional due to the existence of 
maritime boundary delimitation disputes in the East and South China Seas. Nonetheless, even hypothetically 
extending EEZs from all Chinese-claimed features, the zone created would be substantially less than two million 
km2. See Beckman and Schofield 2014 for a creative approach to EEZ entitlements in the SCS. 
142 Subsequent sections explore the likely scope and content of China’s claimed rights in those “other sea areas” in 
the context of China’s “U-shaped” line. 
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Map 6: Hainan’s Partial Northern and Eastern Jurisdictional Limit 
 
(Source: Hainan Maritime Safety Administration 2011) 
Chinese diplomats now partially specify the U-shaped line as a claim denoting, at a minimum, 
Chinese “traditional fishing grounds.”143 As Chinese fishing vessels operate further into the 
southern reaches of the SCS, they have come into increasing conflict with foreign MLE forces – 
notably, those of the Indonesian coast guard and navy in the area around the Natuna islands in 
the far southwest of the SCS. This area, unlike most of the rest of the SCS, lies beyond 200nm 
from any Spratly feature and is therefore the best geographic space to isolate the question of 
what, if any, historic rights the U-shaped line entails. China’s fishing activities in this area make 
                                                
143 See, for example, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016b; PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016c. 
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clear that it claims at least non-exclusive rights to living resources, a practice that has led to a 
Philippine decision to ramp up its enforcement and even confront Chinese MLE forces.144  
The implicit specification of at least one type of rights indicated by the U-shaped line claim – 
that of “traditional” fishing rights – is a foreign policy decision enabled by a domestic legal 
regime sufficiently indeterminate that changes to the scope and content of claimed rights may be 
adjusted to suit circumstances. Because the PRC’s domestic code does not prescribe UNCLOS 
III as the sole basis for arrogating maritime rights, there is considerable scope in practice for 
political elites to evoke non-UNCLOS but nominally legal justifications (like “traditional” 
rights) in support of policies that radically expand the scope and content of regime norms. 
Specific jurisdiction for the coastal state 
Alongside creating the new category of sovereign rights to resources, the other main component 
of the EEZ regime grants new modes of jurisdiction to the coastal state. These are intended as 
limited jurisdictional competencies, covering only specific activities in that zone: “(i) the 
establishment and use of artificial islands, installations, and structures; (ii) marine scientific 
research; and (iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment” (Article 56(1)b).145 
                                                
144 Otto 2016; Cochrane 2016 
145 Environmental protection is beyond the scope of this study. Alongside fishing, it is probably the most fully 
developed regime in UNCLOS III, and the most constraining set of international norms prescribed in it. It is the only 
EEZ jurisdictional field that does not so much enable new activities as create obligations. These duties to avoid 
pollution and other negative externalities arising from exploitation of marine resources place environmental 
protection norms into direct tension with economic development. The Convention defines “pollution of the marine 
environment” in Article 1(1)[4] as “the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the 
marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to 
living resources and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other 
legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities.” The proscriptions 
on activities producing pollution come both in the form of a “general obligation” to “protect and preserve the marine 
environment” (Article 192) and as a set of specific obligations for coastal states within their jurisdictional zones, 
who are authorized to take “all measures consistent with this Convention that are necessary to prevent, reduce and 
control pollution of the marine environment from any source, using for this purpose the best practicable means at 
their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities” (Article 194).    
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Rather than allocating property rights, these provisions assign competence to the state to both 
prescribe and enforce its domestic law on those defined activities.146 China’s internalization of 
these rules exploits indeterminacy in the EEZ regime to assign itself broader and deeper 
jurisdictional authority over those three classes of issues, even adding an additional “security” 
component to its claimed jurisdiction. In practice, PRC implementation of those rules has further 
augmented the content and scope of those codified provisions of domestic law, promoting a 
“creeping” effect whereby a limited source of jurisdiction becomes a writ for broader exercise of 
another related jurisdiction. 
Artificial islands. In 18 months from 2014 to 2016, China reclaimed some 3,200 acres of land in 
the SCS with tacit authorization from domestic laws and regulations. Practically, it did so in 
large part by building artificial islands: dredging up sand, coral and sediment to cover a variety 
of small or submerged features, then constructing airstrips, ports, radar arrays, and other facilities 
over seven rocks, reefs and/or submerged features in the Spratly Islands.147 The justification for 
this practice, in both Chinese and international law, rests upon lawful exercise of EEZ 
jurisdiction. Specifically, within its EEZ the coastal state has exclusive authority to build and 
maintain such facilities (which, typically, would be oil rigs, lighthouses, or scientific research 
equipment). Although these artificial islands now support infrastructure for military and 
intelligence activities, China’s foreign ministry announced that “[t]he main purpose of China’s 
construction activities is to meet various civilian demands and better perform China’s 
                                                
146 Jurisdiction under international law is typically broken down into “jurisdiction to prescribe,” which is the state’s 
competence to promulgate law applicable to specified persons or activities (also called “legislative jurisdiction”); a 
second type “jurisdiction to enforce,” referring to a state’s authority to use judicial, executive, administrative, or 
police action to compel compliance with its law. (Dunoff, Ratner and Wippman 2006: 355-6). 
147 U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense 2016: i. Major news outlets have published a large number of reports on 
this subject, for example, Page and Barnes 2015; Watkins 2016. The “Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative” has 
dozens of more specialized articles on this process, as well as a helpful, updated multimedia presentation on the 
characteristics of each of the artificially-enhanced features: http://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/ 
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international obligations and responsibilities in the areas such as maritime search and rescue, 
disaster prevention and mitigation, marine scientific research, meteorological observation, 
ecological environment conservation, navigation safety as well as fishery production service.”148 
Even if these are not the intended functions of the infrastructure, the claim to jurisdiction over 
those legitimate activities enables China to build military capacity in disputed EEZs. Chinese 
experts and officials emphatically claim that these activities are undertaken “within its 
sovereignty [sic],” although the plausible legal basis for the claim is jurisdiction over artificial 
islands in the EEZ.  
If the PRC’s EEZ jurisdiction in this area were indeed established and recognized by other 
claimants, those named functions would be lawful. However, because each of the features in 
question is the subject of a sovereignty dispute, and the zones in which the building took place 
are plausibly EEZs and territorial seas of other states, PRC jurisdiction is not established as a 
factual or legal matter.149 Pending agreement among the disputants on whose jurisdiction is 
legitimately exercised in Spratly area, UNCLOS Article 74(3) instructs that “the States 
concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into 
provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to 
jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without 
prejudice to the final delimitation.” Although Article 74(2) does prescribe use of the 
Convention’s Part XV dispute resolution procedures, these and other black letters of the 
Convention in no way provide a determinate solution to the problem of contested jurisdiction. 
                                                
148 PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015  
149 Some argue that because the PRC has not delimited territorial seas, EEZs, or continental shelf in the areas of 
construction that would “perfect” their claim, they are also forbidden from exercising jurisdiction as though those 
entitlements existed. (Author interviews with Pentagon officials, July 2015). 
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China’s “solution” to date has been to presume its own jurisdiction, and implement its own laws 
on artificial islands in the disputed zones. China’s domestic rules instruct its administrative and 
law enforcement agencies to operate as though that jurisdiction were uncontested, in the process 
seizing effective control of the features and their surrounding waters.150 Each of the activities 
listed by the MFA spokesperson is among the specific jurisdictional competencies allocated to 
coastal states in their EEZs. That list enumerates the various tasks and responsibilities 
concerning artificial islands assigned to administrative agencies in legislation and specified in 
various regulations and rules. The major piece of national legislation on the subject, the 2009 
Island Protection Law (passed not long before major construction activities in the Spratlys began) 
begins with a call to “protect the ecosystems of islands and their surrounding waters, rationally 
develop and exploit the natural resources of the islands, protect the maritime rights and interests 
of the state, and promote sustainable economic and social development” (Island Protection Law, 
Article 1).151 Excepting the typical, non-specific “rights and interests” and “economic and social 
development,” these are the basic authorities UNCLOS grants to coastal states in their EEZ. The 
SOA and other agencies and commissions given responsibility through this rule now enjoy new 
functional responsibilities related to these artificial installations that rely on UNCLOS norms.152 
Subsequent departmental notices issued by the SOA cite this as the authorizing legislation for a 
variety of activities – from island naming, to development and construction of off-shore wind 
power facilities, to registration, examination and application procedures for usage rights, to 
                                                
150 The US Department of Defense 2016 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving 
the PRC states that “although artificial islands do not provide China with any additional territorial or maritime rights 
within the SCS, China will be able to use its reclaimed features as persistent civil-military bases to enhance its 
presence in the SCS significantly and enhance China’s ability to control the features and nearby maritime space” 
(Department of Defense 2016: 7). 
151 Full text available at: http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=7851&CGid=  
152 A Japanese law of the sea expert argues that the 2009 law and associated regulations “have undeniably led to 
expansion of the interests of the [state] organs involved” (Takeda 2014: 16). 
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central budgetary allocations to commission environmental protection of islands and surrounding 
waters.153 Although PRC jurisdiction over the islands was not yet established in practice during 
this preliminary period of internalization, the functional responsibilities of the agencies 
concerned were laid out in domestic law. The implementing rules treat those norms as applicable 
to maritime space in which there is in fact a dispute over which coastal state lawfully exercises 
jurisdiction. 
Although marked by characteristically vague drafting and political sloganeering, these domestic 
rules do not adjust the scope or content of the EEZ norms prescribed in UNCLOS. Instead, the 
PRC’s domestic law provides the justification for the action itself, and asserts maximal coastal 
state authority to the EEZ by ignoring another part of the regime, namely Part VIII, the “regime 
of islands.” In asserting EEZ jurisdiction over island construction, the PRC treats all of its 
claimed features (all of which are disputed) – including artificial features – as though they were 
entitled to full-fledged island status, either singly or as a group. If there were uncontested PRC 
sovereignty over each of the features, and if one or more of the 140 islets, rocks, reefs, shoals, 
and sandbanks distributed over more than 410,000 km2 in the south-eastern quadrant of the SCS 
were sufficient to meet the legal definition of an island, then the PRC would have clear-cut 
jurisdiction to build artificial islands within the EEZ.  
                                                
153 Documents retrieved from PKU Law (en.pkulaw.cn) on 5 April 2015: Notice of the SOA on Issuing the 
Measures for the Administration of Names of Islands (28 June 2010); Notice of the SOA on Issuing the Trial 
Measures for the Examination and Approval of the Application for Use of Uninhabited Islands (20 April 2011); 
Notice of the SOA on Issuing the Measures for the Registration of the Right to Use an Uninhabited Island;  Notice 
of the Ministry of Finance and the SOA on Issuing the Measures for the Administration of the Use of Funds of the 
Central Treasury for the Protection of Islands and Sea Areas (2 June 2015). 
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At present, it is unclear whether any of the Spratly features is properly regarded as an island 
entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf.154 Under UNCLOS Article 121(1), an island “is a 
naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.” The 
critical yet vague Article 121(3) goes on to qualify that island category by designating an inferior 
type of island, “rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall 
have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.” Such rocks, however, do enjoy 12nm 
territorial seas and 24nm contiguous zones. Islands and rocks are the only features that rate zones 
which grant sovereign rights and jurisdiction. “Low-tide elevations” (LTEs) are also naturally 
formed areas of land, but which are “surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged 
at high tide” (Article 13). If they are located within the territorial sea, low water marks around 
LTEs may be used to bump out a coastal state’s baselines. They may be used as basepoints for 
straight baselines only where “lighthouses or similar installations which are permanently above 
sea level have been built on them” (Article 7.4). Where necessary, coastal states may establish a 
maximum 500 meter safety zone around such artificial islands and installations (Article 60[4]). A 
final category of feature that is unnamed in the convention, and therefore not capable of 
generating any zones, is a totally submerged, even at low tide. Reefs, atolls, and other submerged 
features on the seabed may influence navigation, but may not be used as the basis for sovereignty, 
sovereign rights or jurisdiction under the law of the sea. Such features, if they lie within a coastal 
state’s EEZ or continental shelf, are legally part of that state’s seabed.  
As many as four of the seven features upon which the PRC has built are either LTEs or entirely 
submerged features. No final determination has been made as to whether the other three features 
                                                
154 The UNCLOS arbitration between the Philippines and the PRC determined that none of the features is properly 
classified as an island under this article. The PRC’s response to this award, however, leaves open the possibility that 
some extended jurisdiction will in fact be implemented in this zone – a subject for the extension of this study in 
future work. 
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should be considered rocks or islands.155 Neither the PRC’s Artificial Islands law nor various 
SOA departmental rules concerning uninhabited islands (real or artificial) make any distinctions 
among features along these lines, describing each island group as an archipelago or island group 
(群岛) and asserting full EEZ and continental shelf rights – from straight baselines surrounding 
them, in the case of the Paracels and Diaoyu, and without reference to any baselines in the case 
of the Spratlys. China’s claims to the full slate of UNCLOS zones from artificial features – 
irrespective of their rock, island, or LTE status and lack of legal baselines – are not reconcilable 
with the Convention. In the case of the Spratlys, the claim to such zones does not appear in any 
domestic law, emerging only as a public declaration to the UN in 2011.156  
The net effect is a broad and undefined area in the SCS that is implicitly a PRC-claimed EEZ. 
This cannot be observed from any specific demarcation of the zone, but rather from the PRC’s 
implementation of its domestic laws to EEZ jurisdiction – in this case, to build and administer 
artificial islands, from which further zones are asserted in which China may exercise 
jurisdictional competencies (like the authority to regulate marine scientific research).1 
Marine Scientific Research (MSR). After ratifying the Convention, the PRC began to internalize 
UNCLOS norms on MSR into its domestic legislation and regulation. Complementing this 
exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction, China also implements it by practicing enforcement 
jurisdiction over a wide range of activities that are implicitly regulated under indeterminate 
domestic rules on MSR. Chinese practice on this issue is enabled by the indeterminate way the 
various actions that can be regarded as MSR are defined in both the Convention and PRC law. 
                                                
155 [The Philippines-China Arbitration determined that those three features were all rocks, and each of the other four 
was either an LTE or seabed.] 
156 “China’s Nansha [Spratly] Islands is fully entitled to Territorial Sea, EEZ and Continental Shelf” (PRC 
Permanent Mission to the UN 2011: 2). 
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This has manifested as a clear exercise of creeping jurisdiction, in which China construes the 
content of its rights and scope of its jurisdiction broadly in order to regulate a variety of activities 
that might be considered “MSR” – especially foreign uses – despite no express permission for 
that authority in international law.  
The jurisdictional competence to “regulate, authorize and conduct” MSR in the EEZ lies solely 
with the coastal state, which may also provide “express consent” to foreign vessels to conduct 
such activities in its EEZ. This authority is provided for in Article 56(1)b, and elaborated in Part 
XIII, especially Article 246. The basic norm is that the coastal state has defined and specific 
authority to exercise its jurisdiction over a particular class of activities; these activities, however, 
are never exhaustively defined so limitations on them need to be inferred from the rest of the 
Convention. “Survey activities,” “prospecting,” and “exploration” are dealt with in other parts of 
the LOS Convention, and the activities of military vessels and aircraft are barely discussed in the 
Convention text, and then not in relation to MSR, which is thus by implication only a civilian 
activity. Likewise, hydrographic surveys are treated only in reference to transit passage through 
international straits (Article 40) and innocent passage through the territorial sea (Article 21[g]). 
The category of MSR is, for the most part, indeterminately defined by what it is not. Article 240 
on “General principles for the conduct of MSR” mandates that “MSR shall be conducted 
exclusively for peaceful purposes” and further that it shall be conducted “in compliance with all 
relevant regulations adopted in conformity with this Convention.” Lacking recourse to specific 
prohibitions on military surveys in UNCLOS, Chinese experts pressed to define the legal rule 
prohibiting such activities often lodge a generic objection to any and all military activities in 
their jurisdictional zones on the basis of the UN Charter’s Article 2(4) proscription against the 
“threat or use of force.” This catch-all appears furnishes the indeterminate legal basis for PRC 
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closure of the zone, and underpins PRC laws that pour additional content into coastal state 
jurisdiction over MSR. 
China’s internalized laws on MSR adopt a broad view of which specifically foreign activities can 
be lawfully regulated under that specific competence; no PRC law or regulation specifically 
addresses domestic actors conducting MSR, though authorities to do so are implicitly granted to 
the SOA.157 In those rules, the PRC is consistent with the stance adopted by its representatives to 
the UNCLOS conference, who emphasized the coastal state’s discretion to define its own 
competence to explore, exploit, manage and conserve resources under its domestic law.158 Given 
an uncontroversial right to control MSR in its jurisdictional zones, China’s domestic legal 
institutions seized this opportunity to elaborate functional and substantive authority to define the 
categories of activities that count as MSR, justifying it on the basis of the political imperative to 
protect maritime rights and interests. 
The first significant domestic legal statement on the subject came immediately on the heels of 
the PRC ratification of UNCLOS, in the form of 1996 State Council Provisions on 
Administration of Foreign-Related MSR. Lacking a law on the EEZ at this stage, the sequence of 
these regulations and their focus solely on foreign activity is indicative of the priority to limit 
foreign access rather than promote domestic activity. This priority comes through clearly in the 
regulation’s first article, which lists “safeguarding State security and its maritime rights and 
interests” among the “purposes” of the instrument. Its stipulations are also constructed broadly, 
                                                
157 Wu 2012: 299-300 
158 “If the coastal State did not have the right to protect, use, explore and ex- ploit all the natural resources in the 
zone, to adopt the necessary measures to prevent those resources from being plundered, encroached on, damaged or 
polluted, and to exercise over-all control of the marine environment and scientific research and regulate them, there 
was no point in speaking about full sovereignty over resources” (Ling Ching, PRC representative to the Conference 
on the Law of the Sea, 24th Meeting, 1 August 1974, in Official Records, Vol. 2, supra note 20 at 187). 
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applying MSR authorities in the undefined “other sea areas” of China, and neglecting to 
distinguish between civilian and military vessels.  
The second important piece of MSR-related legislation is the 1992 PRC Surveying and Mapping 
Law (revised in 2002 to include the EEZ), which also neglects any civilian-military distinction. 
In Article 7 of that law, mapping or surveying activities by foreign organizations and individuals 
are subject to unnamed domestic PRC laws and regulations. Conduct of such activities is 
permitted only in the form of a “Chinese-foreign joint equity venture;” foreign surveying and 
mapping “may not involve state secrets or endanger state security.”159 Responsibility for 
overseeing foreign surveying and mapping lies both with the State Council’s Ministry of Land 
and Resources (via its subsidiary State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping) and with the 
“competent department of surveying and mapping” of the PLA. These two laws endow the State 
Council and PLA staff with full discretion to determine which activities are prejudicial to state 
security, involve state secrets, of violate undefined maritime rights and interests. This practice 
tracks the political urgency of denying access, with the added sensitivity that maps (especially 
the U-shaped line and various historical predecessors) are among the key instruments of China’s 
legal public diplomacy. Military surveys, meanwhile, are a significant element of regular US 
navy activities in the ECS and SCS. Hydrographic surveys, in particular, map the seabed and 
provide essential information for monitoring the locations and activities of Chinese submarines, 
now deployed at growing scale and with increasing operational and technical sophistication. 
Discretion to interpret MSR laws and regulations is at the heart of China’s increasingly 
confrontational practice of attempting to deny access to foreign military intelligence-gathering 
and surveillance operations in its EEZ. 
                                                
159 2002 PRC Surveying and Mapping Law, full text at: http://english1.english.gov.cn/laws/2005-
10/09/content_75314.htm 
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Indeed, given the near-total lack of domestic rules governing domestic MSR, it is evident that the 
purpose and function of China’s narrow domestic MSR regime is to restrict access for foreign 
vessels. Implementation of domestic rules on foreign MSR is explicitly linked to major foreign 
and national security policy issues concerning military (especially US) access to Chinese 
jurisdictional waters.160 This political concern drove some twenty-nine central agencies and local 
government stakeholders, including the military,161 to participate in drafting shared rules on 
“Strictly Implementing the Administrative Provisions of the PRC on Foreign-Related Marine 
Scientific Research.” The note confirms that China’s management of MSR has “embarked on a 
legal track” since the 1996 regulations, but challenges administrative agencies to better address 
the state’s failure to prevent “unlawful” foreign MSR: “some people have given more account to 
the scientific aspects and less to the perspective of safeguarding national sovereignty and 
maritime rights and interests.” The note further chastises unspecified administrative actions that 
have promoted “cooperation with the maritime powers such as the United States and Japan 
without being fully aware of foreign parties’ attempts to collect China’s marine information,” 
and even notes that some officials have “unlawfully provided classified information to foreign 
parties.” All of these actions “in varying degrees have violated [the 1996 regulations] and 
harmed China’s sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.”  
Far from detailing differentiated tasks for the many stakeholders, the note instructs various 
                                                
160 Author interview with SOA official (Beijing, June 2014). 
161 The “Notice of the SOA, MFA, PLA general staff, Ministry of State Security, State Secrecy Bureau, Hong Kong 
and Macau Affairs Office, the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council on Strictly Implementing the 
Administrative Provisions of the PRC on Foreign-Related Marine Scientific Research” (10 December 1999), 
available on PKU Law [author search October 2015]. The notice also cites the provision’s applicability to the 
People’s Governments of coastal provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities, the Ministry of Education, the 
Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Land and Resources, the Ministry of Communications, 
Ministry of Water Resources, the Ministry of Agriculture, the State Environmental Protection Administration, the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Seismological Bureau, and the Meteorological Administration of the National 
Natural Science Foundation. 
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named agencies and local governments to simply use their discretion: they ought to take a “broad 
view” and “not establish any project which is not conducive to the national defense and security 
and maritime rights and interests” of the PRC. In a nod to consistency with the purposes 
underlying other engagement with international law throughout this period, the notice allows that 
“[w]here necessary, foreign technologies and capital can be introduced,” but only where it does 
not undermine defense of China’s claims in its maritime disputes. “All cooperative research 
projects to be conducted in disputed sea areas or sea areas which China finds difficult to control 
at this stage shall be determined according to China’s appropriate foreign policies.” The foreign 
policies in question concern China’s maritime disputes, which guide practical efforts to achieve 
closure in those zones on the basis of broadly construed legal authorities to enforce Chinese 
domestic law. These implementation duties have largely fallen on MLE agencies whose principle 
tasks have effectively been to restrict foreign activities that do not concern MSR162 – especially 
military intelligence-gathering and surveillance operations undertaken by the US navy. 
Security jurisdiction in the EEZ 
China’s law challenges the exclusively economic nature of the EEZ, especially in claiming 
undefined jurisdiction over security matters in that zone. In implementing domestic law that 
regulates a wide range of activities under the premise that they touch on economic matters – and 
in some cases without even that justification – the PRC exploits indeterminacy in the UNCLOS-
prescribed balance of rights and interests between coastal and user states. In arrogating to the 
state broad and ill-defined authorities to promulgate and enforce domestic law in claimed 
jurisdictional waters, PRC law enables bureaucracy and MLE agencies to act on the basis of 
                                                
162 See SOA departmental rules on this subject in “Notice on the Law Enforcement Supervision for the Foreign-
Related Marine Scientific Research” (16 May 2000), retrieved by author from PKU Law, April 2014. See also Zou 
2005: 301 
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undefined “security” concerns in claimed EEZs. This possibility draws China into conflictual 
situations not only with its maritime neighbors, but also with the US navy, which prizes access to 
disputed waters in the western Pacific. China’s internalization transforms norms regarding 
economic issues to encompass a far wider range of activities, especially those that touch on its 
security. 
Article 73(1) of the Convention states that “[t]he coastal State may, in the exercise of its 
sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive 
economic zone, take such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial 
proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by 
it in conformity with this Convention.” The language is clear that authority to “take such 
measures” is linked to the coastal state’s exclusive economic rights in the EEZ. The intent and 
purpose of this drafting is plainly to grant enforcement jurisdiction to coastal states whose 
sovereign rights to resources are in some way challenged by foreign users, presumably through 
economic activities to exploit fisheries, oil and gas. Nonetheless, China’s 1992 Territorial Sea 
Law, 1996 Regulations on MSR, and 2002 Surveying and Mapping Law each prescribe 
jurisdiction to the state relating to “national security” interests,163 a broad authority that has been 
implemented largely by MLE agencies without further elaboration as to what activities constitute 
threats to security.  
The principle arena in which this claimed jurisdictional competence comes into play is the PRC’s 
practice of challenging military activities in the EEZ – especially those of the United States. 
With its Seventh Fleet forward deployed in Yokusuka, Japan, the US navy routinely conducts 
                                                
163 The 1992 Territorial Sea Law (Arts. 1 and 7), 1996 MSR Regulations (Art. 1), and 2002 Surveying and Mapping 
Law (Art. 7) cite “security” or “national security” without further definition of those terms. 
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exercises, patrols, drills, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions in the 
waters beyond territorial seas along the East Asian littoral.164 PRC law and regulation do not 
expressly forbid such activities; instead, indeterminate drafting affords MLE agencies 
considerable discretion to operationally contest American naval activities in its EEZs and “other 
areas under PRC jurisdiction.” The decisions as to when, where and how Chinese state actors 
seek to enforce closure in these zones appear to track broader foreign policy calculations,165 
though there are no reliable, publically available data that demonstrate the pattern or frequency 
of these operations. Undefined “security jurisdiction” does not dictate which actions are 
infringements of PRC law, but rather enable Beijing or MLE agencies to make that 
determination according to the circumstances. 
Two pieces of national legislation underpin a growing practice of contesting US navy ISR 
operations, in each case finding the legal authority to do so on the basis of undefined security 
jurisdiction. The first is the 1992 PRC Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone states 
that “China has the right to exercise control in the contiguous zone to prevent and impose 
penalties for activities infringing [PRC] laws or regulations concerning security, the customs, 
finance, sanitation or entry and exit control within its land territory, internal waters or territorial 
sea” (Article 13, italics added). The contiguous zone is, from a resource rights standpoint, simply 
a part of the EEZ; from a jurisdictional standpoint, it includes additional coastal state 
competence over customs, finance, sanitation, and immigration (UNCLOS III Article 33(1)a) – 
otherwise the coastal state authorities are identical to those in the EEZ. UNCLOS lays out a 
                                                
164 O’Rourke 2016 surveys all the major US policy issues related to disputes in the EEZ. 
165 The decisions about when, where and how to interfere with American vessels and aircraft have varied based on 
what one PLA Navy academic described to the author as “Beijing’s vulnerability at that very moment” (author 
interview with PLA Navy academic [Beijing, March 2015]). There may be a more systematic or at least patterned 
basis for PRC responses to ISR missions, but these cannot be directly inferred from open sources. 
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comprehensive and exhaustive account of coastal state jurisdiction in the contiguous zone, 
developed mostly to prevent “hovering” just beyond coastal state jurisdiction by vessels looking 
to smuggle goods to and from ports. The PRC’s inclusion of “security” among its jurisdictional 
competencies is among the most clear-cut instances of augmentation of the content of coastal 
state jurisdiction.166  
The second piece of national legislation indicating security jurisdiction is the 2002 Surveying 
and Mapping Law. Article 7 of that law states that “surveying and mapping may not involve 
state secrets or endanger state security.” Here, Chinese experts suggest that military surveys are 
regulated under Chinese law and are intrinsically threatening to the coastal state. Some point to 
UNCLOS terms that reserve uses of the EEZ “for peaceful purposes” (Arts 58 and 246) and to 
the treaty’s general emphasis on “peaceful use” of the oceans (e.g., in the Preamble, Art. 301, 
and Annex VI). While there is no further elaboration in domestic law, the general interpretation 
forwarded by the Chinese law of the sea community is that “[t]he activities causing such disputes 
[over peaceful uses and peaceful purpose] are mainly military surveys, military maneuvers, 
military reconnaissance activities and other activities not having a direct bearing on passage or 
overflight conducted by foreign military vessels and aircraft in the EEZ and in the air space 
above it. The coastal countries hold that these activities are encroachments on their national 
security because they are an electronic prelude to invasion and thus a threat to use force, and 
therefore not a ‘peaceful use’ of the sea.”167  
This claim to security jurisdiction has been the subject of regular, targeted US navy assertions of 
                                                
166 China is hardly unique in this regard. One analyst assesses 60 states who “have asserted extended rights” to 
security jurisdiction (Kaye 2014: 339).  
167 Ren and Cheng 2005: 143 
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UNCLOS-derived rights to operate military vessels in the EEZ since at least 1992.168 No other 
statutory or regulatory basis exists for this unofficial, intermittently enforced Chinese ban on 
military activities in its EEZ. Although it has existed on paper since 1992, it was not until 2001 
that Chinese aircraft and surface vessels began directly challenging the operation of American 
military activities in areas beyond its claimed territorial sea. The most dramatic of these 
challenges came during in the 2001 “EP-3 Incident,” in which a PLA Air Force fighter jet 
collided with US Navy electronic surveillance aircraft operating near Hainan island in the 
SCS.169 At least 10 subsequent incidents, beginning in 2002 then in each year since 2009 have 
involved Chinese military, MLE and/or civilian assets coming into close contact with foreign 
vessels and aircraft operating in and above PRC-claimed EEZs.170  
There is no specific invocation of the relevant domestic laws or regulations that justify PRC 
contestation of these operations, only the blanket assertion that foreign military activities in 
EEZs are not permitted under UNCLOS or PRC domestic law.171 Officials from the PRC 
Ministry of National Defense have more recently described China’s asserted security jurisdiction 
less as a matter of law than one of prudence: if the United States and other foreign military 
vessels and aircraft were not conducting “threatening close-in surveillance” of waters 
                                                
168 The US “Freedom of Navigation” policy began in 1979, and involves diplomatic protests of “excessive” 
maritime claims by the Department of State complemented by operational assertions conducted by the Department 
of Defense. For US Navy views on China’s excessive maritime claims, see United States Navy Judge Advocate 
General 2015; for the locations (but not frequencies) of US operational assertions, see the United States Department 
of Defense, Annual Freedom of Navigation Reports at: http://policy.defense.gov/OUSDP-Offices/FON/ 
169 See Redden and Saunders 2012 for a thorough discussion of this incident. EEZ rights do not include control over 
airspace, but China’s practice tends to apply similar restrictions to aerial overflight. 
170 There are presumably unpublicized incidents, but those that have been reported in open sources include 
confrontations between Chinese vessels and the following foreign vessels: USNS Bowditch (March 2001); EP-3 
Incident (April 2001); USNS Impeccable (March 2009); USNS Victorious (May 2009); USS George Washington 
(July-November 2010); U-2 Intercept (June 2011); INS [Indian Naval Ship] Airavat (July 2011); INS [Indian Naval 
Ship] Shivalik (June 2012); USNS Impeccable (July 2013); USNS Spruance (July 2013); USNS Cowpens 
(December 2013); unsafe P-8 intercept (August 2014); unsafe EP-3 intercept (May 2016). See O’Rourke 2016: 12-
13 for discussion of these incidents. 
171 Dutton (ed.) 2010 is composed of papers from a conference treating the various American, Chinese and 
international views on the relevant rights and important security issues involved in this question. 
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surrounding China, testing China’s coastal radars and communications, and monitoring their 
growing submarine fleet staged out of the SCS, then China would not need to “implement its 
domestic law” forbidding such activities.172 Clearly, the security questions arising from military 
activities in close proximity to Chinese territory and military assets are not in themselves 
generated by the existence of the legal norms of the EEZ regime.  
Whether or not China practically implements its “security jurisdiction” likely remains at the 
discretion of the PLA, or the SOA and Ministry of Public Security operating China’s Coast 
Guard. There may also be some discretion at lower levels of authority, though the lack of 
published departmental rules specifically laying out how and when military surveys are to be 
contested means that such decisions are made ad hoc. Presumably, the overall political and 
operational effects intended of these practices are determined by foreign policy decision-makers 
in Beijing, then communicated down to the operational level only partially through legal 
channels. Such decisions are likely undertaken within central Party leadership (possibly in the 
Maritime Affairs Leading Small Group or the Politburo Central Committee, though there is no 
virtually transparency in the national security decision-making process).173 As observed in the 
several other functional domains reviewed in this chapter, the legal hierarchy is not itself a script 
for the actions of state officials and bureaucrats, only an organizational framework through 
which policy signals may be more efficiently conveyed to those charged with implementation. 
The laws, regulations and rules canvassed demonstrate, however, that the various functional 
responsibilities undertaken by administrative and MLE actors, and to some degree, the resources 
allocated to them to do so, are enabled by China’s distinctive mode of internalizing international 
                                                
172 Presentation by MND official to US former diplomats and military officers (Beijing, September 2014). 
173 See Saunders and Scobell 2015 for a thorough discussion of the PRC’s national security decision-making 
apparatus. 
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norms of the EEZ regime. 
Practice Makes Perfect 
A prominent researcher in a state think-tank notes that “[t]he maritime rights and interests 
enjoyed by our nation did not fall from the sky, nor did they arise from our subjective desire or 
expectation to have them. They arise from the law, are bestowed by the law — international law 
to be precise, and especially the part of the law represented in UNCLOS….Without UNCLOS 
we would not have our [1992] Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and our [1998] 
Law on the EEZ and Continental Shelf….[UNCLOS] is a critical legal weapon that we must use 
to defend our maritime rights and interests.”174 The EEZ regime creates an entirely new set of 
sovereign rights and a new brand of jurisdiction that enables new interests in closure. Clearly, a 
state’s interests in security and economic development exist independent of any legal regime. 
Yet the geographic space in which those interests are pursued, and the nature of the Chinese 
claims and practices to defend those interests, manifestly depend in fundamental ways upon the 
legal norms brought into being by the EEZ. Similarly, the territorial sovereignty disputes over 
islands that make these interests more pressing exist independent from the law of the sea; yet it is 
the jurisdiction and sovereign rights bestowed by the law of the sea that make these disputes 
touch on critical security and economic interests.  
The distinctive aspect of China’s relationship to the law of the sea regime highlighted in this 
Chapter is the way those international norms are transformed as they are internalized and 
implemented by the PRC. In turn, those norms exert a transformative influence on China’s 
domestic legal institutions by expanding the scope of claimed jurisdiction, and augmenting the 
                                                
174 Liu Nanlai 2013 
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content of claimed rights. In order for those rights and jurisdiction to be administered and 
enforced, the state is prompted to devise new functional responsibilities for the state. This 
Chapter assessed each of these – expanded scope, transformed functions, and augmented content 
– and demonstrated how each manifested in the law and practice of the PRC. 
How can these plain departures from the original norms persist? The obligation for state parties 
to UNCLOS III to “harmonize their national legislation with the provisions of the [Convention]” 
has been reaffirmed in the UN General Assembly each year since the treaty went to effect.175 In 
the context of the Chinese political-legal system, such “harmony” need not eliminate stark 
contradictions between PRC law and the ratified treaty. There is no constitutional or statutory 
rule that requires China to conform its domestic law to its treaty obligations; even if there were, 
there is no expectation in China that law will be drafted and implemented in the determinate 
form that could regularize compliant practices. Even if state agencies were to attempt strict 
conformity with domestic laws, regulations and rules, they probably could not do so uniformly. 
China’s legal institutions are after all only an adjunct to its policy-making and policy 
implementation processes, arenas dominated by the CCP and subject to its political discretion at 
every stage from drafting the language of the rules to their practical enforcement.  
This analysis of China’s internalization and implementation of the EEZ confirms that 
international norms from UNCLOS enable new “maritime rights and interests” that underpin 
these political decisions. The vast new area subjected to coastal state jurisdiction and sovereign 
                                                
175 See, for example, UNGA resolutions 68/70, 9 Dec. 2013, paras. 5-6; 67/78, 11 Dec. 2012, paras. 5-6; 66/231, 23 
Dec. 2011, paras. 5- 6; 65/37, 7 Dec. 2010, paras. 5-6; 64/71, 4 Dec. 2009, paras. 5-6; 63/111, 5 Dec. 2008, paras. 5-
6; 62/215, 18 Dec. 2007, paras. 5-6; 61/222, 20 Dec. 2006, paras. 5-6; 60/30, 29 Nov. 2005, paras. 5-6; 59/24, 17 
Nov. 2004, paras. 4-5; 58/240, 23 Dec. 2003, paras. 4-5; 57/141, 12 Dec. 2002, paras. 3-4; 56/12, 28 Nov. 2001, 
paras. 3-4; 55/7, 30 Oct. 2000, paras. 3-4; 54/31, 24 Nov. 1999, paras. 3-4; 53/32, 24 Nov. 1998, paras. 3-4; 52/26*, 
26 Nov. 1997, para. 2; 51/34, 9 Dec. 1996, para. 2; 50/23, 5 Dec. 1995, para. 2; 49/28, 6 Dec. 1994, para. 2; all 
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/general_assembly/general_assembly_resolutions.htm 
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rights under the new regime invited a similarly vast expansion of the functions and capacity of 
PRC state agencies. It provided a comparatively legitimate framework through which to expand 
and “defend” the areas in which China could deploy its MLE fleet and effectively prohibit access 
to foreign users of maritime space. The economic, strategic, and political appeal of controlling 
more space is self-evident; the practical means of achieving it without triggering destabilizing 
conflict with other claimants is not so obvious. China’s political elites recognized in UNCLOS 
norms a possibility to transform the state and its maritime environment in a gradual and 
sophisticated way – through creeping jurisdiction to effect closure.  
From the standpoint of power, there is little wonder that China has not conformed its behavior to 
the treaty’s provisions. Strict adherence to UNCLOS III would deny China desired sovereign 
rights and jurisdiction (and perhaps even sovereignty over non-island features) and weaken its 
position in its several urgent maritime disputes. We are left to consider why the PRC internalized 
so much of the Convention, and why it refers to UNCLOS as the legal basis for its 
implementation of its domestic law. The analogy of contract does little to resolve this puzzle, 
because there is no basic correspondence between the norms codified in the Convention and 
those internalized in PRC law and implemented in practice. Addressing them as a norms with 
subjective meaning and function in the contemporary PRC provides the analytical space for a 
more substantive reckoning with the transnational legal process in play; more specifically, it 
helps us ask how the EEZ regime enables a range of Chinese practices that are otherwise 
unaccountable.  
This returns us to the broader concern with China’s general attitude toward international law as 
an instrument of statecraft – one with a historical pedigree that imposes “unequal” restraints on 
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China and is therefore not yet well-adjusted to serve China’s interests. In light of this, China has 
announced a clear intention to “vigorously participate in the formulation of international 
norms”176 – to shape, through practice, the generally accepted norms and rules of international 
politics. A concluding Chapter takes up this question of influencing the global EEZ regime, 
focusing on how “rising power” gives rise to “creeping jurisdiction.” 
 
                                                
176 Xinhua 2014: 中共中央关于全面推进依法治国若干重大问题的决定 [Decision of the CPC Central Committee 
Concerning Some Major Questions in Comprehensively Moving Governing the Country According to the Law 
Forward].  





China’s Law of the Sea: Summary and Future Prospects 
 
 
“The Sea, by the Law of Nature or Nations, is not common to all men, but capable of private 
Dominion or proprietie as well as the Land.” 
- John Selden, Mare Clausum: Of the Dominion, or Ownership, of the Sea (1635) 
 
“We should enhance our capacity for exploiting marine resources, strengthen the marine 
economy, develop the marine economy, protect the marine ecological environment, resolutely 
safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests, and build China into a maritime power” 
- PRC President Hu Jintao at 18th CCP National Congress (2012)1 
 
This study explored China’s evolving relationship to the law of the sea. The PRC’s roiling 
maritime disputes with each of its littoral neighbors motivate the core question about how the 
law of the sea – especially as manifested in the EEZ regime created by UNCLOS III – bears on 
Chinese practices. This attention to the law of the sea follows from the observation that legal 
norms are the unique source of many of the basic parameters of these disputes. The EEZ, in 
particular, establishes the sovereign rights and jurisdictional competencies that define many of 
the substantive issues in dispute. It also radically extends the geographical scope of state 
authority extending out to sea from sovereign territory. In so doing, the EEZ generates entirely 
new overlapping zones of rights and jurisdiction and raises the economic and strategic stakes of 
long-standing sovereignty disputes over islands. 
																																																						
1 Xinhua 2012b  
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China’s distinctive mode of understanding and practically incorporating these new rights and 
jurisdiction has been the primary subject of empirical analysis. The overall finding is that these 
legal norms have enabled transformative changes to the state. Those changes entail new and 
explicit PRC interests in formal control over maritime space, with the law of the sea furnishing a 
viable instrument for China to realize those interests through closure of its claimed maritime 
zones, pursued in legal terms through creeping jurisdiction. These practices to augment China’s 
legal authority – and correspondingly, diminish that of other users – hold potentially 
transformative implications for the regime itself. China exploits indeterminacy in the rules of the 
EEZ to advance a closed interpretation of the rights of other users of ocean space, challenging 
some of the underlying liberal norms of the law of the sea.  
This strategy is possible in part due to the indeterminacy of law within the PRC party-state, 
which is drafted and implemented in a manner that assures its fundamentally inferior status to 
Party decisions about political priorities. This mode of “ruling the country through law” is at 
odds with expectations that China’s integration into international legal institutions would bring 
about gradual liberalization. The case is an influential one that should occasion some 
circumspection about how well legalized norms function in a system with China as a major 
player. International law internalized and practiced in the manner observed in this case does not 
produce the various salutary effects usually attributed to legal rules and procedures agreed upon 
by sovereign states. Instead, the law of the sea presents a striking case of dysfunction in the 
international legal system, a new venue for international political discord and conflict rather than 
a solution to well-known problems of international cooperation.   
This concluding Chapter will (I) summarize how the preceding chapters arrived at this judgment, 
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(II) analyze its implications for China’s practice of international law moving forward, and (III) 
note certain limits and weaknesses of the project and suggesting potential extensions. 
I. Summary of the study 
The introductory chapter described the EEZ regime as both a radical expansion and dilution of 
state authority over the oceans. Narrow coastal bands of fully sovereign ocean space were for 
centuries the furthest extent of the state. Over the course of the second half of the twentieth 
century, the international community adjusted to technological, ecological, and economic change 
by codifying a legal regime affording something short of full sovereignty over the vast resources 
of an extensive new economic zone, comprising nearly 40% of the water space on the planet. 
This remarkable change in the boundaries of the sovereign state is seldom recognized in the 
international relations discipline, despite its evident bearing on geopolitics – not least in the 
contested waters of East Asia, where the EEZ is now front and center in a collection of heated 
disputes. Among other neglected elements of this story of the EEZ is China’s role in its creation 
and its current position at the vanguard of a movement to enclose and effectively “territorialize” 
maritime space as an integral part of the state (Oxman 2006). Rather than treating this as a 
second-order feature of the conventional, territorial disputes in which China is engaged, this 
study recognizes that the “creeping” jurisdictional element is consequential and worthy of 
analysis in its own right. 
After canvassing varied theoretical approaches to international law in international politics, I 
selected the transnational legal process approach championed by former U.S. State Department 
legal adviser Harold Koh. This theory’s prescriptive account demonstrates how processes of 
interaction, interpretation and internalization may produce “obedience” – the state’s routine, 
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willing compliance with international legal obligations. International norms eventually become a 
valued part of the state’s practical repertoire. This bold prediction offers a stimulating contrast to 
observed PRC practices, which on balance challenge rather than adhere to the norms promoted 
by the EEZ regime.  
The theory adopted to structure this study modifies the transnational legal process theory in four 
ways: (1) discarding the teleology of obedience, (2) introducing a process of implementation 
after internalization to examine the various alternatives to obedience, (3) recognizing that 
internalization processes in China are systematically different from those in liberal, rule of law 
polities, and (4) accounting for the implications of indeterminacy, particularly the wide berth it 
permits for political discretion in legal processes. The theory thus reconstructed challenges the 
validity of “transnational legal process” as a prescription for making illiberal states more liberal. 
It also isolates how China’s Leninist political-legal system should give pause to any presumption 
of a productive role for lawyers, courts, civil society, and any other potential “norms 
entrepreneurs” operating in such an environment. These sub-state actors’ preferences are entirely 
marginalized by the centralized political decision-making processes that organize PRC 
engagement with international law. Lacking an institutional milieu in which issues can be drawn 
out of the “zone of politics” and into the “zone of law,” China is not a state in which 
transnational legal processes are likely to produce the desired normative outcome. 
But China is not simply rejecting international law outright – i.e., “disobeying” – so much as it is 
taking interpretive liberties with liberal norms, practicing its legal obligations in line with its 
preferences, which themselves appear to be transformed by those norms in unanticipated ways. 
Such auto-interpretation is not so unusual and alerts us to a wealth of social science explanations 
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of the practical influence of international law. To develop these alternatives to obedience, I turn 
to international relations theories that privilege either power, contract, or norms as the primary 
explanation for the operation of international law in international politics. Power-based analysis 
treats law as an epiphenomenon, an analytically secondary manifestation of coercion of some 
kind such that law reflects the interests of powerful states. Contract approaches argue that the 
dominant effects of power can be channeled by mutual self-interest, and that states may consent 
to binding arrangements that effectively constrain their behavior. Norms-based accounts take a 
more sociological view of the international legal system as a social arena in which all actors 
operate, and which may over time transform those actors’ identities and interests. 
Applying these lenses to the basic empirical pattern of Chinese engagement with the law of the 
sea, I argue that the deductions demanded by the power and contract approach are ill-suited to 
the basic empirical patterns of the case. A view solely from power cannot account for the fact 
that the dominant powers in the system – the US and the USSR – fought vigorously against the 
establishment of a new law of the sea, and objected especially to the advent of an EEZ which 
would limit their existing advantages in a liberal, open system. The contract view explains some 
of the economic aspects of the regime, but fails in explaining why China would lobby 
vociferously for an inferior, even reduced, distribution of material gains; contract’s presumptions 
of equilibrium further limit its methodological capacity to account for the sheer indeterminacy of 
some of the most important norms in the law of the sea. They are also ill-suited to a set of 
domestic institutions in China that tend to promote indeterminate rules. Compliance with the 
terms of the contract depends upon the agent’s particular interpretation of compliance, and 
invites such a wide range of behavior as to rule out the utility of a strict contract approach. 
Further, each approach at least tacitly expects liberal norms to prevail: for power, because those 
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approximate the interests of the powerful states in the system; for contract, because liberal norms 
better approximate market rationality and efficiency.  
Arguments from norms are not similarly hindered by falsifiable predictions; they just require 
reimagining for a study of “failed” socialization. Further adjustment is required to treat a set of 
norms with no particular ethical content, and which therefore function differently in social 
settings than liberal norms concerning political and civil rights, the typical focus of norms 
studies. Fortunately, because the various theories are not mutually exclusive, an approach that 
treats norms as the principle empirical object allows us to recognize that contract or power may 
indeed be operating in some measure. Norms shape actor interests such that their practices may 
be rendered as a function of actors’ evaluations of which means and ends are appropriate and 
efficacious. Such evaluative choices can also be unlinked from purely instrumental rationality by 
positing some variation in actor identity: states’ historical and institutional trajectories determine 
the ways they assess their own interests and the means appropriate to achieve them. For some, 
perhaps many, actors, international law and the norms it prescribes have no special legitimacy or 
appeal beyond their potential for instrumental use.  
These theoretical positions intact, the study moves to analyze China’s practice of the law of the 
sea in terms of the four i transnational legal processes: interaction, interpretation, internalization 
and implementation. In the interaction phase, the subject of Chapter 2, we examined the PRC’s 
initial encounter with the EEZ regime. The PRC participated in negotiations and then ratified 
UNCLOS III despite enjoying few of the treaty’s benefits and disproportionately bearing the 
treaty’s costs. China’s interaction at this rule-making forum is difficult to square with 
conventional accounts of why states commit to international legal treaties. We expect states – 
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great powers in particular – to prefer and advocate legal rules and norms consistent with their 
interests (however conceived); at a minimum, they will not consent to disadvantageous rules 
unless coerced to do so. Yet without plausible coercion, the PRC enthusiastically consented to 
various rules in UNCLOS III that impose obvious economic, political and strategic costs on 
China without corresponding benefits. This costly commitment is especially remarkable with 
regard to the rules governing the newly-formed EEZ, which PRC delegates ardently supported 
during the Conference. Analyzing the official records of Chinese positions and statements 
before, during and after the conference, we observed that the discrete Chinese preferences for the 
treaty were borrowed from those of the many Third World states participating in the 
negotiations. The broad statements of PRC delegates indicate that their preferences were 
secondary, and flowed from a more diffuse shared interest in revising an old regime that accrued 
to the benefit of “maritime hegemonists.” They sought to do so by promoting an illiberal 
doctrine that functioned with indeterminate rules, and a core norm of enhanced control for the 
coastal state, i.e., closure.  
Chapter 3 inquired into the cultural-institutional and historical bases for this Chinese 
interpretation, a necessary consideration to make sense of the interests Chinese delegates 
represented in UNCLOS III. Drawing on the Chinese tradition of law, the history of the unequal 
treaty system, and a set of experiences specific to the law of the sea that inclined the Chinese to 
view it as a potentially useful defensive instrument, this Chapter assessed the overall Chinese 
attitude toward international law. Situating it also in the context of the radical politics of the era, 
we can make sense of the Chinese move to ratify despite the disadvantages of the treaty. Those 
politics were marked by pronounced hostility to international law giving way to an explicitly 
instrumental view of how international law could serve “socialist modernization.” Close analysis 
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of the way international law was taught and practiced in China during this important transitional 
period further sheds light on the distinctive interpretation Chinese leaders applied to the new law 
of the sea, and indicated some of the specific ways it should be practiced. 
The rest of the analysis, in Chapters 4 and 5, treated the paired processes of internalization and 
implementation – that is, how the law of the sea was incorporated into China’s domestic law and 
then put into practice. This question required a preliminary inquiry into legal institutions, rules, 
and procedures in the modern PRC, centering on the question of how they are organized to 
incorporate treaty law. Based on the formal rules laid out in the PRC constitution(s) and in 
relevant statutes and regulations, we can conclude that China’s legal scheme does not necessitate 
the internalization of treaty obligations into domestic law. Any elements of a treaty that 
subsequently enter domestic law do so only because they have been selected and adapted 
according to ad hoc political preferences. Central authorities (especially political-legal cadres) in 
the CCP enjoy near-total authority about which treaty norms will enter domestic law and in what 
form. Lower-level bureaucratic and administrative actors then exercise considerable discretion 
over how those international legal norms will be put into practice. Given the relative weakness of 
the PRC’s legal institutions and their susceptibility to political influence, the ill-defined concept 
of “maritime rights and interests” provided sufficient political motivation for a selective but far-
reaching internalization of many of the norms of the nascent EEZ regime. Legal rights are 
readily affixed to political interests in a set of institutions that makes no special distinction 
between the “zone of law” and the “zone of politics.” 
The analysis then turned to the specific processes by which the EEZ regime itself manifested in 
PRC law and policy. These norms entered the Chinese system only after being interpreted and 
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drafted into laws, regulations and rules that promote a high degree of closure – state authority at 
the expense of international rights – in the disputed waters surrounding China. We observed a 
systematic move to expand the geographic scope and augment the substantive content of the 
norms undergirding the EEZ. This was accompanied by rather dramatic changes to the function 
of the state – especially its maritime law enforcement agencies and their supporting bureaucracy 
– which now had a far broader mission to establish Chinese rights and jurisdiction over a far 
larger swathe of maritime space than had ever before come under the state’s authority. The 
transformative impact depended both on the quality of the norms themselves, and on the 
domestic political context in which they were received. In both cases, indeterminacy prevailed: 
the treaty admits of several more or less reasonable interpretations. This comports with the 
Chinese preference for using law as a flexible instrument of policy, with rules and regulations 
drafted indeterminately so as to afford political actors considerable (but not unlimited) discretion 
to construe the law as circumstances demand.  
The upshot is that UNCLOS radically expanded China’s claimed maritime jurisdiction into the 
EEZ, producing a large body of domestic law that puts the state to work in that new zone. The 
functional tasks assigned to state organs tend to exceed the rights assigned in the Convention, 
exploiting indeterminacy in the text of the treaty to claim broader and deeper authority, then 
granting broad discretionary authorities to implement EEZ rules according to political 
expedience. Highly salient and seemingly urgent demands arising from maritime disputes greatly 
amplify the political importance of enforcing these domestic laws in disputed zones. There are of 
course military and diplomatic components of this, but the establishment of PRC “administrative 
control” is of fundamental importance in China’s South and East China Sea disputes. The 
necessity for “administrative control” in the EEZ, where none existed in the past, creates a range 
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of new responsibilities, among them “rights protection” missions for maritime law enforcement 
(MLE) agencies. These take the form of demonstrating presence, protecting Chinese commercial 
activities, and denying access to foreign users and militaries. These missions drive substantial 
resources toward the MLE fleet, personnel, and training. They have led to substantial 
enhancements of the bureaucratic status and political prestige of the principle state organs 
involved in implementing maritime policies. Several vignettes of recent episodes of international 
frictions arising from China’s implementation of its domestic law helped illustrate the practical 
consequences of this political-legal system. In short, China’s growing capacity (rising power) 
can be channeled through a domestic maritime legal scheme that does not constrain but rather 
prompts and enables its practical efforts to assert deeper and broader authority (creeping 
jurisdiction). 
II. Implications for China’s Future Practice  
What does this analysis portend for China’s future practice of the law of the sea? The processes 
observed are gradual, and though they should not be expected to proceed linearly, PRC 
jurisdiction seems likely to continue creep out into its near seas. The trend is toward ever more 
domestic Chinese law and law enforcement in disputed zones, effective to the degree Chinese 
power is properly organized to coerce or persuade other potential maritime users. This creeping 
jurisdiction towards closure is already in evidence, a far more consequential outcome than 
“delay” (Fravel 2008). It is possible that the underlying logic of the Fravel theory of escalation 
and cooperation still obtains – if, for example, China faced a significant security threat on its 
continental boundaries, it might well seek to compromise in the maritime domain. However, in 
the absence of such exogenous change, future practice will likely continue in this vein.  
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China’s short-lived participation in modern transnational legal processes is changing 
endogenously, marked by growing knowledge and familiarity with the instrumental application 
of international law, and growing Chinese confidence as a military and economic power at 
regional and global levels. With respect to the law of the sea, we should consider the possibility 
that there is an implicit hierarchy in the PRC’s maritime strategy, such that the indeterminate 
qualities of norms the state internalizes and promotes are only temporary means to the end of 
closure. It may even be that closure is only a temporary means to the end of security, and, if 
Chinese capabilities continue to grow, may yield to a more open set of preferences about the law 
of the sea. Illiberal interpretations of the law of the sea – and international law generally – seem 
unlikely to subside within a Chinese party-state so constituted, pace expectations of an 
irresistible liberalizing tide sweeping through China’s political institutions on a wave of foreign 
capital and trade. China’s practices seem certain continue to reflect its orientation toward state 
control at the expense of individual rights. As PRC practices externalize these norms into the 
maritime domain with growing confidence and capacity, they may become more widely accepted 
by other states that share China’s orientation, are coerced to do so, or otherwise see some 
benefits in acquiescence. 
Indeterminacy, while a characteristic of China’s domestic law-making and manifest in certain 
aspects of the EEZ regime, may diminish if these illiberal preferences become the norm. China’s 
“tributary” tradition of statecraft is premised on Confucian values that have been resuscitated in 
Beijing’s rhetoric and diplomatic repertoire. Among those values were rather precise and 
determinate rules governing interstate relationships, prescribing specific practices ranging from 
the symbolically-weighted “kowtow” to elaborately codified standards for diplomatic protocol 
(Li 2004; Fairbank 1968). Order was formally established on hierarchic terms that were explicit 
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and prioritized stability – to the extent that China did not leverage its superior status to extract 
unequal distributional rewards (Kang 2007, 2010). Thus there is a historical basis for at least 
some wishful thinking that a relatively modest appetite for international conquest and overall 
preference for stability will characterize a more powerful China’s conduct in its disputes. 
Perhaps perceptions of enhanced maritime security will incline PRC leaders to favor the 
compromises that prevailed in the settlement of China’s land boundary disputes (Fravel 2008). 
The need for indeterminacy, and thus Chinese freedom of action in the “grey zones” of law, 
would be obviated if the customs of the region were to approximate China’s preferences. 
What are the prospects for China’s preferences becoming the norm in the region, or beyond? The 
liberal triumphalism implied by Koh’s reading of transnational legal process is not persuasive in 
the maritime domain, at a minimum. As China’s practices diverge further from obedience to 
UNCLOS rules and become more potent, they will incline other states toward obedience to 
illiberal standards set by the PRC. For IR theorists inclined to similar beliefs about the 
transcendence of determinate, liberal norms, it is hard in 2016 to share Ikenberry’s conviction 
that “[r]ival hegemonic states with revisionist and illiberal agendas have been pushed off the 
global stage.”2 China’s agenda for regional maritime security, however revisionist and illiberal, 
is in no way marginalized by an UNCLOS treaty to which the United States is not even a party. 
There need not be an immediately viable alternative to the “Western liberal order” for the basic 
openness of that system to break down piecemeal. This process is already evident in the law of 
the sea regime, especially in the competing norms of closure that China champions in the EEZ. 
However robust and efficient the institutions of liberal order compared to the alternative, there is 
no obvious legal remedy for such dysfunction. The potential for radical transformation of the 
																																																						
2 Ikenberry 2011a: 67 
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liberal order appears still greater as we enter an era marked by profoundly illiberal sentiments 
expressed by the people and leaders of even the supposed champions of global liberalism, the 
United States and the United Kingdom.  
Looking across functional arenas, we might also look to China’s performance in the World Trade 
Organization for insights into plausible developments on the maritime front. Here, again, there 
are grounds for cautious optimism. While China’s degree of compliance remains a subject of 
controversy,3 it is thoroughly integrated into the essentially liberal global trading regime. 
Chinese trade negotiators have made extensive use of its dispute settlement system, and have in 
some other contexts also shown openness to third-party dispute resolution (Akande 2010). If 
China is subverting the regime, it is only gradually through legitimate procedures within the 
institutional framework to which it has acceded.4  
This study counsels a less sanguine attitude about China’s participation in the transnational legal 
process, even in this domain of trade in which the absolute, mutual gains seem most likely to 
generate converging legal practices. China’s “rising power” in global trade may be linked to 
creeping trends away from liberal commercial relations among states – perhaps to protect their 
intellectual property (Massey 2006) or to appease rising protectionist sentiments, as witnessed in 
2016 in the United States and Britain. The U.S. Trade Representative’s 2015 Annual Report to 
Congress on China’s WTO Compliance notes that since 2012, China has “demonstrated a 
																																																						
3 For a compelling early assessment of Chinese practice, see Clarke 2003. Subsequent analysis have highlighted the 
degree to which China’s WTO “accession induced regulatory, institutional and normative changes that have 
transformed the landscape of trade and investment in China” (Qin 2007: 720), some of which are in line with the 
liberal norms of the complex trade regime and others of which reflect “selective adaptation” (Potter 2004). Other 
later analyses run the range from enthusiastic cheerleading for China’s rigorous compliance with WTO dispute 
resolution (Zhang and Li 2013) to analysis of the various ways China shirks WTO responsibilities through extra-
institutional “modes of resistance China deploys to avoid complying with basic WTO norms” (Webster 2014: 530).  
4	“Chinese foreign policy accepts that for the foreseeable future it will have to accommodate US hegemony, or when 
it must be challenged, it will do so mainly inside international institutions” (Johnston 2008: 208). 
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stronger embrace of state capitalism,”5 and has buttressed it with domestic legal reforms that 
actually codify non-compliant practices (e.g., the implementing regulations flowing from its 
2008 Anti-Monopoly Law). China’s practice in the WTO is “mixed” at best,6 demonstrating 
substantial transformation of the Chinese state to participate in the regime, and reciprocally, 
substantial transformation of the global trading regime to accommodate China. In the absence of 
steadfast Western support for ever-greater liberalization of that regime, China’s is poised to 
wield ever-greater transformative influence.  
What are the implications for China’s practice in the law of the sea? Growing comfort and 
familiarity operating in and around international legal institutions may breed contempt. Even if 
abrogation of treaty commitments appears unlikely, there are many ways these institutions may 
decay – or, rather, evolve in unexpected ways less favored by the liberal west. Evidence and 
logic support a less dramatic, if perhaps obvious, expectation: China will exercise greater 
influence in shaping international norms. The prevailing liberal character of norms in the trade or 
oceans domain are not immune from the influence of a powerful, purposive actor able to make 
coercive or persuasive appeals to other actors who may share, or at least not ideologically reject, 
their illiberal values.  
A potential silver lining for liberal crusaders is that some liberal norms may become more 
appealing if China’s power continues to wax. A stronger position in global markets could skew 
China’s economic preferences towards greater openness. All things being equal, relatively 
deregulated market access and non-discriminatory trade rules favor the actor with more capital 
																																																						
5 U.S. Trade Representative 2015: 3 
6 This is also the net assessment of an influential earlier study of China’s participation in the international legal 
system (Feinerman 1995). It is an analytically unsatisfying conclusion, but empirically robust: the scale and 
complexity of Chinese practices resist easy characterization in virtually every domain of legal practice.	
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and a larger market.  Similarly, in the oceans domain, a “blue water” Chinese navy able to 
operate effectively out of area would, in theory, lead PRC leaders to favor a more liberal, open 
regime that would afford it ready access to littoral regions where it could project power, protect 
investments, secure its vital commercial and strategic sea-lanes, and show the flag. Many 
Chinese naval strategists already express a desire for ready access to distant straits and foreign 
EEZs;7 in fact, the PLAN operates openly in foreign EEZs, despite its principled arguments 
against such practices when they are conducted by the United States Navy in PRC-claimed EEZs 
(U.S. Department of Defense 2015, Erickson and de la Bruyere 2014).   
Even if we anticipate that China’s “rising power” in terms of its naval and commercial enterprise 
lends itself to more open preferences, would this likely apply also in its “near seas” in East Asia? 
One fundamental element of liberal norms is their universality. Individual rights apply across 
time and space without discrimination, or so the classical theory goes. Is this ordering principle 
plausible in a region dominated by China? “An open region is one that is free of the irresistible 
gravitational pull of any one power…. One in which regional states are free to pursue their 
economic and political interests and are not bound to accede to the demands of their strongest 
neighbor.”8 By contrast, a closed region would be one in which Chinese rights are superior to 
those of other states. Without the liberal conviction that rights are universal and uniformly 
distributed, there is no necessary contradiction for China to pursue openness globally but closure 
in its own region. The balance of user and coastal state rights may be calibrated ad hoc, with 
substantial discretion for the actor wielding the most political leverage – an externalization of the 
Chinese mode of domestic governance into the pattern of regional relations. Evidence from the 
																																																						
7 Author discussions with PLAN officers in the sidelines of conferences (Beijing, June 2014 and September 2014). 
This is an increasingly common sentiment expressed to me by think-tankers and academics in China, though no 
public comments or publications advance this argument explicitly. 
8 Dutton 2016: 7 
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case of China and the law of the sea indicates the “progressive development” of a more closed, 
rather than more open, regional order in East Asia. 
III. Unanswered Questions and Potential Extensions 
By tracing China’s relationship to the EEZ through four transnational legal processes – 
interaction, interpretation, internalization, and implementation – this analysis sought to 
demonstrate the transformative influence of international law on China, and indicated China’s 
potentially transformative influence on international law. The study lacks sufficient evidence to 
clinch the latter claim that China’s practices feed back into the EEZ regime itself to the extent 
that they have demonstrably changed the underlying norms that shape the practices of other 
states. Still, short of that, there remain reasons to argue that Chinese practices alone are sufficient 
to promote a kind of dysfunction in international law, in which lack of agreement on the rules, 
and unwillingness to submit to legal procedures and remedies, produces conflict rather than 
cooperation. The notion of international law-as-contract presumes some basic compatibility 
among the political-legal systems states party to an agreement; it requires common knowledge in 
the form of at last rough equivalence between how its terms are interpreted.  
A full treatment of the more sweeping possibility of regional or global norm-transformation 
would require a far broader comparative effort to assess not only China’s practices, but those of 
the many other users of disputed maritime space in which China’s practices are assumed to play 
an important normative role. Such analysis would also require more attention to be paid not only 
to the paramilitary elements of Chinese practice, but its growing military capabilities and 
presence – which after all, constitute the bulk of its state activity and investment in securing 
maritime closure. The “rising power” component, taken largely as a given, would be far more 
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persuasive if illustrated with practical demonstrations of China’s effective capacity to control 
maritime space and its correlation with practical efforts to do so – that is, by clinching the direct, 
practical connection between China’s expanding maritime “interests,” based on its political 
goals, and the growing commitment to asserting and defending its maritime “rights,” grounded in 
legal norms that exist largely independent of China. 
The Philippines’ Arbitration as a Critical Test 
On the first issue – the lack of a comparative evaluation of other states’ practices – a partial 
corrective may be applied through a case study of the recently concluded Philippines’ UNCLOS 
Annex VII arbitration against the PRC. A short discussion of this important episode in China’s 
relationship to the law of the sea here will suffice to demonstrate how analysis of the arbitral 
award could extend and strengthen the study – and perhaps even test some of its conclusions in 
the crucible of an international legal “outcome” that could determine some of the indeterminate 
aspects of UNCLOS III that the PRC had seen fit to exploit.  
As noted in Chapter 2, the PRC delegation expressed strong objections to the compulsory dispute 
resolution mechanisms of the treaty during its negotiation, later attempting to issue a 
“reservation” on the treaty barring the application of such procedures. They expressly reserved 
the right to adopt a preferred dispute resolution method of “negotiation and consultation” – this 
despite the fact that the treaty bars reservations and imposes a mandatory, third-party dispute 
resolution system to resolve issues of interpretation and application of UNCLOS III. Already, we 
see China’s defection from the supposed contract and the assertion that China’s preferred norms 
must prevail in practice. Exclusion of third-party arbitration and adjudication allows the legal 
process to remain constrained by the political decisions of Chinese leaderships – the inverse of 
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the much-desired legal constraint on politics that lawyers and contract-oriented IR scholars 
promote. PRC contributions to the interaction in forging the convention were insufficient to 
render the dispute resolution regime toothless. While that preference was not honored in the 
treaty, the PRC interpreted away the binding and compulsory nature of dispute resolution 
mechanisms. China’s interpretation of its obligations under this particular arbitration process 
does not bode well for subsequent internalization and implementation of the arbitral award.  
Judgment on internalization and implementation will have to await a sufficient volume of 
practice related to the arbitral award to accumulate as evidence. Still, even at this early stage, we 
have some substance for analysis in China’s unequivocal and shrill rejection of the legitimacy of 
the arbitration procedure and frequently repeated pledge not to recognize or implement the 
award. Full reckoning with the implications of this award requires analysis of the parties’ 
implementation of the award; China need not formally accept its normative validity in order to 
be influenced by the judgment rendered in the award.  
Aspects of the award concerning the EEZ that will bear especially close consideration are: the 
determination that none of China’s claimed territories in the Spratly Islands support human 
habitation or economic life of their own (UNCLOS III, Article 121[3]) and thus do not rate EEZs 
or continental shelves; the determination that the “9-dashed line” does not grant China any 
sovereign rights or jurisdiction, historic or otherwise, because they were extinguished by the 
advent of the EEZ regime; and the determination that a variety of Chinese actions in the EEZ 
were contrary to established norms for marine environmental protection. This study’s findings 
suggest that China will persist in decoupling its practices from those prescribed in UNCLOS, 
while seeking to promote its practices as in conformity with its interpretation of the regime. 
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Sustained observation will allow the thesis to be tested and, if necessary, revised. 
A Non-Unitary Actor? 
One factor that may aid this analysis is a further disaggregation of the state. The actors who will 
“obey” or disobey or transform the norms of the EEZ in (not) implementing the arbitral award 
are not necessarily the central political-military leaders of the party-state in Beijing. While the 
study has established a sound basis for understanding their decisions vis-à-vis the EEZ as 
deliberate and strategic, the indeterminacy characteristic of China’s political-legal system 
ensures significant scope for variation further from the center. One upshot of this indeterminacy 
and the generally weak legal institutions is a lack of capacity to directly and effectively issue 
commands to local actors; except in areas of highest priority, these cadres and apparatchiks are 
charged with interpreting often vague policy demands and adapting them for local 
implementation. Even in diminishing the expected role of “norms entrepreneurs,” lawyers, 
judges, and others in a typical transnational legal process, this research has gestured towards the 
non-trivial role of actors at lower levels – whether bureaucrats, coast guard officers, fishermen, 
legal scholars. Practice is the central object, and these actors are ultimately the ones charged with 
practical implementation.  
Attitudes toward international law are by no means distributed uniformly across China. While 
there is a remarkable degree of conformity in public pronouncements, and a great deal of 
homogeneity induced by standardized (and highly politicized) educational policies, my 
experiences interacting with a small slice of the international law community indicate quite a 
wide range of views on the function of the law of the sea in China’s disputes. In the current 
political climate, voices dissenting from policy (or unwilling to quickly adjust to new policy) are 
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severely marginalized and may remain so indefinitely. Nonetheless, we may yet find interesting 
variation between the practices of diplomats in Beijing whose priority is low-key stability and 
those of provincial leaders in, say, Hainan province who are likely to profit most directly from 
enhanced resource development in disputed zones. The signals these more local actors send to 
the actors operating in disputed zones to fish or exploit oil and gas or enforce domestic law may 
be at odds with central directives.  
In the case of the arbitral award, there are a few important indicators of the extent to which the 
center will completely dictate PRC practices. Patriotic Chinese fishermen, seized of the notion 
that the Scarborough Shoal (黄岩岛) is China’s “sacred” and “ancient” traditional fishing ground, 
may resist Beijing’s efforts to strike a compromise with the Philippines, a process already 
underway. The perception or reality of strong support from the well-resourced and motivated 
China Coast Guard may amplify this tendency. PLA Navy officers unremittingly hostile to the 
idea that any international legal decision can infringe upon their strategic prerogatives may also 
resist in a variety of ways, though likely not on the water’s surface. Elite political leaders in 
Beijing may not themselves be in full accord, despite the norm of consensus-based decision-
making, and the policies adopted may be unsatisfactory or contradictory as a result. Assuming 
the persistence of strong and assertive leadership from Xi Jinping, these lower-level variations 
may not emerge as dominant patterns, but should be considered when interpreting variations in 
observed practices. In any event, it is imperative to resist the trap of reifying China as a unitary 
actor; even where central authority appears to be the dominant force in policy, as in this case, 
assuming its full coherence throughout the implementation process is unwise. 
Formation of Regional Custom? 
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More sweepingly, the clarity and precision of the ruling against China starkly poses the question 
of whether or not Chinese practice is sufficient to alter the norms as currently practiced by most 
states. The express Chinese intention to overwhelm those existing norms with persistent 
objection to disadvantageous elements and diligent practice of its own interpretations of those 
norms confronts a major jurisprudential obstacle: customary norms do not necessarily adjust to 
the “new normal” where other states do not recognize that behavior as lawful. As the ICJ ruled in 
its Nicaragua v. United States award, “[the court] does not consider that, for a rule to be 
established as customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity 
with the rule...the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be 
consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule 
should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition 
of a new rule.”9 The ruling confirms that powerful states cannot transform customary law by 
individual practice alone. The judgment was ignored by the United States, which withdrew its 
acceptance of the ICJ’s jurisdiction prior to the decision and set an unfortunate precedent for 
China. In that case, as perhaps in the present one involving China, one powerful state’s defection 
may not be enough to meaningfully influence the content of a customary rule. 
This subject of change and development in customary international law lies well beyond the 
scope of this study. However, it bears brief remark because if Chinese practices are to be valid 
under international law, such a legal transformation is the only logical alternative to a formal 
amendment to UNCLOS III. In delivering an authoritative decision on the “interpretation and 
application” of the law of the sea, in line with the treaty’s mandate (UNCLOS III, Article 279), 
the arbitral award ruled out the possibility that substantial parts of Chinese claims may be 
																																																						
9 International Court of Justice 1986: para. 186 
Conclusion – Summary and Future Prospects 
	 321 
chalked up to indeterminacy in the Convention. Custom is a live arena of debate in international 
legal scholarship, the subject of an ongoing International Law Commission investigation into the 
very “identification of customary international law,” which must precede judgment about its 
proper application.10 For present purposes, suffice it to say that customary international law 
remains susceptible to purposive application of political power, even if the jurisprudence is not 
fully developed. States capable of establishing a behavioral norm and unilaterally enforcing it, as 
China arguably is becoming in the South and East China Seas, may have a creditable claim to be 
the author of new (or at least “special” or “regional”) customary norms. In the case at hand, the 
behavioral norm will be in tension with an authoritative decision of an international court. This is 
a case whose development bears close scrutiny by international law and international relations 
scholars, and will occupy my attention in extending and broadening this study in the future.  
Implications of Growing Maritime Capability 
That capacity to sustain and enforce a “new normal,” at least for rights and jurisdiction in 
disputed maritime space of East Asia, will depend in large part on China’s military capabilities, a 
second of the major lacunae in this study. These capabilities, no doubt, will play a critical role in 
shaping the practice of other states operating in this space. Observation of the patterns of Chinese 
naval operations in its own and others’ EEZs will provide a longer-term test of the argument 
from power that international law does not meaningfully constrain strong states. It may be that 
the use of international law as a “defensive weapon,” or instrument of closure to deny or limit 
foreign access, is a temporally limited campaign. With sufficient “anti-access, area denial” 
capabilities, the legal niceties may fall by the wayside in Chinese diplomacy – especially if 
																																																						
10 See International Law Commission “Identification of Customary International Law” website, including the 
several reports and ongoing studies on the subject http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/1_13.shtml  
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further arbitrations or other authoritative judgments on the law of the sea place China’s conduct 
further and further outside the bounds of international law. 
One interesting tension that hints at such a development is the steadily growing activity of the 
PLAN fleet in foreign EEZs. These activities are occurring not just in disputed zones that are at 
least plausibly part of China’s own EEZ, but in undisputed EEZs administered by Japan and the 
United States. The indeterminacy of China’s own domestic law on this subject merely grants law 
enforcement agencies the discretion to declare foreign activities in Chinese EEZs as damaging to 
China’s security interests and thus illegal (see Chapter 5); there is no specific legal prohibition 
on the activity, preserving the flexibility for Chinese actors to interpret that law to adjust to 
political circumstances. At any rate, it seems likely that the PLAN would be dismissive of any 
domestic law that purported to regulate their freedom of action in domains they deem important 
to China’s broader security.11 These operational patterns bear continued observation and would 
serve as a worthy empirical extension of the narrower legal analysis undertaken in this study. 
Indeed, this study focuses only on the legal dimension of what must be reckoned as a far broader 
and more comprehensive effort to secure control of the territory and maritime space along 
China’s vulnerable coast. “Creeping jurisdiction” is only the observable, legal manifestation of 
this political campaign. Now that the once-backward PLAN is capable of operating in the 
disputed zones and reinforced by substantial power-projection capabilities from the coast, the 
legal element – arguably always peripheral – may diminish as a focus of Chinese diplomacy. 
Whatever its legal status, closure would be the basic norm of a Chinese-dominated western 
																																																						
11 Author interview with PLAN legal specialist at Beijing University of Politics and Law (March 2015); the 
interviewee argued vociferously that the few lawyers in the PLAN felt that domestic maritime law “totally 
unnecessary.” 
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Pacific. The openness preferred by European and then American navies is a characteristic of a 
liberal, maritime order that requires sustained enforcement to remain effective. That is a system 
in which illiberal, continental-minded Chinese strategists consider their nation to be at a 
permanent disadvantage. With military capabilities to enforce legal claims to the space along 
their vulnerable littoral, China may redefine that space as more of a continental zone, an 
extension of the boundaries of the sovereign state in which foreign users enjoy only limited 
rights of transit and trade. Put at risk by Chinese submarine, missile, and robust air and surface 
warfare capabilities (aided by the establishment of PRC military facilities on disputed Spratly 
features), foreign military users’ access could steadily erode. The economic and strategic 
consequences of this remain purely speculative (some suggest a Chinese “sphere of influence”); 
less speculation is required to predict the fate of “Western” international law in a space where 
Western power is effectively excluded. The law of the sea would remain, but bearing the 
illiberal, indeterminate mark of China’s politically-dominated legal institutions, now operating at 
scale throughout the region. Chinese practices of international law bear the imprint of their 
domestic legal institutions, which we might reasonably expect to be externalized to the 
governance of the broader region.   
International Law With Chinese Characteristics 
Whatever the longer-term implications for regional order, and whatever our normative views on 
the desirability of a Sinic substitute for the familiar Anglo-American system, there is significant 
contemporary demand for original research and analysis on how China understands and practices 
international law in the maritime domain. All stakeholders (and especially the United States) 
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publicly agree that the disputes must be handled according to international law,12 but there is 
little agreement on what that means in theory or practice. For the US, “[i]nternational law, not 
power or an ambiguous sense of historical entitlement, should be the basis of making and 
enforcing maritime claims.”13 Historical entitlement looms large in the Chinese interpretation of 
the law of the sea and broader worldview; these two attitudes are not easily reconciled. 
The Chinese voice of dissent on what “the rules” are and how they must be applied is 
unmistakable. Hopeful estimates of China’s willingness to “obey” international law during its 
period of reform and opening are giving way to the reality of a more disruptive stage in the 
PRC’s relationship to the international legal system, one in which China is less constrained by 
international norms and rules and more engaged in transforming them in its image. The influence 
of China’s rising power in contemporary international relations is evident in its evolving 
attitudes toward and practice of international law. China’s “creeping jurisdiction” bears further 
study as a leading indicator of this process. 
																																																						
12 In July 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told an ASEAN Regional forum meeting in Hanoi, “the United 
States, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons, 
and respect for international law in the South China Sea,” (http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/145095.htm). 
Since then, U.S. leaders including the President have voiced strong support for peaceful resolution of disputes 
through international legal mechanisms as a main pillar of U.S. foreign policy in the region. 
13 Fuchs 2014 
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PART V 




Specific legal regime of the exclusive economic zone 
The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, 
subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and 
jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are 
governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention. 
 
Article56 
Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the exclusive economic zone 
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has: 
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, 
conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or 
non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the 
seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the 
economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the 
production of energy from the water, currents and winds; 
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this 
Convention with regard to: 
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, 
installations and structures; 
(ii) marine scientific research; 
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment; 
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention. 
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2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the 
exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and 
duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this 
Convention. 
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the seabed and subsoil shall be 
exercised in accordance with Part VI. 
 
Article57 
Breadth of the exclusive economic zone 
The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
 
Article58 
Rights and duties of other States in the exclusive economic zone 
1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, 
subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in 
article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and 
pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, 
such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and 
pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention. 
2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the 
exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part. 
3. In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention in the 
exclusive economic zone, States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the 
coastal State and shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal 
State in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of 
international law in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part. 
 
Article59 
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Basis for the resolution of conflicts 
regarding the attribution of rights and jurisdiction 
in the exclusive economic zone 
In cases where this Convention does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to the coastal 
State or to other States within the exclusive economic zone, and a conflict arises 
between the interests of the coastal State and any other State or States, the conflict 
should be resolved on the basis of equity and in the light of all the relevant 
circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of the interests involved 
to the parties as well as to the international community as a whole. 
 
Article60 
Artificial islands, installations and structures 
in the exclusive economic zone 
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have the exclusive right to 
construct and to authorize and regulate the construction, operation and use of: 
(a) artificial islands; 
(b) installations and structures for the purposes provided for in 
article 56 and other economic purposes; 
(c) installations and structures which may interfere with the 
exercise of the rights of the coastal State in the zone. 
2. The coastal State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such artificial islands, 
installations and structures, including jurisdiction with regard to customs, fiscal, 
health, safety and immigration laws and regulations. 
3. Due notice must be given of the construction of such artificial islands, installations 
or structures, and permanent means for giving warning of their presence must be 
maintained. Any installations or structures which are abandoned or disused shall be 
removed to ensure safety of navigation, taking into account any generally accepted 
international standards established in this regard by the competent international 
organization. Such removal shall also have due regard to fishing, the protection of the 
marine environment and the rights and duties of other States. Appropriate publicity 
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shall be given to the depth, position and dimensions of any installations or structures 
not entirely removed. 
4. The coastal State may, where necessary, establish reasonable safety zones around 
such artificial islands, installations and structures in which it may take appropriate 
measures to ensure the safety both of navigation and of the artificial islands, 
installations and structures. 
5. The breadth of the safety zones shall be determined by the coastal State, taking into 
account applicable international standards. Such zones shall be designed to ensure that 
they are reasonably related to the nature and function of the artificial islands, 
installations or structures, and shall not exceed a distance of 500 metres around them, 
measured from each point of their outer edge, except as authorized by generally 
accepted international standards or as recommended by the competent international 
organization. Due notice shall be given of the extent of safety zones. 
6. All ships must respect these safety zones and shall comply with generally accepted 
international standards regarding navigation in the vicinity of artificial islands, 
installations, structures and safety zones. 
7. Artificial islands, installations and structures and the safety zones around them may 
not be established where interference may be caused to the use of recognized sea lanes 
essential to international navigation. 
8. Artificial islands, installations and structures do not possess the status of islands. 
They have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the 
delimitation of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf. 
 
Article61 
Conservation of the living resources 
1. The coastal State shall determine the allowable catch of the living resources in its 
exclusive economic zone. 
2. The coastal State, taking into account the best scientific evidence available to it, 
shall ensure through proper conservation and management measures that the 
maintenance of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone is not endangered 
by over-exploitation. As appropriate, the coastal State and competent international 
organizations, whether subregional, regional or global, shall cooperate to this end. 
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3. Such measures shall also be designed to maintain or restore populations of 
harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield, as 
qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors, including the economic 
needs of coastal fishing communities and the special requirements of developing 
States, and taking into account fishing patterns, the interdependence of stocks and any 
generally recommended international minimum standards, whether subregional, 
regional or global. 
4. In taking such measures the coastal State shall take into consideration the effects on 
species associated with or dependent upon harvested species with a view to 
maintaining or restoring populations of such associated or dependent species above 
levels at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened. 
5. Available scientific information, catch and fishing effort statistics, and other data 
relevant to the conservation of fish stocks shall be contributed and exchanged on a 
regular basis through competent international organizations, whether subregional, 
regional or global, where appropriate and with participation by all States concerned, 
including States whose nationals are allowed to fish in the exclusive economic zone. 
 
Article62 
Utilization of the living resources 
1. The coastal State shall promote the objective of optimum utilization of the living 
resources in the exclusive economic zone without prejudice to article 61. 
2. The coastal State shall determine its capacity to harvest the living resources of the 
exclusive economic zone. Where the coastal State does not have the capacity to 
harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other arrangements 
and pursuant to the terms, conditions, laws and regulations referred to in paragraph 4, 
give other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch, having particular regard 
to the provisions of articles 69 and 70, especially in relation to the developing States 
mentioned therein. 
3. In giving access to other States to its exclusive economic zone under this article, the 
coastal State shall take into account all relevant factors, including, inter alia, the 
significance of the living resources of the area to the economy of the coastal State 
concerned and its other national interests, the provisions of articles 69 and 70, the 
requirements of developing States in the subregion or region in harvesting part of the 
surplus and the need to minimize economic dislocation in States whose nationals have 
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habitually fished in the zone or which have made substantial efforts in research and 
identification of stocks. 
4. Nationals of other States fishing in the exclusive economic zone shall comply with 
the conservation measures and with the other terms and conditions established in the 
laws and regulations of the coastal State. These laws and regulations shall be 
consistent with this Convention and may relate, inter alia, to the following: 
(a) licensing of fishermen, fishing vessels and equipment, 
including payment of fees and other forms of remuneration, 
which, in the case of developing coastal States, may consist of 
adequate compensation in the field of financing, equipment and 
technology relating to the fishing industry; 
(b) determining the species which may be caught, and fixing 
quotas of catch, whether in relation to particular stocks or groups 
of stocks or catch per vessel over a period of time or to the catch 
by nationals of any State during a specified period; 
(c) regulating seasons and areas of fishing, the types, sizes and 
amount of gear, and the types, sizes and number of fishing vessels 
that may be used; 
(d) fixing the age and size of fish and other species that may be 
caught; 
(e) specifying information required of fishing vessels, including 
catch and effort statistics and vessel position reports; 
(f) requiring, under the authorization and control of the coastal 
State, the conduct of specified fisheries research programmes and 
regulating the conduct of such research, including the sampling of 
catches, disposition of samples and reporting of associated 
scientific data; 
(g) the placing of observers or trainees on board such vessels by 
the coastal State; 
(h) the landing of all or any part of the catch by such vessels in the 
ports of the coastal State; 
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(i) terms and conditions relating to joint ventures or other 
cooperative arrangements; 
(j) requirements for the training of personnel and the transfer of 
fisheries technology, including enhancement of the coastal State's 
capability of undertaking fisheries research; 
(k) enforcement procedures. 




Stocks occurring within the exclusive economic zones of 
two or more coastal States or both within the exclusive economic zone 
and in an area beyond and adjacent to it 
1. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur within the exclusive 
economic zones of two or more coastal States, these States shall seek, either directly 
or through appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to agree upon the 
measures necessary to coordinate and ensure the conservation and development of 
such stocks without prejudice to the other provisions of this Part. 
2. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur both within the 
exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone, the coastal 
State and the States fishing for such stocks in the adjacent area shall seek, either 
directly or through appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to agree upon 
the measures necessary for the conservation of these stocks in the adjacent area. 
 
Article64 
Highly migratory species 
1. The coastal State and other States whose nationals fish in the region for the highly 
migratory species listed in Annex I shall cooperate directly or through appropriate 
international organizations with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the 
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objective of optimum utilization of such species throughout the region, both within 
and beyond the exclusive economic zone. In regions for which no appropriate 
international organization exists, the coastal State and other States whose nationals 
harvest these species in the region shall cooperate to establish such an organization 
and participate in its work. 




Nothing in this Part restricts the right of a coastal State or the competence of an 
international organization, as appropriate, to prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation 
of marine mammals more strictly than provided for in this Part. States shall cooperate 
with a view to the conservation of marine mammals and in the case of cetaceans shall 
in particular work through the appropriate international organizations for their 




1. States in whose rivers anadromous stocks originate shall have the primary interest 
in and responsibility for such stocks. 
2. The State of origin of anadromous stocks shall ensure their conservation by the 
establishment of appropriate regulatory measures for fishing in all waters landward of 
the outer limits of its exclusive economic zone and for fishing provided for in 
paragraph 3(b). The State of origin may, after consultations with the other States 
referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 fishing these stocks, establish total allowable catches 
for stocks originating in its rivers. 
3. (a) Fisheries for anadromous stocks shall be conducted only in 
waters landward of the outer limits of exclusive economic zones, 
except in cases where this provision would result in economic 
dislocation for a State other than the State of origin. With respect 
to such fishing beyond the outer limits of the exclusive economic 
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zone, States concerned shall maintain consultations with a view to 
achieving agreement on terms and conditions of such fishing 
giving due regard to the conservation requirements and the needs 
of the State of origin in respect of these stocks. 
(b) The State of origin shall cooperate in minimizing economic 
dislocation in such other States fishing these stocks, taking into 
account the normal catch and the mode of operations of such 
States, and all the areas in which such fishing has occurred. 
(c) States referred to in subparagraph (b), participating by 
agreement with the State of origin in measures to renew 
anadromous stocks, particularly by expenditures for that purpose, 
shall be given special consideration by the State of origin in the 
harvesting of stocks originating in its rivers. 
(d) Enforcement of regulations regarding anadromous stocks 
beyond the exclusive economic zone shall be by agreement 
between the State of origin and the other States concerned. 
4. In cases where anadromous stocks migrate into or through the waters landward of 
the outer limits of the exclusive economic zone of a State other than the State of 
origin, such State shall cooperate with the State of origin with regard to the 
conservation and management of such stocks. 
5. The State of origin of anadromous stocks and other States fishing these stocks shall 
make arrangements for the implementation of the provisions of this article, where 




1. A coastal State in whose waters catadromous species spend the greater part of their 
life cycle shall have responsibility for the management of these species and shall 
ensure the ingress and egress of migrating fish. 
2. Harvesting of catadromous species shall be conducted only in waters landward of 
the outer limits of exclusive economic zones. When conducted in exclusive economic 
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zones, harvesting shall be subject to this article and the other provisions of this 
Convention concerning fishing in these zones. 
3. In cases where catadromous fish migrate through the exclusive economic zone of 
another State, whether as juvenile or maturing fish, the management, including 
harvesting, of such fish shall be regulated by agreement between the State mentioned 
in paragraph 1 and the other State concerned. Such agreement shall ensure the rational 
management of the species and take into account the responsibilities of the State 




This Part does not apply to sedentary species as defined in article 77, paragraph 4. 
 
Article69 
Right of land-locked States 
1. Land-locked States shall have the right to participate, on an equitable basis, in the 
exploitation of an appropriate part of the surplus of the living resources of the 
exclusive economic zones of coastal States of the same subregion or region, taking 
into account the relevant economic and geographical circumstances of all the States 
concerned and in conformity with the provisions of this article and of articles 61 
and 62. 
2. The terms and modalities of such participation shall be established by the States 
concerned through bilateral, subregional or regional agreements taking into 
account, inter alia: 
(a) the need to avoid effects detrimental to fishing communities or 
fishing industries of the coastal State; 
(b) the extent to which the land-locked State, in accordance with 
the provisions of this article, is participating or is entitled to 
participate under existing bilateral, subregional or regional 
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agreements in the exploitation of living resources of the exclusive 
economic zones of other coastal States; 
(c) the extent to which other land-locked States and 
geographically disadvantaged States are participating in the 
exploitation of the living resources of the exclusive economic 
zone of the coastal State and the consequent need to avoid a 
particular burden for any single coastal State or a part of it; 
(d) the nutritional needs of the populations of the respective 
States. 
3. When the harvesting capacity of a coastal State approaches a point which would 
enable it to harvest the entire allowable catch of the living resources in its exclusive 
economic zone, the coastal State and other States concerned shall cooperate in the 
establishment of equitable arrangements on a bilateral, subregional or regional basis to 
allow for participation of developing land-locked States of the same subregion or 
region in the exploitation of the living resources of the exclusive economic zones of 
coastal States of the subregion or region, as may be appropriate in the circumstances 
and on terms satisfactory to all parties. In the implementation of this provision the 
factors mentioned in paragraph 2 shall also be taken into account. 
4. Developed land-locked States shall, under the provisions of this article, be entitled 
to participate in the exploitation of living resources only in the exclusive economic 
zones of developed coastal States of the same subregion or region having regard to the 
extent to which the coastal State, in giving access to other States to the living 
resources of its exclusive economic zone, has taken into account the need to minimize 
detrimental effects on fishing communities and economic dislocation in States whose 
nationals have habitually fished in the zone. 
5. The above provisions are without prejudice to arrangements agreed upon in 
subregions or regions where the coastal States may grant to land-locked States of the 
same subregion or region equal or preferential rights for the exploitation of the living 
resources in the exclusive economic zones. 
 
Article70 
Right of geographically disadvantaged States 
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1. Geographically disadvantaged States shall have the right to participate, on an 
equitable basis, in the exploitation of an appropriate part of the surplus of the living 
resources of the exclusive economic zones of coastal States of the same subregion or 
region, taking into account the relevant economic and geographical circumstances of 
all the States concerned and in conformity with the provisions of this article and of 
articles 61 and 62. 
2. For the purposes of this Part, "geographically disadvantaged States" means coastal 
States, including States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, whose geographical 
situation makes them dependent upon the exploitation of the living resources of the 
exclusive economic zones of other States in the subregion or region for adequate 
supplies of fish for the nutritional purposes of their populations or parts thereof, and 
coastal States which can claim no exclusive economic zones of their own. 
3. The terms and modalities of such participation shall be established by the States 
concerned through bilateral, subregional or regional agreements taking into 
account, inter alia: 
(a) the need to avoid effects detrimental to fishing communities or 
fishing industries of the coastal State; 
(b) the extent to which the geographically disadvantaged State, in 
accordance with the provisions of this article, is participating or is 
entitled to participate under existing bilateral, subregional or 
regional agreements in the exploitation of living resources of the 
exclusive economic zones of other coastal States; 
(c) the extent to which other geographically disadvantaged States 
and land-locked States are participating in the exploitation of the 
living resources of the exclusive economic zone of the coastal 
State and the consequent need to avoid a particular burden for any 
single coastal State or a part of it; 
(d) the nutritional needs of the populations of the respective 
States. 
4. When the harvesting capacity of a coastal State approaches a point which would 
enable it to harvest the entire allowable catch of the living resources in its exclusive 
economic zone, the coastal State and other States concerned shall cooperate in the 
establishment of equitable arrangements on a bilateral, subregional or regional basis to 
allow for participation of developing geographically disadvantaged States of the same 
subregion or region in the exploitation of the living resources of the exclusive 
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economic zones of coastal States of the subregion or region, as may be appropriate in 
the circumstances and on terms satisfactory to all parties. In the implementation of 
this provision the factors mentioned in paragraph 3 shall also be taken into account. 
5. Developed geographically disadvantaged States shall, under the provisions of this 
article, be entitled to participate in the exploitation of living resources only in the 
exclusive economic zones of developed coastal States of the same subregion or region 
having regard to the extent to which the coastal State, in giving access to other States 
to the living resources of its exclusive economic zone, has taken into account the need 
to minimize detrimental effects on fishing communities and economic dislocation in 
States whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone. 
6. The above provisions are without prejudice to arrangements agreed upon in 
subregions or regions where the coastal States may grant to geographically 
disadvantaged States of the same subregion or region equal or preferential rights for 
the exploitation of the living resources in the exclusive economic zones. 
 
Article71 
Non-applicability of articles 69 and 70 
The provisions of articles 69 and 70 do not apply in the case of a coastal State whose 
economy is overwhelmingly dependent on the exploitation of the living resources of 
its exclusive economic zone. 
 
Article72 
Restrictions on transfer of rights 
1. Rights provided under articles 69 and 70 to exploit living resources shall not be 
directly or indirectly transferred to third States or their nationals by lease or licence, 
by establishing joint ventures or in any other manner which has the effect of such 
transfer unless otherwise agreed by the States concerned. 
2. The foregoing provision does not preclude the States concerned from obtaining 
technical or financial assistance from third States or international organizations in 
order to facilitate the exercise of the rights pursuant to articles 69 and 70, provided 
that it does not have the effect referred to in paragraph 1. 




Enforcement of laws and regulations of the coastal State 
1. The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, exploit, 
conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive economic zone, take such 
measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be 
necessary to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by it in 
conformity with this Convention. 
2. Arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released upon the posting of 
reasonable bond or other security. 
3. Coastal State penalties for violations of fisheries laws and regulations in the 
exclusive economic zone may not include imprisonment, in the absence of agreements 
to the contrary by the States concerned, or any other form of corporal punishment. 
4. In cases of arrest or detention of foreign vessels the coastal State shall promptly 
notify the flag State, through appropriate channels, of the action taken and of any 
penalties subsequently imposed. 
 
Article74 
Delimitation of the exclusive economic zone 
between States with opposite or adjacent coasts 
1. The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with opposite or 
adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as 
referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to 
achieve an equitable solution. 
2. If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, the States 
concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in Part XV. 
3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States concerned, in a spirit 
of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional 
arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to 
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jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be 
without prejudice to the final delimitation. 
4. Where there is an agreement in force between the States concerned, questions 
relating to the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone shall be determined in 
accordance with the provisions of that agreement. 
 
Article75 
Charts and lists of geographical coordinates 
1. Subject to this Part, the outer limit lines of the exclusive economic zone and the 
lines of delimitation drawn in accordance with article 74 shall be shown on charts of a 
scale or scales adequate for ascertaining their position. Where appropriate, lists of 
geographical coordinates of points, specifying the geodetic datum, may be substituted 
for such outer limit lines or lines of delimitation. 
2. The coastal State shall give due publicity to such charts or lists of geographical 
coordinates and shall deposit a copy of each such chart or list with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations. 
  
 






MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
 
SECTION 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
 
Article 238 
Right to conduct marine scientific research 
All States, irrespective of their geographical location, and competent international 
organizations have the right to conduct marine scientific research subject to the rights 
and duties of other States as provided for in this Convention. 
 
Article 239 
Promotion of marine scientific research 
States and competent international organizations shall promote and facilitate the 




General principles for the conduct of marine scientific research 
In the conduct of marine scientific research the following principles shall apply: 
(a) marine scientific research shall be conducted exclusively for peaceful 
purposes; 
(b) marine scientific research shall be conducted with appropriate 
scientific methods and means compatible with this Convention; 
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(c) marine scientific research shall not unjustifiably interfere with other 
legitimate uses of the sea compatible with this Convention and shall be 
duly respected in the course of such uses; 
(d) marine scientific research shall be conducted in compliance with all 
relevant regulations adopted in conformity with this Convention 




Non-recognition of marine scientific research activities 
as the legal basis for claims 
Marine scientific research activities shall not constitute the legal basis for any claim to 
any part of the marine environment or its resources. 
SECTION 2. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
 
Article 242 
Promotion of international cooperation 
1. States and competent international organizations shall, in accordance with the 
principle of respect for sovereignty and jurisdiction and on the basis of mutual benefit, 
promote international cooperation in marine scientific research for peaceful purposes. 
2. In this context, without prejudice to the rights and duties of States under this 
Convention, a State, in the application of this Part, shall provide, as appropriate, other 
States with a reasonable opportunity to obtain from it, or with its cooperation, 
information necessary to prevent and control damage to the health and safety of 
persons and to the marine environment. 
 
Article 243 




States and competent international organizations shall cooperate, through the 
conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements, to create favourable conditions for 
the conduct of marine scientific research in the marine environment and to integrate 
the efforts of scientists in studying the essence of phenomena and processes occurring 
in the marine environment and the interrelations between them. 
 
Article 244 
Publication and dissemination of information and knowledge 
1. States and competent international organizations shall, in accordance with this 
Convention, make available by publication and dissemination through appropriate 
channels information on proposed major programmes and their objectives as well as 
knowledge resulting from marine scientific research. 
2. For this purpose, States, both individually and in cooperation with other States and 
with competent international organizations, shall actively promote the flow of 
scientific data and information and the transfer of knowledge resulting from marine 
scientific research, especially to developing States, as well as the strengthening of the 
autonomous marine scientific research capabilities of developing States 
through, inter alia, programmes to provide adequate education and training of their 
technical and scientific personnel. 
SECTION 3. CONDUCT AND PROMOTION OF 
MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
 
Article 245 
Marine scientific research in the territorial sea 
Coastal States, in the exercise of their sovereignty, have the exclusive right to 
regulate, authorize and conduct marine scientific research in their territorial sea. 
Marine scientific research therein shall be conducted only with the express consent of 
and under the conditions set forth by the coastal State. 
 
Article 246 
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Marine scientific research in the exclusive economic zone 
and on the continental shelf 
1. Coastal States, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, have the right to regulate, 
authorize and conduct marine scientific research in their exclusive economic zone and 
on their continental shelf in accordance with the relevant provisions of this 
Convention. 
2. Marine scientific research in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental 
shelf shall be conducted with the consent of the coastal State. 
3. Coastal States shall, in normal circumstances, grant their consent for marine 
scientific research projects by other States or competent international organizations in 
their exclusive economic zone or on their continental shelf to be carried out in 
accordance with this Convention exclusively for peaceful purposes and in order to 
increase scientific knowledge of the marine environment for the benefit of all 
mankind. To this end, coastal States shall establish rules and procedures ensuring that 
such consent will not be delayed or denied unreasonably. 
4. For the purposes of applying paragraph 3, normal circumstances may exist in spite 
of the absence of diplomatic relations between the coastal State and the researching 
State. 
5. Coastal States may however in their discretion withhold their consent to the 
conduct of a marine scientific research project of another State or competent 
international organization in the exclusive economic zone or on the continental shelf 
of the coastal State if that project: 
(a) is of direct significance for the exploration and exploitation of 
natural resources, whether living or non-living; 
(b) involves drilling into the continental shelf, the use of 
explosives or the introduction of harmful substances into the 
marine environment; 
(c) involves the construction, operation or use of artificial islands, 
installations and structures referred to in articles 60 and 80; 
(d) contains information communicated pursuant to article 248 
regarding the nature and objectives of the project which is 




organization has outstanding obligations to the coastal State from 
a prior research project. 
6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5, coastal States may not exercise their 
discretion to withhold consent under subparagraph (a) of that paragraph in respect of 
marine scientific research projects to be undertaken in accordance with the provisions 
of this Part on the continental shelf, beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines 
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, outside those specific areas 
which coastal States may at any time publicly designate as areas in which exploitation 
or detailed exploratory operations focused on those areas are occurring or will occur 
within a reasonable period of time. Coastal States shall give reasonable notice of the 
designation of such areas, as well as any modifications thereto, but shall not be 
obliged to give details of the operations therein. 
7. The provisions of paragraph 6 are without prejudice to the rights of coastal States 
over the continental shelf as established in article 77. 
8. Marine scientific research activities referred to in this article shall not unjustifiably 
interfere with activities undertaken by coastal States in the exercise of their sovereign 
rights and jurisdiction provided for in this Convention. 
 
Article 247 
Marine scientific research projects undertaken 
by or under the auspices of international organizations 
A coastal State which is a member of or has a bilateral agreement with an 
international organization, and in whose exclusive economic zone or on whose 
continental shelf that organization wants to carry out a marine scientific research 
project, directly or under its auspices, shall be deemed to have authorized the project 
to be carried out in conformity with the agreed specifications if that State approved 
the detailed project when the decision was made by the organization for the 
undertaking of the project, or is willing to participate in it, and has not expressed any 
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Duty to provide information to the coastal State 
States and competent international organizations which intend to undertake marine 
scientific research in the exclusive economic zone or on the continental shelf of a 
coastal State shall, not less than six months in advance of the expected starting date of 
the marine scientific research project, provide that State with a full description of: 
(a) the nature and objectives of the project; 
(b) the method and means to be used, including name, tonnage, type and 
class of vessels and a description of scientific equipment; 
(c) the precise geographical areas in which the project is to be 
conducted; 
(d) the expected date of first appearance and final departure of the 
research vessels, or deployment of the equipment and its removal, as 
appropriate; 
(e) the name of the sponsoring institution, its director, and the person in 
charge of the project; and 
(f) the extent to which it is considered that the coastal State should be 
able to participate or to be represented in the project. 
 
Article 249 
Duty to comply with certain conditions 
1. States and competent international organizations when undertaking marine 
scientific research in the exclusive economic zone or on the continental shelf of a 
coastal State shall comply with the following conditions: 
(a) ensure the right of the coastal State, if it so desires, to 
participate or be represented in the marine scientific research 
project, especially on board research vessels and other craft or 
scientific research installations, when practicable, without 
payment of any remuneration to the scientists of the coastal State 





(b) provide the coastal State, at its request, with preliminary 
reports, as soon as practicable, and with the final results and 
conclusions after the completion of the research; 
(c) undertake to provide access for the coastal State, at its request, 
to all data and samples derived from the marine scientific research 
project and likewise to furnish it with data which may be copied 
and samples which may be divided without detriment to their 
scientific value; 
(d) if requested, provide the coastal State with an assessment of 
such data, samples and research results or provide assistance in 
their assessment or interpretation; 
(e) ensure, subject to paragraph 2, that the research results are 
made internationally available through appropriate national or 
international channels, as soon as practicable; 
(f) inform the coastal State immediately of any major change in 
the research programme; 
(g) unless otherwise agreed, remove the scientific research 
installations or equipment once the research is completed. 
2. This article is without prejudice to the conditions established by the laws and 
regulations of the coastal State for the exercise of its discretion to grant or withhold 
consent pursuant to article 246, paragraph 5, including requiring prior agreement for 
making internationally available the research results of a project of direct significance 
for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources. 
 
Article 250 
Communications concerning marine scientific research projects 
Communications concerning the marine scientific research projects shall be made 
through appropriate official channels, unless otherwise agreed. 
 
Article 251 
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General criteria and guidelines 
States shall seek to promote through competent international organizations the 
establishment of general criteria and guidelines to assist States in ascertaining the 




States or competent international organizations may proceed with a marine scientific 
research project six months after the date upon which the information required 
pursuant to article 248 was provided to the coastal State unless within four months of 
the receipt of the communication containing such information the coastal State has 
informed the State or organization conducting the research that: 
(a) it has withheld its consent under the provisions of article 246; or 
(b) the information given by that State or competent international 
organization regarding the nature or objectives of the project does not 
conform to the manifestly evident facts; or 
(c) it requires supplementary information relevant to conditions and the 
information provided for under articles 248 and 249; or 
(d) outstanding obligations exist with respect to a previous marine 
scientific research project carried out by that State or organization, with 
regard to conditions established in article 249. 
 
Article 253 
Suspension or cessation of marine scientific research activities 
1. A coastal State shall have the right to require the suspension of any marine 
scientific research activities in progress within its exclusive economic zone or on its 




(a) the research activities are not being conducted in accordance 
with the information communicated as provided under article 248 
upon which the consent of the coastal State was based; or 
(b) the State or competent international organization conducting 
the research activities fails to comply with the provisions of 
article 249 concerning the rights of the coastal State with respect 
to the marine scientific research project. 
2. A coastal State shall have the right to require the cessation of any marine scientific 
research activities in case of any non-compliance with the provisions of article 248 
which amounts to a major change in the research project or the research activities. 
3. A coastal State may also require cessation of marine scientific research activities if 
any of the situations contemplated in paragraph 1 are not rectified within a reasonable 
period of time. 
4. Following notification by the coastal State of its decision to order suspension or 
cessation, States or competent international organizations authorized to conduct 
marine scientific research activities shall terminate the research activities that are the 
subject of such a notification. 
5. An order of suspension under paragraph 1 shall be lifted by the coastal State and 
the marine scientific research activities allowed to continue once the researching State 
or competent international organization has complied with the conditions required 
under articles 248 and 249. 
 
Article 254 
Rights of neighbouring land-locked 
and geographically disadvantaged States 
1. States and competent international organizations which have submitted to a coastal 
State a project to undertake marine scientific research referred to in article 246, 
paragraph 3, shall give notice to the neighbouring land-locked and geographically 
disadvantaged States of the proposed research project, and shall notify the coastal 
State thereof. 
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2. After the consent has been given for the proposed marine scientific research project 
by the coastal State concerned, in accordance with article 246 and other relevant 
provisions of this Convention, States and competent international organizations 
undertaking such a project shall provide to the neighbouring land-locked and 
geographically disadvantaged States, at their request and when appropriate, relevant 
information as specified in article 248 and article 249, paragraph 1(f). 
3. The neighbouring land-locked and geographically disadvantaged States referred to 
above shall, at their request, be given the opportunity to participate, whenever 
feasible, in the proposed marine scientific research project through qualified experts 
appointed by them and not objected to by the coastal State, in accordance with the 
conditions agreed for the project, in conformity with the provisions of this 
Convention, between the coastal State concerned and the State or competent 
international organizations conducting the marine scientific research. 
4. States and competent international organizations referred to in paragraph 1 shall 
provide to the above-mentioned land-locked and geographically disadvantaged States, 
at their request, the information and assistance specified in article 249, paragraph 1(d), 
subject to the provisions of article 249, paragraph 2. 
 
Article 255 
Measures to facilitate marine scientific research 
and assist research vessels 
States shall endeavour to adopt reasonable rules, regulations and procedures to 
promote and facilitate marine scientific research conducted in accordance with this 
Convention beyond their territorial sea and, as appropriate, to facilitate, subject to the 
provisions of their laws and regulations, access to their harbours and promote 
assistance for marine scientific research vessels which comply with the relevant 
provisions of this Part. 
 
Article 256 




All States, irrespective of their geographical location, and competent international 
organizations have the right, in conformity with the provisions of Part XI, to conduct 
marine scientific research in the Area. 
 
Article 257 
Marine scientific research in the water column 
beyond the exclusive economic zone 
All States, irrespective of their geographical location, and competent international 
organizations have the right, in conformity with this Convention, to conduct marine 
scientific research in the water column beyond the limits of the exclusive economic 
zone. 
SECTION 4. SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH INSTALLATIONS OR EQUIPMENT 
IN THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 
 
Article 258 
Deployment and use 
The deployment and use of any type of scientific research installations or equipment 
in any area of the marine environment shall be subject to the same conditions as are 





The installations or equipment referred to in this section do not possess the status of 
islands. They have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect 
the delimitation of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone or the continental 
shelf. 
 




Safety zones of a reasonable breadth not exceeding a distance of 500 metres may be 
created around scientific research installations in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of this Convention. All States shall ensure that such safety zones are 
respected by their vessels. 
 
Article 261 
Non-interference with shipping routes 
The deployment and use of any type of scientific research installations or equipment 
shall not constitute an obstacle to established international shipping routes. 
 
Article 262 
Identification markings and warning signals 
Installations or equipment referred to in this section shall bear identification markings 
indicating the State of registry or the international organization to which they belong 
and shall have adequate internationally agreed warning signals to ensure safety at sea 
and the safety of air navigation, taking into account rules and standards established by 
competent international organizations. 
SECTION 5. RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY 
 
Article 263 
Responsibility and liability 
1. States and competent international organizations shall be responsible for ensuring 
that marine scientific research, whether undertaken by them or on their behalf, is 




2. States and competent international organizations shall be responsible and liable for 
the measures they take in contravention of this Convention in respect of marine 
scientific research conducted by other States, their natural or juridical persons or by 
competent international organizations, and shall provide compensation for damage 
resulting from such measures. 
3. States and competent international organizations shall be responsible and liable 
pursuant to article 235 for damage caused by pollution of the marine environment 
arising out of marine scientific research undertaken by them or on their behalf. 
SECTION 6. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
AND INTERIM MEASURES 
 
Article 264 
Settlement of disputes 
Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of this 
Convention with regard to marine scientific research shall be settled in accordance 




Pending settlement of a dispute in accordance with Part XV, sections 2 and 3, the 
State or competent international organization authorized to conduct a marine scientific 
research project shall not allow research activities to commence or continue without 
the express consent of the coastal State concerned. 
 




PRC Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf 
(Adopted at the third session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's 
Congress, 26 June 1998) 
 
Article 1 
This Act is adopted with a view to safeguarding the sovereign rights and jurisdiction exercised 
by the People's Republic of China over the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf 
and to protect China's maritime rights and interests. 
 
Article 2 
The exclusive economic zone of the People's Republic of China is an area beyond and adjacent 
to the territorial sea of the People's Republic of China extending to a distance of 200 nautical 
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
 
The continental shelf of the People's Republic of China comprises the seabed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its 
land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles 
from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge 
of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance. 
 
Conflicting claims regarding the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf by the 
People's Republic of China and States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be settled, on the 
basis of international law and in accordance with the principle of equity, by an agreement 
delimiting the areas so claimed. 
 
Article 3 
In the exclusive economic zone the People's Republic of China shall exercise sovereign rights for 
the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources of the 
waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other 
activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of 
energy from the water, current and winds. 
 
The People's Republic of China shall have jurisdiction in the exclusive economic zone with 
regard to the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; marine 
scientific research; and the protection and preservation of the marine environment. 
 




The People's Republic of China shall exercise sovereign rights over the continental shelf for the 
purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. 
 
The People's Republic of China shall have jurisdiction over the continental shelf with regard to 
the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; marine scientific 
research; and the protection and preservation of the marine environment. 
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The People's Republic of China shall have the exclusive right to authorize and regulate drilling 
on the continental shelf for all purposes. 
 
The natural resources of the continental shelf referred to in this Act consist of the mineral and 
other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to 
sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile 
on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed 
or the subsoil. 
 
Article 5 
Any international organization, foreign organization or individual entering the exclusive 
economic zone of the People's Republic of China to engage in fishery activities must have the 
approval of the competent authorities of the People's Republic of China and comply with the 
laws and regulations of the People's Republic of China and any treaties or agreements concluded 
by the relevant States and the People's Republic of China. 
 
The competent authorities of the People's Republic of China shall have the right to take any 
necessary conservation and management measures to ensure that the living resources of the 
exclusive economic zone are not endangered by over-exploitation. 
 
Article 6 
The competent authorities of the People's Republic of China shall have the right to conserve and 
manage the straddling fish stocks, highly migratory fish stocks and marine mammals of the 
exclusive economic zone, anadromous stocks originating in the rivers of the People's Republic of 
China and catadromous species that spend the greater part of their life cycle in the waters of the 
People's Republic of China. 
 
The People's Republic of China shall have the primary interest in anadromous stocks originating 
in China's rivers. 
 
Article 7 
Any international organization, foreign organization or individual engaging in the exploration or 
exploitation of the natural resources of the exclusive economic zone or continental shelf of the 
People's Republic of China or to carry out drilling in the continental shelf of the People's 
Republic of China must have the approval of the competent authorities of the People's Republic 
of China and comply with the laws and regulations of the People's Republic of China. 
 
Article 8 
The People's Republic of China shall have exclusive rights in the exclusive economic zone and 
the continental shelf to establish and to authorize and regulate the establishment, operation and 
use of artificial islands, installations and structures. 
 
The People's Republic of China shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the artificial islands, 
installations and structures in the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, including 
jurisdiction with regard to customs, fiscal, health, security and immigration laws and regulations. 
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The competent authorities of the People's Republic of China shall have the right to establish 
safety zones around the artificial islands, installations and structures in the exclusive economic 
zone and continental shelf in which they may take appropriate measures to ensure the safety both 
of navigation and of the artificial islands, installations and structures. 
 
Article 9 
Any international organization, foreign organization or individual engaging in marine scientific 
research in the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the People's Republic of China 
must have the approval of the competent authorities of the People's Republic of China and shall 
comply with the laws and regulations of the People's Republic of China. 
 
Article 10 
The competent authorities of the People's Republic of China shall have the right to take the 
necessary measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment and to 




Any State, provided that it observes international law and the laws and regulations of the 
People's Republic of China, shall enjoy in the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf 
of the People's Republic of China freedom of navigation and overflight and of laying submarine 
cables and pipelines, and shall enjoy other legal and practical marine benefits associated with 
these freedoms. The laying of submarine cables and pipelines must be authorized by the 
competent authorities of the People's Republic of China. 
 
Article 12 
The People's Republic of China may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, exploit, 
conserve and manage the living resources of the exclusive economic zone, take such measures, 
including boarding, inspection, arrest, detention and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to 
ensure compliance with its laws and regulations. 
 
In the event of a violation of the laws and regulations of the People's Republic of China in the 
exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf, the People's Republic of China shall have the 
right to take the necessary investigative measures in accordance with the law and may exercise 
the right of hot pursuit. 
 
Article 13 
Rights enjoyed by the People's Republic of China in the exclusive economic zone and the 
continental shelf that are not stipulated in this Act shall be exercised in accordance with 
international law and the laws and regulations of the People's Republic of China. 
 
Article 14 
 The provisions of this Act shall not affect the historical rights of the People's Republic of China. 
 
Article 15 
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This Act shall enter into force on the date of promulgation. 
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Note on fieldwork and sources  
The majority of the fieldwork informing this study was conducted over 12 months on a 
Department of Education Fulbright-Hayes Doctoral Dissertation Research Award in 2014 
and 2015. During this time, I secured an affiliation as a visiting scholar with the PRC 
National Institute for South China Sea Studies (NISCSS) in Hainan province. As a guest 
of a state think- tank, I enjoyed extraordinary access to some of the leading scholars, 
policy experts, and practitioners in the PRC maritime law and policy field. Not only was I 
able to establish professional and personal relationships with many of the Fellows at the 
institute (some of whom are among the most knowledgeable and internationally 
recognizable advocates for PRC maritime policy), but the affiliation made it much easier 
for me to meet with officials in the State Oceanic Administration, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, People’s Liberation Army, National People’s Congress, and experts from various 
universities and think-tanks across the PRC. Organizational constraints within the PRC 
bureaucracy tend to limit foreign access, but my status (as a visitor of a state 
organization) allowed them to speak with me without undue bureaucratic hassle. Where it 
still proved difficult to meet with officials, many were willing to meet with me over 
coffee, or to chat on the wings of the many conferences and workshops I attended during 
that year.  
Because of the extraordinary political sensitivity of these issues in the contemporary 
PRC, I conducted only a very small number of formal interviews, opting instead for 
informal discussions when guests visited NISCSS programs and events, and through 
conversations at the many workshops and conferences at which I presented (or at least 
attended). While it is unfair to say that there was total homogeneity in the views these 
PRC interlocutors expressed, it would be even more inaccurate to say that there was not 
substantial consensus on the fundamental “correctness” of PRC law, policy, or practice 
on these issues. There was some variation in the ways that they explained the purpose and 
function of PRC conduct in this domain, but no “dissenting views” on its basic 
appropriateness. Different agencies and departments predictably focused on those areas 
most closely related to their responsibilities, so my most substantive discussions on law 
unsurprising came from those with law of the sea portfolios. Those with purely political 
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duties were, on balance, somewhat more dismissive of the “constraining” effects of 
international law and repeatedly cited, almost verbatim, the litany of Chinese grievances 
about “unequal treaties” and decried the perversity and hypocrisy of the US position on 
international law, UNCLOS in particular. Many of the law of the sea experts were 
somewhat more hesitant to downplay the importance of UNCLOS obligations, but rather 
gave substantially more emphasis to various doctrines of international law that might 
allow them to change gradually, especially through customary international law. That this 
mechanism of change was broadly shared across departments and areas of law of the sea 
expertise is indicative of the substantial consensus on the instrumental qualities of 
international law, and highlighted its secondary role in PRC statecraft.  
That consensus, in my view, is largely a product of a PRC legal education curriculum and 
mode of pedagogy that are obliged to reflect, rather than shape or critique, the political 
demands of the day. This is a system of education to which I also enjoyed privileged 
access. My affiliation with NISCSS was secured by a Tsinghua law professor, whose 
graduate seminar on the law of the sea I audited in the winter of 2014. I also lectured in 
his class, comparing US and Chinese practice of the law of the sea. Additionally, in both 
2012 and 2014, I spent substantial time with the law and international relations faculty at 
Peking University, attending talks on the law of the sea and participating in several 
workshops with faculty and their guests from state think-tanks. These curricula and 
scholars consistently delivered the message that international law is a political 
instrument, originally wielded by the West against China, but now increasingly viable as 
a tool of Chinese statecraft. I observed the impact of this pedagogy in discussions with 
several masters and doctoral students at both universities, whose research agendas and 
career trajectories were explicitly determined by the substantive issues and professional 
roles promoted by the CCP. 
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